Thanks for the words of support, Mikhas, but please understand that my role is not to inspire or discourage, but simply to offer the best analysis I can. Sure, I also have personal sympathies and hopes, but I try hard to set them aside and provide an honest analysis, whether it results in a standing ovation or a deluge of hate mail 🙂
Concerning Syria, I am “very cautiously optimistic” even though I see tremendous risks and difficulties ahead.
Cheers!

The way Russian airpower is being used is not ‘original,’ it is in fact doctrinal for every modern military and has been since modern infantry tactics were developed in WWI.

I think that you missed something here: I spoke of “the Russian military operation”, “the Russian force in Syria” and of a “small force”. You substituted “airpower”. I never spoke of airpower alone. Neither did I reduce the operation to its purely military aspect. Furthermore, I tried to explain that the main effect of this “small force” is not a military, but a political one. In other words, the airpower component of the Russian force has an effect which is way out of proportion with the actual effectiveness of the bombing and support efforts. I will admit writing the sentence the way I did (at the top and the explanation below was bad writing, no doubt here) was a bad idea. But I wish you had read the entire article before blasting me for sleeping in basic tactics courses 🙂

And yes, from tactical CAS to strategic FOFA, the use of airpower (and missiles) to support ground operations is, as you say, doctrine. But the reason why the Russian operation is so effective is not a purely military one, not even a primarily one, but primarily a political one. Furthermore, what the Russians also did is was to boost the morale of the Syrian military, a psychological operation if you want, by making the “Assad must go” option a nonstarter.

Likewise, the main “cover” function of that force for a possible Iranian military intervention will be primarily a political one, and a only secondarily a military one. The two, really, go hand in hand.

What I call the “elegance” of the Kremlin’s solution is not some novel use of airpower at all, but the way a small military operation is used to achieve an immense political effect. This is why a few hundred Russian sorties have achieved much more than tens out thousands of US ones: when the Americans think doctrine they think kinetics. Russians always think politics first and kinetics second.

Cheers!

The Saker

: thank you for your kind words, which I will strive to deserve.

I thought the Mig-31s were part of a total air defense system (S-300, Buk, Pantsir, Mig-31s; cover long, medium, and short range + interceptors/combat air patrols). I mean it takes more than a single weapon system to make up an air-defense system

100% correct. But that would mean a HUGE logistical effort to get all that into Syria and to achieve what exactly?

Hi WorkingClass,

I don’t think that pipelines are crucial to the issue, at least not at this point in time. What is taking place is a US attempt to reshape the Middle-East and crush the “Shia crescent”. Iran is, and always was, the real target. As for Lebanon, may I recommend this really good article I posted yesterday:

http://thesaker.is/the-capitulation-of-grand-liban/

Also, to get a sense of the rampage the Saudis are engaged in, check out this CrossTalk show:

It is against this backdrop that Russia has to act in careful coordination with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on one hand, and China on the other. The biggest issue now is what to do about Daesh (aka “ISIS”). Here, again, Russia will have to act with the local countries, even those generally hostile to Russia or those who, like the Saudis and the USA, who have unleashed Daesh.

It is dangerous, subtle and complex game which does not allow for one simple solution, but which requires a combination of carefully crafted mid-to-long term policies.

As for Israel, as long as Hezbollah exists it will never be capable of over running Lebanon. They tried and they suffered one of the worst military defeats in modern history. Hezbollah is one of the mosts capable military organizations on the planet and they have the full support of Iran. Neither Israel nor the Saudis will be capable of removing it.

Cheers,

The Saker

I never spoke of “Jewish”. I spoke of Zionist. The former is an ethnicity, the latter an ideology. The CRIF represents a small minority of French Jews and most of the power of the CRIF comes from non-Jews such as Vals or Hollande. Nor does the situation in France have anything to do with Judaics, by the way. The CRIF does not care one bit about Jews or Judaics – it cares about power and only about power. As for Christianity, it is neither White nor Black nor of any other color. Ditto for Islam. Please don’t involve any of what I wrote with racist or neo-pagan nonsense.

The Saker

So why the provocative moves in the Baltic States and Poland?

My hope is that the main purpose is to create a sense of crisis and urgency in Europe. After all, if there is a crisis then Europe does “need” Uncle Sam to “protect” it, right? I believe that this is all a strategic PSYOP campaign to give the western ruling class the environment it loves so much: a Cold War.

The US war planners I met and studied with in the late 1980s early 1990s were very smart folks and they openly told us in class that political statements have nothing to do with real warfare. I bet you that at the Naval War College they told you that even though officially the Navy had this plan for “forward deployment” and US carriers wings striking at the Kola Peninsula in case of war, it all was nonsense and that in reality the US carriers would never get so near to the Russian Backfire cruise missile range. A fellow student of mine was an officer on one of the carriers in question and he told me that in their own modeling the incoming waves of Russian cruise missiles always ended up sinking the carrier. One of my teachers – from ONA – said that he believed that the US carriers would remain south of the GIUK gap.
I just think that the bottom line is simple: the closer to Russia’s borders, the bigger the risk. I personally estimate this Russian domination zone as less than 1000km max and effective at roughly 500-600km. I may well be wrong, but I believe that US force planners will not consider any war-fighting scenario within that distance.

This is even true if tactical nukes are used. By the way, I also did some nuclear wargaming during my studies in the USA and we had the same results as you did: tactical strikes eventually always escalated into strategic ones. And while we were pretty good a modeling escalation, we never found a way to model de-escalation.

The real good news for Europe is that the Russians simply do not have the means to project their power much beyond their borders, so there is no “Russian threat” and no reason to fear “whom Putin will invade next” 🙂

Cheers,

The Saker