Nika Dubrovsky: Hi everyone. It’s a real honor to welcome you on behalf of the David Graeber Institute. We’re especially grateful to our speakers — many of whose work aligned closely with David’s thinking and values — for joining us to reflect on how radically our world is changing.
It’s in this spirit that we hope to better understand the transformations unfolding around us.
Today’s conversation marks the beginning of a new series of public discussions hosted by the David Graeber Institute.
With that, I’m happy to hand over to Ann Pettifor, who will be moderating today’s session.
Ann Pettifor: Thank you very much, Nika. And can I say how wonderful it is for Michael and Yanis and myself to be gathering here in the name of our very dear friend David Graeber, whom we loved very much and were so sad at his loss. And thank you to Nika in particular for establishing the Institute and for facilitating these exchanges and reminding us all of how important David was to the current public debate. So I’m feeling quite emotional even thinking about him.
So anyway, great. So I want to just begin. Everyone here knows Michael Hudson, I’m assuming, and Yanis Varoufakis.
They will speak about their work. And what we have in common, I think, is A, David Graeber, but B, an understanding of the international financial system and its impact on Europe, on the United States and on the South. And that’s what is going to be the major theme of this today.
And I hope to begin with Michael Hudson’s latest paper, which is superb. And Michael, you give us the title because it’s escaped me for the minute. But it really is a wonderful paper, which I think Nika will be distributing more widely.
So, Michael, you begin our conversation by talking to us about what is actually going on, really. What is the real motives of the Trump administration? And why are we where we are right now?
Michael Hudson: Well, there are two things that are key in this. I think that a few years ago, Trump was talking to some economists, and he said, isn’t there some way that America can get rid of the income tax? We want to get rid of taxes, at least on my constituency, the donor class, the 1%.
And the economists told him, well, you know, America didn’t really have an income tax until 1913. And Trump said, well, how did we get by from the revolution until World War I? And the economists said, well, we had tariff revenues. That was almost the entire source of the American government and the Treasury, along with the sale of land that had been grabbed from the Indians.
And so Trump said tariffs. That’s wonderful. Trump loves tariffs because they fall mainly on the consumers, not his class.
They don’t fall on the class that he wants to untax. So he somehow thought, how do we justify a tariff policy? And if only we can go back to that golden age, of course, we have to shrink government, at least the government social spending. And how do we justify a tariff policy? Well, I think that we’re now talking about him imposing tariffs to threaten other countries with destabilizing their economy.
And that’s the only thing that America has to offer now. It can’t offer industrialization because it’s deindustrialized. It can’t really offer much financialization because it’s weaponized the dollar.
Trump wants to weaponize foreign trade as well. And he’ll tell foreign countries, well, of course, we can roll back the tariffs and let’s sit down and negotiate. What can you give back to the United States? And it’s almost as if he’s read Yanis’s articles on the role of information technology is dominating the new economic shape of the world and that of empire builders.
They want to gain dominance in information technology and various platforms and in ship making technology with a view to making other countries dependent on paying monopoly rents to U.S. companies, especially those in Silicon Valley, which are Trump’s large campaign contributors. So it’s as if information technology monopoly rents are going to be the new buttress of the American balance of payments. If other countries can be blocked from creating their own independent technology.
Well, U.S. diplomats can impose sanctions on this. They can try to prevent China from developing IT. They can try to lock Europe and other countries into this.
And the magnitude of this issue today is as large as that of the 19th century fight against landlords. And it was the fight against landlords that inspired classical economists from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill to Marx and the socialists to define economic rent. And they said, if we’re going to free our economies from the legacy of feudalism, a hereditary aristocratic landlord class, then we’ve got to take away their economic rents, mainly by either taxing rents away or by just socializing the land and making it a public utility.
So they developed the whole concept of economic rent as the excess of market price over intrinsic cost value. Well, they didn’t succeed in getting rid of the landlord class, but they did define rents in a way that can be applied to monopoly rents. Again, excessive price over income and that the fight against the kind of monopoly rents that Yanis has described as the ideal of the platforms of information technology and all of its associated dynamics are a parallel to the fight today to the 19th century fight against landlords.
To free economies from economic rent. And in this case, from economic rent that’s been sponsored and controlled by the United States as a means of replacing the form of dominance that it had over the rest of the world since 1945.
Ann Pettifor: Fantastic. That does lead us into Yanis’ book and Yanis’ work on technology. Yanis, what would you say to Michael’s analysis of what’s happening right now?
Yanis Varoufakis: Well, of course, I agree. How can I not? Ever since he wrote the great book, Super Imperialism, and now he’s even alluding to my work on techno-feudalism.
Look, it’s not technology. It’s got nothing to do with technology. I mean, technology is everything.
Since the Iron Age, we’ve had technology. And it’s not information technology either. Because look, compare and contrast, for instance, OpenAI, which is, you know, heavy duty information technology, right? But in the end, it was so easy to append it.
DeepSeek came out and offered a cheap version of it and essentially damaged that business model spectacularly. So what I think Michael Hudson is very poignantly bringing into the conversation about the global order of things is what I call cloud capital. So you can have an industrial robot, which is very technologically advanced, uses information technology and algorithms and so on to assemble Teslas, right? You can have OpenAI, which produces a standard service in a standard capitalist model.
But what lives in here? What lives in here? In Google? In Facebook? In Meta? In X? In all these platforms, this is not just information technology. We get it wrong. It’s a new form of capital.
Because every form of capital we’ve had up until now, since we created the first tool to the old singing, old dancing industrial robots that assemble Teslas, they’ve been produced means of production. That’s what capital was. With this, we had a mutation of capital.
For the first time, we have automated systems that are not produced means of production, but are purely produced means of behavioral modification. So unlike the machines that Henry Ford employed to produce other machines, Model Ts, and create a monopoly capitalist system whereby he’ll use the monopoly profits in order to buy newspapers to influence people and governments and to rip up all the streetcars, trams, in order to replace them with his own cars. Unlike that, you know, Jeff Bezos doesn’t sell anything.
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