That sounds reasonable, especially since the French Army in Syria was commanded by general Weygand who was one of the few French generels who took part in fighting Bolsheviks during a large scale operation (Weygand is one of the few suspecsts regarding the Polish battle plan of 1921, however I am on the side of general Tadeusz Rozwadowski). Do you know more about this operation Pike? It could explain a strange lull which descended on the West front after Poland's capitulation. As for this lull, the most interesting question is what did it make end? Your theory would explain the sudden Blietzkrieg against France in 1940.

The official theory that Poles inflicted such great losses on Wehrmacht that it temporariy was unable to fight, doesn't really glue with the general Wehrmacht resilience during WW2. However it was true that the Greeks inflicted such incapacitating losses on Italians. Well, unfortunately there were not enough Italians for everyone to fight them. By the way, the Greeks used a lot of Polish weaponry, so it shows that Poland wasn't without a chance in a single front defensive battle. A single front plan was to shorten a defense line to Vistula, centering it around Modlin fortress which was packed with weaponry for such a case, among else, piles of so needed new armour-piercing rifles.

One must say that the explicit, timed British guarantees turned out really bad for Poland, since Polish military strategists took for granted the promised French-British offensive in TWO weeks. This promised offensive became the cornerstone of Polish startegy, since Polish army decided that it would really have to fight just 2 weeks. The previous, more realistic defense plan proposed the immediate withdrawal from Western Poland, skipping the border battle entirely, and dugging in along Vistula and Carpathian mountains, as well as around the insular Hel peninsula, offering a beachhed for an allied intervention. Unlike Czechoslovakia, which fortified only Sudeten, Poland did fortify the Vistula line and Hel peninsula as well, which were to become either the first or the second line of defence (the latter in the case of the border battle plan). The Vistula line plan also expected military intervention of allies, but WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC deadline. In fact, it accounted for the fact that Poland maybe would be forced to fight alone even for 6 months. And that was realistic, not a 2-weeks offensive, as proved by the preparation time of French-British intervention forces for Finland (were sent to Norway, finally).

As much as it may appear strange today, the main argument for the unrealistic border battle plan was the fact that the immediate withdrawal to Vistula could be later interpreted by the Great Powers as Polish renunciation of its Western territories, and they could therefore stay German even after Germany losing a war (sic!!!!). Remember, those were 'lost' German territories.

If you analyze the 1939 September campaign, you notice that the cohesion of Polish army kind of disintegrates after two weeks, despite putting a pretty good fight earlier (better than the French later; during night attacks - for protection from German airpower - in a man against man fight, the Polish infantry thrashed several German infantry divisions, among them SS division "Germania"), with only Hel continuing the staunch resistance until 2.10.1939 in the vain expectation of 'Allied landing'. This is the testimony to the fact that the Polish army expected to fight alone only 2 for weeks. Even the ever-wary Stalin waited for the French-British offensive; this is why Soviet troops entered Poland only on 17 September (17= 14 + 3). This very fact is also a small consolation for Poles since it shows that even the cunning Uncle Joe was so befuddled by British/French diplomatic chicanery that he wasn't really sure what was going on. That are also slightly exonerating circumstance for the Soviets, since it shows that they weren't really so intent on attacking Poland after all, and rather just took the advantge of opportunity, in the way Poland did in 1938, taking part in the partition of Czechoslovakia. Poles did it to the Czech, Soviets did it to Poles, but Germans started it all.
Against Soviets speaks the fact that Soviet Union and Poland had the clear non-aggression treaty, valid until 1944. And this treaty, by the way, barred Poland from joining Germany against Soviet Union. So in this way, Soviet Union betrayed the clearly stated Polish good faith, even though the Soviets denied any attack, claiming that they only "entered Polish territory due to the collapse of the Polish state in order to protect Belarusians and Ukrainians (sometimes they love Chochols, you see)".

Surely Stalin did learn something from the fate of Poland, when after 1941 he harrassed Anglo-Americans with incessant demands of a second front 'Now! Show me your attack plans! Now!!!'. This is what Poland should have done, too. No plans - words were empty. Well, romantic Poles surely were guilty of wishful thinking as hell.

Danzig. To understand the Danzig problem from the Polish perpsective, it is instructive to look a bit further into the past, as far as to the war of Danzig with the Polish king Stefan Batory in the 16th century. Danzig prospered only because the Polish trade with Western Europe was being moved by Vistula; you could compare Danzig to Rotterdam and Vistula to Rhine, or even better, Danzig of 1939 to Hong Kong 2019.
So if Danzig were to become German, that would naturally rise Polish fears that later time would come for taking Poland itself, i.e. Vistula area, since Poland is "Lebensraum" of Danzig. However, Poland was ok with the international status quo of Danzig since it built the port of Gdynia to sidestep Danzig if necessary. The construction of Gdynia essentially removed the necessity of taking Danzig over. So, no, a plan to conquer Danzig ONLY did not exist. The Danzig offensive was to be executed only as a part of a general war with Germany, in order to secure this port for Western supplies and reduce a danger for Gdynia (they were very close); taking Danzig was a necessity of war, not a necessity of peace. In the end Danzig issue became a matter of prestige rather than necessity for Poland, unfortunately.
In fact, Danzig plight had worsened after Gdynia construction - Danzig became a port without land, so to say. The very special status of Danzig after WWI reflected this conundrum - of German population economically dependent on Poland.
The Germans of Danzig found themselves in the impossible situation of hating Poland, yet being dependent on it for their prosperity, Hong Kong - like. It is well known that German mindset has serious problems with accepting ambiguity and cognitive dissonance, in the Danzig case, of being dependent on their 'inferiors', Slavs, so in the end NSDAP was very sucessful there.

