One hopes that the Taliban will once agan hand out death for those that keep Dancing Boys.
One should know that the afgani pedos that kept Bacha bazi are going to end up in America making Rotherham, UK a footnote in the Rape of the Kafiri history.
Jihad watch says 500,000 UK women have been raped in the last 40 year’s…
https://www.jihadwatch.org/2020/07/uk-muslim-rape-gang-survivor-reveals-at-least-500000-non-muslim-girls-have-been-raped-by-m

This article wins the greatest waste of time award so far today.

My own opinion on this is that East Asian ‘visuo-spatial’ intelligence led to deeper contributions to pure literature (which lacked that ingredient), while Western verbal intelligence (for alphabetic, not logographic languages) stimulated the development of mathematics (say, the idea of mathematical proof derived from verbal dialectic, like the ‘argument from contradiction’). That is, mathematics at the higher levels actually requires abilities other than mathematical; and literature at the higher levels benefits from the additional level of visual content that Kanji provides (that facilitates poetry).

1. The West, Russia, Japan, China, all have radically different value systems: the reason why East Asia does not ‘invent’ is because it seeks not to radically invent, but other forms of expansion. Russia, again, has its own value system that led to its heights of literature, high-end engineering, mathematics, and so on.

The Western world represented explosions: either an explosion at the beginning (Ancient Greece), or an endless explosion: at the top (French, Italian), or explosion from the inward to the outward (German). Quick, virtuosic invention (as in music) is explosion; it is the sudden seizing out, the inward to the outward, domination over a single great moment. Gradual construction, levels of discipline and vision (starting with the Romans, and cumulating in the development of accurate measurement and visual representation in the Italian Renaissance), directs invention and prevents its excesses. German culture ended with Richard Wagner, since he represented such a complete satisfaction of the inward exploding completely and totally, that there was nothing left to express: the full journey of body, mind and spirit ended here. (The only other explosive civilization of the past was Ancient India.)

Russia (and also I think Hungary) represents turbulent eddies, vortices, psychological rather than philosophical, mentally unclear but clean in substance, the inward world that imitates and reflects the outward. It is the endless development and recovery from inner confusion. (Hence, the weakness of Russian philosophy was the strength of the Russian novel.) This is not the ‘explosion’ from the inward to the outward. It does not explode, it ‘gathers’ and mobilizes all aspects. The Russian expansion is the highest and deepest domination that ‘makes up for’ an inward disorder or blockage in a few crucial regions, makes up for the arctic squalor of the surroundings. (Hence, the Soviet style in mathematics and theoretical physics, without a single wasted particle of thought.) The obstacles are inward, not outward.

East Asia represents not invention (the explosion), nor the endless “brewing” of Russia, but the power of organic breadth of expansion (while invention is only one type of expansion, but the fastest). East Asia has many uniquely deep forms of construction (the ‘dialectical’ structuring in its painting, literature, strategy), while the West has two uniquely deep forms of architectonic (pure mathematics, classical music composition). Unlike what Oswald Spengler said, there was never any clear, or non-muddled ‘inward consciousness’ of China or Japan, since the real basic principles were a matter of conceptual formation: everything — every conception, rule, goal, distinction, and inward-directedness — was a compromise or ‘moderated point’ between opposites (hence the contradictoriness of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, one of them backward-looking even at an early point, one of them ‘moderated’ between inwardness and outwardness, one of them extreme — and each of them dealing with a different domain of questions). Another way to see this is that China never reached full civilization and satisfaction, nor had any ‘hardening’ to backward-looking satisfaction, or even any form of complete civilization: it combined or perpetually mixed this with its opposite: this is obvious at the levels of basic institutional disorder at each period (with violence ‘brewing’ beneath the surface), and the huge expansion in epic literature and strategic thinking that took place at later periods (say the Three Kingdoms). The same applies to Japan: it achieved enormous expansions, such as epic Samurai literature (The Tale of the Heike). It represents the wide expansion of an organism, that remains powerful at every single period, rather than completely revolutionary during a single one.

Rather, the Chinese and Japanese conception of civilization is not a perfected state, but an arrangement that works in the long term (which must be moderated, not perfected). The Western revolutions in fundamental science were dependent on a stage in history, much like the advances in Ancient India (that constructed entire notations and subject matter from scratch). It is not guaranteed to be relevant beyond it. East Asian advances (in pre-scientific discovery and pure engineering) are relevant in every single stage, but not absolutely dominant over any single one. But after a certain stage in history (say, after fundamental physics is mostly clarified and there are only advances in condensed matter, complex systems and such), there is good evidence that both the Russian and East Asian modes will be dominant over the Western one.

