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Jérôme Fourquet, L’archipel français: Naissance d’une nation multiple et divisée (Paris: Seuil, 2019)

Jérôme Fourquet is a mainstream pollster with the venerable French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), the nation’s leading polling agency. He made a splash last year with his book, The French Archipelago: The Birth of a Multiple and Divided Nation, which presented a fine-grain statistical analysis of socio-cultural changes in French society and, in particular, fragmentation along ethno-religious and educational lines.

The book persuasively makes case that the centrist-globalist Emmanuel Macron’s election to the presidency and the collapse of the traditional parties of government in 2017 were not freak events, but the reflection of long-term trends which finally expressed themselves politically. The same can be said for the growing popularity of anti-establishment movements like Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) and the yellow-vests.

Following the works of many sociologists and historians, Fourquet sees French politics as historically divided between a Catholic Right and secularist Left. This divide had been highly stable since the French Revolution, if not earlier, with a dechristianizing core stretching out from the greater Parisian basin into the Limousin, with most of the periphery remaining relatively conservative. These subcultures united people of different classes within particular regions and corresponded politically with the conservative and Socialist parties who have taken turns governing France since World War II.

Percentage of Catholic priests swearing loyalty to the Constitution in 1791, a good marker of secularism.
Percentage of Catholic priests swearing loyalty to the Constitution in 1791, a good marker of secularism.

 

Political party of representatives elected in the 1936 parliamentary elections. Supporters of the Popular Front Socialist-Communist coalition in red, pink, orange and yellow.
Political party of representatives elected in the 1936 parliamentary elections. Supporters of the Popular Front Socialist-Communist coalition in red, pink, orange and yellow.

Since 1945, the collapse of Catholicism and the steady cognitive/economic stratification of French society have destroyed the reach and unity of the Catholic-right and secularist-left blocs. Macron was able to tap into the latent political demand of the wealthiest, most educated, and mobile 20% of French society, while the increasingly alienated and déclassés lower classes of French Whites have been falling out of the mainstream political system altogether.

Fourquet meticulously documents the social trends of the past 70 years: the decline of Catholicism, the Communist Party, and traditional media, the triumph of social liberalism, the division of cities into gentrified areas, crime-ridden ghettos, and the (self-)segregation of individuals along educational and ethnic lines. In all this, Fourquet’s book serves as an excellent statistical companion piece to Éric Zemmour’s Le Suicide français, which looks at many of the same themes through the lens of political and cultural events.

What’s in a first name? Quite a lot, actually

Fourquet uses a wealth of socio-economic and polling data to make his case. Some of the most innovative and striking evidence however is the big-data analysis of first names in France’s birth registries since 1900. This looks into the trends for numerous different types of names: Christian, patriotic, regional (Breton and Corsican), Muslim, African, and . . . Anglo. Far from being random, Fourquet shows that the trends in first-name giving correlate with concurrent social and political phenomena. For example, the number of people giving their girls patriotic names like France and Jeanne spiked during moments of nationalist fervor, namely the first and second world wars (p. 35).

More significantly, Marie went from being the most common name for girls (20% of newborns in 1900) to 1-2% since the 1970s. Unsurprisingly given the Virgin Mary’s importance in the Catholic religion, Marie was more popular in more religious regions and declined later in the conservative periphery. Marie’s decline thus seems to be a solid temporal and geographical marker of dechristianization (mass attendance and traditional Christian values, such as marriage and opposition to abortion and gay marriage, also collapsed during this period).

First names also provide a marker for assimilation of immigrant groups. Fourquet shows how Polish first names exploded in the northern mining regions of France in the 1920s and then fully receded within two decades. He shows the same phenomenon for Portuguese immigrants and first names in the 1970s. This assimilation is in accord with sociological data showing that European immigrants tend to rapidly converge in terms of educational and economic performance with the native French population.

Percentage of new-born males with a Muslim first name.
Percentage of new-born males with a Muslim first name.

By contrast, Fourquet shows that people with Muslim last names almost never choose to give their children traditional French first names. He documents a massive increase in the proportion of newborns given Muslim first names from negligible in the 1960s to around a fifth of the total. There is also an increase in the number of people with Sub-Saharan African names.

Somewhat similarly to Europeans, Asian immigrants (disproportionately from the former Indochina) are much more likely to adopt French first names and perform comparably in economic and educational terms.

