THE SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE

412-394 B.C.

by

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In the summer of 478 B.C., Sparta abandoned her first attempt at naval empire. Spartans had had no history of naval excellence, but the overwhelming prestige of Sparta's land forces and her place at the head of the Greek alliance against Persia had insured that Spartan admirals were chosen to lead the united Greek fleet during the Persian War. Eurybiades had commanded at Artemision and Salamis; King Leo-tychidas at Mykale.\(^1\)

After the close of the Persian War, Pausanias, the victor at Plataiai and regent for one of the Spartan kings, led the Greek fleet which won over Cyprus and Byzantion.\(^2\) Lasting Spartan domination of Ionia, the Hellespont, and the islands of the Aegean seemed possible, and this may well have been Pausanias' design. But Pausanias combined plans for increasing Spartan power in the Aegean with plans for increasing his own personal power at Sparta, and within a few years he was dead at the hands of the Spartan ephors as a traitor to Sparta and to Greece, his reputation blackened throughout the Greek world by stories of his corruption, arrogance, and medizing behavior.\(^3\) Such propaganda, ranging from the plausible to the absurd, makes it nearly impossible to untangle the details of Pausanias' intentions.

It is clear that Sparta's naval commitment did not survive Pausanias' fall. By 478, the year of Pausanias'
first recall for misconduct, the Greek cities of Asia had already become disenchanted with the severity of Spartan leadership as experienced under Pausanias; when the Spartiate Dorkis arrived as Pausanias' replacement, the allies refused to follow him and turned to Athens instead. Sparta raised no objections at this decision; indeed, many of her leaders probably welcomed it. Sparta had no great experience at sea, and traditionally conservative Spartiates must have viewed a naval hegemony as a foolish and risky venture. More to the point, naval operations along the Asian coast could not be subject to the same political oversight and control as land campaigns in the Peloponnese, and ambitious Spartan admirals might dream of succeeding where Pausanias had failed. It is essentially these reasons for rejection of naval empire which Thucydides ascribes to the Spartans of 478.

Three-quarters of a century later, at the close of the war against Athens, Sparta again came to a watershed decision on naval hegemony. Twenty-seven years of bitter fighting had been required to destroy the Athenian naval empire whose birth Sparta had allowed. This time Sparta accepted the role of thalassocrat, and for the next decade she attempted with varying effort and success to maintain her naval empire in the Aegean. In analyzing the origin, growth, and decline of this "second Spartan naval empire," we must seek to understand why it came into being, and why the "first Spartan naval empire" never existed.
Chapter I: THE SPARTAN HOME FRONT

Sparta is the commonly used modern name of the ancient Greek state of Lakedaimon in the Peloponnese, centered on the city of Sparta--formed from five small villages--and controlling the home territory of Lakonia and the occupied lands of Messenia.

At the top of Spartan society were the Spartiates, descendants of the Dorian conquerors of Lakonia, and the ruling caste of the Spartan state. The land Spartiates held was worked for them by state-owned slaves or serfs called helots, who were required to produce a fixed annual contribution from the crop. The Spartiates themselves did no work (they were prohibited by law), but instead engaged in continual military training and drill. They constituted a warrior caste, and lived as such, eating most of their meals in communal messes and living much of their lives in barracks.¹ The rigorous training process Spartan youths underwent--the agoge--was meant to instill those qualities necessary in a warrior: physical toughness, athletic ability, and mental discipline.²

Among the Spartiates themselves, there seems to have been an important distinction between the homoioi or "equals" and various types of hypomeiones or "inferiors."³ The former term is widely used in describing Spartiates and almost certainly referred to Spartiates in good standing, possessing full citizen rights; it probably reflected their political "equality."
Only *homoioi* could hold political office or (normally) military command, and only they possessed the franchise.\(^4\)

*homoioi* viewed themselves as "equals" in more than just the narrow social or political sense. Although Xenophon emphasizes the Spartan virtue of obedience at length in his *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*,\(^5\) the empirical evidence is quite strong that *homoioi* were remarkably willful and independent-minded when in positions of command. Amompharetos, commanding a Spartan unit at Plataiai, repeatedly refused to withdraw his men from their position facing the Persians despite direct orders from his commander-in-chief Pausanias; he felt disobedience to be much better than what he viewed as "cowardice."\(^6\) In 421 the Peace of Nikias with Athens was badly weakened shortly after it was sworn when the Spartan Klearidas, in control of Amphipolis, refused to turn the city over to the Athenians in compliance with the agreement; despite his direct orders (and the Spartan officials who brought them), he felt that it was "impossible" for him to violate the wishes of the inhabitants by obeying.\(^7\)

To the *homoioi*, "equality" was very closely identified with "autonomy." When Amompharetos became angered at Pausanias' insistence that he retreat, he cast a stone down at the feet of his supreme commander, saying that it represented the pebble with which he voted against retreating;\(^8\) in his mind, political equality implied political independence.

We know much less about the *hypomeiones*. In fact the term is used only once, in Xenophon's *Hellenica* 3.3.6: it seems to be a generic term for all those Spartiates who for
one reason or another lacked full citizen rights; probably
the most important component of this disfranchised group
were fallen homoioi. Of these, some fell from equality
through cowardice on the battlefield or capture by the enemy,
resulting in formal atimia--"dishonor"--and the loss of all
citizen rights for an indefinite period. A few Spartiates
may have been unable to pass the strenuous course of training
of the agoge. But most "inferiors" probably became inferior
from economic causes: under the Lykourgan system, any Spartiate
who failed to provide his contribution of food to the common
mess was disfranchised, and as more and more of Sparta's land
became concentrated into the hands of a few families, greater
and greater numbers of Spartiates fell from homoios to "in-
ferior" status. Henceforth, in accordance with ancient
usage, the term "Spartiate" will be restricted to the homoioi.

The exact number of Spartiates is of course unknown, but
some rough indications exist. According to tradition, some
time in the eighth century, land holdings were redistributed
and each of the 9000 male Spartiates (adults and children) re-
ceived a kleros or lot. Sparitate numbers seem to have de-
clined slightly by 479, at which time there were about 8000,
of whom over 5000 were of military age. By 418, at the
life-or-death struggle at Mantinea, there were only some
2000-3000 full citizens of military age available, and
by the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon in 399, Spartiates
could be said to make up only one percent of the adult male
population. This trend of population decline continued
down to Leuktra in 371, at which time there were fewer than
1000 Spartiates of military age. From the last quarter of the fifth century onward, perhaps 98% of the people living within the Lakedaimonian state were not Spartiates, but others—"inferiors," perioikoi, neodamodeis, and helots.

The perioikoi had been an integral part of the Lakedaimonian state from its foundation; they were allocated a share in the original Lykourgan redistribution of land. As the name implies, the perioikoi were "dwellers around" Sparta, Lakedaimonians who lived in their own small towns spread across Lakonia; they were probably the descendants of those Dorians who had settled in small communities away from the large Dorian centers of Sparta, Argos, and Messene. Although they lacked the full citizen rights of homoioi, perioikoi were fully integrated into the Lakedaimonian army and seem to have been very loyal to the Spartan state. According to tradition, there had been 30,000 male perioikoi at the time of the Lykourgan redistribution, and we have no reason to doubt this.

The neodamodeis or "new citizens" were helots who had been freed for military service. The first mention of this class comes during the Peloponnesian War, when some time around 424 the Spartan promised freedom to the 2000 helots who had done Sparta the best service on the battlefield; but the Spartans soon regretted their decision and came to fear such a large body of potential rebels, for it seems that shortly after granting the helots freedom, the Spartans killed them all in secret.

Despite this inauspicious beginning, Spartan use of
freed helots as hoplite troops soon began in earnest. In 424, 700 neodamodeis were sent with Brasidas on his Thracian expedition; according to Thucydides, the Spartan leaders aimed at reducing the number of strong young helots at Sparta as much as they hoped to provide Brasidas with a viable army without risking Spartiate lives. In any event, the freed helots served so well and so faithfully that upon their return in 421, Sparta gave them land along the border with Elis so that they could serve as a resident frontier garrison. The good behavior of these neodamodeis set the pattern and overcame Sparta's initial reluctance, so that in the years which followed, Sparta began to utilize large numbers of helots and neodamodeis for military purposes, especially in overseas campaigns: Sparta's force sent to Syracuse in 413 consisted of 600 helots and neodamodeis; 300 neodamodeis were sent to Euboia in 413/2; some neodamodeis served at Byzantion; Thibron took 1000 with him to Asia in 401/0, and Agesilaos brought 2000 more a few years later. The reason for such widespread use of freedmen--at times neodamodeis must have far outnumbered Spartiates and perioikoi in the army--is obvious: there were simply too few Spartiates, while perioikoi and Spartan allies were unwilling to serve far from home for long periods. The choice was between freed helots and mercenaries, and both were widely used. As far as we can tell, neodamodeis were thoroughly loyal.

Helots also seem to have been freed or granted partial freedom in return for performing other services to the Spartan state: desposionautai probably served as petty officers over
the mass of helot oarsmen who rowed Spartan ships; erukteres may have been the Spartan police force; the aphetai and the adespotai performed obscure roles, perhaps as domestics or state servants.27

At the bottom of the Spartan social pyramid were the helots proper, state-owned slave-serfs bound to the land, and required to contribute a fixed portion of each year's crop to their master, the Spartiate who owned the land they tilled. Helots possessed no rights whatsoever, and could be killed with impunity by any Spartiate at will.28 Most Lakonian helots were perhaps the descendants of the pre-Dorian inhabitants of the Peloponnese;29 the helots of Messenia were the Dorian Messenians, enslaved by the kindred Spartans after two long wars in the eighth and seventh centuries.30 While the Lakonian helots seem to have been surprisingly loyal to their Spartan masters,31 the enslaved Messenians longed for freedom and rebelled on a number of occasions, including an uprising of some years in the middle of the fifth century.32 The helot population (Lakonian and Messenian) probably made up the great majority of those living in Lakedaimonia.

Sparta's military system was strongly influenced by the characteristics of Spartan society, especially the overwhelming ratio of slaves to full citizens. As mentioned above, Spartiates had the freedom from manual labor to be able to devote all their time and effort to military training, becoming truly professional hoplite troops unequaled anywhere else in Greece.33 The outstanding performance of Spartiate contin-
gents at all the major battles of the fifth century—Thermopylae, Plataiai, Tanagra, Mantinea—often overcoming extreme numerical odds to win victory, shows the value of this training.

Sparta's extreme military caution and conservatism stemmed from this same cause, the small number of Spartiates and the enormous number of helots. During peacetime it was difficult enough for a few thousand Spartiate warriors to keep several hundred thousand helots enslaved, and Spartan society seems completely designed around this one vital task; it is likely that the military preoccupation of Spartiates began for this same reason, the continual danger of a helot rising.

In times of war, these difficulties were greatly multiplied. Fear of a helot revolt seems to have been a major factor in Sparta's remarkable reluctance to enter into major wars or lengthy military commitments. Sparta under King Kleomenes—a man not noted for his great caution or lack of daring—refused to undertake a long-term commitment to protect the independence of Plataiai or to aid the Ionian revolt in 499. Sparta willingly relinquished the naval hegemony to Athens in 478, and for several decades did nothing to support the revolts of Athens' rebellious subject allies, vague promises to the Thasians notwithstanding. It was the united call for war by Sparta's leading allies, backed by the threat that they might not long remain allies if Sparta did nothing to support them against Athens, which finally persuaded the Spartans to enter the Peloponnesian War in 431; and even at this juncture, King Archidamos opposed the decision. After just a few years of war, Spartan leaders were already looking
to a negotiated settlement, and from the time of the first major set-back, attempted to make peace.

Spartan campaigning reflects an extreme effort to never sacrifice Spartiate lives unless absolutely necessary. Lake-daimonian troops were very seldom sent on expeditions to areas far from the Peloponnese; the 300 Spartiates at Thermopylai is about the only major exception. Brasidas' force which captured Amphipolis in 421 was made up of freed helots and mercenaries, with Brasidas himself the only Spartiate; the Asia Minor expeditionary forces of Thibron and Agesilaos had this same composition.

Even during campaigns close to home, most Spartan commanders of the fifth century or later avoided battle whenever possible. King Agis refused to join battle with the Argives outside Argos in 418 despite overwhelming superiority in strength; he retreated before the battle of Mantineia in the same year; in 400 he used the excuse of an earthquake to end a campaign against Elis which had barely begun; the next year he refused to risk casualties by storming Elis, despite the fact that it was unwalled. Nor was Agis' caution exceptional among Spartan commanders. When King Pleistoanax invaded Attica in 445, he returned to the Peloponnese without risking a battle after advancing no further than Elis. In 403, King Pausanias arranged a generous settlement with the Athenian democrats after fighting a sharp skirmish in which a few Spartiates were killed.

It is important to realize that in all the examples of military caution adduced above, it is the Spartan commander
rather than the Spartan troops who judges safety to be the better part of valor and avoids battle; in fact we are told that these decisions to avoid battle were generally very unpopular, and we know of kings who were severely punished for their caution by an enraged citizen body. The truth seems to be that ordinary Spartiates--men raised from infancy to eschew rational thought for fighting skill and the glories of battlefield death--simply could not understand that Sparta's best interests might be served by minimizing casualties; Sparta's leaders were thinking men, and often paid a heavy price for their patriotic caution.

The logical basis for this caution was the small number of Spartiates. A few score dead in a skirmish cost Sparta 5-10% of the total number of her full citizens by the end of the fifth century. This grim truth even shows up in the balance sheet of the battle of Mantinea in 418: 1100 enemies died and only 300 Lakedaimonians, of whom (perhaps) half were Spartiates; Mantinea was an overwhelming victory, yet even so over 5% of Sparta's total citizenry perished. The 120 Spartiates captured by Athens after Pylos became Athens' strongest bargaining chip in the peace negotiations, clearly worth more to Sparta than captured cities, fleets of ships, the interests of her major allies, or even the war effort itself; the men had only surrendered themselves after Sparta refused to order them to fight to the death after being surrounded, and had instead given them face-saving instructions aimed at saving their lives. Years later in 371, the Spartan defeat at Leuktra killed only 400 Spartiates, but this was close
to half of Sparta's total citizen body by that time, and Sparta's power was broken forever. Sparta's earlier leaders had had good reason to avoid heavy casualties.

As we have seen above, the number of full Spartan citizens was small, so small that by any standards Sparta was an oligarchy. But within this ruling elite of Spartiates, the Spartan political system was a peculiar blend of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—the ideal blend according to Plato, Xenophon, and many other contemporary Greeks.

The Spartan kingship was dual: one Spartan king came from the Agiad house, the other from the Eurypontid. Although the kings possessed great social prestige and certain archaic and peculiar privileges—they were served double portions of food at the communal mess—by classical times, their intrinsic political power was almost nil. A strong king might use the auctoritas of his position, the continuity of his tenure, and his right to supreme command of an army in the field as tools to slowly build up his influence and power. Some kings became de facto rulers of Sparta. But for every Agesilaos who succeeded in this, there were many other kings who failed, or never attempted to dominate Sparta politically. And a surprising number of kings were severely punished by the ephors for real or perceived offenses: in the fifth century, three of the five reigning Agiad kings, along with Pausanias, an Agiad regent, were deposed or executed for misconduct; the same fate befell two of the four Eurypontids of this period.
those kings escaping exile or death were made to pay severely for their mistakes; after a military blunder, King Agis was threatened with an enormous fine and the demolition of his house; when he begged for a second chance, he was assigned ten Spartiates as military advisors without whose permission he could take no action.\textsuperscript{53}

Aristotle styles Sparta's kings as nothing more than hereditary high priests and war leaders, and this is all they would have appeared as on any paper chart showing the political organization of the Spartan state; but as historians, we must concern ourselves with political realities rather than theoretical constructs, and the continuity of a Spartan king's power base gave him a good deal of influence over long-term policy. Even in immediate matters, a Spartan king by virtue of his status and experience had an important say on all decisions; as king, he might often succeed in winning over to his side the thousand-odd ignorant and unsophisticated Spartiates who made up the Assembly or the five ignorant and unsophisticated Spartiates who happened to be ephors that year. But a king's influence should not be over-estimated; powerful and popular King Archidamos failed in his effort to dissuade the Spartans from entering the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{54}

The main reason the Spartan kings possessed the real power they did was the peculiar nature of the Spartan governmental system. In theory, the ephors were the rulers of the state. Chosen each year from the entire body of Spartiates,\textsuperscript{55} the board of five ephors had the authority to fine or imprison a king or any other magistrate at will,\textsuperscript{56} and it was
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their influence. Both kings held seats on the gerousia, whose 28 other members were elected for life from those Spartiates over 60 years old by voice-vote of the citizen body; the Assembly consisted of all adult Spartiates. A highly-regarded king might lobby members of the gerousia into supporting his policies, or sway the men of the Assembly by his speech.

The exact nature of the law-making process is unclear because of the scant surviving evidence, and has been the subject of much recent discussion. It is clear that the process was multi-staged, with the approval of both the Assembly and the gerousia required: the gerousia seems to have framed the issue, put it to the Assembly for approval and possible amendment, then decided whether to approve the version which came out of the Assembly. Declaration of war seems to have been handled by this same procedure; presumably treaties were ratified in this same way. Besides its legislative role, the gerousia also functioned as a high court, judging all capital cases, though in trials of a king, the ephors were also included as judges.
Chapter II: THE PERSIAN PERSPECTIVE

In the second half of the sixth century, the major civilizations of the ancient Near East were conquered and politically unified by a relatively young Indo-European people, the Persians, led by their king, Cyrus II. For the next several centuries, the Persian empire which Cyrus had created played a very significant role in shaping the course of Greek history and in molding the political attitudes of individual Greeks. Persia was at times the overwhelming menace to Greek freedom; at times, the powerful potential ally to Greek cities at war with each other; and at times, the tempting military prize in the rhetoric of panhellenic Greek orators and statesmen.

All of this is true, but misleading. Such a view of Persia is the consequence of falling into the mental framework of our Greek historical sources, who naturally enough viewed Persia from the purely Greek perspective. But to reduce the Persian empire to a stock character on the Greek political stage--on a par with Athens or Elis--hides the fact that Persia was not Greece and that the Persians were not Greeks. The political behavior of the Great King and the Persian empire which he ruled can only be well understood in the context of the Persian culture in which it was rooted.

Much of this culture becomes apparent in the Persian view of kingship. An idealized Persian ruler was not a "hero-king"
as in the Greek homeric tradition or an Egyptian "God-king," but had a royal nature closer to that of a "lawgiver-king" or a "judge-king" (as in the Old Testament sense, based as it is upon a people of a similar culture). This is seen if we consider some of the characteristics viewed as essential to a king:1

Saith Darius the King: By the favor of Ahuramazda I am of such a sort that I am a friend to right, I am not a friend to wrong. It is not my desire that the weak man should have wrong done to him by the mighty; nor is that my desire, that the mighty man should have wrong done to him by the weak.

What is right, that is my desire. I am not a friend to the man who is a Lie-follower. I am not hot-tempered. What things develop in my anger, I hold firmly under control by my thinking power. I am firmly ruling over my own (impulses).