2. The two (China and Japan) never were antagonists. Japan helped China at a systemic level; competent Chinese leadership were trained in Japan (like Chiang Kai-Shek, Zhou En-lai), and without Japan there would have been no Chinese attempt at modernization. Japanese conquest of Manchuria was necessary to halting Russian imperial advances towards China. A Japanese conquest of China would subtract nothing from the culture but simply add additional elements (compare this to the Maoists, who tried to abolish Kanji). Japanese ‘massacres’ were balanced by the fact that they saved elite Chinese cultural figures like Lu Xun from nationalist White Terror. The technology transfer that went from Japan to China from the 1970s-90s was the largest transfer of production know-how in all of human history, and covered extreme high-end production technology that the USA tried to avoid access to (this is detailed by Eamonn Fingleton, in his book). The point is, without Japan, China would be nowhere today: and vice versa (Japan’s industrialization of Manchuria provided the model for its post-war economic system). E. Asian countries have ambiguous — not absolutely negative or positive — relations with each other. The West tends to misunderstand this because it simply stops at observing a certain practice without looking at different aspects of it. E.g., the same Chinese people who complain about Japan also buy Japanese products and entertainment, visit Japan as tourists, and Chinese students still seek Japan as the top destination.

This is based on the basic principles. Chinese and Japanese culture (including its philosophy and basic way of forming conceptions) is based on the principle of moderation: every belief, rule, law, goal, system is not followed absolutely but with exceptions, or with contradictory aspects. The same goes for Japan and other E. Asian countries: if you understand their philosophy and cultural values, “moderation” is something prior to the idea of civilization itself. That is, China was never completely civilized in its history (but mixed civilization, barbarism, decadence). The West fully rises and declines; China never had any comparable golden ages (only silver ages). China does not support full freedom or totalitarianism, but some compromise in the middle (escaping certain limitations of both extremes, like internet restrictions today are easily evaded). There is little absolute friendship or opening oneself up in China (hence the dislike for dogs). China is never fully educated, but never completely ‘dark’ (there is a ‘spirit’ of education). China was never absolutely safe in any part of its history, but it avoided both extremes. China is never absolutely racialist; it referred to barbarians as inferiors, but it also encouraged racial mixing with barbarians throughout its history, and the concept of ‘Chinese’ is racially ambiguous (not as universal as ‘Roman’, but not strictly an ethnic group either). There is a sharp moderation between the public and the private views, in which contradictions are cultivated. China never had absolute civic spirit, but its periods of disunity lasted shorter than in the West (where an empire permanently split into smaller warring countries). Guerilla warfare is China’s specialty, and it is literally ‘intermediate’ between individual criminality, and organized, civic warfare. That is, China is not any less criminal than the West, but it lacks any features of blunt, random violence as in the West, or purely gratuitous violence or torture. None of this is guaranteed to be absolutely superior or inferior; it actually depends on which stage of history one is talking about.

(It is exactly by working with moderated properties, like Yin and Yang not being absolutely exclusive, that makes qualities more elaborate and structured, with one thing converting to its opposite if pushed enough; e.g., by attempting to be moderate in every area, you push the extremes to a few crucial ones — like the vast scale of literary production, and overall longevity. Also, there is no ‘induction’ from a particular to a general since every particular fact is actually fully ‘general’; every particular belief or seemingly simple distinction, is structured by contradictory aspects.)

This has, it must be admitted, certain long-term advantages: the fact that China is never absolutely civilized (but is partly barbarous, and partly decadent) prevents it from declining to extreme decadence, like what is happening with European birthrates. The fact that they are centralized yet highly corrupt has long-term advantages, since China can adopt many ‘dangerous’ technologies that would not be possible in more rigid societies (like a long-term space program, human genetic engineering). China was never as militarily powerful as the Roman Empire or Russia or Germany was at its height, but never as weak as they were in their weak periods either: this again makes for longevity (of military power; that is, China’s guerilla warfare capabilities were always good and they were able to ‘gradually’ push out invaders).

But then ‘longevity’ itself is moderated: China is slightly more continuous (in terms of a continued stream of major and highly influential literary production) than India, Persia or Europe, and in the form of institutions, and in specific intellectual ‘traditions’ that depend on deep linguistic construction, but it is not quite as continuous as Japan. It is in many aspects (like presevation of architecture) not as continuous as Europe. Not only is longevity moderated, but also the attitude towards longevity is moderated: China boasts about being ancient, but destroys actual direct artifacts of the past, and it also adopts foreign ideas, technology, and so on.