Beyond these stark ethno-religious demographic changes, Fourquet also highlights more subtle trends that often fall below the radar. First names also provide a marker for the degree to which the French have a common culture or, conversely, of heightened individual or sectoral identities.

Fourquet identifies an explosion in the number of different names used by the French. This figure was stable around 2000 from 1900 to 1945, rising to over 12,000 today. And this does not count the proliferation “rare names” – those for which there are less than 3 people with that name – among all populations. Fourquet takes this as evidence of increased individualism and “mass narcissism,” more and more people wishing to differentiate themselves.

In principle, until recently the French were forced by Napoleonic-era legislation to choose their first names from the Christian calendar, medieval European names, or Greco-Roman antiquity. All of France proper used a common corpus of names, with little local variation. The list of acceptable names was extended by ministerial instruction to regional and mythological names in 1966, while in 1993 the restriction was abolished. However, the trend of more-and-more names in fact long predates these legal changes. Evidently municipal authorities already were tolerating unusual names more and more.

What are the names in question? All sorts. The use of Breton (Celtic) names in Brittany has more tripled from 4% to around 12% (p. 127), with sharp rises corresponding to moments of heightened Breton regionalist politics in the 1970s.

Similarly, Italian-Corsican first names have risen from virtually nil in the 1970s to 20% of Corsican newborns today, coinciding with the rise of the Corsican nationalist vote on the island to 52.1% in 2017 (p. 130). Corsican nationalism has risen despite the fact that use of the French language has largely supplanted the Corsican dialect. Many Corsicans resent colonization both by wealthy metropolitan French buying up properties on the fair isle and by Afro-Islamic immigrants.

There has also been a steady increase of the use of markedly Jewish first names like Ariel, Gad, and Ephraïm – which were virtually unheard of in 1945 (p. 213)

One of the most intriguing trends is the proliferation of Anglo first names from a mere 0.5% of newborns in the 1960s to 12% in 1993, today stabilized around 8% (p. 120). Names like Kevin, Dylan, and Cindy became extremely popular, evidently influenced by American pop stars and soap operas (The Young and the Restless was a big hit in France under the title Les Feux de l’Amour). Significantly, Anglo names are more popular among the lower classes, going against the previous trend of French elites setting top-down fashion trends for names. Indeed, many yellow-vest and RN cadres in France have conspicuously (pseudo-)Anglo first names, such as Steeve [sic] Briois (mayor of the northern industrial city of Hénin-Beaumont), Jordan Bardella (RN youth leader and lead candidate in the 2019 EU parliamentary elections), and Davy Rodriguez (youth deputy leader).

A fragmented France: Globalists, populists, and Muslims

Fourquet sees France as an “archipelago” of subcultures diverging from one another. Among these: Macron-supporting educated metropolitan elites, the remaining rump of practicing Catholics (6-12% of the population), conservative-supporting retirees, expats outside of France (whose numbers have more than tripled to around 1.3 million since 2002), alienated lower-class suburban and rural Whites (often supporting the yellow-vests and/or Marine Le Pen), and innumerable ethnic communities, mostly African or Islamic, scattered across France’s cities.

The French are less and less united by common schools, media, and life experiences. The fifth or so of most educated, wealthy, and deracinated French finally manifested politically with Macron’s triumph in 2017. But will these other subcultures become politically effective? Fourquet concludes that

Thus, over the past 30 years, many islands of the French archipelago are becoming politically autonomous and obey less and less the commands of the capital-island and its elites. Though indeed the scenario in which the [subculturally] most distant islands or provinces would declare their independence does not seem to be on the order of the day. (pp. 378-79)

Still, we can see major subcultural blocs consolidating. In the immediate, the most important is the vast suburban and rural bloc of alienated Whites. Support for Marine Le Pen correlates with distance from city-centers, the presence of Afro-Islamic immigrants (until these overwhelm the natives), and/or chronic unemployment. Fourquet says that “the yellow-vest movement has been particularly revealing not only of the process of archipelization underway but also of the peripheries’ inability to threaten the heart of the French system” (379). It seems probable the bloc of alienated Whites will continue to grow and develop politically.

Vote for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections.
Vote for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections.

 

Unemployment rate in 2016 by territory.
Unemployment rate in 2016 by territory.