The man who cooperates, him according to his co-operative action, him thus do I reward. Who does harm, him according to the damage thus I punish. It is not my desire that a man should do harm; nor indeed is that my desire, if he should do harm, he should not be punished.

What a man says against a man, that does not convince me, until he satisfies the Ordinance of Good Regulations.

The King does not embody the law or transcend good and evil, but is bound by the same standards of justice and truth as the lowliest peasant, and is indeed charged with enforcing Value The role of the King is one of divinely-appointed judge of men and champion of good and truth against "the Lie:"2

Saith Darius the King: Much which was ill-done, that I made good. Provinces were in commotion; one man was smiting the other. The following I brought about by the favor of Ahuramazda, that the one does not smite the other at all, each one is in his place. My law--of that they feel fear, so that the stronger does not smite nor destroy the weak.

As we see above in these passages, the Great King is the Great King merely at the sufferance of Ahuramazda, the nearly all-powerful god who has made him King, bestowed wisdom upon him, and maintains and protects him, and through him, the
A great god is Ahuramazda, who created this earth, who created yonder sky, who created man, who created happiness for man, who made Darius king, one king of many, one lord of many.

A great god is Ahuramazda, who created this excellent work which is seen, who created happiness for man, who bestowed wisdom and activity upon Darius the King.

Hauntingly beautiful praise of Ahuramazda, akin to that of the Book of Psalms in the Old Testament.

As we see, the Great King is King by grace of God, not Man: we do not find Darius claiming the kingship by virtue of his abilities or achievements, except insofar as they are due to the favor of Ahuramazda. This is directly contrary to the essentially secular nature of the Greek weltanschauung, and the contrast is evident in Herodotus' stories of Darius and the other Persian kings. Herodotus says that Darius received the throne because his horse neighed (with the aid of a stratagem) before the horses of the other conspirators against the Magus; this is a typically Greek tale, and fits as well into Persian political history as an empire-wide election based on universal suffrage.

The difficulty seems to be that there was an unbridgable gap between Greek and Persian notions of religion, which left the Greeks unsuccessfully attempting to describe alien ideas in terms of their own. Greeks were devout, but were filled with a different, more "secular" attitude. Greek religion was essentially "practical superstition" rather than "transcendent metaphysics." A Greek kept his oaths because he knew perfectly well that the gods punished oath-breakers; it was a practical decision. The idea that lies or deceit ("the Lie") constituted
absolute evil in and of themselves was alien, and Herodotus comments on the Persians being peculiar in their rigid adherence to the truth; he treats this as merely another strange foreign custom (like eating ants) and never even connects it to Persian religion.

Most Greek ritual acts sprang from very mundane motives: one visited an oracle to settle a dispute or find out about the future; one sacrificed an animal to learn whether or not victory was likely in a battle; one expiated a curse in order to get a better harvest or to end a plague. Gods were not so far above men that they could not be understood or dealt with. Even popular views on ethics and morality were practical-minded: a good man was one who helped his friends and punished his enemies; no deep philosophy involved.

Persian religion seems very much concerned with "absolutes" than with practical matters, and considering its modern distant cousins among the Judeo-Christian religions, this should not surprise us. In Greece, Socrates disturbed the minds of many Athenians by asking such questions as: "Do the Gods do what is good because it is good, or is it considered good because the Gods do it?" The same question (rephrased in terms of Ahuramazda) asked of Darius likely would have been as meaningless as: "Is darkness dark because it is dark, or is the dark considered dark because it is found in darkness?" An unthinkingly devout modern Jew or Moslem would probably have the same reaction. We can say with absolute certainty that Darius' Ahuramazda was not a god of the type which seduced Greek maidens or quarrelled with his wife while relaxing in his home on Mount Olympus.
The inscriptions we have quoted above probably give us an accurate impression of the essence of Persian religion—the mighty god Ahuramazda, abhorrence toward "the Lie" and love of truth and justice—but they are all taken from only one period and the reign of only one man, Darius I; as such, they represent a slice in time of a system of beliefs which seems to have evolved considerably over the two centuries of Persian rule.\(^1\)

With regard to the relation between Persian religion and the other religions of the Near East our general evidence is rather meager, but one fact is clear: the Persian empire allowed religious freedom among its component peoples. The great size and diversity of the empire made this almost inevitable. Cyrus I seems to have captured Babylon aided by the passive support of discontented local priests (who had been angered by the contrary religious views of Nabu-Naid, the Babylonian ruler),\(^2\) and he apparently took this lesson to heart: although he himself presumably worshipped Ahuramazda,\(^3\) he treated the Babylonian gods with the proper awe and reverence.\(^4\) Cyrus adopted this same policy with regard to the gods of the Elamites, Assyrians, and Jews.\(^5\) As far as we can tell, he seems to have established complete religious tolerance for the various national gods, winning over the important priestly classes by this; hence he avoided the endemic local unrest and hostility which would doom an over-extended political empire. This policy was generally continued by his successors.

From the political perspective, the single most significant feature of the Persian empire was its truly enormous size: from Ephesos on the Ionian coast, it stretched over 1700 miles by
to Susa, and from there a somewhat greater distance to the Indian provinces in the east, making it one of the largest land empires which ever existed in the world prior to the development of modern communications and transport.

The importance of communications and transport to a large empire cannot be overemphasized. The Persians clearly recognized this, and one of their greatest achievements was the construction of a series of "royal roads" and messenger networks linking the heart of the empire with the outlying provinces. Our Greek sources speak with awe of the road from Sardis to Susa: close to 1700 miles long, with 111 way stations along the route—a three months' journey for a traveler.16

Along each of these roads, royal messengers were stationed at intervals equal to the distance they could ride in a day at top speed; by having a message relayed along the road from courier to courier, the Persians achieved the fastest rate of land communication possible in ancient times.17 Even so, the vast distances to be crossed meant that it would have taken several weeks for any word of what was happening at the frontiers of the empire to reach the Great King at Susa or Persepolis, and an equal time for even the most hasty and urgent of royal replies to be returned;18 the leisurely pace of oriental courts would have multiplied this time considerably for ordinary messages. Transporting a major military force the length of the empire would have taken most of a full campaigning season.19

Under such physical constraints, a highly-centralized or tightly-run empire was simply an impossibility. Moreover, Persia was not a national state in the Macedonian or Egyptian sense; instead, the Persian Great King was quite literally a
"King of countries," ruling as he did over a vast number of totally dissimilar subject peoples, each with its own language, its own customs, and its own traditions.

Even politically, the Persian empire was not the single solid patch of bright green or red which it appears as on modern maps. Persian kings made no attempt to subjugate the fierce and impoverished hill tribes of the interior; we find the unconquered Carduchi within a few days' march of Persia's richest Mesopotamian lands, and the Uxians in the hills overlooking the Susa-Persepolis road, demanding tribute every time the Great King wished to travel between his capitals.20

Those portions of the empire's territory which did recognize the authority of the Great King were ruled indirectly. The Persian empire was composed of a varying number of kingdom-sized political units, most centered on a particular nationality and each ruled by a vassal of the Great King. According to our Greek sources, some of these provinces--such as Cilicia and Paphlagonia--were independent kingdoms and their rulers vassal kings, while the rest were more closely bound to Persia, each being ruled by a royal governor called a satrap (Persian Khshathrapavan or "Protector of the Kingdom");21 but this distinction may be an artificial construct, and it was anyway more theoretical than real.22

From our literary sources it seems that the degree of control the Great King exercised over his satrapies varied considerably from region to region and from era to era, the methods he employed to maintain this control did not. In the Cyropaedia Xenophon tells us that from the establishment of the satrapal system (which he anachronistically ascribes to Cyrus rather than...
to Darius) down to his own day—the first half of the 4th century—key garrisons in all the satrapies had remained under the direct authority of the Great King in order to serve as a check upon satrapal independence;23 all the evidence we have supports this.24 Herodotus and Xenophon also speak of the "King's Ears" and "Eye" (or "Eyes"), apparently royal spies or inspectors of some sort, charged with the task of monitoring the activities of satraps.25

It is virtually impossible for us to learn the degree of independence exercised by most satraps. Our only detailed and circumstantial evidence concerning the position of satraps is based entirely upon our Greek sources, yet with few exceptions these sources touch only upon the activities of Asia Minor satraps, principally those of Lydia(Sardis) and Hellespontine Phrygia(Daskyleion). Aside from glimpses, we know absolutely nothing of what went on in the Eastern provinces of the empire for the two centuries of Persian rule.

Our evidence concerning the Asia Minor satrapies should not necessarily be generalized to the Persian empire as a whole. Communication distance alone would ensure that the King's hold in this region would be weaker than his grip on the heartland of his empire; and there are other factors which tended to make the Asia Minor satrapies somewhat anomalous. Excellent Greek mercenaries were easily available in the Aegean area; we have evidence of their use going back to the middle of the 5th century.26 There were also the powerful states of Greece itself, some of which could and often did support a rebellious satrap.27

Asia Minor may be a special case, but in analyzing Persia's relations with Greece it happens to be the special case we are most interested in, and the evidence based upon our Greek sources is very useful. The impression our evidence generates of satrapal
independence is quite remarkable. As early as the middle of the 5t
century, the satrap Pissouthnes of Sardis seems to wage a "cold war
against the Athenian empire, supporting the Samian revolt and
holding Athenians hostage;28 he appears to be acting on his own
v̇olition, though it may be that the Great King deliberately turned
a blind eye to his activities. By the end of the century, satraps
and other officials of the Great King in Asia Minor commonly co-
operated with invading armies against neighboring satraps, and
apparently at times even went to war with each other.29 All of this
seems to have been done more or less openly, and Xenophon(who must
have been in a position to know) believed that the Great King did
not much care what his outlying satraps did so long as they
regularly sent him the appropriate tribute and did not threaten
his own position.30 The reins of the Great King seem loose indeed.

When reins are loose, the nature of the horses becomes of
greater importance than the nature of the driver, and at this
point it is worthwhile to say something of those portions of the
Persian empire which directly abutted the Greek world.

Hellespontine Phrygia--called "People by the Sea" by the
Persians--was a large satrapy covering (in theory) most of the
northern third of western Asia Minor, with its satrapal capital
at Daskyleion, just south of the Hellespont. By 412 Pharnabazos
was a satrap, a man whose great-grandfather Artabazos(of royal
blood) and father Pharmakes had ruled the satrapy in succession
before him from the time of the against the European Greeks.31 To
say that we know Pharnabazos' personality is foolish, but we
can state that he struck the Greeks(or at least our Greek sources)
as a very honorable and courageous man; he was a rather hellenized
Persian, which should not surprise us since his family had ruled a province containing Greek cities and in close proximity to Greece for four generations.\textsuperscript{32}

Sardis, the other major satrapy of the west, comprised more or less the area of the vanished kingdom of Lydia. Its satrap seems often to have ruled the smaller southern satrapy of Caria as well,\textsuperscript{33} and generally to have held in title the coastal satrapy of Ionia (many of whose cities were de facto controlled by Athens for most of the fifth century);\textsuperscript{34} during the fifth century, the satrap of Sardis thus held claim to most of the southern two-thirds of western Asia Minor. Lydia had once been a rich kingdom, and it seems that the strength of the satrapy of Sardis often tempted its holder with dreams of independence. In contrast with the orderly succession at Daskyleion, we find a checkered pattern at Sardis: independence-minded Oroites was murdered through stealth by Darius I in the late sixth century; Pissouthnes led a rebellion around 418; the next satrap, Tissaphernes, was murdered at royal command in 396.\textsuperscript{35} The long gaps in our knowledge may hide further examples.

Neither of the two western satraps was in firm control of all his nominal holdings. Many tribal peoples of the interior--Mysians, Pisidians, Lykaonians, Paphlagonians, Bithynian Thracians--were independent or autonomous to a greater or lesser extent, and quieting them often occupied much of a satrap's time and effort.\textsuperscript{36} During most of the fifth century, many of the Greek cities of the Aegean coast--those part of Hellephantine Phrygia and those making up the "satrapy" of Ionia, attached to Sardis--were members of the Athenian empire and free from Persian rule; however the Great King never theoret-
ically acknowledged their loss and merely ceased to request their tribute money from his western satraps; this presumably being the arrangement worked out in the Peace of Kallias sworn with Athens.  

The likely attitude of the Persian monarchs toward Greece and the Greeks is rather sobering to unthinking philhellenes. In contrast to the ancient Greek view (and its common popularization) which sees the free city-states of Greece as the defenders of civilization, protecting themselves against the "savage" barbarian hordes of Asia, the Persian perspective produces an inverse image: it is the Greeks who are the warlike barbarians hammering at the gates of an empire which embraces and protects the ancient civilizations of the Near East.  

To a fifth-century Great King at Susa, Greece must have seemed a distant and peculiar land, of little more intrinsic significance (except perhaps for the amount of trouble it caused) than any of the other outlying border regions. Greek culture was completely alien and hence unattractive; Greeks devoted the greater part of their lives to fighting one another for miserable patches of poor soil, in contrast to the peaceful and "civilized" peoples of Mesopotamia; Greece had no wealth and no political unity, being merely a step above the tribal stage of organization in the mind of a King of Kings. A comparison with Rome and the German tribes is very illuminating (as long as it is not taken to extremes); a German Herodotus of the early first century A.D. (admittedly an impossibility) would have given the impression that the main ambition of the subjugation despotic rulers of Rome was the subjugation of the free Germanic peoples. Just as in the Roman paradigm, the main impact of Greece upon Persia and the attention of a Persian Great King was in the
military sphere; nonetheless Greece was very important in this regard. The Persian empire had been founded from the saddles of the superb Persian and Median cavalry, probably the best in the world during this period. Infantry seems to have held low esteem in Persia, as might be expected from the "feudal" nature of the economy and the land tenure system. It is likely that the Royal Guard--the Ten Thousand Immortals described by Herodotus--was the only well-trained and equipped body of foot soldiers; the remainder of the infantry was probably Asiatic peasant levy, undoubtedly without training or armor, and likely to melt away in the heat of battle if it were used at all.

Like the Persian navy, the grand army of the Persian empire was merely the sum of the various contingents of the nationalities making up the empire, each led by its chieftain or king, and serving under the command of the appropriate satrap. Except for the nomadic peoples (who relied entirely upon cavalry), the various nations of Asia seem to have had military systems essentially similar to that of the Persians.

Persian military organization had been admirably adapted to the conquest of neighboring kingdoms based upon the same system or for the domination of nomadic tribes of horsemen, but it was hard put to hold its own against Greek armies. The rugged terrain and poor soil of Greece was unsuited for the growth of large personal estates or for heavy reliance upon cavalry; Greek armies were built around hoplite tactics, the use of dense formations of heavily armored and well-trained yeoman citizen-soldiers, who relied upon long spears and contact fighting for victory. Thermopylae proved that disciplined hoplite troops in close ranks
on favorable terrain could defeat any number of frontally-attacking cavalry or Asiatic infantry. The subsequent victories of Plataiai and Mykale signaled the passing of Persian military supremacy, as Greek hoplite armies destroyed much larger Persian armies on open terrain.

But though the Greeks fought well, they had little wealth, and Great Kings and satraps soon came to the conclusion that their wisest policy was to hire Greeks to do much of their fighting for them, either individually as mercenaries or collectively as "bought" or allied and subsidized city-states; we again note the resemblance to Rome's German policy during the Empire.

There is substantial evidence for the use of Greek mercenary contingents by western satraps as early as the middle of the 5th century, and this likely played a crucial role in satrapal dreams of rebellion. A Greek mercenary bodyguard gave satraps the support of men who were loyal to them alone rather than men with loyalties divided between satrap and Great King; independence-minded Oroites could have used such men in the 6th century, for despite his strong military position, a personal message from the Great King convinced the men of his Persian bodyguard to execute him. When a later Great King tried to do away with Tissaphernes, his agent first had to lure the satrap away from his bodyguard of 300 Greek mercenaries by a clever stratagem. Even more significantly, as Greek hoplites became more important militarily and cavalry less so, the Iranian cavalry ceased to be the Great King's irresistible trump, and the success or failure of a revolt came to depend upon which side could obtain the larger
number of Greek mercenaries.

The Great King seems to have realized that gold was his strongest weapon against Greek arms as early as 460 if we credit our sources: we are told that he sent Megabazos to Greece around this time to "buy" a Spartan attack against Athens, hoping that this would force the Athenians to end their massive intervention in Egypt. In the early 4th century, 10,000 golden "archers" were distributed to the leading anti-Spartan politicians of several large Greek cities; these did their part in stirring up an anti-Spartan coalition and driving the Spartans out of Asia.
Chapter III:

THE IONIAN WAR AND THE RISE OF THE SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE

When Sparta and her allies went to war with Athens in 431, the expected stalemate of land power against sea power quickly developed. Despite foolish Spartan dreams of obtaining 500 ships (!) from friendly Greek cities in the West or of hiring away Athens' experienced mercenary seamen by offering better pay, the truth was that Sparta had few ships and almost no money.

While Spartan hoplite troops were the best in the world--the nucleus of the unmatched land army of the Peloponnesians--success in naval warfare was largely a function of financial resources: a trireme cost about one talent to build, and pay for the 200 sailors on a ship ranged from three to six obols per man per day, or one-half to one talent per ship per month. Only a state with a huge financial base could hope to maintain a fleet of 100 or more triremes for any length of time, and while Athens could draw on the yearly tribute of over 100 subjects and had a large reserve fund, Sparta had no significant financial resources whatsoever.

Sparta's Peloponnesian allies were in much the same position. Only Korinth had a fine naval tradition and adequate resources, but she was no match for the Athenian empire in either category; furthermore, she suffered a precipitous decline in strength during the early years of the war as the Athenian naval blockade apparently took its toll on her commercial relations.
The Peloponnesians recognized their naval weakness, and only a handful of rather cautious and limited naval efforts were made during the early years of the war against Athens. When in 425 the entire Peloponnesian fleet of 60 ships (without their crews) was seized by the Athenians following a truce, it seems not to have been rebuilt; between 425 and 414 we find not a single reference to Peloponnesian naval forces. The sea had been wholly abandoned to Athens.

It was the Athenians themselves who caused the end of Athens' absolute naval supremacy. In 415, Athens took advantage of the Peace of Nikias made with Sparta a few years earlier to dispatch an enormous military expedition to Syracuse in an astonishingly bold (and foolish) attempt to subjugate all Sicily. The result was utter disaster, and as the entire total of the Athenian expeditionary force together with major reinforcements--over 200 ships and crews plus 3400 Athenian hoplites--was annihilated in Sicily, the Spartans re-entered the war against Athens.

