Three years after Paris’ Notre Dame burned on April 15, 2019, with needless to say still no word on the culprit, France must again, as in 2017 have to choose between flawed immigration patriot Marine Le Pen and Establishment globalist Emmanuel Macron. Their much-anticipated debate is on Wednesday April 20. The Brussels bureaucracy’s sudden allegation against her of campaign finance irregularities has been widely derided
I doubt that Madame Le Pen's hopes have been dealt a blow. This is not the first time that courts or regulatory bodies have launched charges against her, sometimes very inconveniently. Many voters will see it as proof of the Euro-establishment's determination to suppress critics. https://t.co/gv5J8OQjos
— John O'Sullivan (@JohnOSullivanNR) April 18, 2022
and there are some Establishment media worries about a Brexit/ Trump-style upset [Macron’s struggles with young voters leave an opening for Le Pen by Ivana Saric, Axios, April 18, 2022]
Perhaps Le Pen won’t make it, this time. But, compared to 20 years ago, France is clearly on the move.
There was much to parse in these first-round election results. There is no question that radical immigration patriot Eric Zemmour’s final result, 7% of the vote, was deeply disappointing, at least to me. Le Pen received 23.15 %. There are a number of reasons for this score, not least the “strategic voting” (vote utile in French) of perhaps one third of Le Pen voters, who voted for her to prevent a Leftist candidate from reaching the second round.
But perhaps more significant: the collapse of the mainstream Socialist and conservative (UMP or LR) parties that had governed France for decades until the last-minute invention of Emmanuel Macron. The Socialist and conservative candidates received 55.8% of the vote as recently as 2012. But they reached less than 7% this time.
Bruno Gollnisch, Le Pen père’s former right-hand man, could not hide his schadenfreude:
“seeing the candidates of the two parties, … who have governed France for 60 years and co-managed the coutry’s decline, getting less than 7% of the vote gives me, I admit, some perverse pleasure.”[Twitter, April 15, 2022, my translation]
The Socialist candidate was already a non-entity in the 2017 election. This year, however, the Establishment Conservatives candidate, Valierie Pecresse also received less than 5% of the vote—which crucially means that the government will not reimburse her campaign spending! Pécresse was reduced to pleading for donations to make up the 7 million Euro loss, 5 million Euro of which she had obtained through personal loans.
Thus the two traditional parties of France (= Democrats and Republicans), while still powerful in local and regional politics, are irrelevant so far as national politics are concerned.
Macron rules on the basis of a hegemonic center while all opposition has concentrated around two irreconcilable “extremes”—the Left around Mélenchon; the Right around Le Pen.
Mélenchon’s triumph on the Left is suggestive of the racialization of French politics. in the major cities, white neighborhoods voted Macron while black/Muslim ones voted Mélenchon:
Damien Rieu, a social media maven who has joined Zemmour’s Reconquest party, declared the election had seen “the eruption of the ethnopolitical [and] electoral communitarianism, the first step towards [becoming] Lebanon.”
Indeed, it seems that around 70% of Muslims voted Mélenchon and 40% of his voters were Muslim. Tellingly, 45.8% of prisoners who voted cast for Mélenchon, twice the national average. This is highly suggestive of the ethnic composition of French prisons.
(The Government of the French Republic generally declines, on principle, to collect demographic date—see David Orland’s Connerly’s Racial Privacy Initiative: The Unhappy French Connection published on VDARE in 2003.)
Mélenchon, who had spent his whole career as a die-hard secularist, is now embracing his increasingly colorful electorate. While denouncing the very idea of a “Great Replacement,” he tells his activist supporters—who are still mostly elderly white boomers—about the glories of “creolization” in the mixed-race France of the future. [Qu’est-ce que la créolisation, nouvel étendard de Jean-Luc Mélenchon? by Vincent Bresson, Slate.fr, October 1, 2021] He no longer opposes the wearing of Islamic headscarves by university students, something he used to condemn as a sign of archaic patriarchal culture. His laïcité now basically boils down to a rabid hostility towards Christianity.
But curiously, Le Pen and Mélenchon both did well in France’s majority-black and mixed-race overseas territories (French Guiana and several islands in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean). This was essentially motivated by a desire for handouts (Le Pen and Zemmour both have voiced strong emotional attachment to these territories as the last vestiges of France as an intercontinental empire) and, significantly. the fact that some of these territories face huge amounts of illegal immigration from Latin America and Africa.
Indeed, there have been amusing cases of local black women protesting against pro-migrant NGOs run by well-thinking white women. NazBol Françafrique when?