The White “popular bloc” is not coherent politically but is basically entropic. The yellow-vests, themselves not an organized group at all, did not so much have a political program but a set of concerns essentially revolving around purchasing power, public services declining areas, and direct democracy. The most clear and political demand of the yellow-vests was the famous Citizen Initiative Referendum (RIC), similar to practices in Switzerland or California. This measure, whatever its merits, is more about means than ends and is entropic as such.

Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, the other great manifestation of this bloc, is characterized by a mix of socialistic civic nationalism and political opportunism. Given the travails of the Brexit and Trump experiences, one wonders how an eventual National Rally administration would or could govern, especially if virtually the entire French educated class would similarly rise in opposition.

The other great emerging bloc(s) is that made up of France’s fast-growing African and Islamic communities. I would have liked more information on this group. There is data indicating that French Muslims are considerably endogamous (most marry within their own ethny, though there is some variation by community). While the French overwhelmingly support abortion and homosexuality, only small majorities of Muslims do, an important marker of limited convergence. He also observes that a significant minority of Muslims are entering the middle and upper classes, and indeed that the more educated a Muslim is the more likely he or she is to be married to a native French.

However, other indicators of “assimilation” have if anything gone into reverse since the early 2000s: more Muslim women are wearing headscarves, Muslim youth are more likely to say sex before marriage is immoral than their elders (75% to 55%), and two thirds of young Muslims support censorship blasphemy and one quarter condones the murder of cartoonists mocking Mohamed. The War on Terror and renewed Arab-Israeli conflict appear to have rekindled Muslim identity in France. What’s more the sheer number of Muslims and the unending flow from the home country appear to be making them more confident in rejecting assimilation.

In the coming decades, we can reasonably expect French society to become polarized between an Afro-Islamic bloc, united by economic interests and ethno-religious grievances, and a middle/lower class White bloc. And I use the word White, rather than native French, advisedly: many prominent French nationalists and their supporters are of Italian, Polish, or Portuguese origin.

To his credit, Fourquet repeatedly emphasizes the scale and unprecedented nature of the ethno-religious changes in the French population. He also discretely observes the potential for conflict, saying of Paris: “This great diversity is the source of tensions (the demographic balance within certain neighborhoods is changing according to the arrival or reinforcement of this or that group)” (p. 377). And then hidden away in a footnote: “In a multiethnic society, the relative weight of different groups becomes a crucial matter, as individuals seek a territory in which their group is the majority or at least sufficiently numerous.” Indeed.

Fourquet concludes:

At the heart of the capital-island [Paris], the elites reassure themselves in the face of their opponents’ impotence. In so doing, they think that they can rely on the traditional exercise of authority without having to draw the consequences of the birth of a France with a new form and new drives: a multiple and divided nation. (p. 379)

This book left me curious, but also unnerved, about the further social transformations in store for our societies, even beyond the ethnic factor. The disturbing trends in France very much have their analogues in other Western nations. White proles – vilified by their own ruling class or left to their own devices – are in sorry shape. Western elites have lost their collective minds. Looking further afield, how will individualism and social fragmentation manifest in other nations, such as Israel or Japan? Will authoritarian states like China be better able to manage these tendencies, or not? To what extent will these trends intensify? What new trends will emerge in coming decades with advent of yet more new technologies? Amidst this uncertainty, there will certainly also be political opportunities.

 
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  1. Thanks Guillaume. Very interesting. Fourquet’s work suggests a France divided among several increasingly separate blocs but I would have thought the new development is really the growth of the Afro-Islamic bloc. Don’t you think the elite versus poor urban/rural native French divide has always been present in one form of another going back to the Ancien Regime i.e. nobility/Church and peasants. Granted, today’s elite in anti-French/globalist compared to the elites of the past. But, the Afro-Islamic bloc is a totally new element which indicators suggest, that as their numbers increase, they are less likely to assimilate to French ways.

    • Replies: @Guillaume Durocher
  2. Lot says:

    Great article.

    “Given the travails of the Brexit and Trump experiences, one wonders how an eventual National Rally administration would or could govern”

    I hope and expect that Marine would not display the sheer incompetence of Trump. She has stronger views than him, and based on deeply held principles. We in the USA ended up in a situation where the competent figures on the right wouldn’t work for Trump because they’d quit their old job, move to DC, get attacked by the elites for working for him, and then he’s promptly crap on them and fire them. Or to keep their job, they’d have to submit to absurd and constant humiliation.