The sheer magnitude of the Athenian losses--perhaps two-thirds of Athens' naval strength and a third of her land army--created a widespread feeling throughout the Aegean that Athens was doomed, and this encouraged additional parties to enter the field against her. Many major Athenian subject allies such as Chios, Mitylene, Erythrai, and Euboia either revolted or moved toward revolt. Even more significantly, Pharmabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia, independently sent representatives to the
Spartans to promise cooperation against Athens, along with generous subsidies.15

The intervention of Persia must be placed in context. Throughout the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans had made some effort to gain Persian support, since only Persia could supply the cash which Sparta desperately required in order to wage effective naval warfare. We find a joint Peloponnesian embassy dispatched to Persia in 430, and many other diplomatic missions had been sent by 425.16 The results of these efforts were nil. The Persians had far too much respect for the strength of Athens to risk a war, and in any event the political scruples of the Spartans--men raised on the *mythos* of Thermopylae and Plataiai--toward the notion of Greek liberty seem to have kept the Spartan offers to the Great King so ambiguous and ungenerous that the Persians saw little to gain from a Spartan victory.17 There is substantial evidence that Darius II renewed Persia's standing peace treaty with Athens, perhaps in 424/3, shortly after he had come to the throne.18

The aftermath of Sicily changed all this, and we are told that it was the Great King himself who took the initiative in pressuring his satraps to actively support Sparta against Athens.19 By this time, the peace treaty had become a dead letter; Athens had broken it some time around 414 by supporting the revolt of Amorges, who had continued (or rekindled?) the earlier revolt of his natural father Pissouthnes, late satrap of Sardis.20

With the entrance of Persia into the war, a very complex
and multipartite struggle began along the waters and coastal areas of the eastern Aegean—the "Ionian" pase of the Peloponnesian War—lasting from 412 until Athens' final defeat at Aigospotami in 405. Several distinct parties were involved: the Athenians, attempting to maintain their surviving imperial control over the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands, and to safeguard Athens' lifeline of grain from the Black Sea area; the Spartans and their allies, doing their best to destroy the remaining Athenian navy and force Athens into surrender; the Persians, supporting the Spartans against the Athenians in hopes of recovering the Asian Greek cities, once part of the Persian empire, but since 478 under Athenian sway; and the Greek cities of the region themselves, some such as Miletos or Chios under governments strongly anti-Athenian, others such as Samos under governments staunchly loyal to Athens, but most—as far as we can tell from the evidence—mere onlookers, seeking to avoid being trampled by the giants struggling all about them.21

Even this muddled picture of three major participants and a host of (more or less) neutrals is far more straightforward than the true state of affairs; neither Athens nor Sparta nor Persia had a unified policy or leadership. At Athens, the disaster in Sicily and the beginnings of Persian intervention had led to a general loss of faith in the efficacy of democracy, and oligarchic elements used this opportunity to seize power in the winter of 412/11; for much of the following year, the pro-oligarchic forces based at Athens were more or less in a state of war with the main fleet, based at Samos, which had remained loyal to democracy.22 Even after popular government was restored at Athens in 411, there seems to remain a
severe lack of coordination and trust between the home city and her commanders in the field; we commonly find generals replaced for political reasons, or even executed.23

Sparta's difficulties were of a slightly different nature. From 413 to the end of the war, King Agis remained summer and winter at Dekeleia, a fortified base he had established in Attica, from which he continuously ravaged Athenian holdings and encouraged slaves to desert. Dekeleia was a great success--decisive in the decline of Athenian strength--24 but to a certain extent it cut both ways, for it allowed Agis to set up what amounted to a second Spartan government, one entirely under his personal control.25 The result was fragmentation of the Spartan war effort, especially during the first few years of the Ionian War, as Agis and his political rivals back home at Sparta independently prepared military thrusts against Athens, each hoping to gain sole credit for the expected victory in the war.26

Persian rivalries mirrored those within Sparta; Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes each hoped that he would be the won to win the lion's share of the Great King's gratitude for regaining the Greek cities of Asia; hence neither supported the other, and each tried to convince the Spartans to make his satrapy the primary area of operations against the Athenians.27

Given this image of fragmentation on all sides, it is often stated that it was only the disorganization of Athens' enemies which allowed her to survive the year 412. To a certain extent this is true, but if we focus our attention on
the simple question of raw naval power, we find that Athens' strength was not at all incommensurate with that of her foes. In Sicily she had suffered a loss unmatched by that of any other Greek city-state in history, but even the remnant of Athenian might was very powerful indeed; in 412 she had perhaps more than 100 ships available in need, and rather more than 1000 talents in cash. Against this, Sparta and her allies seem to have had only sixteen ships available before winter 413/12--those had fought in the Syracusan campaign and were still in Sicily-- and while during the winter we find Sparta ordering her allies to construct 100 ships, this is reminiscent of that earlier directive demanding 500 ships, and from the external evidence it seems that at most only 40 or 50 triremes were completed and crewed by the end of summer 412. Chios added 30-40 ships to this total, and 20-35 Sicilian triremes arrived in late summer 412. The veteran crews Athens possessed remained far superior to the inexperienced Peloponnesian sailors for several years.

The pattern of Athenian weakness masked by even greater Peloponnesian weakness was doubtless repeated in finances; the military calamities of Athens would not have put cash into bankrupt Peloponnesian treasuries, and for the first few years of the Ionian War, the subsidies of Persian satraps were probably measured not in hundreds but in scores of talents.

The precise details of the Ionian War need not concern us, except insofar as they touch upon the two matters most crucial to an understanding of the Spartan naval empire: Sparta's relations with Persia and Sparta's policy with regard to the
Asian Greeks. The course of the Ionian war had much influence on the evolution of both these political issues, and they in turn determined the nature of the Spartan naval hegemony which emerged in 404.

The first hard decision the Spartan government was forced to make came in 413/12, when it was faced with the choice of either sending its newly-built ships to assist the revolt of Chios and the other cities of the Ionian region as Tissaphernes requested, or to the Hellespont to support Pharnabazos.37 The strength and importance of Chios seems to have decided the issue, and in spring 412, the first tentative naval forces were sent out: 21 ships under the Spartiate Alkamenes were detected by the Athenians and bottled up in Korinthian territory,38 but five Lakedaimonian ships under Chalkideus succeeded in making their way to Ionia, where they supported the revolt of the Chians; revolts of the nearby Erythraians and Klazomenaians soon followed.39

In all of these cities, the revolts which occurred were most strongly supported by the oligarchic elements of the population, the wealthier and more powerful of the citizens; the exact attitude of the popular elements is unclear, though at Chios, Thucydides implies that they were somewhat hostile to the notion of revolt. Support for whichever outside power seemed stronger at the moment was also a major factor.40

Soon after bringing about the revolt of Miletos, Chalkideus negotiated the first of what proved to be several treaties between the Spartans and the Great King, as represented by Tissaphernes.41 This first treaty formalized a Persian-Spartan alliance, and conceded the Greeks of Asia to the Great King.
These terms may seem significant as evidence for Spartan intentions, but this impression is rather misleading; a close inspection makes it seem likely that the treaty is nothing more than the on-the-spot creation of Chalkideus, and hence gives us little insight into the policy of the Spartan government concerning Persia and the freedom of the Asian Greeks.

The very haphazard nature of the pact is shown by its other features: the treaty grants the Great King most of European Greece along with the Asian cities; it makes no reference to Persian financial support for Sparta; and it binds only the current Great King, Darius II, allowing any successor to violate the agreement freely. These miserable terms for Sparta make it clear that no Spartan diplomat had been present at the negotiations, and quite likely that Chalkideus had been the sole Spartan author. Chalkideus obviously knew nothing of diplomacy, and as a Spartiate commander he would have been too proud to devolve any of his negotiating responsibility upon any of the other Greeks under his command; it may also be that he was trying to hide the fact that he was promising to return all the Greek cities of Asia to Persian rule—how would the Chians have reacted to this? This seems the only way to explain the treaty's terms.

Not long after these events, the Spartan nauarch Astyochos crossed the Aegean with four ships and arrived at Chios. This episode serves to illustrate the lack of Peloponnesian confidence in the sea and in naval matters at this point in time, for Astyochos left 16 of his ships behind in Korinthian territory; Chalkideus' earlier crossing of the Aegean
with five ships had been made only at the continual urgings of his friend Alkibiades, the daring Athenian exile, who knew perfectly well that Spartan caution was one of the chief obstacles to victory. Only near the end of summer, after these initial probes have proven strikingly successful, do the Spartans consider sending their main fleet--55 Peloponnesian and Sicilian ships--to Ionia. At this same time, the Spartans sent out their first harmost of the Ionian War, Pedaritos, who was given charge of the Peloponnesian forces at Chios.

This last institution deserves some mention. The small number of Spartiates--probably fewer than 2000 at this time--made it impractical (and far too risky) for any sizable number to be sent overseas for any reason. Despite this, Sparta's position at the head of the anti-Athenian alliance along with the high military prestige of Spartiate warriors allowed Sparta to make the presence of her citizens felt: only a handful of Spartiates might be sent out, but each was sent as a commander or a potential commander. A single Spartiate, Brasidas, leading a force of mercenaries and neodamodeis had nearly ended Athenian control of the Thraceward region a decade earlier; the single Spartiate Gylippos with a similar force had turned the tide at Syracuse, leading to the destruction of fully half of Athens' total military strength. Now in the Ionian War, the Spartans hoped to repeat the success of this system, and Pedaritos is the first in a long series of harmosts sent to Asia by the Spartans, Lakedaimonians (usually Spartiates as far as we can tell) appointed as military governors in com-
mand of cities controlled by the Peloponnesians.

The Spartan use of nauarchs—of whom Asyochos seems to have been the first appointed for a decade—was based on the same system. Although Lakedaimonian triremes composed only a tiny fraction of the total Peloponnesian fleet facing Athens—10 ships out of 120 at Arginousai—once again Sparta's position and her prestige insured that the commanding admiral was always a Spartiate; the various allies (and the Lakedaimonians!) would have balked at serving under (say) a Chian or a Syracusan. Since the Spartans had no strong naval tradition, and no man could hold the nauarchy twice, the system usually meant that the Peloponnesian fleet was commanded by a man with little or no naval experience; this naturally proved to be a severe handicap during the course of the Ionian War.

During winter 412/11, the nauarch Astyochos and the Spartiate Therimenes arranged a new treaty with Tissaphernes and the Great King aimed at removing some of the inequities of the earlier treaty. This time Persia is explicitly required to provide pay, and the treaty is made binding upon King Darius and all his sons—potential heirs each one—as well as Tissaphernes. However, by implication this new treaty still grants most of European Greece to Persia. This may simply be once again an oversight—two ignorant Spartiates not realizing the full legal meaning of the words—but since the other obvious blunders of the first treaty have been caught, we should perhaps look for an alternate explanation. One is easily available. The world-view of the Great King—his religion and culture—
would have made it difficult, perhaps nearly impossible, for him to formally acknowledge the loss of any territory which he or his ancestors before him had once claimed. Being a party to a treaty which implied the independence of those parts of mainland Greece which had once sent earth and water to Darius I or which had fallen to Xerxes' army was simply unacceptable at this point; Tissaphernes would have known this and it is possible that he succeeded in convincing Astyochos\textsuperscript{55} and Therimenes to humor the theoretical claims of the Persian monarch.

It is possible that when the terms of the treaty sworn by Astyochos became known at Sparta, they caused a furor, for soon after the swearing we find twelve Spartiates being sent out as "advisors" to Astyochos—with the authority to replace him if they choose—\textsuperscript{56} and one of these, Lichas, was an experienced diplomat.\textsuperscript{57} Lichas reacted with horror at the terms of the two treaties with Tissaphernes and the Great King.\textsuperscript{58} The agreements were declared null and void; they had never been ratified by the Spartan \textit{gerousia} and Assembly (and Lichas well knew that they could never be ratified), so their nullification was more or less legitimate (at least from the Spartan point-of-view). Tissaphernes reacted very angrily to this; to his mind, the Spartans had proven themselves to be completely untrustworthy, making and then nullifying two separate treaties within a short space of time. After having forwarded to the Great King two consecutive treaties which respected his formal claim to Greece, Tissaphernes did not dare to ask the King to be a party to a treaty which did not; he left the Spartans in disgust. At this point, Tissaphernes is alleged to have come under
the influence of Alkibiades, that brilliant but unscrupulous Athenian exile. After the death of his patron Chalkideus in battle outside Miletos, Alkibiades had become distrusted by the Spartans, and some time toward the beginning of winter, he had fled for protection to the satrap, offering excellent political advice about the Greeks in return for safety. According to him, the Great King's (and Tissaphernes') wisest course of action was to pay the Peloponnesians as little money as possible and hence keep them as weak as the Athenians; the result of such a policy would be that the two Greek alliances would wear each other out, and leave the Persian satrap to pick up the pieces, without having to contend with a strong and victorious Sparta.

Alkibiades is clearly Thucydides' chief informant for much of book eight, and he very likely exaggerated his own influence with the Persians; but as Thucydides himself points out, Tissaphernes certainly seemed to act as if he were following Alkibiades' suggestions, though a key motive perhaps was his resentment as what he viewed as Spartan treachery with regard to the treaties. The facts are that pay for the Peloponnesian sailors was reduced from six to three obols per day, and the money was given infrequently at that. This may also be partly due to the limited nature of Tissaphernes' resources; a satrap did not have the wealth of the Great King, and Tissaphernes was spending his own money at this point.

After a lengthy period of dispute with the Peloponnesians brought on by the disagreements over Persian sovereignty and subsidies discussed above, Tissaphernes decided to end the
hostility and negotiate a new treaty with Sparta. We are told that Tissaphernes was beginning to fear that the Peloponnesian fleet—which had relocated to Rhodes in anger—would completely disintegrate due to lack of funds or might even begin pillaging the mainland for supplies; the sailors had been on starvation rations for almost three months.

The treaty which followed did not contain any of the difficulties of the earlier agreements, and its form shows that it had been negotiated by an experienced diplomat. The Great King's sovereignty was explicitly limited to Asia and pay was guaranteed for the Peloponnesian fleet while it served in support of Persia. As part of the agreement, Tissaphernes promised to bring a powerful Persian fleet up from Phoenicia to support the Peloponnesians and help sweep Athens from the sea. In return for all this, the Great King was granted all the Greek cities of Asia. The Persian concession over sovereignty in Greece made it impossible for the Great King himself to be a party to the treaty, but the oaths of Tissaphernes, Pharnabazos (along with his brothers), and Hieramenes (the Great King's brother-in-law) were sufficient for the Spartans; the participation of the last of these men makes it clear that the treaty had Darius' de facto approval.

The promise concerning the status of the Asian Greeks is very significant. Although both the earlier treaties had contained similar provisions, we have seen that they also contained provisions which were clearly not acceptable to Sparta, and had been negotiated by Spartiate military commanders who possibly did not even realize the enormity of the concession
they were making with regard to the Greeks of Asia. By contrast, the third treaty was sworn by a full team of Spartiate envoys, headed by Lichas, an experienced diplomat, who may well have been sent out from Sparta for this very purpose. Sparta had entered the Peloponnesian War vowing to liberate the Asian Greeks from Athenian rule, but now she had apparently sold their freedom to Persia in exchange for Persian financial and military support.

This much is clear. What is not clear is how long this arrangement remained in effect. That the third treaty was a model of diplomatic correctness—proper opening formula and date—has blinded many scholars into failing to consider the question of whether the treaty long remained in effect, or indeed whether it was ever even ratified at Sparta; it is widely assumed that this third treaty governed Sparta's relations with Persia and her policy toward the Asian Greeks down to 405, and even beyond.6

In considering this extremely crucial issue, we must bear in mind that some time during summer 411 the Spartan gerousia and Assembly must have been considering whether to ratify or reject the proposed treaty; presumably, under ordinary circumstances, the requirements of diplomatic honor and the trust in the judgments of the men on the scene would make the ratification of a properly negotiated treaty almost a certainty; but rejection was always a possibility. The death of Lichas in early summer 411 would have removed the most powerful voice for ratification. In fact, the empirical evidence we shall examine below proves that the treaty as given in Thucydides was never ratified, or at least did not
remain in force for more than a few months; in practice, it was a dead letter by late summer 411, and Spartan commanders no longer officially recognized the right of the Great King or his representatives to do as they wished with the cities of the Asian Greeks.

Several factors combined to doom the treaty, notably the perceived betrayals of Tissaphernes and the violent reaction of many Asian Greeks to their new status as Persian subjects. Some time after the end of winter 412/11, Tissaphernes had established a fortified garrison at Miletos—now his to do with as he wished under the agreement—and in early summer 411, the Milesians stormed the fort and drove out the Persian garrison. This incident brought home to Sparta the difficulties of her position, for while most of Sparta’s allies (and obviously the other Ionians) were wholeheartedly in support of the Milesians’ action, seeing it as a blow for Greek liberation from the barbarian, if Sparta herself approved it, she would be in violation of her recent treaty with Persia.

The decision was difficult, but Lichas was the senior Spartiate present, and he had a personal stake in the success of his treaty; also, as a diplomat, he was very likely more sophisticated than most Spartiates, and realized how dependent Sparta was upon Persian support. He came down firmly on the side of the treaty, telling the Milesians (and any other Ionians who wished to hear) that they and all the citizens of the Greek cities of Asia would have to subjugate themselves to some extent to Tissaphernes, at least until the war with Athens was over and Persian support was no longer needed.
This greatly angered the Milesians—they refused Lichas burial when he died soon afterwards of an illness—71 but his words would hardly have assured Tissaphernes when his agents at Miletos reported them; they implied a future betrayal by the Spartans after the war with Athens was concluded. Furthermore, Thucydides does not say that the Milesians were forced to reaccept Tissaphernes' garrison, which likely would have been difficult for the Spartans to manage; if the garrison was not reinstalled, Tissaphernes' suspicions would have grown into certainties. It is reported that Tissaphernes became very dilatory in his financial support as the summer moved on; and the Persian fleet—whose entrance into the war the treaty had assumed—never arrived.72

Sparta's allies and the Milesians had not taken Lichas' words as final, but instead had sent representatives to Sparta, hoping that the home government would annul the agreement or at least demand its modification with respect to the status of the Asian Greek cities.73 Then as the summer wore on and the failure of Tissaphernes' promises became more and more manifest, the Peloponnesians decided to sail north and support the efforts of the satrap Pharnabazos instead, as the latter had apparently been trying to persuade them to do for some time.74 Soon afterward, we find the Peloponnesians giving support to the Antandrians after they drove one of Tissaphernes' garrisons out of their city;75 Tissaphernes' garrison was also driven out of Knidos (a Spartan colony)76 around this same time.77

It is apparent by now that the treaty is no longer operational, at least in the minds of Spartan field commanders; and their hostility toward Tissaphernes seems plain.
The military events of the next few years of the Ionian War are important for our purposes only in outline. Pharnabazos proved to be a much better ally than Tissaphernes had been, and the Spartans were not in serious financial want again for several years. Despite this improvement in condition, Peloponnesian naval incompetence (or more precisely, the incompetence of Spartan nauarchs) allowed the Athenians to be victorious in battle after battle. In summer 411, Mindaros was defeated at Kynossema, the first major battle of the Ionian War; later that same summer, he was badly beaten at Abydos, and in spring 410, he was killed and the ships of his fleet annihilated at Kyzikos, though most of his men escaped to shore. Although Pharnabazos supplied enough money to allow the Peloponnesians to rebuild most of their fleet, it was still several years until they had regained the strength and determination to risk a major sea battle, and during this period the Athenians went on the offensive, recapturing a number of their subject cities.