It is also the basic principle of both Chinese and Japanese philosophy. Yukio Mishima, say, was a good example of a Japanese ‘Zen’ figure (and he is still so regarded in Japan itself); by purging himself of Chinese influence, he becomes a figure characteristic of China itself (the ‘revolutionary ideologists’ at the end of each dynastic period, including Lu Xun in the 20th century) rather than Japan. By supporting his own imaginary Japan, he renders himself helpless against the real, actual Japan in the flesh. By being a Western-style individualist and Nietzschean egotist (towards positive affirmation), he commits suicide in the end (nihilism), which is the extreme ‘emptiness’ of the self. By rejecting Buddhism, he becomes a very ‘Zen’ figure. By projecting a false image of the Japanese as inward individualists, he paralyzes the Western understanding of Japan, and so destroys the West and individualism.

There are some caveats to this:

1. Not all parts of technology are equally complex. In sectors like aerospace, East Asia has lagged behind. Again, the design problems, analytical models for design, and materials engineering, metrology, for military and space equipment (like avionics, sensors, composite materials, optics, electronics) is much more advanced than the rest put together. The USA, Russia, Israel and so on lead in these areas. It is much more complex than consumer gadgets, and it requires larger single obstacles. Single large technology innovations, like entirely new capabilities or layers of offense/defense (hypersonic munitions, radar, acoustics) were and are all made in the West or Russia. Although China might pull ahead here in the future, its strong areas are still different.

2. Not all scientific areas are equally complex or difficult. Namely, there (almost) aren’t any East Asian research contributions to pure math or theoretical physics, while you have plenty of these from the West. (See: Fields Medal recipients.) In fact, East Asians couldn’t even “invent the wheel” mathematically for thousands of years. They didn’t come up with basic notation, basic proofs, or anything. What they did have was stolen from India. No major scientific discovery was ever made in East Asia in modern times. It’s also a myth that more advanced pure mathematics is based on just mathematical intelligence (which at the simple levels is ‘formal’ instead of topological or abstract); in fact verbal methods, spatial methods, are also commonly used in discovery. (G. Polya thought ‘verbally’, Poincare thought ‘poetically’, and most thought not symbolically but used ‘soft’ visualization; see the book by Hadamard on the “psychology of invention”, of visualization by research mathematicians.)

3. East Asians aren’t inferior in literature, poetry, philosophy, etc. This is just a stereotype, since they have their own logographic languages. China has a long tradition of philosophy that uses verbal reasoning, but it consists in constructing complicated and abstract qualities (and how one quality transforms to its opposite, in Zen Buddhism), not complex objects. China still has “philosophers” comparable to those in the West, see Xiong Shili “New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness” recently translated to English. It’s a myth that China doesn’t have philosophy or complex conceptualizations: it does. And furthermore, the Chinese theories are also fruitful technologically (Yin-Yang thinking also used in martial arts, strategy, medicine). Also, the four vernacular novels of China were also strategic treatises (like Romance of the Three Kingdoms), and philosophical treatises on Yin-Yang progressions. Also see the work of François Jullien and Roger T. Ames on Chinese philosophy, philology and semiotics, including figures like Wang Bi. China invented a larger range of ‘secondary languages’ on top of natural language (while the West merely attempted it, e.g. the languages of Wilkins, Dalgarno, Leibniz). The West invented the single most rigorous language (formal mathematics).

4. China has been superior not in science, but in pre-scientific experimentation, and China was extremely deep in developing entire language (based on Yin-Yang progressions) for heuristics. Say, Traditional Chinese Medicine still is the source for many discoveries, like the ‘Gilenya’ drug (FDA approved). The single largest Chinese advances — such as gunpowder without chemistry, the magnetic compass, earthquake prediction machines, medical advances — are based on highly complex verbal models, like the Yin-Yang system. Some Western mathematicians (like Grothendieck) find Yin-Yang thinking highly relevant for developing heuristics, since this converts the question of invention into a question of ‘where’, in predicting where the same kind of quality or aspect should be injected at which stage. Pre-scientific experimentation is still just as relevant as science: heat engines were built before thermodynamics, airplanes before aerodynamics, the ‘enigma of the aerofoil’, computers before computer science, and so on.

I knew last year after all the bitching about no nigs getting awards that this year we'd get 'em shoved down our throats.

I never watch the AA' s anyway, nor the crap movies they celebrate, but I marvel at how quick the white libtard will kiss the black ass.

In an amusing turnaround, white actor Joseph Fiennes is playing Michael Jackson in a British film and the same AA groids, who are all for black actors playing white historical figures, are pissed.

A million squared is a trillion. A billion is 1000 million.

"that people have had in cities all across the country because someone they loved was harmed in a random, senseless altercation with a Black person."

You are insulting persons with your "Black" qualifier. You are also insluting people with your S"B"PDL name.

The cure to your misperceptions-

http://www.cimmay.us/carroll.html

http://goo.gl/hRGDX

http://www.archive.org/details/negroesinnegrola00helpiala

The only proper usage is "the blacks," and never black persons or black people or black man or black woman, just "the blacks".