    This is a Trump-specific problem, fortunately for the French!

  3. @Agathoklis

    Hello Agathoklis. There have always been economic divisions in France. However, there was considerable more social mixing in previous decades. What’s more, the left and the right used to unite people of difficult classes: progressive bourgeois might lead workers, while pious peasants and small business might readily side with the nobility. This is less and less the case. The Afro-Islamic presence represents the biggest change however, as it changes the very character of the people.

  4. @Lot

    I hate to disillusion people, but I doubt Marine Le Pen has many strong principles, though she certainly has more of an ideology than Trump. Unfortunately, much of that ideology is anti-EU civic nationalism. If Brexit is any indication, that means any Le Pen administration would likely waste a lot of energy theatrically clawing back bits of legal sovereignty from Brussels, with arguably little result.

    Le Pen is not an outrageous reality-TV celebrity like Trump. However, she has also performed regular purges of her party, whether for reasons of personality, tight control (she has a very narrow party line), or ideology (removes those too politically-incorrect).

    A big difference is that the central State plays a much more important role in French democracy and this is much more intertwined with the executive. To some extent there would then be less opportunities for the kind of sabotage Trump has faced. And admittedly, Salvini was able to achieve quite a lot even in coalition government in Italy, as has Orbán’s government in Hungary. Perhaps France will be able to replicate there success.

    • Replies: @German_reader
    , @Rob McX
  5. Franz says:

    White proles – vilified by their own ruling class or left to their own devices – are in sorry shape

    Yes, they/we really are.

    This is a fine article in a worrying way. What’s going on here is too reminiscent of the Calhoun rat experiments with the entire Former West entering the Behavioral Sink phase.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioral_sink

    What intrigues me is that Calhoun discovered the behavior of White Norway Rats in overcrowding situations nearly 70 years ago, Everybody seems to have heard of him but nobody quite got the point he was making.

    Where population is concerned, thanks to Calhoun, we now know how many are too many… rats. But of humans we have not even asked. Even before the accelerated rate of immigrants, migrants and refugees into formerly mostly-white homelands, the European-derived countries had populations higher than most historic empires. What’s that doing to our state of mind, collectively?

    It’s sure turned rich against poor, female against male, and engendered a kind of destructive individualism and sexual confusion. Calhoun’s Norway rats exhibited all these traits during overcrowding. When are we going to see a connection?

    So far as I can find, what Calhoun did was introduce large numbers of other kind of rats into the rat utopias while they were breeding. What’s normal for our overclass to do to humans is cruelty to animals.

    • Replies: @SIMP simp
  6. Anon[293] • Disclaimer says:

    The west since inception have bern marked by individualism , the democratic and republicans way of the ancient graeco roman world are the imprescidible base to the rise of the individual that ultimely have condemned europeans, if you convine with the takeover of the universalistic values of cristianity you have a group of people without any identity or an identity that is subjected to exportation around the world and ultimely devoid of his ethnic marker .

    Only if Plato is democratic individualism have trimphed
    His bersion of the spirit of democratic freedom encourages each person not only to play many roles in the course of his life because no role is as large as the soul, but also to reverse roles. When roles that usually define people exhaustively and in a starkly contrastive manner are exchanged, such reversal shows that the individual behindthe role matters more than the role, and that anyone is capable of doing just about anything.

    Europeans have trasformed the world succesfuly in a version of its own little world but will fail to comandate the world they have built for their lack a strong identity.

    Quite funny isnt it

  7. Indeed, many yellow-vest and RN cadres in France have conspicuously (pseudo-)Anglo first names, such as Steeve

    I know a French plumber in Australia named “John Edward” (not Jean, literally John). He came from a lower class area (forget where) and, as a hardcore French patriot, bitterly complains about feeling like a foreigner in his own country. (He could pass undetected in the Scotland of 1950 with his red hair and freckles.)

    He likes to say “I know my people. They will not take this forever. They will rise up.” Yet when I suggested that maybe it’s time to vote Le Pen, he wagged his finger at me. Anyone with activist experience will know that this is an all too common phenomenon. No matter how much they seem to agree with pro-white principles, some people just have it lodged in their heads that there are some lines that simply cannot be crossed, even if these offer the only apparent hope of national salvation.