This same period is very badly attested politically, and the only evidence we have concerning the sort of arrangement Sparta had with Pharnabazos is empirical; in a limited number of cities we know what Sparta did (or did not do) with the satrap's blessing or at least his acquiescence. These examples permit some cautious generalization.

In 408, we find a Spartan harmost, Hippokrates, in charge at Chalkedon, rather than the agents of Pharnabazos; yet when Hippokrates was defeated and killed by the Athenians, it was Pharnabazos who took responsibility for the city, nego-
tiating for the safety of its citizens.\textsuperscript{82}

The same pattern is repeated at Byzantion. Klearchos, the Spartan harmost, ruled the city, and the garrison was composed of Peloponnesians, but Pharnabazos seemed to be content with this arrangement and willingly supplied money to the Greek forces.\textsuperscript{83}

About this same time there was a revolution at Iasos,\textsuperscript{84} and the Spartan harmost Eteonikos along with his garrison were driven out; a party supported by Tissaphernes seized power.\textsuperscript{85} Whether or not the satrap had actively aided the overthrow is unclear; but it is apparent that Sparta did not feel herself to be under any sort of treaty obligation to surrender the city to direct Persian control.

In fact we find not a single instance in the years 410-408 of a Persian garrison of either satrap present in any Asian Greek city. This may possibly be due to the pro-Spartan bias of our chief source, Xenophon, who might find Spartan willingness to hand over "liberated" Greek cities to Persian garrisons simply too embarrassing to mention; but surely we would still find some mention in passing in one of our other sources, say Diodorus-Ephorus, probably based for these years on the excellent \textit{Hellenica Oxyrhynchia}\textsuperscript{86}. The total of the evidence makes a rather good \textit{prima facie} case that Sparta had completely reversed her apparent earlier policy of allowing Persian satraps to assume direct control over Greek cities freed from Athens--the policy begun after the treaty with Tissaphernes.

What was Sparta's new policy? From the limited and scattered evidence discussed above, a pattern emerges. Greek
cities were not to be occupied by Persian garrisons or directly reincorporated into the empire; Miletos, Antandros, and Knidos had shown this to be unworkable. Instead, though all the cities were to be under titular Persian authority, Peloponnesian garrisons and Spartan harmosts were to be in direct control. Pharnabazos was clearly willing to accept this new arrangement; it is likely that Tissaphernes was not.

It seems extremely doubtful whether any provisions of this new agreement were rigidly set down in the form of a permanent treaty; more probably, it was a working arrangement established after the failure of the earlier treaty had become apparent to all parties. Given the difficulties Sparta was experiencing with Tissaphernes, and the Spartan belief that he had broken his commitments under the third treaty, and had been the chief cause of its failure (a belief he reciprocated), we would expect that the Spartans were attempting to negotiate a treaty with the Great King himself during these years.

In fact, in early spring 407, we hear of the return of a Spartan diplomatic mission from the Great King's court.87 We are not told when the mission had been sent out, but the vast distances to be travelled and the ponderous workings of an oriental court make summer 409 a reasonable possibility; this would have been (perhaps) five or six months after Sparta had tried—and failed—to make peace with Athens following the disaster at Kyzikos.88

Apparently the long negotiations led by Boiotios had been successful, and a treaty of some sort with the Great King had been worked out, presumably more or less along the lines of the third treaty; it may even be possible that the treaty
was formally resurrected.

Under other circumstances the new arrangement worked out with Darius might have received more attention in our sources (though not in Xenophon, who would have deplored its terms), but in this case its importance was overshadowed by the appearance of Cyrus, the younger son of the reigning Great King; he had been sent down to the coast with the returning ambassadors by his father to act as overlord of the local satraps. The intent was to provide centralized coordination to Persia's efforts against Athens, which--as the Spartan ambassadors must have pointed out--had so far failed to achieve very much. It is likely that the Great King had become convinced that unless a personal representative of his, such as his own son, were in charge, the local satraps (especially Tissaphernes) might continue to pursue their own policies and the war might continue to drag on for some time. It is also very likely that he feared to entrust significant royal funds to a potentially rebellious satrap.

The arrival of Cyrus marks a watershed in the pattern of Persian support for Sparta. On the purely financial level, the subsidies granted Sparta until the appearance of Cyrus seem to have been very meager, probably no more than a few hundred talents from 412 to 408. This may be due to satrapal stinginess or satrapal poverty. In any event, Cyrus arrived with 500 talents of royal silver, and he made it clear that he intended to spend it all and as much more as was necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. For the first time, money ceased to be a limiting factor.
Another actor of exceptional importance to the history of the Spartan naval empire also entered the stage at this time. In spring 407, the term of the Spartan nauarch Krates-ippidas expired, and a new and unusually capable nauarch, Lysandros, arrived in Ionia. Within a matter of weeks, shrewdly charming Lysandros had met with Cyrus at Sardis, and laid the foundation of a close personal friendship with the Persian prince, an impressionable youth of about 17; Cyrus went so far as to directly modify his father's instructions by raising the pay for Peloponnesian sailors as a personal favor to Lysandros.

With full Persian cooperation assured, Lysandros was able to turn his attention to military matters, and in late 407 at Notion, he succeeded in inflicting a stinging defeat upon the main Athenian fleet under the temporary command of Antiochos, Alkibiades' first officer. The battle was far from decisive militarily--only some 20 Athenian ships were lost--but it was decisive politically: Notion represented the first major Spartan victory at sea in the six years of the Ionian War, and in the political repercussions which followed the battle, Alkibiades' political enemies at Athens used the defeat to drive him once more into exile, thus depriving Athens of her most brilliant general and diplomat.

Soon after Notion, probably during winter 407/6, Lysandros began to capitalize on his victory by attempting to create a personal power base in the Asian Greek cities. He invited many of the leading men of these cities to his headquarters at Ephesos, and distributed honors and favors to those who pledged him their loyalty; he encouraged these men to form
"political clubs" loyal to him and to Sparta (in that order) in their respective cities. Lysandros may have hoped that a network of supporters in the Greek cities, together with the personal friendship of Cyrus, would allow him to retain influence in Ionia after his nauarchy expired; he certainly attempted to make matters difficult for his successor, in the hope that he would fail.

Lysandros' hopes were realized. In spring 406, his successor Kallikratidas arrived, a young man seemingly cast in the mold of an ideal Spartiate—brave, scrupulously honest, and too proud to charm a Persian barbarian for financial handouts. Xenophon admired these characteristics, and accordingly portrayed Kallikratidas' deeds in as favorable a light as possible, but he could not cover up the basic facts, and these easily show us that Kallikratidas' Lakonian virtues and lack of military experience (and ability) left him rather a tactless blunderer. In quick succession, he succeeded in alienating his paymaster Cyrus (who expected the proper deference due a son of the Great King) and Lysandros' clients in the Greek cities (who expected a continuation of Lysandros' political favoritism); and in summer 406, after a few bold naval strokes, Kallikratidas died while losing 77 Peloponnesian ships at Arginousai, a disastrous defeat brought on by his own stupidity.

Cyrus seems to have become very annoyed with the Spartan government for replacing his friend the victorious Lysandros with the blunderer Kallikratidas; the peculiar Spartan political system which forbade a single man from holding the nauarchy twice would have been alien and incomprehensible to a Persian prince. Cyrus made his displeasure very plain after Arginousai,
for he seems to have cut off all Persian subsidies. We find the surviving Peloponnesian sailors hiring themselves out as agricultural laborers at Chios in order to eat, and facing starvation during winter 406/5; these terrible conditions led to a widespread conspiracy among the men which was discovered by the commanding Spartiate just in time, and the Peloponnesian fleet narrowly escaped mutiny and disintegration. 100

This final incident badly frightened the Spartan government, causing it to finally bow to the demands of Cyrus' envoys and those from the Ionian cities, and Lysandros was returned to command; since he was prohibited from serving as nauarch a second time, he was appointed assistant nauarch under a nonentity, with the understanding that it would be he who actually commanded the fleet. 101

Returning to Asia in spring 405, Lysandros quickly restored good relations with Cyrus and with the men he had established in power in the Greek cities. More Persian money was obtained and the Peloponnesian fleet was restored to strength within a few months. Then, some time during summer 405, Lysandros had a great stroke of fortune: Cyrus was summoned home to Persia to be at his father's deathbed, and the young man decided to leave his remaining war funds, together with his official authority over the Greek cities and their tribute, in the hands of his Spartan friend Lysandros. 102 Tissaphernes traveled to the Persian court in company with Cyrus. 103 Hence, for the crucial year or two which followed, Lysandros had almost unchecked authority over the coast of Asia Minor.

Lysandros was not one to waste such an opportunity, and he immediately proceeded to use his military strength and Cyrus'
writ to install his own supporters as rulers in those Greek cities controlled by the Peloponnesians. In Miletos, he seems to have arranged a massacre of the popular elements and those among the wealthy whom he suspected of opposition; all power was placed in the hands of Lysandros' cronies. This same process was probably repeated in less bloody fashion in many of the other Greek cities at this time.

In late 405, Lysandros finally felt his strength was sufficient for a decisive engagement, and he brought the Athenian grand fleet to battle in the Hellespont at Aigos-potami; through clever strategy, he was completely victorious. Although the details of the battle are confused and unclear, the outcome is not: the Athenians lost all but a handful of their 180 ships, and the Peloponnesians led by Lysandros gained absolute control of the sea.

Following up his decisive victory, Lysandros swept through the Greek cities of the Aegean and coastal Asia Minor with his fleet, allowing the demoralized Athenian garrisons in each to return home under truce and installing in their places Spartan harmosts and native dekarchies (boards of ten), the latter composed of influential citizens chosen for their loyalty to Lysandros and placed in charge of day-to-day administration. Aside from democratic Samos, which remained loyal to the cause of Athens and continued to resist, Sparta now controlled most of the eastern portion of the old Athenian empire. A Spartan naval empire had come into being.
During the winter of 405/4, Sparta's position in Greece was one of near absolute power. The war against Athens had been won militarily and would soon be won politically: the Athenians were slowly being starved into surrender behind their Long Walls, and elsewhere only democratic Samos continued to resist the Peloponnesians. Lysandros' fleet of 200 ships controlled the Aegean, and the Greek cities of Asia Minor, the islands, and the Hellespont were all under Sparta's domination or her direct control. Cyrus and Tissaphernes were still at Susa awaiting the Great King's death in March 404, and Cyrus' writ given to Lysandros still held; for now, Sparta could do as she wished with the Asian Greeks without Persian interference.

Sparta and Sparta's policies had come to a crossroads. The mission which she had undertaken in 432 had been fulfilled; Athenian imperialism was dead. But that mission had been begun twenty-seven long years in the past, and an entirely new generation of Spartan leaders now ruled the state; only a small fraction of Sparta's citizenry was now made up of men who had voted for war in the assembly of 432. The unprecedented nature of the war—its naval character and the alliance with Persia—had raised up new leaders whose power and position were based upon characteristics which would have seemed alien and repugnant to a Spartiate of 432. Lysandros had never fought a land
battle, but his naval experience and his ability to flatter and charm Persian aristocrats (contrast dead Kallikratidas) gave him an importance approaching that of a Spartan king. Dozens of other Spartiates had similarly served abroad as nauarchs, harmosts, or subordinate officers; men raised under total Lykourgan discipline and scrupulous poverty had been placed in sole and absolute command of wealthy Ionian cities—small wonder that a sizable fraction became power-hungry or corrupt. From the time of the Lykourgan reforms of the eighth century, Sparta had been run as a closed society, with all citizens save for the kings trained in discipline rather than in original thought, and instilled with courage rather than with reasoning ability; by 404 a sizable fraction of Spartiates had "discovered the outside world" and for the first time in their lives had had an opportunity to give orders as well as to obey them. The Peloponnesian War had opened up the closed Spartan society to an unprecedented degree. Sparta now faced the choice of whether to close herself up once more.

The question was intimately connected with the issue of retaining the naval hegemony. As a land power, Sparta had been able to remain closed and conservative, a state possessing no public funds and hostile to the very notion of coined money. But if Sparta wished to retain her domination of overseas territories, she needed a navy, and a navy required a financial base to support it. Sparta had no revenue or state income, and the notion of a tax levied upon wealthy Spartiates would have been utterly alien to Lakedaimonian society; only a re-imposition of the hated peacetime phoros in one form or another could provide sufficient revenue for a fleet. In essence, Sparta
was faced with only two options: she could retain the naval empire Lysandros had created in the process of defeating the Athenians or she could give it up, and accept the power vacuum which would result.

There were many Spartiates who advocated each of these two policies. Lysandros and others who had benefited greatly from the naval hegemony obviously wished to maintain it. Many other Spartiates may have remembered the terrible lesson of the regent Pausanias in the 470s and would have pointed to the more recent cases of corruption and misdeeds by Spartiates in Asia\(^2\) as proof that a "cosmopolitan" naval empire would necessarily bring moral decay to Sparta and to Spartiates. Modern scholarship often speaks of the two(or three) "imperialist" or "anti-imperialist" "political factions" which existed in the Sparta of this era.\(^3\) But to talk of "political factions" in a closed society of (perhaps) 1500 ignorant, unsophisticated members of a warrior caste is misleading; it evokes images of political parties, official platforms, and candidates for office campaigning on the pro- or anti-imperialist ticket.\(^4\) It is safest(and most accurate) to say that some Spartiates more or less supported the notion of a "naval empire," some more or less opposed it, and many were undecided or gave it no consistent thought at all. The thread of this shifting and evolving distribution of Spartiate sentiment--and the chance selection of ephors--underlies Spartan policy of the next decade.

The first direct decision Sparta faced came in early 404 when Athens surrendered.\(^5\) The Athenians, blockaded for months and facing mass starvation, had sent an embassy to Sparta in
order to sue for peace on any terms. We are told that Korinth, Thebes, and many of Sparta's other allies opposed accepting any Athenian surrender and instead wished to totally destroy the city the way Histiaia, Melos, and Skione had been destroyed; twenty-seven years of war had left a great deal of hatred. Sparta balked at destroying so notable a city; further, her more thoughtful leaders must have realized that a docile and dependent Athens would make an excellent counterweight to some of Sparta's more independent allies, notably the Thebans, who were already showing signs of discontentment with Spartan highhandedness. Athens lost her navy and her Long Walls to the Peiraiæus, symbols and substance of her power, but she retained her existence and her city fortifications. Less happily, she gained an imposed extreme oligarchy, the so-called Thirty Tyrants. She was also enrolled as a Spartan ally at this time.

The exact manner in which the Thirty came to power at Athens is somewhat unclear; Xenophon, an Athenian, is so annoyingly brief and imprecise that it seems unlikely he was an eyewitness or bothered to learn the details. But if we credit Diodorus, Plutarch, and Pseudo-Aristotle, then it was Lysandros who actually imposed the Thirty; Plutarch's account compresses many events into a few sentences, but the other two accounts, which are much more detailed, say that Lysandros did this some time after the formal surrender and acting on his own initiative, and this is supported by the sequence of events which our sources describe. This would have been in character, for as we have noted above, Lysandros succeeded in installing men favorable to him as rulers in most of the Spartan-occupied cities; having similar influence over Athens, the largest city in Greece, would
have been very tempting.

In the early summer of 404, the entity we have described as the Spartan naval empire might have seemed more a Lysandrine naval empire to the Greeks of the cities which composed it. Lysandros was the man who commanded the fleet which controlled the Aegean, his clients ruled in the subject cities, and he personally held nearly all of Sparta's war chest, made up of captured loot and the remaining money of Cyrus; when his friend Cyrus returned from Susa, Lysandros was likely to become still more powerful. All of these factors gave Lysandros more power than any Spartan commoner in history had ever had, and the Greeks of his day recognized this, flattering him by composing songs in his honor; whole cities erected altars to him, offered sacrifices in his name, and created festivals in his honor. Plutarch believed that Lysandros wielded more personal power at this time than any single Greek before him had, and this may well be true.

But if Lysandros' power was enormous, it was without any firm political foundation. Lysandros was not a Spartan king; he was too young to become a member of the gerousia; ephors were selected randomly, and the office could only be held once. His achievements gave him great influence at Sparta, but it is nonsense to speak of a "political party" loyal to him; and his only official position—the de facto nauarchy—had been granted him under extraordinary conditions, and since the naval war with Athens was over, it was likely not to be renewed. A single vote of the ephors would be sufficient to make the erstwhile ruler of Greece a private citizen once more, with no authority over Spartan ships or troops.
Essentially, Lysandros had two choices: he could work within the Spartan constitutional framework or he could attempt to subvert it. His prestige and influence at Sparta—very great at this point in time—might make it possible for him to secure further military commands; and new victories would allow him to maintain his reputation (and hence his power) in Lakedaimon. But while this course of action might serve Lysandros' needs for a few years, it was obviously no long-term solution. What Lysandros desperately required was a permanent political base, and according to several of our sources, he sought to obtain one by changing the Spartan constitution.\(^\text{14}\)

The goal they allege was fundamentally simple; Lysandros schemed to become a Spartan king. Using bribery, he hoped to obtain oracles which would persuade the Spartans to open their kingship to direct election; he felt sure that his reputation would make him an obvious choice at the next vacancy, and King Agis was already an old man by this time, with his only "son" widely believed to be illegitimate.\(^\text{15}\) Lysandros first sought to bribe the oracle of Apollo at Delphoi, but was unsuccessful; this had presumably taken place during winter \(405/4\), when Lysandros traveled to Delphoi to dedicate the spoils of Aigospotami.\(^\text{16}\) His next attempt, made at the oracle of Zeus at Dodona possibly came during this same winter, and it too failed.\(^\text{17}\) A third attempt at Zeus Ammon in Libya was to occur in the future, as were various other more complicated plots involving forged sacred tablets and a spurious son of Apollo.
How much we can credit all these stories is difficult
to judge. The fact that Lysandros visited the three principal
oracles in the Greek world within a short span of time cannot
be disputed, and does seem to imply some extraordinary motive
on his part; but whether his plans corresponded to the ones
our sources describe is unclear.

What is clear is that these dreams of kingship (if they
can be credited) did not blind Lysandros to his need to main-
tain his military reputation. The chronology of Lysandros'
movements in this period is so ill-established that it must
frankly be called guesswork; but if we stick closely to the
sources, few and fragmented as they are, a consistent sequence
of events does emerge.18

It seems that soon after establishing the Thirty at
Athens, Lysandros succeeded in persuading the ephors to
send him to Thrace.19 We find him waging a campaign of some
length against those cities of the north which remained out-
side Sparta's hegemony. He captured Thasos, slaughtering
the leaders of the pro-Athenian elements, and spent some
time in an unsuccessful siege of Aphytis, a city near Poteidaia.20
Some time after this, probably in late 404, Lysandros moved
the focus of his operations to the Hellespont region, and
there he clashed with Pharnabazos, who resented the attacks
made on territory within his sphere of influence. The latter
dispatched complaints to Sparta, and after some consultation,
the ephors officially recalled Lysandros;21 at this same time,
they may have also overturned a few of his local decisions
made in the Hellespont.22 Lysandros suffered some disgrace
and obtained the ephors' permission to visit the temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya in fulfillment of a vow made during the Thracian campaign;\textsuperscript{23} he obviously hoped to return to Sparta after the political storm had died down (and perhaps with a helpful oracle).