However, I would like to stress that the very efficient construction of a maritime port from the scratch, Gdynia, does show the best side of Poland, namely the Polish aptitude for visionary thinking and constructive rather than destructive way of solving problems.

The only thing that is not true is that Poles somehow 'welcomed' concentration camps. If anything, that were Jews (as long as they did not know that that were concentration camps). There is a theory that at the beginning Germans peacefully 'invited' the construction of ghettos by selling it to Jews as a fulfillment of a long-cherished Jewish dream about 'autonomy' and 'exterteritoriality'. This is why inside ghettos were essentially garrisoned by Jewish police, neither Germans nor Poles. What is now depicted as the perverse necessity of the time - Judenräte and their Jewish police - originally was seen by Jews as a PRIVILEGE, a kind of liberation from Poland and its laws, autonomous goverment at last...
Later, of course, Jews realized that the German candy wasn't sweet at all. Unfortuantely, they had already eaten the candy....
This is an interesting theory which at least explains some paradoxes of Jewish "willing victim attitude", but it is of course a fringe theory of a Polish historian, Ewa Kurek, since one of it premises is that Jews, at least at the beginning of German occupation, did not act under duress. The theory is somehow supported by Ringelblum archive, where there is not much trace of Jews 'waiting' for Polish help (since they did not want to live with Poles, they do not wait for their coming). One of theory unwelcomed corollaries is also the impression that Jews - sort of - were duped by their own culture, the culture of slavish obedience to their "Elders", so to say. The theory also explains - sort of - Polish passivity towards Jewish suffering: the Jews brought that, literally, upon themselves, by having eagerily jumped on German propositions. It is too much to expect that Poles were to save Jews from themselves if Jews willingly built their own walls.... But of course many Poles did have compassion for Jews, as showed by the famous poem of Czeslaw Milosz, Campo di Fiori. Now, how many poems on Jewish or Slavic suffering were written by Germans during the Third Reich? Not a one, which does support thesis about the exceptional selfishness of Germans, as well that that Germans are tacitly convinced that they are the final measure of anything.


The entire Ringelblum archive, the archive of Warsaw ghetto, has recently been published in both Polish and Jiddish, with some parts available in English, too (the English translation project is going on, albeit much more slowly than the previous translation from Jiddish to Polish) - this is a mine of what daily living in a ghetto was like, in thousands and thousands pages. In short, enforced cheerfulnees with confusion & despair everywhere as a subtext. This is an archive not only of official documents, but above all, documenting cultural, political and economic life of ghetto, discussion about Palestine and Jewry.
There were cabarets, theaters, restaurants, political parties, newspapers etc.... the ghetto social life was rich. Its founder, Emmanuel Ringelblum was a librarian in his pre-war time, and decided to continue this collecting activity in ghetto, with a team of helpers.
However, American donors do not seem to be very interested in bringing out this treasure of the wartime Jewish social life into English, the only full editions up to date being the Polish one and the Jiddish one, the latter only in the electronic form. A bit strange, I would say; so much Jew trashing around and here thousands and thousands of pages of REAL ghetto documents, completely unlike some Eli Wiesel-like memories. The online versions of documents have been recently taken down, too.

https://www.jhi.pl/en/ringelblum-archive/book-series-rigelblum-archive

I really think that Jews should give a pass to Poland: the Polish saved the highest number of Jews, the Polish did help in those very few instances when ghettos took upon arms (two, Warsaw and Bialystok) and started to shoot at Germans, the Polish commemorated Jewish suffering in literature, the Polish pretty early did inform the Allies about the Jewish plight, the Polish undergorund state did create a special department charged with helping Jews (Żegota), the Polish underground state did shoot at Polish collaboreteurs and schmalcovniki; well, compare that to the joyful Arisierung in German lands. It was Arisierung as der Wirtschaftsfaktor (economic policy) that was the main vehicle of persecution of Jews by ordinary Germans since Arisierung policy created interest in persecution of Jews on the side of common Germans. Arisierung is still almost total tabu in Germany and Austria, since the majority of arised assets have never been returned; this is why German Vergangenheitsbewältigung propagates the picture of SS-crimes, and maybe of Wehrmacht, (from time to time) but totally sidesteps ordinary Germans, since acknowledging Arisierung would go against the standard idea of Germans 'temporarily getting mad between 1933-45' since Arisierung was a policy of creating economic gain for ordinary Germans through Jews persecution.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aryanization

Ewa Kurek book:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/1475938314/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_de_DE=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&keywords=Ewa+Kurek&qid=1572969965&s=books&sr=1-1

Milosz poem:
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/49751/campo-dei-fiori