    • Replies: @Rob McX
  8. @Lot

    I agree. Having a party infrastructure in place is very different to coming in from the outside. I think Trump underestimated the strength of the opposition to him. Or at least I hope he did, the only alternative being that he was a complete fraud, as some on the right allege he was. Hopefully he’ll do better in his second term.

  9. I’m thinking there’s an awful lot of lip-flapping over first names in there with nary a mention of the fact that, from Napoleon right up to 1966, the only first names that French civil registrars would accept had to come from French Catholic calendars or classical history. When they loosened it up in 1966, they added regional names (e.g., Breton, Basque), compound names, mythological names, and diminutives. It wasn’t until 1993 that French parents could give their kids any name they wanted to, so long as it wasn’t deemed harmful to the child or someone else. (Nutella, for example, got a thumbs down.) As for foreign (non-French) names making it into French civil registries before 1993, they would have to be transcribed from original foreign records.

    There’s another way of looking at this. The French imported a buttload of cheap workers from North Africa during the 1945-1975 economic boom, strung them along on temporary 11-month work visas for 30 years, didn’t allow them to bring their wives or children, generally treated them like crap, and didn’t grant them secure residency and family reunification rights until the early 80s. You could say that caused some hard feelings and didn’t exactly smooth the path to social and cultural integration. Later, the French helped destroy Libya and supported the terrorist insurrection in Syria, unleashing massive waves of refugees and economic migrants.

    So which is it? Is it an innocent France suffering an invasion of the barbarian hordes? Or is it France’s chickens coming home to roost?

  10. @Lot

    I hope and expect that Marine would not display the sheer incompetence of Trump.

    In the TV debates with Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen was dishearteningly incompetent in all matters of the financial and economic field. I mean – she kenw what was coming towards at her. It looked as if she hadn’t even been briefed. TRump – oh Trump would have eaten her alive (Joe Rogan).

  11. @Monsieur Édouard

    So which is it? Is it an innocent France suffering an invasion of the barbarian hordes? Or is it France’s chickens coming home to roost?

    Oh look, a cuck maggot making excuses for nation-wrecking levels of immigration and telling the French they deserve it anyway. Very original.

    • Agree: Lot, Icy Blast
  12. @Monsieur Édouard

    Most of the refugees are not coming from Syria and Libya, they’re just passing through them

  13. Svevlad says:

    Future society will play out like in that weird game G String. Abandoned megacities filled with degenerates and malfuncioning sexbots, patrolled by deathsquads with orders to kill anything that moves

  14. France needs a Ho Chi Minh.

  15. @Monsieur Édouard

    So which is it? Is it an innocent France suffering an invasion of the barbarian hordes? Or is it France’s chickens coming home to roost?

    Blame the capitalists who wanted cheap labor and the new left that fetishized the Other.

  16. German_reader says:
    @Guillaume Durocher

    Unfortunately, much of that ideology is anti-EU civic nationalism.

    I suppose if Le Pen ever got into power she would spend much of her time bashing Germany (because that’s what “the EU” is mostly code for, in the end it always comes down to “Germany is trying to dominate Europe again”)? I certainly noticed that her niece Marion Maréchal proposed a “Latin alliance” of France and the Southern Europeans against an alleged threat of German domination (also interesting that she pals around with people like Yoram Hazony and various American Enterprise Institute types). So just like with Brexit demographic displacement might continue to be a taboo subject while the world wars are refought, if only on a verbal level.

    • Replies: @Mr. XYZ
  17. As you point out, “The disturbing trends in France very much have their analogues in other Western nations.”
    One specificity of France is the high level of expectation of the population towards the State. In particular, the welfare State is extremely generous and very poorly controlled acting as a major magnet for Third World immigration. Not many people in the populist right are willing to recognize this fact and Marine Le Pen is frankly Left-wing on economic matters, and this is repulsive for many more traditionally right wing voters.
    I guess there is an opportunity to attract both sensibilities around the denunciation of widespread fraud and mismanagement of the welfare system (mostly by foreigners or recent immigrants)

  18. TGD says:

    I understand that French school children are taught English as their first foreign language starting at 11 years old. It used to be German first. This is what will change France more than anything else.