There does seem to have been a political storm around this time, as the full implications of a naval hegemony began to make themselves felt to the blunt minds of Sparta's warrior caste. Before leaving Samos for Athens, Lysandros had dispatched one of his subordinates, Gylippos, to Sparta with the bulk of the cash and valuables which had accumulated, and when the man embezzled part of the money and the theft was detected, a major debate on the whole question of the naval empire broke out.\textsuperscript{24} Traditionalist Spartiates used the incident as further proof of the corrosive effects of Sparta's new naval and fiscal policy: Gylippos, the hero of Sicily, had fallen before a sack of silver. Ephorus and Theopompus both agree that the ephors seriously considered "purifying" Lakonia of all silver and gold, whether publicly or privately held.\textsuperscript{25} But in the end, although Lysandros was in Thrace by this time and could not add his voice to the debate, men of Lysandros' views carried the day and a compromise was worked out: while private possession of gold or silver was made a capital offense, the Lakedaimonian state would retain its newly-created public treasury.\textsuperscript{26} By this Sparta hoped to remove the opportunity for personal aggrandizement, but still retain the public funds she needed for a fleet and the naval hegemony. It is doubtful that any firm
or final decision was made on the overall question of whether to retain Sparta's control over the cities of her naval empire.

About the same time as the recall of Lysandros, the Spartans had caught Thorax—a friend of Lysandros and the man he had appointed harmost of Samos—in illegal possession of private money and had executed him.27 Such an incident coupled with Gylippos' crime, the bribery of Kallibios,28 and doubtless many other cases of peculation which have not survived in the sources, would have put a permanent stain of suspicion upon all those Spartiates who had served abroad; and it was probably only Lysandros' reputation for scrupulous personal incorruptibility and poverty which saved him from a worse fate than mere disgrace.29

Many of Sparta's overseas representatives were showing themselves to be far worse than merely corrupt. The brutality and lack of sophistication of the Spartiates placed in charge of large, complex cities often resulted in atrocities unmatched since the time of the Persian Wars: A Spartan harmost sent to Trachinian Herakleia to put down civil unrest did so by immediately putting to death 500 citizens, an enormous number for a Greek city of about 10,000 men.30 As Lysandros is alleged to have observed after noting a brutality of the harmost at Athens, many Spartiates did not know how to govern free men.31

Far worse from Sparta's own perspective than some "good Lakonian toughness" on the part of a harmost or two were the cases of personal abuse of power. Of these, Klearchos' was by far the worst. Some time in 404 or 403 this Spartiate
had been sent out as a harmost to the Byzantines, who were troubled by civil strife and warfare with the Thracians. No sooner had Klearchoos arrived and secured his power than he hired a large body of mercenaries, murdered the civic magistrates, and set himself up as a tyrant and local potentate, terrorizing the Byzantine population and even conquering neighboring Salymbria; needless to say he ignored the orders of the Spartan ambassadors sent to recall him home for punishment. Sparta was forced into the humiliating position of having to send out a sizable Lakedaimonian army to overthrow the man she herself had placed in power; after a hard-fought battle, Klearchoos' army was defeated, and he himself fled to Cyrus.32 We cannot date the career of Klearchoos with any precision, but whatever the date, we can well imagine the degree to which Klearchoos' deeds soured the Spartans on their naval empire.

Some time in late 404--very likely while Lysandros was still away from Sparta in Libya--Tissaphernes returned to the coast from Susa.33 Cyrus was still at court, under threat of execution for plotting against his elder brother Artaxerxes II, who now reigned as Great King; Tissaphernes had uncovered the alleged plot and only the intervention of the Queen Mother Parysatis (who favored her younger son) had been sufficient to save Cyrus' life.34

The arrival of Tissaphernes changed the political framework under which the Spartan empire in Asia had been created. In her treaties sworn with Persia during the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had promised the Asian Greeks to the Great King
and his successors, and upon his return Tissaphernes obviously would have demanded that Sparta honor her commitment.

Tissaphernes was no friend to Sparta, but his demand was legitimate, and his wishes would have coincided with the wishes of those Spartans who feared the inordinate influence of Lysandros and his dekarchies ruling in the Ionian cities; such Spartans included King Agis and King Pausanias.35 Withdrawing the Spartans stationed in Ionia would have certainly appealed to the "anti-imperialists" at Sparta, and the Greek cities themselves might not have been too displeased by the change, coming as it did after several years of rule by brutal and corrupt Spartan harmosts and Lysandros' tyrannical dekarchies.

Obviously, the ordinary Spartiates of the Assembly or the ephorate would never have approved "abandoning" the Greeks of Asia to the barbarian; but Sarta's more sophisticated leaders would never have presented the decision in these terms. Instead, the ephors would have been persuaded to "free the Ionians from Lysandros' tyrannies" by withdrawing the harmosts and garrisons which kept the dekarchies in power. Sparta would not have turned any of the Ionian cities over to Tissaphernes, but merely left them free and independent just as she had promised to do in 432; if Tissaphernes happened to take them over, it was none of Sparta's concern. This was precisely what Sparta had done in a similar situation at Amphipolis, following the Peace of Nikias with Athens during the Peloponnesian War.36

The preceding three paragraphs are admittedly conjectural
and poorly documented; the sad truth is that nowhere in any
of our sources is there a statement or a direct implication
that Sparta returned control of the Asian Greeks to Tissa-
phernes upon his return to Asia Minor—we are not even told
of Tissaphernes' arrival itself. Xenophon obviously would
not have mentioned this stain on Sparta's record, while
our other sources are very sketchy at best concerning Asia
during these years.

Despite the silence of our sources, the external evidence
that such a transfer of control took place is very strong.
Xenophon says that upon Cyrus' return to Asia Minor around
early 403, all the Asian Greek cities had revolted from
Tissaphernes and gone over to him; nowhere is there a mention
of any Spartan garrisons or harmosts present. When we are
told that King Agis and King Pausanias convinced the ephors
to depose all of the dekarchies Lysandros had installed in
the Asian Greek cities, and "return the governments to the
control of the people," the Spartan harmosts and Peloponnesian
garrisons must have been withdrawn at this same time.

In early 403, a major new development took place as the
civil war at Athens reached a critical point. The Thirty,
appointed by Lysandros, had grown more and more violent and
politically extreme in the months following their appointment.
At first they had been content to execute Athens' demagogues
and her radical popular leaders; and the Athenian citizenry--
which probably blamed these groups for defeat in the war--seems
not to have opposed this very much. But soon the Thirty began
to kill large numbers of Athenians without cause, including
those members of the upper classes whose wealth they coveted, and a regular reign of terror began. Losing what little broad support they had once held, the Thirty requested a Spartan harmost and a Peloponnesian garrison from Sparta to protect them "from the rebellious democrats" and this request was granted along with various other measures to support them.\textsuperscript{41} With 700 foreign troops to strengthen their hold over the city, the Thirty further increased their killings, and soon Theramenes, depicted by some sources as the leading moderate among the Thirty, was executed by the other oligarchs for his opposition to their extreme policies.

During this time, greater and greater numbers of Athenians had been fleeing the city and the terror of the Thirty, and many of these exiles began to join the "national liberation army" which Thrasyboulos, an exiled popular leader, had formed and based at the Attic fortress of Phyle which he had seized. By the winter of 404/3 this exile force had accumulated sufficient strength to defeat the army of the Thirty along with their foreign garrison troops in a battle near the Peiraeus, killing their leader Critias in the process; the remaining extreme oligarchs, dispirited and discredited, withdrew to Eleusis, while their place was taken by a new group of ten oligarchs, slightly more moderate and apparently with strong support among citizens of the cavalry class.\textsuperscript{42} As the popular forces based at the Piraeus prepared to lay siege to the city, the Ten (and possibly the surviving members of the Thirty as well) sent for Lakedaimonian support against the democrats. By now it was spring 403, and Lysandros saw
an excellent opportunity to regain some of his old power and influence; he persuaded the Spartan government to send him out as harmost of Athens, and with his brother Libys—who had been appointed nauarch for 403/2—in command of a fleet blockading the democratic forces inside the Peiraeus, Lysandros began to raise a mercenary army with which to regain control of Athenian territory.

Lysandros’ ambitions were once more frustrated by the Spartan kings acting in unison.\(^43\) We are told that they feared Lysandros would again become too powerful if he were allowed to take Athens, the greatest city in Greece, a second time, and install his own men as rulers. The kings persuaded three of the five ephors to send King Pausanias with a large Peloponnesian army to Athens in order to arrange a settlement there. After a sharp skirmish near the Peiraeus with the Athenian democrats, a fairly generous political settlement was worked out; it met with the approval of the two ephors who had accompanied Pausanias’ army and a special fifteen-man negotiating team later sent out by the Assembly and ephors at Sparta.\(^44\)

The terms of the agreement were designed to frustrate Lysandros’ ambition yet still serve Sparta's interests. The democrats—the overwhelming majority of Athenians—were granted Athens and (presumably) most of Attic territory; any other arrangement would have meant a resumed civil war. At the same time, the territory around Eleusis was detached to form a politically-independent rump-state granted to the Thirty, the Ten, and those of their oligarchic supporters who feared
punishment by the victorious democrats. This arrangement would end the troubling Athenian civil war, and so long as it lasted, Athens would not be able to pose a threat to Sparta; hostile Eleusis would serve as a strong check on Athens' power and ambition. Both Athens and Eleusis were enrolled as Spartan allies.45

As we have noted, this settlement had the full support of the ephors present and of the fifteen special negotiators sent out by the Spartan home government; indeed it must have seemed a brilliant solution to the difficult problem of permanently checking Athens' power while at the same time not wasting Spartiate lives in continually putting down Athenian popular rebellions. Only Lysandros, who had lost his chance at installing personal clients as rulers in Greece's most populous city, would have been dissatisfied. Yet it seems that virtually all modern scholars believe that upon Pausanias' triumphant return, he was tried by the Spartans for malfeasance--he had let the democrats escape--and nearly condemned.46 The grim hand of vengeful Lysandros and his pro-imperialist "political faction" is seen in this.

This idea is obvious nonsense. As we have discussed above, Lysandros had no "political party" at Sparta in any meaningful sense of the word, and such personal supporters and "fellow travellers" as he did possess would have abandoned him politically after his complete humiliation in front of Athens; his plans had been thwarted by the united effort of both kings, and the settlement made by Pausanias had been the work of the ephors and Assembly as well. Lysandros would have
appeared to be anything but a rising political star.

But Pausanias was tried for his settlement at Athens; we even know the distribution of votes for and against his condemnation. The point is that we have no reason to believe that this occurred in 403. In fact our sources conclusively show that the trial took place around 401 or 400, shortly after the Athenians had seized Eleusis and annexed it, unifying their state once more. At this time, Pausanias' solution which must have seemed so brilliant in 403 had shown itself to be nothing more than a recipe for allowing the restoration of a democratic and powerful Athens, and the Spartiates were clearly enraged against the man identified with the policy; even elderly King Agis voted for conviction. Plutarch tells us that Lysandros regained much of his influence in Sparta at this time, since it was felt that his policy in 403 had been correct all along.

For several years after Pausanias' settlement at Athens, Lysandros' political weakness is very much apparent. Our sources are silent about his activities, and this silence is rather convincing evidence that Lysandros was given no position of authority nor military command. He plays no role in Cyrus' growing efforts to raise a Greek mercenary army and secure Spartan military assistance; the silence of our sources makes it probable that Lysandros never even had personal contact with the Persian prince after 405. When Sparta sent a fleet to support Cyrus in spring 401, Lysandros would have been an obvious choice as admiral, but Samios was appointed instead.
Thibron was appointed to conduct the war in Asia against Tissaphernes in 400, and Derkyllidas replaced him in 399; Lysandros would have given anything for those commands. Lysandros obviously retained significant numbers of personal supporters in the Ionian cities and elsewhere—-that much became clear in 397—-but Ionians had no say over Spartan policy. We must remember that officially Lysandros was nothing more than an ordinary Spartiate, a cog in a totalitarian warrior state, and he could not even leave for Asia as a private citizen without the ephors' permission. The frustration Lysandros felt must have been enormous; he who might have carved out a personal empire in Asia Minor was trapped at Sparta by the archaic Lykourgan code, forced to drink black broth in the communal messes as a Spartiate commoner. Lysandros, who a little before had been the most powerful man in Greece, was reduced to this.
Chapter V: SLIPPING INTO A WAR WITH PERSIA

By the winter of 402/1, most Greeks must have come to believe that relations between Sparta and Persia would remain close for the indefinite future. Many Spartans might still bear a grudge against Tissaphernes (and vice-versa) for what had happened during the Ionian War, while others might dream of being able to return to Ionia as harmosts over rich Ionian cities, but in Asia Minor "Persia" meant Cyrus, the younger brother of the Great King and chief among the western satraps; he had seemingly healed his differences with Artaxerxes II and had returned to the coast with his original power restored soon after Tissaphernes had returned.¹

Sparta's relations with Cyrus were excellent. Many Spartans must have continued to feel gratitude for the generous support which he had provided them during the Ionian War, and soon Sparta as a whole was to show her collective feelings by providing him with substantial military support. Cyrus had been significantly hellenized by the formative years which he had spent in Ionia,² and he employed large numbers of Greek mercenary troops.³ Upon his arrival in Ionia he had taken over the Greek cities which Tissaphernes had gained control of following the departure of the Spartans, and apparently this transfer had not been free of violence;⁴ no doubt Cyrus still bore Tissaphernes a grudge (to put it mildly) for supporting Artaxerxes in the succession struggle following the death of Darius II, and apparently doing his best to have Cyrus executed.⁵
Xenophon's account of Cyrus' great popularity among the Greeks of Asia is obviously biased, but probably more or less true nonetheless; as mentioned earlier, harmosts and dekarchies would have made most other rulers seem good by comparison, and Cyrus certainly knew how to win the friendship of Greek mercenaries at least. It seemed that peace had finally come to the Aegean after some thirty years of more or less open warfare.

Then in spring 401, this stable framework came apart as Cyrus began his attempt to seize control of the Persian empire from his brother. His earlier reconciliation had been pretence; for several years he had been gathering large numbers of Greek hoplite mercenaries, which he intended to use as the cutting edge of the army he would lead against the Great King. By early 401, his preparations were complete, and the Greek contingents were all ordered to assemble at Sardis; Spartan support was formally requested at this same time.

In all, Cyrus' army comprised about 13,000 Greek mercenaries—11,000 of them hoplites—and (perhaps) 70,000 Asiatic troops including 3000 cavalry. The Great King would probably be able to field an army twice as large, with many times the number of cavalry, but Cyrus believed that the training and heavy armor of his Greek hoplites—who were to fight in a broad, shallow front—would win him victory and the throne. For her part, Sparta contributed a contingent of about 700 hoplites, including a substantial number of Lakedaimonians, and commanded by Cheirisophos, a Spartiate; she also sent 35 ships under the nauarch Pythagoras to support Cyrus' march along the coast of Asia Minor.
The reasons behind Sparta's support for Cyrus are easily apparent. The advantages of having a friend of Sparta on the throne of Persia are obvious; and the argument that Cyrus was entitled to Spartan assistance in return for the support he had given Sparta during the war against Athens would have swayed a Spartiate assembly. These are precisely the reasons our sources cite, and apparently they were good enough for the vast majority of Spartiates, for we do not hear a whisper of any disagreement over the policy or any recriminations when Cyrus' scheme failed. 13

For Cyrus did fail, dying in battle against Artaxerxes II in summer 401 at Kunaxa, and in the months which followed, Sparta began to learn the risks involved in supporting a pretender to the Persian throne. In the mind of Artaxerxes, the Spartans and the other Greeks had repaid the generous Persian assistance they had been given a few years earlier by supporting a Persian rebel and waging war against the Greek King. We are told that to the end of his life, Artaxerxes considered the Spartans to be the most shameless of all men. 14 The Greeks had attacked the legitimate ruler of Persia without provocation; the Greeks would have to be punished.

The suitable agent for punishment was at hand. Tissaphernes, a personal enemy of Cyrus, had remained loyal to Artaxerxes, and had given valuable service at Kunaxa. Reward for loyalty went hand in hand with punishment for betrayal, and accordingly, by summer 400 Tissaphernes had returned to Asia Minor as satrap of Karia, Lydia, Ionia, and other
holdings; he was also given authority over Pharnazos, who had apparently remained at his own establishment during the struggle between Cyrus and Artaxerxes. How severely Tissaphernes intended to treat the Ionian Greeks is unclear, but their hostility toward him combined with their past loyalty to Cyrus certainly led them to suspect the worst; the cities dispatched embassies to Sparta, begging the Spartans for protection.

Sparta and the Spartans were faced with a dilemma. A war with Persia had been the last thing Sparta had intended when she had sent her men and ships to support Cyrus, who in the context of Asia Minor and Sparta's perspective, was Persia. But now friendly Cyrus was dead, and it seemed very doubtful that Tissaphernes would consider returning to the old arrangement, and grant the Ionians a sizable degree of internal autonomy in exchange for submission and taxes. Frightened Ionian ambassadors would have told the Spartan assembly that Tissaphernes meant to install tyrants in their cities and completely destroy their freedom, and Sparta's poor past relations with Tissaphernes would have led most Spartiates to believe these charges. A Spartan embassy was sent to the Persian satrap, warning him not to commit aggression against the Greeks of Asia; it apparently received no reply other than Tissaphernes' attack on Kyme. Sparta was faced with the choice of either sending a military force to Asia or allowing the Asian Greeks to be conquered and very harshly treated by the hated Tissaphernes.

An earlier Sparta might have sent a second embassy,
then washed its hands of the whole business; but the Sparta of late 400 contained a substantial number of Spartiates who longed to leave the narrow confines of Greece and return to Asia Minor; these men would not have let the issue of aiding the Ionian cities fade away without a political struggle. The specific incidents of power abuse and corruption which had helped to bring about Sparta's earlier partial retreat from naval empire were several years in the past, and--public memory being as transient as it usually is--had probably lost much of their sting. By this date, the Athenians had annexed Eleusis, causing Lysandros to regain a measure of his old influence; he would have vigorously endorsed the arguments of the Ionians, hoping to be sent out as a commander to Asia. We must not neglect emotional considerations: a Spartan assembly might have been swayed by the pleas of Ionian representatives to protect fellow Greeks against the hubris of detested Tissaphernes. If rumors of the arrival of the Ten Thousand--the remnant of Cyrus' mercenaries--at the Euxine had reached Sparta by this time, Spartans might have come to hold an exaggerated impression of the power of Greek arms against barbarian numbers.