    • Replies: @Guillaume Durocher
  19. songbird says:

    IMO, there were definitely too few personal names in use, before about 1900. Makes it difficult to do genealogy in some cases.

    In Ireland, it often happened that more than one person living near a small village would have the same name (first and last). People were regularly given unique nicknames back then, to help tell them apart. Another common technique was to give someone a second name, based on the name of their father or grandfather. I guess both techniques (by no means exclusive of each other) were predicated on greater communitarianism, and to a certain extent stronger familial relationships.

  20. SIMP simp says:
    @Franz

    All major psych experiments of that era are bull. What happened was that Calhoun started with tiny populations of closely related animals and after a few generations they started to suffer from severe inbreeding.

    • Replies: @Coconuts
  21. @TGD

    Indeed. As late as the 70s around 15% of French high-schoolers learned German as their first foreign language (80% English, the rest negligible). Today, 99% learn English and Spanish has risen to be by far the most popular second foreign language (47%, against German’s 15%).

    • Replies: @German_reader
  22. Coconuts says:
    @SIMP simp

    I believe Michael Woodley of Menie has done some related (but refined) experiments more recently to test his social epistasis theory. Some of the results seem to support aspects of what Calhoun observed, though according to Woodley the whole colony going extinct during the infamous ‘mouse utopia’ experiment was probably due to specific genetic factors Calhoun didn’t originally control for, as noted here.

  23. German_reader says:
    @Guillaume Durocher

    Somewhat OT, but do pupils still learn Latin in the French school system or is that seen as too elitist nowadays?

  24. songbird says:

    I’ve never tried to analyze it, to test my theory, but I suspect that within the US, that, even among whites, there has been a flight from the name “George” (associated with George Washington), as people have stopped perceiving a coherent American culture into which they can integrate, and as Washington has been criticized for owning slaves, and as the foundational myths of America have generally been eroded, in the schools and elsewhere.

    I wonder if any one has tracked trends among Jewish names in America. I’d guess that there are more gentiles adopting them. (Though it isn’t necessarily imitative because of the OT) Probably the Orthodox, who are more fertile, use them more.

  25. Bill P says:

    Back when I lived in France there was some dispute over names, a couple having named their daughter Cerise (cherry). It was declared illegal at the time.

    Some of my classmates had Breton names, and I remember the teacher treated one in particular like shit. He wasn’t a bad boy as I recall, but she slapped and insulted him in front of the entire class. It made a big impression on me as a 10yo. Kind of bothers me because I’m of Welsh heritage, and the Bretons are cousins to the Welsh. Seemed to me that he was being singled out for derision. Would she have dared do this to an African or Muslim even back in the 80s? I doubt it.

    Kind of puts the low support for Le Pen in Brittany in perspective. My grandfather was born in the Ile-aux-Moines during WWI, BTW. French should have been more accommodating to Bretons.

    • Replies: @Johann Ricke
  26. TGD says:

    Back when I lived in France there was some dispute over names, a couple having named their daughter Cerise (cherry). It was declared illegal at the time.

    I don’t know if the Académie Française is that strict anymore. But it kept French from being bastardized. I admire the French for that. In the English speaking world, you can choose or invent whatever name you like for your children. This is especially true for black children. Some of the names are downright weird. White parents are following down the same path.

  27. Seraphim says:

    France’s decline started in earnest when it adopted the slogans:
    “Écrasez l’infâme!”
    “Les hommes ne seront jamais libres tant que le dernier roi ne sera pas étranglé avec les entrailles du dernier prêtre”
    “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité ou la mort”.
    It certainly started earlier, when to the dismay of all Christendom, la ”Fille aînée de l’Église” signed an alliance treaty with the enemies of the Church, stabbing in the back the fighters against the Islamic mudslide over Europe, supporting the Ottomans thereafter in every circumstances and swooning over the beauties of Islam, Soufisme, and over the advantages of the lucrative commerce with the ‘Orient’ (‘la traite des Noires’, among them).
    The French invented ‘l’Islamophobie’: “Alain Quellien, ”La Politique musulmane dans l’Afrique occidentale française”, 1910: « L’islamophobie » « un préjugé contre l’Islam répandu chez les peuples de civilisation occidentale et chrétienne »… « pour d’aucuns, le musulman est l’ennemi naturel et irréconciliable du chrétien et de l’Européen, [que] l’islamisme est la négation de la civilisation [et que] la mauvaise foi et la cruauté sont tout ce qu’on peut attendre de mieux des mahométans », castigating the French colonial personnel for their attitude towards Muslims, paradoxically maintaining that “Islam is the best ally of colonialism” and for that reason “believers must be protected from the nefarious influence of modern ideas; their way of life must be respected”. In his views “the religion of the Koran, a ‘practical and indulgent’ religion, better adapted to indigenous peoples, while Christianity is ‘too complicated, too abstract, too austere for the rudimentary and materialist mentality of the Negro’”.
    Tu l’a voulu Georges Dandin.

    • Replies: @Coconuts
  28. Anonymous[479] • Disclaimer says:

    Brexit was worth it, however, just as a last ditch desperate act of defiance and contempt towards The Economist ridden British political class – which is wholly and solely responsible for the terrible reality of modern Britain.

    A sheer act of defiance, like the condemned man spitting in the eye of his executioner. Just the aggravation and anger it provoked in the shitcunts is justification enough. Every time I see on of those shitcunts in hysterics on TV, sheer pleasure courses through my blood.

  29. @Bill P

    Would she have dared do this to an African or Muslim even back in the 80s? I doubt it.

    I have a feeling the parents would have taken it a lot more personally. Nobody likes to be beaten, or worse.

  30. Rob McX says:
    @Guillaume Durocher

    Unfortunately, much of that ideology is anti-EU civic nationalism. If Brexit is any indication, that means any Le Pen administration would likely waste a lot of energy theatrically clawing back bits of legal sovereignty from Brussels, with arguably little result.

    Very similar to British Brexiters, then. Stopping non-white immigration is infinitely more important than getting control back from Brussels (and handing it over to British bureaucrats who will do the same as their EU counterparts). In retrospect, I think it would have been better if British patriots had stayed in the EU and concentrated all their efforts on stopping immigration.

    • Replies: @Anonymous
  31. Rob McX says:
    @silviosilver

    Yet when I suggested that maybe it’s time to vote Le Pen, he wagged his finger at me. Anyone with activist experience will know that this is an all too common phenomenon.

    I’ve encountered this too many times to remember. What’s wrong with people? It seems established political parties have an almost hypnotic control over people. People see the idea of voting for an outsider party the way they’d look at leaving home and moving in with a stranger’s family for no reason.

  32. Anonymous[247] • Disclaimer says:
    @Rob McX

    Sorry, but the main – and rapidly escalating – source of black/brown immigration into the UK, is/was ‘re-emigration’ of the trash,( so called ‘refugees’ etc), from the continent, with EU passports, into the UK.
    Many a paki or Somali performed that trick.

    And lately, a shitload of distinctly dusky Brazilians.

    • Replies: @Coconuts
  33. Coconuts says:
    @Seraphim

    It seems this attitude wasn’t unique to French observers; Ernesto Gimenez Caballero, the famous Spanish Fascist writer, is supposed to have coined the little rhyme ‘Guarden otros pueblos el oro, nosostros el moro’ in appreciation of the enthusiastic Moroccan commitment to General Franco’s cause in the Civil War.

    • Replies: @Seraphim
  34. Coconuts says:
    @Anonymous

    The potential implications of the new rules on UK immigration that the government plans to implement seem alarming:

    https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/478/potential-global-pool-of-recruits-under-new-points-based-system

    It could be that following Brexit the only change will be even higher levels of immigration from outside the EU.

  35. Mr. XYZ says:
    @German_reader

    Marine Le Pen doesn’t talk about demographic replacement AT ALL?

    • Replies: @German_reader
  36. German_reader says:
    @Mr. XYZ

    Don’t know for sure (I’m not French after all), but I doubt she does it in explicit terms, both because she wants to appeal to normies and because of the legal situation restricting speech about such subjects.

    • Replies: @Guillaume Durocher
  37. Seraphim says:
    @Coconuts

    Caballero and Franco and Spain remained staunch Catholics. The Moroccans were from Ceuta and Mellila, deemed integral parts of Spain for nearly 300 years and were not to remain in Spain anyway. They were few by all accounts, not millions like in France.

  38. @German_reader

    Marine Le Pen wants net immigration reduced to negligible levels. But, when prompted by the media, she agrees with them that the Great Replacement is a hoax…

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