We know nothing of the arguments made at Sparta, or how narrow the vote turned out to be, but some time (probably) in late 400, Thibron was sent out to defend the Asian Greeks against Tissaphernes and Persia. The chronology of Sparta's ensuing war in Asia over the next half-decade is so poorly presented in the surviving sources that it is generally
difficult to firmly establish any date to within a year; hence our treatment must take the form of an outline. But although a precise history of these years is virtually impossible, the events themselves do fall into a consistent pattern and generate a good impression of the nature of Sparta's revived overseas empire.

The strength of Sparta's commitment to the war against Tissaphernes is a crucial question for us to decide. At first inspection it might seem that Sparta placed great importance upon the war, for the army Thibron took with him was very large by Greek standards: 1000 neodamodeis and 4000 Peloponnesians from the allied cities. But this appearance is somewhat deceiving, for the lives of neodamodeis were obviously worth nearly nothing to Spartiates and might actually have negative value if Sparta feared their presence. Also, Diodorus' more detailed account informs us that the "Peloponnesian allies" which Xenophon refers to were actually mercenaries; since the Ionians themselves would presumably be paying for them, they cost Sparta nothing. None of this directly proves that Sparta was uninterested in the war; but it certainly shows that there was no great interest. If Sparta was consciously seeking an empire in Asia, she was definitely seeking an "empire on the cheap."

With the arrival of Thibron in Asia, Sparta began to recreate her imperial presence along the Ionian coast. As we have argued earlier, Sparta's naval empire had never had an infrastructure or administrative base; as far as we can tell, it merely consisted of individual harmosts ruling by
fiat, scattered military garrisons, and the Spartan fleet with its nauarch. Re-establishing such an "empire" would require little more than sending out new harmosts and garrisons, and persuading (or coercing) the Greek cities into accepting them; widespread fear of Tissaphernes would have made this last task rather easy.

Matters were different in the north of Asia Minor. There, Pharnabazos ruled, and the Hellespontine Greeks certainly would not have turned their cities over to Sparta in fear of destruction at his hands. But from the limited evidence we have, it seems that Sparta had never completely ended her presence in that area. In early 400, we find Anaxibios, the Spartan nauarch for 401/0, making his presence known in the Euxine, and some time later we come across a Spartan harmost in charge of Byzantion. A Spartan garrison is also in control of Chalkedon, and Xenophon includes vague statements to the effect that various cities of the region had Spartan harmosts. There is no hint that the Spartan presence had recently been restored, and since Pharnabazos appears to have given the entire arrangement his blessing and to have been on amicable terms with the Spartan authorities, it seems very likely that Sparta had controlled some important Hellespontine cities such as Byzantion and Chalkedon continuously from 405, probably because of the importance of Euxine grain to Greece.

If the nature of Spartan control may be generalized from this area and time—and we have no reason to doubt this—then the Spartan naval empire was an extraordinarily loose
and undirected entity. Since the recall of Lysandros in 404, there had been no single leader to dominate the various harmosts and set the broadlines of policy; as a result, it seems that the Spartiates sent out to Asia as commanders pretty much did whatever they felt like, whether contrary to "Spartan policy" (and the wishes of the local Greeks) or not. We see no signs of any official chain of command.

Xenophon’s eyewitness account makes this strikingly clear.28 After the Ten Thousand led by Xenophon had made their way to Byzantion and nearly sacked the city following a dispute with the local Spartan officials, the nauarch Anaxibios made a proclamation that any of the mercenaries caught within the city would be sold as slaves.29 Kleandros, the harmost of Byzantion, disagreed and simply ignored the directive (he seems even to have invited the sick and disabled to come in), but when his successor Aristarchos arrived some time later, 400 Greek soldiers were sold as slaves.30 Pharnabazos had done his best to secure Anaxibios' cooperation while the man was nauarch, but after his term expired, ignored him, and made arrangements with the new harmost of Byzantion instead; this personal insult led Anaxibios to completely reverse his earlier behavior, and he did his best to frustrate the aims of Pharnabazos and the new Spartan commander.31 Sparta had no policy, though individual Spartiates (sometimes) did; and Pharnabazos clearly recognized this.

The evidence of Xenophon also supports the notion that Spartan commanders in these years essentially ruled by fiat.
He says this outright in the Anabasis: "'The Greek cities are not far away, and the Spartans are masters of Greece. They have the power, yes, each individual Spartan in the (Greek) cities has the power, to do what they like there.'"32

He repeats this same description of Spartan authority in the Hellenica.33 Since we come across no mention of any organized system of taxation or tribute-gathering by the Spartans during this period, it is quite possible that local financial contributions to Spartan commanders were raised in the same manner, by fiat.

During winter 400/399, Thibron quartered his troops among his Ionian allies and raised a further 2000 men from Ephesos and other neighboring Greek cities; by late spring, he had also gained the service of most of the 5000 remaining troops of the Ten Thousand.34 Although the 12,000 or so troops he now had may seem a small force when measured against the manpower of Asia, it was actually a very formidable army. We must remember that Cyrus had expected his 14,000 Greek mercenaries to win him victory against the grand army of the Great King in the heart of the Persian empire. Thibron's force is more than twice the size of the original land army which Athens had sent to Syracuse.35

The presence of this enormous Greek army in Asia Minor is without precedent. In her day, Athens had been a naval power, and her empire had confined its expansion to islands or coastal strips. By contrast, the Spartans were most accustomed to land warfare, and with increasing numbers of
Greek mercenaries rather than of citizen hoplites allowed Sparta's commanders in Asia to take military risks that a Perikles or even a Konon had never dared to consider. The Athenian naval empire had done no more than send out small tribute-collecting forces a few miles inland; under Sparta, large armies were to march all through the interior of western Asia Minor.

The first Spartan probes into the interior were very tentative and cautious. In early spring 399, basing his army on Ephesos, Thibron captured several inland Greek towns, but withdrew to the coast in the face of Tissaphernes' cavalry. After the arrival of Cyrus' mercenaries had nearly doubled the strength of his army, Thibron felt confident enough to face Tissaphernes in open country, and marched into the hinterland of Ionia, winning over a large number of inland towns (including some Greek ones) which had (apparently) remained under Persian control since the 6th century.

Following this short campaign, Thibron received a message from the ephors ordering him to leave Ionia and instead concentrate his attack upon Tissaphernes' home territory in Caria. As he was at Ephesos in summer 399, preparing for his march into Caria, his successor Derkyllidas arrived to replace him; Thibron returned to Sparta, where he was condemned for misconduct—he had let his troops plunder his allies—and exiled.

Derkyllidas was now in command, and we need not go into the details of his campaigns at all. Over the next
two years, it is unlikely that he spends more than a few months actually fighting Tissaphernes or Pharnabazos; most of the remaining time is spent visiting the Chersonese (!) to help build a wall against the Thracians or besieging a few Chian exiles in Atarneus. The reasons behind Derkyllidas' great willingness to make all the truces he does with the Persian satraps is as obvious as his nickname—"Sisyphos"—which happens to be the name of an ancient king of Korinth legendary for his shrewdness and greed. It seems almost certain that Derkyllidas was turning his military commission in Asia to very profitable advantage, lining his pockets with Persian gold and in return not causing the Persian satraps any trouble; under him Sparta's empire in Asia was very likely a glorified protection racket. Naturally Xenophon—who very clearly liked Derkyllidas—makes no mention of this.

It is also obvious how Derkyllidas managed to get away with his activities: Spartan interest in Asia was clearly almost nil. Just before Derkyllidas had arrived to replace Thibron, the latter had received an order to attack Tissaphernes in Caria and had been preparing to do so; Derkyllidas simply ignored the order and marched north instead of south. The ephors apparently forgot all about him. Two years later, after Derkyllidas marched to most parts of coastal Asia Minor except Caria (probably Tissaphernes paid him well), the ephors once again send him an order to invade Caria; given Spartiate ignorance of geography, it is possible that they thought he had invaded Caria, until some Ionian Greeks pointed out their error.
While Derkyllidas had been wasting his time against Chian exiles, the Persian satraps had been taking stock of the situation. The Spartans had shown themselves to be much more dangerous than the Athenians had ever been, for their powerful land army made them simply too strong to face with mere satrapal levies, and they had succeeded in capturing inland towns which had never been controlled by Athens. Although at present the Spartans were content to waste their time marching aimlessly along the coast, this indecision might not be permanent. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos may have begun to fear that Sparta would soon take the logical step of attempting to extend her power into the non-Greek areas of Lydia or Phrygia; if 12,000 hoplites could nearly overthrow a Great King, 8000 or 9000 hoplites would have no trouble defeating a satrap if they were properly led and supported by adequate cavalry. It was well within Sparta's ability, at least from the purely military point of view, to detach the western satrapies from Persia, and place them in the hands of friendly native rulers. If Pissouthnes had been able to call upon thousands of allied Greek hoplites, his revolt would have been successful.

It is obvious from Sparta's behavior that the Spartan government never even remotely considered any of these options, but the Persians could not have known this, and the satraps would have grown increasingly nervous as the large "barbarian" army remained on their territory and showed no sign of preparing to depart. In early summer 398, Phanabazos set off for Susa to confer with the Great King about the situation.
By the time Pharnabazos reached the court of the Great King, messengers from Evagoras, a subject king of Cyprus, had already been there for some time, and were attempting to persuade Artaxerxes to counter Spartan land power with Persian naval power; Evagoras proposed building a large fleet and placing it under the command of Konon, the experienced Athenian admiral living in exile at his court. Pharnabazos apparently added his support to this plan, and was granted 500 talents to initiate the construction of a fleet at Cyprus; Konon was put in charge of the Great King's ships.

Returning to the coast some time in early 397, Pharnabazos met with Tissaphernes; together they raised a large army from the territories of their satrapies—allegedly 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry—and marched against Ephesos. There, they encountered Derkyllidas with the army he had hastily put together to defend his base; during the long truces with the Persians, Derkyllidas had allowed his army to fall dangerously low in numbers, and now, even with Ionian levies, he had only 7000 troops.47 From Xenophon's account, it seems that a Persian attack might very well have been successful; he claims Pharnabazos urged such an attack, but that Tissaphernes—who remembered what a few Greek hoplites had done at Kunaxa—decided to avoid battle instead. A truce was arranged, and the commanders negotiated treaty terms: the Greek cities would be left independent from Persia and in exchange the Spartan harmosts and army would be withdrawn from Asia. Both parties dispatched messengers to seek approval for the treaty from their respective home
governments. It is very likely that both sides were using this "treaty" as a device to stall for time: the Persians were waiting until the Great King's fleet would be ready to sail; Derkyllidas may have been hoping that the Spartans would send him additional support.

While all of these events had been unfolding in Asia, significant developments had also been taking place in mainland Greece. In late 400\(^48\) probably, Sparta had gone to war with Elis, a strong Peloponnesian state which had long been a thorn in Sparta's side, and after several years of fighting had finally forced a surrender in spring 397. The terms were harsh: Elis was forced to grant independence to many of her outlying communities, and hence lose much of her territory and power. The war is notable in that the Athenians participated as Spartan allies, while the Boiotians and Korinthians both refused.

From the end of the war against Athens, there is a pattern of growing Boiotian resentment of the Spartan hegemony over Greece, and we find Thebes' attitude mirrored to a lesser extent in Korinth. In 404 Thebes had quarreled with the Spartans over the division of the loot from Dekeleia and over the fate of Athens.\(^49\) Later that year and the next she had provided overt and covert assistance to the Athenian democrats fighting to overthrow the Thirty, whom she viewed as pro-Spartan puppets;\(^50\) neither Thebes nor Korinth had been willing to contribute troops to Pausanias' expedition against Athens.\(^51\) Some time in these years—very likely before the
overthrow of the Thirty—the Thebans had annexed a small slice of Attic territory around Oropos, and this may have led to further political conflict with Sparta.\textsuperscript{52}

Internal Boiotian politics played a role in shaping much of Boiotia's foreign policy; the Oxyrhynchian historian discusses pro- and anti-Spartan factions at length.\textsuperscript{53} But it seems most likely that the mere fact of Spartan hegemony over Greece was the main factor which pushed Korinth and Thebes into opposition; overwhelming Athenian power had united Greece against Athens three decades earlier.

While relatively strong states such as Elis, Korinth, and Boiotia could afford to make their anti-Spartan sentiments known, Athens could not. Thirty years of war against Greece and a year of terror under the Thirty had drained her, both in the physical and in the psychological sense. Aside from her annexation of Eleusis in 401\textasciitilde{}0—which seems to have been a near-bloodless \textit{putsch} rather than a true military action—\textsuperscript{54} she remained a model Spartan ally after 403, dutifully sending contingents to Thibron and to the war against Elis as requested.\textsuperscript{55} Even as late as 397, we find nearly all Athenians—upper-class politicians and popular demagogues alike—desperately frightened and submissive when they learn that a few citizens had arranged a provocation against Sparta.\textsuperscript{56}

As to Sparta's own internal politics in the crucial two or three years after Cyrus' expedition, we are faced with a near impenetrable darkness. When Athens annexed Eleusis, Lysandros' star had risen while King Pausanias had narrowly
escaped condemnation--this is virtually the only fact we know in this period, and even it is poorly established. It is impossible to guess which of Sparta's leaders (if any) supported the Elean War or Drkyllidas' inactivity in Asia or non-intervention following the Theban annexation of Oropos or the Athenian annexation of Eleusis. Certain modern scholars have attempted to dissect Spartan policy-making into the interaction of several well-defined political factions, but this amounts to drawing a cartoon on a blank slate, and the blank slate is the more accurate picture. The internal workings of Sparta are a mystery, a mystery which is not solved by the construction of artificial paradigms which have no historical reality.
Appendix A: THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

In the period of Greek history which this thesis focuses on, virtually all important evidence is literary. Epigraphical evidence is very marginal and will not be discussed below: inscriptions are few and those which survive are relevant to Athens and not to Sparta. Of our literary sources, only the few of major importance to this thesis will be singled out for analysis.

Thucydides:

The history of Thucydides, an Athenian general exiled for malfeasance in 423(4.104-107,5.26), is a continuous and detailed account of the Peloponnesian War fought between Athens and Sparta; the narrative discusses the rise of Athenian power and covers the war to 411. Thucydides is rightly recognized as the finest of our ancient sources, approaching in his writing the most rigorous standards of factual accuracy and depth of analysis.

We need not concern ourselves with a detailed discussion of the man or his method; a general statement will be enough. Thucydides carefully cross-examines and compares the statements of his informants(1.22), refuses to credit supernatural intervention(2.54), and shows a keen ability to use evidence, reason logically, and form plausible hypotheses(1.2-6). As an exile, he was able to gather information on the course of the war from the men of both sides(5.26). He intends his history not as a romantic story to suit fickle public tastes, but as a
sober record of the events of his time, aimed at giving men of the future a solid knowledge of the ways in which human beings and city-states react under varying conditions (1.22). As such, his writing is meant to be true rather than moralistic or apologetic; such little bias as manages to creep in (e.g. with regard to Kleon: 4.27-39) seems very much the exception rather than the rule in comparison with most other ancient historians.

Unfortunately for our purposes, Thucydides never lived to complete his history of the Peloponnesian War; even his eighth book—which covers the beginning of the Ionian War and hence is most pertinent to this thesis—is unmistakably in a rough and unfinished state. Unlike the others, this book contains none of the polished speeches which Thucydides used to show the apparent motives and views of the major belligerents; furthermore, the narrative breaks off abruptly at the end, in the middle of a narrative.

Besides these obvious signs, the account itself clearly requires extensive editing and revision. We find Athens supporting the revolt of Amorges against the Great King in Asia Minor (8.5, 19, 28, 54), but we are never told of the beginning of the revolt or why Athens decided to intervene; Athenian collusion with Amorges was crucial in Persia's decision to back Sparta (cf. Andocides 3.29), so Thucydides would have discussed the revolt at length in his final version. The same need for revision appears in the account of the oligarchic revolution at Athens: it contains several minor inaccuracies which Thucydides probably would have caught in a later check. It is also likely that Thucydides might have reworked the form of
the three treaties between Sparta and Persia made during this period, though this is not certain; the treaties differ greatly in form and seem to have been directly based on the original documents, rather than reworked into Thucydides' own style, as was usual with ancient authors. Even with these apparent defects in the eight book--and the apparent inclusion of the actual forms of the Persian treaties, which is a great advantage--Thucydides' account of the Ionian War is still far superior to those of our subsequent surviving sources.

Only in one regard is Thucydides' account sadly lacking, and that is concerning the political decisions made at Sparta relating to the war in Ionia; Alkibiades is obviously one of Thucydides' chief informants for book eight, and while he is at Sparta we get good (though undoubtedly biased) information, but when he leaves for Asia with Chalkideus we learn nothing more about Sparta's view of the events which develop.

Xenophon:

No other source is nearly as important to our understanding of Sparta's naval empire as Xenophon, both because of his great personal knowledge of Sparta and Persia and because his *Hellenica* is the only extant continuous narrative of this period of Greek history; hence it is vital to gain a good understanding of the man and his works.

Xenophon himself was apparently born into the Athenian cavalry class--note his essays on cavalry (*The Cavalry Commander*, *The Art of Horsemanship*), and the attention paid to the Athenian cavalry class (*Hell.* 2.4.26-27). This made him a member of the
richest one or two percent of the citizen population, but although it is clear that his sympathes were mildly oligarchic, there is no evidence that he performed anything but loyal military service during the years of the Peloponnesian War: a few of the cavalry skirmishes described in the Hellenica seem based on personal experience (Hell. 1.2.2-5, 15-18). The details which he includes concerning the rise and fall of the Thirty Tyrants proves that he was in Athens during most of their reign and heartily despised their cruelty and violence (e.g. Hell. 2.3.15, 17, 50-56); he was no extremist. But he had remained in Athens under the Thirty rather than join Thrasyboulos' army of liberation, and his social class would have made him somewhat suspect under the restored democracy of 403, so within a year he had left the city, invited by a friend to join Cyrus' army in Asia (Anab. 3.1.4-10). After Kunaxa, and the death of his friend along with the other Greek generals, Xenophon helped lead the remnant of the Ten Thousand back to Asia Minor; these events he recorded in his Anabasis, combining memoirs with apologia. He remained in Asia for several more years, serving under the Spartans Thibron, Derkyllidas, and King Agesilaos. He seems to have become a close friend of Agesilaos during this period, for he is obviously an eyewitness at several important conferences (most noticeably the one with Pharnabazos: Hell. 4.1.30-40), and after Agesilaos' death in 360/59, he wrote a lengthy encomium, the Agesilaos. The seven or eight years Xenophon spent in Asia under Cyrus and under the Spartans gave him a considerable knowledge of Persian affairs, and some years later he distilled this knowledge—together with a strong leavening of historical romance and moralism—into
his Cyropaedia, the education of Cyrus the Great.

When Agesilaos marched back to Greece with his army in 394, Xenophon travelled back with him, clearly taking part in the battle of Koroneia (Ages.2.10-15); Athens had fought on the other side, and henceforth Xenophon was unable to return to his native city, settling at Skilloos in Spartan-controlled Peloponnnesian territory instead (Anab.5.3.7-13). His friendship with Agesilaos and other leading Spartans together with his close proximity to Sparta allowed him to acquire a knowledge of Lakedaimon which was unprecedented for a non-Lakedaimonian. Besides describing the social customs of the Spartans at length in his Constitution of the Lacedaimonians, in his Hellenica he routinely uses specialized Spartan terms--the "inferiors," the "Little Assembly," the "Spartan-trained" (Hell.3.3.6;3.3.8;5.3.9)--whose meaning we can only guess at, proving the depth of his knowledge and the depth of our ignorance. It is very likely that Xenophon had personally met most of the few thousand Spartiates of this period.

Xenophon's Hellenica is invaluable as a source of social or institutional knowledge; but as straight history it is rather poor. His "Greek History" begins with the Ionian War in 411 soon after Thucydides' narrative breaks off, and purports to cover the events of the next fifty years, closing with the battle of Mantineia in 362; however, the work is not unitary. There is a very obvious stylistic break between the first portion--which deals with the Ionian War to the surrender of Athens and the establishment of the Thirty (Hell.2.3.11)--and the remainder of the work, which
may or may not have been composed as a single unit in the late 350s.  

The portion of the Hellenica dealing with the Ionian War contrasts sharply for its clumsiness and lack of detail with the account of Thucydides which it attempts to continue. The events of seven years--411 to 404--are compressed into little more space than Thucydides devotes to the year 412; and wheat not chaff is lost. Xenophon apparently made little effort to gain firm knowledge of the war as a whole: he omits the civil war in Korkyra (Diodorus 13.52-53); the very significant Spartan peace mission to Athens following the defeat at Kyzikos in 410 (Diodorus 52-53); or the Megarian seizure of the Athenian-held fortifications of Nisaia (Diodorus 13.65.1-2). He mentions the return but not the departure of Boiotios' embassy to Susa (Hell. 1.4.1-3); and devotes one ambiguous sentence to the Spartan capture of Pylos (Hell. 1.2.18; cf. Diodorus 13.64.5-7). The accuracy of his chronology is subject to much doubt.

All the errors of historiography which Xenophon displays in this first segment of the Hellenica are repeated and magnified in his account of events after 404, for now he ceases to even mention the passage of most winters, leaving us often unable to date an event within a year or two.

His factual omissions are equally striking. His coverage of the Asian campaigns of Agesilaos (in which he clearly participated) is often vague and spotty. The decisive naval war along the Asia Minor coast between 397(? ) and Knidos is almost totally ignored, and afterwards naval matters
are treated very briefly; no integration with the land war is attempted, while the chronology is turbid (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia). Xenophon makes no mention anywhere of the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378 or the refoundation of Messene in 370, both events of the greatest importance.

Instead of devoting his space to significant matters, Xenophon often emphasizes trivial but colorful details. He spends four full sections giving a vivid description of Agesilaos' training camp prior to the Sardis campaign of 396 (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia), but not a single word on Agesilaos' campaign in Phrygia following the battle of Sardis (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 12), though this weighting may be due to apologia as much as incompetence. A little later, Xenophon ignores Agesilaos' difficult campaign in Mysia (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 21), instead writing at great length about Agesilaos' role as matchmaker in the marriage of Otys to Spithridates' daughter (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 4.1.4-15). As Cawkwell aptly notes, the Hellenica, despite its title, is closer to being personal memoirs than "A History of Greece," and its silence on any matter carries no weight at all.

Apologia also plays a large role, often in the form of especially suspicious silences. Xenophon bore a deep admiration for Sparta and King Agesilaos, often forcing us to read between the lines to guess the truth of matters, and sometimes no doubt making it impossible. The Hellenica says not one word about Sparta's return of most of the Greek cities of Asia Minor to Persian rule at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War; not one word of the many atrocities committed by Spartan commanders in Asia; not one word about Agesilaos'
story that Lysandros had secretly plotted to make himself king by extra-legal means.16

When Xenophon does speak, it is as often in defense of his friends as in defense of the truth. In the Agesilaos (5.4-7) he defends Agesilaos at great length against charges of impropriety with Spithridates' son Megabates, a handsome youth, while in the Hellenica he emphasizes Agesilaos' interest in Spithridates' political knowledge and keeps silent about Megabates; the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 21 briefly states that Agesilaos was much more interested in the son than in the father, saying that "he was said to have a mighty passion for the boy."17 Similarly, Xenophon does his best to exonerate Agesilaos (and Sparta) from any complicity in Phoibidas' treacherous seizure of the Theban Kadmeia in 382 (Hell. 5.2.25-36; cf. Diodorus 15.20.2; Plutarch Agesilaos 23) or Sphodrias' raid against the Peiraius in 378 (Hell. 5.4.20-34); it is very difficult to disengage the truth of these affairs.

Xenophon's panhellenic sentiments also cause him to cut and trim the facts to suit his own conceptions. He inserts long, noble speeches into the mouth of Kallikratidas, depicted as his co-believer, and emphasizes his ability and valor (Hell. 1.6.1-34), though a close reading shows the man to have been rather a blunderer.18 Agesilaos' campaigns in Asia are portrayed as much more ambitious and successful than they actually were.19

Besides these biases, Xenophon at times shows a rather moralizing and superstitious streak. The hubris of the Spartan Assembly, "seemingly impelled by some divine power," is responsible for the disaster at Leuktra; the battle is lost at
the place where some Boiotian virgins had long ago killed themselves after having been raped by some Spartans (Hell. 6.4.2-8). After Iason of Pherai appears to be planning to seize the treasures of Delphoi, the God says that he will protect his own, and Iason is slaughtered in the very next sentence (Hell. 6.4.30-31).20

Despite all these difficulties with Xenophon, he does remain our principal source for this period. We can suspect him of inaccuracy everywhere, but we can directly check his statements against a more credible source only rarely (see next item).

The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Ephorus, and Diodorus: 21

Xenophon's devaluation as a historical source has been accelerated in this century by the discovery of several new papyri. In these Oxyrhynchus Papyri--the first fragments published in 1908 by Grenfell and Hunt, others in 1949 by Bartoletti--are contained fragments of an anonymous Greek history, apparently beginning where the history of Thucydides leaves off and ending perhaps at Knidos in 394, or more likely at the Peace of Antalkidas in 386.22 The author (generally denoted "P." for papyrus) is unknown and speculation includes Theopompos (whose surviving fragments seem totally dissimilar), Cratippos (who is little more than a name to us), or some totally unknown historian.23 But whoever the man was, the serious analysis and great detail of the portions of his writing which survive show him to have been far superior to Xenophon in historiography. One surviving chapter of P.'s history gives us more knowledge of the political structure of Boiotia than all Xenophon's works
give us about the Spartan constitution. Unlike Xenophon, P. devotes the proper space to the naval war up to Knidos, and gives us complete information concerning the passage of winters, the appointment of nauarchs, and the domestic politics of the Greek states.

The detailed nature of the information P. presents makes it virtually certain that the author relied upon eyewitness and first-hand accounts whenever possible; he probably followed directly the historical method, though not the style, of Thucydides. The history he wrote was relatively dull—there were none of Thucydides' speeches (as far as we can tell), nor passages of much literary merit—but accurate; and there is little overt political bias, except perhaps against the anti-Spartan factions in Thebes and in Athens, and here it may be due to P.'s informant. Where Xenophon baldly charges that the Korinthian War was caused by Persian bribes to anti-Spartan politicians, P. takes a more moderate view, discounting the impact of the Persian gold and pointing to political faction fighting instead; his view may not be wholly correct, but at least it is much more balanced. Although Xenophon served in Asia with Agesilaos, his accounts of the campaigns do not begin to compare with those of the Oxyrhynchus historian, whether in clarity, accuracy, or completeness.

Despite the substantial intrinsic value of those fragments of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia which have been found, they are limited in size and number and come from only a few years of the history. Their greatest value comes from the strong
evidence they provide that P.'s writings were the basis for much of Ephorus' history, and hence found their way into Diodorus' work, which survives. Of Ephorus himself, we have a few surviving fragments, but he is known as a pro-Athenian, a bit of a moralizer, and a man whose descriptions of battles (when not relying upon P.) were rather poor.26

Diodorus, a Sicilian Greek writing in the age of Caesar, is our conduit for Ephorus and other historians and unfortunately a poor one. Setting out to write a complete world history, including Greek, Sicilian, and Roman affairs on an equal footing and set within a chronological framework of Archonships, Consulships, and Olympiads, he encountered a serious difficulty: Ephorus, his chief source for much of the 5th and 4th centuries, wrote not chronologically but topically. This—together with Diodorus' own incompetence—makes his history virtually useless for precise dating: the death of King Archidamos II is recorded three years before the outbreak of the war which took his name and in which he repeatedly led Peloponnesian invasions of Attica (Diod. 12.35.4);27 the fall of the Thirty at Athens is dated to 401/0 rather than 403/2, and is placed after the activities of the Ten Thousand during winter 400/399 (Diod. 14.30.4-14.33.6); sometimes several complete "years" are devoted to Sicilian affairs before a continuous Greek narrative is resumed and vice-versa (e.g. Diod. 14.40-78). Diodorus' general accuracy is quite poor—he sometimes blunders in summarizing his sources—and there is substantial evidence that he occasionally chose which historian to follow based upon his own predisposition.
for moralizing, seeking to show the success of the good and the failure of the wicked.28

Despite all of these numerous faults, Diodorus provides us with a great deal of valuable information about Greek history between 411 and 386, years when it seems that his summaries of Ephorus retain quite a bit of the facts of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. In all portions of Diodorus' history during these years which correspond to surviving fragments of P.'s work--the battles of Notion and Sardis, Konon's activities at Rhodes, the outbreak of the Korinthian War--it is clear that the Oxyrhynchus historian is the ultimate source.29 (A few portions of Polyaeus, Pausanias, and perhaps Justin may likewise be ultimately based upon P.) Because of this, with some caution it is probably safe to assume that any passage of Diodorus in this period which contains reasonable and detailed information is ultimately derived from P., and hence essentially trustworthy.

Plutarch:30

A well-educated Greek from Chaironeia in Boiotia, Plutarch lived in the era of the Roman Empire, writing his works during the late first and early second centuries A.D. Although Plutarch disdained rhetoric,31 his Lives were not overly concerned with facts for their own sake; strictly speaking, they were not history but biography, and the factual material each contains is intended to illustrate the personal character of the subject rather than simply recount the life's history of the man(Alex.1). A strictly chronological development of events is not the goal, and Plutarch often digresses sharply from the main flow of his
narrative in order to illustrate a particular trait (e.g. Lys. 2.4-5; 24.1-26.4 cf. 20.6).

Plutarch's knowledge of the fourth century B.C. Greek world was obviously no better than that of his sources, but these are many and good. Among others, he uses Xenophon (Ages. 18.1), Ephorus (Lys. 17.2), and Theopompus (Lys. 17.2); the last of these wrote a continuation of Thucydides history down to Knidos. Plutarch also cites the works of Ctesias, the personal court physician of Artaxerxes II, who wrote a long history of Persia which apparently provides much of the material for Plutarch's Life of Artaxerxes (Arta. 1 and passim). The very large number of historical sources cited by Plutarch has led some modern scholars to doubt whether he actually consulted the original works themselves, or merely relied upon condensed versions contained in intermediate sources. The question is difficult to resolve for the more obscure authors, but for such major historians as Ephorus or Theopompus the evidence seems clear that Plutarch read them in the original. 32

As an writer himself, Plutarch routinely compares his sources and often cites disagreement between them (e.g. Lys. 17.1-2, 20.6); he also attempts to use sources with direct knowledge of the events they describe whenever this is possible. 33 Plutarch's knowledge of historical method may be informal, but it does seem at least reasonably good. We can generally rely upon him as an intermediate source.
Appendix 6: THE SELECTION OF EPHORS

In recent years, the nature of the Spartan ephorate and its impact upon Spartan policy have come under increasing scrutiny, yet several puzzling problems remain. The authority of the ephors was enormous—by any criteria they had the chief power in the Spartan state. In addition, there were other emoluments to the office: Aristotle says that by the late 4th century, ephors routinely made vast sums of money during their terms of office, and in general lived lives of ease. The ephorate would seem a very attractive position.

Yet there is no known case in these centuries of any Spartiate seeking the ephorate, of any ephor being elected for any positive (personal or political) reason. Aristotle contrasts the excessive and dictatorial power of the ephorate with the relatively modest authority of the gerousia; but according to him it is the gerousia which attracts power-hungry men of ambition, while the main problem of the ephorate is that it is routinely filled by "any chance men" (οἱ λυκόντες).

Aristotle's statements are borne out by such external evidence as exists. We have the names of some 64 Spartan ephors down to 330/29, yet of these all but eight are apparent nonentities, who receive no mention in our sources except during their term of office; and of the eight which do appear, only three—Brasidas, Endios, and Antalkidas—appear as men of major importance. Five ephors were appointed each year,
and by law or by custom reappointment was forbidden; this and the small number of Spartiates would have allowed many undistinguished men to serve as ephor. But the evidence of our sources is that this was the overwhelming rule rather than the exception; the number of distinguished men serving as ephor is about what we would expect random chance to produce.

Perhaps this is because ephors were selected by a process whose results approached those of random chance. In classical Greece, most democratic states (such as Athens) elected their highest civilian officials by lot, and the ephorate is always identified as the "democratic" component of the mixed Spartan constitution. It is clear that the process was not simply election by lot—Aristotle Politics 4.7.5 rules this out—but the evidence is that whatever the actual system—Aristotle calls it very childish—the result was that ephors were chosen essentially at random. Aristotle strongly implies that no Spartiate could announce his candidacy for the office and that there was no danger of ambitious men gaining it (in contrast to the gerousia); instead he repeatedly criticizes the Spartan system for allowing "any chance men" (οἱ τυχόντες) to become ephors, and hence hold so much power and make so many important decisions.

While Aristotle condemns Sparta for choosing her ephors in a random manner, Plato praises the Spartan ephorate for exactly this same reason: "Then your third savior, seeing your government still fretting and fuming, curbed it, as one might say, by the power of the ephors, leading the government nearly to power by lot."

Plato and Aristotle disagree about the efficacy of the
system, but both men recognize the same facts, that Sparta's ephors were chosen in an essentially random manner.

The word "essentially" goes to the heart of the issue. We have no way of ever guessing what the actual process was, and as mentioned above, Aristotle makes it clear that some sort of elective procedure took place. But whether the electors were blindfolded Spartiates or priests honestly interpreting the entrails of sacred chickens, the important point is that no Spartiate or group of Spartiates could influence the result for political purposes; from the standpoint of politics or policy, ephors were selected randomly.

From this crucial fact it follows that ephors could not be elected on the basis of any "policy" they espoused. If the ephors of one board differed on an issue from those of the preceding board, this was quite possibly due to chance rather than to any shift in Spartiate "public opinion;" and the chance selection of ephors might very often cause a dramatic change in Sparta's foreign or domestic policy.

Thucydides 5.36 contains an excellent example demonstrating the impact of chance upon Spartan foreign policy; he describes how Xenares and Kleoboulos, two Spartan ephors for 420, opposed the Peace of Nikias negotiated by the ephors of the preceding year and did their best to thwart it:

Thucydides' words do not in the least describe a general change in the views of most Spartiates, which they demonstrated by electing ephors who favored an end to the treaty with Athens;
instead, he is describing the chance selection of two anti-Athenian ephors, a purely fortuitous event which had a decisive impact on Spartan-Athenian relations.
Appendix C: Suggested Chronologies

Chronological Notes on the Elean War:

Xenophon describes two invasions of Elis by King Agis (Hell.3.2.21-31). The first began the war and was quickly terminated following an earthquake(Hell.3.2.23-24). Some diplomatic maneuvering followed, then "as the year was coming round"( ) the ephors called out the ban again and Agis led all the allies(except the Korinthians and the Boiotians) in a second invasion of Elis(Hell.3.2.25). The invasion seems rather lengthy(Hell.3.2.26), and after it ended, Agis left behind the harmost Lysippos to ravage Elis "during the rest of the summer and the following winter"(Hell.2.3.29-30); time contraints and the phrase periionti de toi eniautoi(Cf. Thucy.1.20.3) make it virtually certain that Agis' two invasions took place during different campaigning seasons, with the diplomatic exchanges occupying the winter.

Diodorus(14.17.4-12) describes only one invasion of Elis, and that by King Pausanias. The account is filled with numerous and very precise details so it very likely ultimately derives from P. and is accurate. The description bears no resemblance to the invasions described by Xenophon, so Diodorus' account cannot be a duplication with the name of the king changed.

In Xenophon's account we are told that Elis is unwalled(Hell. 3.2.27). In Diodorus' account, Pausanias laid siege to Elis but found it too difficult to capture(14.17.10-11); clearly Elis had strong walls. Therefore, if we believe both these
details, Pausanias' invasion must come after Agis' second invasion, probably in the next campaigning season.

Xenophon (Hell.3.2.30-31) tells us that Elis sought peace in the summer following Agis' second invasion, but that Sparta found the Elean terms unacceptable and "compelled" Elis to make peace on Sparta's terms; this "compulsion" probably refers to Pausanias' invasion. Therefore the Elean War lasted three campaigning seasons, with Agis' invasions in the first two and Pausanias' in the third. Elis probably surrendered during the third winter.

King Agis died soon after dedicating the booty from his second invasion to the God at Delphoi (Xen. Hell.3.3.1); this is the reason he does not lead the third invasion.

The Spartans been refused permission to attend the Olympic Games at Elis for over a decade, and this provided on of the main Spartan pretexts for the war (Hell.3.2.21). Therefore it seems unlikely that our sources would have failed to mention an interruption of the war by the Olympic games which fell in summer 400. Thus, the war probably either lasted from summer 403 to winter 401, from summer 400 to winter 398, or from summer 399 to winter 397 (NB: the war ended after the third winter had already begun). The death of King Agis occurred in the middle year of the war.

The possibility 403-401 is ruled out by the statement of Xenophon that the Elean War occurred while Derkyllidas was campaigning in Asia (Hell.3.2.1); Derkyllidas arrived in Asia in 399 (See following item). Therefore the Elean War probably took place in 400-398(or later), with Agis' death occurring in 399(or later).
But Agesilaos, who succeeded Agis, died in winter 361/0 or more likely 360/59 (Cf. Plut. Ages. 40; Xen. Ages. 2.31), while Plutarch Agesilaos 40.2 tells us that he had been king of Sparta for 41 years (or at the least that his reign extended into 41 Spartan political years, i.e. that it had lasted for about 40 years). Hence, Agis' death might come in 399, but it could not come later than that.

So: If the Olympic games did not interrupt the Elean War, the war must be dated to 400-398; otherwise 401-399 is a possibility, though the overlap with Derkyllidas' campaigns in Asia would be so slight as to nearly conflict with Xen. Hell. 3.2.21. This, combined with the implausibility of an unnoticed Olympic festival in the middle of the war, suggests that 401-399 should be excluded and leaves 400-398 as the only plausible date.

Chronological Notes on the Campaigns of Thibron and Derkyllidas:

As our starting point, we know that the Battle of Kunaxa occurred in summer 401 (Anab. 1.8.1ff; Diod. 14.22.1ff). The first winter after the battle--401/0--was marked by the Ten Thousand's march through heavy snow (Anab. 4.5; Diod. 14.28). The summer of 400 came when there was good sailing weather for ships (Anab. 5.3; Diod. 14.30.4-5). The winter of 400/399 was explicitly mentioned (Anab. 7.3.13). In the spring of 399, Thibron contacted the Ten Thousand (Anab. 7.5.6); but by Hell. 3.2.1, Thibron had wintered in Asia, so he must have arrived in very late 400.

In early spring 399, Thibron campaigned near Ephesos for a short time before the Ten Thousand joined him (Diod. 14.36; Hell. 3.1.5); once Cyrus' mercenaries arrived, he campaigned in north-
ern Lydia for a time (Hell.3.1.6-7). After this, the ephors ordered Thibron to invade Caria, and while he was at Ephesos preparing his expedition, Derkyllidas arrived to replace him (Hell.3.1.7-8; Diod.14.38.2). Derkyllidas then made a truce with Tissaphernes and led his army to Aiolia, where he quickly captured a number of towns (Hell.3.1.9-28; Diod.14.38.2-3). After this, Derkyllidas made an eight month truce with Pharnabazos and marched into Bithynian Thrace for the winter (Hell.3.2.1-5; Diod.14.38.3).

At the beginning of spring 398, Derkyllidas returned to Europe and had his term of office renewed by some Spartan commissioners (Hell.3.2.6-9). Derkyllidas renewed his truce with Pharnabazos, then traveled to the Chersonese where he built a wall against the Thracians until before the time of the harvest (Hell.3.2.9-10; Diod.14.38.6-7).

(Meanwhile, as soon as the second truce with Derkyllidas had been sworn, Pharnabazos had left for Susa, and from there had gone to Cyprus, probably returning to Asia Minor some time in early 397 (Diod.14.39.1-4).)

After completing the work in the Chersonese, Derkyllidas returned to Asia and then besieged Atarneus (held by Chian exiles) for eight months (Hell.3.2.11); Since Derkyllidas had returned to Asia not long before the time of the harvest, Atarneus' fall must be dated to summer 397.

After this, the ephors ordered Derkyllidas to invade Caria; as he was preparing to do this, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos marched toward Ephesos, encountered Derkyllidas' army and swore a truce (Hell.3.2.12-20; Diod.14.39.4-6). The nauarchy of Pharax came at this time (Hell.3.2.21).
Chronological Notes on the Asian Campaigns of Agesilaos:

The chronology of Agesilaos' campaigns in Asia is relatively straightforward. The sequence of events is clear and my chronology differs from the orthodox chronology in only one respect: I argue for the existence of a "missing winter" (396/5) around Xen. Hell. 3.4.28-29 and in the badly fragmented book 14 of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia.

My arguments are:

(A) In Hell. Oxy. 9, the nauarch Pollis comes out to replace the nauarch Archelaidas; in Hell. Oxy. 19, the nauarch Cheirirkrates arrives to replace Pollis. Prima facie a winter has passed, but the only place where a winter might have been mentioned is in book 14.

(B) Xenophon claimed that money sent out by Tithraustes caused the Korinthian War to begin (Hell. 3.5.1). But Agesilaos had remained at Ephesos until the thirty new Spartiates had arrived from Sparta, hardly before late spring, especially since he sells all captured prisoners naked (Hell. 3.4.16-20); then after he won the battle of Sardis, it would have taken some time for news of the defeat to reach Susa and for Tithraustes to travel to Lydia and execute Tissaphernes (this is the cause-and-effect relationship which Hell. 3.4.21-25 presents). By the time tithraustes arrived, it would have been well into the summer at least, scarcely giving him time enough for starting the chain of events in Greece which led to the Korinthian War. I am not arguing that Tithraustes did start the war; only that Xenophon is able to tell us that he did.

(C) If there is a missing winter in Hell. Oxy. 14, then Hell. Oxy. 9 would deal with the events of 396 and the "eighth year"
referred to is the eighth year after the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 (which is a very plausible reference-point for P. to use) rather than the eighth year after 403 (which is not nearly as important a year and hence a much less plausible reference-point).
Notes to chapter IV:


2. For example, Astyochos, the Spartan nauarch, was thought to have been bribed by Tissaphernes in 411(Thucy.8.50.3,8.83-84).


4. This grotesque caricature is almost identical to Hamilton's impression of Spartan government and society; cf. Hamilton(1970)295,303 and Hamilton(1979)75,81-87 for a few examples. Henceforth I will not bother to refute Hamilton in detail.

5. For what follows, cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.9-23; Diod.13.107,14.3; Plut. Alc.38; Plut. Lys.15; Ath. Const.34.2-3; Lysias.12.48ff, 13.5ff,13.33ff.

6. The Thebans had demanded a share of the loot at Dekeleia (Xen. Hell.3.5.5).

7. Xen. Hell.2.20.

8. It is also exactly at this point that the break between the first and second parts of the Hellenica comes; this may have added to Xenophon's compression of events. See Appendix A.

9. At the time of Athens' surrender, we are told that she was forced to allow all political exiles to return, and that it was these exiles who helped to call in Lysandros and establish the Thirty. Obviously, it would have taken a week or two at least before these exiles would have returned to Athens; hence the Thirty probably were set up some time after Athens' surrender.

10. Allegedly 1500 talents of silver at the time of the establishment of the Thirty at Athens(Diod.13.106.8).


14. Plut. Lys.20.6,24-26,30.2-4; Diod.14.13.2-8; Nepos Lys.3. Ephorus seems to be the ultimate source of these stories.

15. Xen. Hell.3.3.1-4. Agis was an "old man" when he died in 399.


17. There is no real way to precisely date the attempt at Dodona. All our sources tell us that it came after the one at Delphoi and
before the one at the oracle of Zeus Ammon; the first likely came during winter 405/4 while the second directly followed Lysandros' recall from the north in summer 404. This means that Lysandros either visited Dodona during winter 405/4 or between the establishment of the Thirty and the beginning of his Thracian campaign (which seems to contradict Plutarch).


20. Nepos Lys. 2.1-3 and Polyaenus 1.45.4; Plut. Lys. 20.5.
22. Plut. Lys. 14.2; it may be at this point in time that the ephors overturned his expulsion of the Sestians from their city.

24. Plut. Lys. 16-17; Diod. 106.8-10.

30. Diod. 12.59.5, 13.38.4. The severity of Spartan harmosts at Herakleia had been noted by Thucydides (3.93), but although Herakleia was not a typical city in the Spartan naval empire--the Spartans themselves had founded it in the late 5th century--it is likely the brutality of Sparta's harmosts there was not atypical. The 500 citizens summarily executed by Herippidas may have represented a much larger fraction of the population than the 1500 Athenians killed during the year-long "reign of terror" of the Thirty (Ath. Pol. 35.4).

31. Plut. Lys. 15.5.
32. Diod. 14.12. The parallel with Pausanias' career as tyrant of Byzantion in the 470's would not have been ignored (Thucy. 1.128-131).

33. As we noted above, Darius II died in March 404, and Tissaphernes would have presumably left for home soon afterward.

34. Xen. Anab. 1.1; Plut. Arta. 2-4.

36. Thucy. 5.35.

37. See Appendix A.


39. Plut. *Lys*. 21.1. Lysandros' dekarchies were clearly so unpopular that simply withdrawing Spartan support from them would have been sufficient to cause their overthrow and "return the governments to the control of the people."


41. The Spartans ordered all the other Greek states to return any Athenian exiles to the Thirty; only Thebes (and Argos) refused to allow this (Diod. 14. 6).

42. This is asserted in Xenophon's version (*Hell*. 2.4.24-27).

43. Xenophon and Diodorus only mention King Pausanias' involvement, but since it was he who was actually sent out, it is understandable that they ignored King Agis.

44. Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.38.

45. Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.35-36. There is a surviving decree from the state of Eleusis concerning the right of an Athenian army to travel through Eleusinian territory when summoned by the Spartans. See J. Wickersham and G. Verbrugghe, *Greek Historical Documents of the Fourth Century* (Toronto, 1973) #2.

46. So Lewis (1977); Hamilton (1979); Jones (1967) 96.

47. Paus. 3.5.1-2. Fourteen gerontes and King Agis voted for conviction; fourteen gerontes and the five ephors voted for acquittal. Although King Agis had supported the original plan to stop Lysandros, he clearly did not support the settlement Pausanias had arranged.

48. Plutarch *Lys*. 21.3-4 makes it very clear that King Pausanias was brought to trial "some time after" his settlement at Athens when "the Athenians had revolted again;" this is clearly a reference to Athens' annexation of Eleusis contrary to the terms of Pausanias' agreement. According to Ath. *Pol*. 40.4, this annexation took place two years after the settlement at Athens, in the Archonship of Xenainetos, hence in 401/0.

49. Diod. 14.19.4-5; he was probably the nauarch for 402/1 since Xenophon's account of a later stage of the campaign describes the Spartan nauarch as being Pythagoras, who was apparently the nauarch for 401/0 (Xen. *Anab*. 1.4.1-2).


Notes to chapter V:

1. Plut. Arta.3.5. Artaxerxes came to the throne in March 404 (See chapter 4, n.1.), and after he was persuaded not to kill Cyrus it is unlikely that he kept him at Susa for more than a month or two.

2. For his hellenization, cf. the eulogy in Xen. Anab.1.9 which emphasizes his personal traits; these (allegedly) were very Greek and very commendable. He also had several Greek mistresses (Xen. Anab.1.10.1-3).


5. Xen. Anab.1.1; Plut. Arta.3. Tissaphernes either revealed Cyrus' plot to assassinate the Great King or invented the story; either way, Cyrus would be a great enemy of his.

6. Xen. Anab.1.1.6-8,1.2.2.

7. Only such loyalty, plus a great deal of gold, could have enabled Cyrus to persuade his mercenaries to march 1500 miles into the heart of Asia.

8. Xen. Hell.3.1.1.


10. Xen. Hell.1.2.15. The Greeks were to fight in ranks four deep rather than the usual eight to allow them to extend over much of the front of the Great King's army. Cf. C.L. Cawkwell, notes and introduction to Xenophon's Hellenica (New York, 1972) 37-41.


12. Xen. Anab.1.4.2; Diod.14.19.3-4; Xen. Hell.3.1.1. The last two references list Samios as the Spartan nauarch, and the matter seems difficult to resolve.


15. Xen. Hell.3.1.3,3.2.13; Diod.14.27.4,14.35.2-3.

16. Xen. Hell.3.1.3; Diod.14.35.6-7.

17. Diod.14.35.6-7.


19. A suggested chronology of these years of the war in Asia will be presented in Appendix C.
20. Xen. *Hell*.3.1.4

26. With the exception of the period of Klearchos' revolt of course; cf. chapter 4, pp.63-64.


28. Much of what follows is discussed in Cawkwell(1979)44-45; but Cawkwell seems unable to believe the evidence which he himself has gathered.

33. Xen. *Hell*.3.1.5.
34. Xen. *Hell*.3.1.5-6; Diod.14.36.2-37.4.
35. Thucy.6.43.
36. Thucy.2.69,3.19.
37. Diod.36.2-3; Xen. *Hell*.3.1.5.
40. Xen. *Hell*.3.1.8,3.2.1; Diod.14.38.2.

41. Xen. *Hell*.3.1.8-3.2.11; Diod.14.38.2-7. For the details and a suggested chronology, see Appendix C.

42. Xen. *Hell*.3.1.8.
45. Xen. Hell.3.2.12-13.


47. Xen. Hell.3.2.12-20; Diod.14.39.4-6.

48. For a detailed discussion of the Elean War and its suggested chronology, see Appendix C.

49. Xen. Hell.2.2.19-20; 3.5.5.

50. Xen. Hell.2.4.1-2; Diod.14.6.3,14.32.1.

51. Xen. Hell.2.4.30.


54. Xen. Hell.2.4.43; Ath. Const.40.

55. Xen. Hell.3.1.4,3.2.25.

56. Hell. Oxy.6-7. A few citizens with the collusion of members of the Athenian Boule had dispatched an Athenian trireme to Konon; this was probably intended as an anti-Spartan provocation, but the very negative public reaction—which cut across party lines--forced the act to be disavowed. It had perhaps also been intended as a show of support for Konon and to give him some idea of Athens' potential assistance.

25. It is the issue of whether Agesilaos did or did not successfully exploit his opportunity on which Xenophon's account appears highly questionable. Cf. Cawkwell (1979) 16-17.

27. Xen. Hell. 4.1.3-4; Hell. Oxy. 22; Plut., Ages. 11.
29. Xen., Hell. 4.1.20-28.
30. Xen., Hell. 4.1.26-28. Agesilaos' reluctance or inability to force Herippidas into agreeing to an equitable division of spoils with Spithridates and the Paphlagonians is remarkable.
31. Xen. Hell. 3.5.3-16; Hell. Oxy. 16-18; Diod. 14.81.1.
32. Xen. Hell. 3.5.17-25; Plut., Lys. 28-30; Diod. 81.1-3, 89.
33. Xen. Hell. 4.2.1-4; Plut., Ages. 15; Diod. 14.83.
34. Hell. Oxy. 19-20; Diod. 81.4-6.
35. Xen. Hell. 4.3.10.
36. Peisandros had been appointed by Agesilaos to the naval command through the persuasion of his sister, Agesilaos' wife; Xenophon himself criticizes Peisandros' complete lack of naval experience (Xen. Hell. 3.4.27).
37. Xen. Hell. 4.3.10-12; Plut., Ages. 16; Diod. 83.4-7.
Notes to Appendix A:


2. For this and subsequent notes in this appendix, the source (unless otherwise noted) will be the author under discussion.

3. See chapter 3, p.32.

4. The number of syngrapheis appointed to revise the constitution was probably 30(Ath. Const.29-33) rather than the 10 as Thucydides reports(8.67); see Finley(1972)618-619 for a discussion of this and various other minor inaccuracies.

5. For an excellent discussion of Xenophon's life and his Hellenica from which many of the following arguments are borrowed, see G.L.Cawkwell notes and introduction to Xenophon's Hellenica(Penguin,1979).

6. Thucy.2.13. In 413 there were 1200 Athenian citizens in the cavalry class, 29,000 in the hoplite class, and uncounted additional masses who served as rowers or light troops.

7. For an excellent discussion of the essentially apologetic nature of the Anabasis, see G.L.Cawkwell, notes and introduction to Xenophon's Anabasis(Penguin,1972)17ff.


9. See chapter 3, p.49.

10. Besides being very muddled, Xenophon(Hell.1.1.35-36) directly contradicts both Thucydides(8.80) and Diodorus(13.51) in dating when Klearchos was sent to Byzantion; numerous other errors may simply be undetectable due to the absence of parallel accounts.

11. See chapters 4 and 5 passim.

12. The campaign didn't accomplish anything; see chapter 6.


14. See chapter 4, pp.64-66.

15. See chapter 4, pp.63-64.

16. See chapter 4, pp.60-61.

17. See chapter 6.

18. See chapter 3, p.52.


26. Cf. Meiggs (1972) 10. It should be noted that Polybius 12. 25f highly praises Ephorus' accounts of the naval battles of Cyprus and Knidos (which would have been based on P.), while he finds a great deal of fault with his accounts of Leuktra and Mantinea (which could not have been based on P.).

27. So Meiggs (1972) 11.

28. So Drews (1962). At 1.2.2 of his history, Diodorus says that he aims at:

...preserving the nobility of distinguished men, proclaiming the wickedness of the base, and serving the good of mankind in general. For if the myths about those in Hades, despite the fact that their content is fictitious, do much to turn men toward piety and justice, certainly History, the voice of truth and the "mother country" of all philosophy, must be regarded as a most effective means of endowing men's character with noble integrity.


32. The matter is discussed in Hamilton (1969) xliii-xlvi.

Notes to Appendix C:


3. Arist. Pol. 2.6.16, 2.7.5. In the latter reference, Aristotle says that the kosmoi of Crete are similar to the ephors of Sparta in that they are hoi tykhoetes, but differ in that they are selected only from certain families rather than from the citizens as a whole; this proves that hoi tykhoetes is not being used in the sense of "anybody" but in the sense of "any chance persons."


5. P. Poralla, Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier (Breslau, 1913), lists references to some 800 Spartiates who are mentioned by our sources down to the era of Alexander the Great; he also lists the 64 ephors known to us. If we restrict our examination to the hundred-odd years from 433/2 to 330/29--which contains the bulk of these references--these numbers are reduced to (perhaps) 600 Spartiates and 57 ephors. There were probably fewer than 3000 adult Spartiates alive in 433/2, the number had declined to about 1000 by 371, and that year 400 of these died at Leuktra (See p. ); it is likely that there were fewer than 6000 adult Spartiates alive between 433/2 and 330/29. About 10% of these attracted the notice of our sources, and roughly the same fraction of Sparta's ephors were deemed worthy of mention outside the term of their ephorate; all but a small handful are simply names on an ephorate list to us. Rhodes (1981) 498 makes the valid point that importance in the eyes of our sources and importance in the minds of most Spartiates are not necessarily equivalent; but it seems rather presumptuous to argue that all of our sources--including Xenophon, who knew Sparta intimately--simply ignored the overwhelming majority of Sparta's leading political figures.


8. Arist. Pol. 2.6.16. Aristotle Politics 2.6.18 also describes the manner of selecting the gerousia as "childish;" but there is no reason to believe that the two processes were necessarily similar in any significant way.


10. See n. 3 above.

11. Plato Laws 692a, emphasis mine. Rhodes (1981) 499 points out that after Leuktra, the Spartiate population was so severely reduced that perhaps one in three or four Spartiates eventually
served as ephor; this he cites as the reason for Plato's choice of words. Rhodes' figures are questionable—he is assuming an equilibrium model, which was not the case—but even if they are correct, Plato's passage is clearly referring to Sparta of the 8th or 7th century, when there were perhaps 6000 or 7000 Spartiates, making it highly unlikely that any particular individual would serve as ephor.

12. Admittedly Agis IV arranged for his supporter Lysandros to be elected ephor in 243 (Plut. Agis.7), but this is over a century later than the time of most of our other evidence, and it is apparent that the Spartan constitutional system had broken down by this date: a year later, Agis summarily removed five hostile ephors and appointed a new board of his own choice, and he himself was murdered some time later (Plut. Agis.12-19). It is notable that while we hear rumors of all forms of political maneuvering and intrigue by Spartan kings and other prominent figures of the 5th and 4th centuries, there is never a whisper that a Spartan leader attempted to get a friend or supporter elected to the ephorate.

13. τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμημένου ἴτερος (ἐποίηκεν τὸ ἄρτερον ἴτερον καὶ οὐ ἔγεραν αὐτὸς ἐπεισδον έπροντος ἐπὶ καὶ τίτος αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπανειλήμενος...
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