Very nice summary. The good thing with the Internet is that finally one can read older documents and notice that many people did know what happened in those times and then the knowledge kind of disappeared. But you still have not written any article of the long time plan. There was a plan, a long one, say almost 400 years.

Replies: @Gefreiter, @PaleoAtlantid

A Reassessment of Anglo-French Strategy during the Phony War, 1939–1940, TALBOT CHARLES IMLAY, English Historical Review, Oxford University Press 2004,

A February 1940 report on the blockade by the Conseil supérieur de la défense nationale (CSDN), the body attached to the general staff and charged with overseeing France’s economic war effort, was typically pessimistic: Germany ‘is trying by every means to defeat the Anglo-French blockade and, moreover, [is doing so] with some success’.43 Blockade Ministry officials meanwhile expressed alarm at the increase in German imports from third countries. A balance sheet prepared in March 1940 for the first six months of the war identified a long list of holes in the blockade, including the Soviet Union, Italy and the Balkan states.

Darlan grew increasingly interested in military action as a means to weaken Germany. Indeed, during 1940 he would take the lead in pressing for the Allies to take the military initiative.

hanging assessments of Soviet intentions were the final factor in the growing belief that time worked against the Allies. Despite the Nazi–Soviet Pact, the French initially decided not to provoke a rupture with Moscow, reasoning that the need to avoid war had forced the Soviets into Germany’s arms and that Soviet–German interests would eventually clash. Assessments quickly changed, however, following the Soviet attack on Finland in November 1939. Daladier remarked bitterly that the Soviet Union ‘had thrown off its mask’ and must now be considered as an enemy. More ominous still, a German–Soviet economic partnership now appeared to be a real possibility. News of the signing of an economic accord between Moscow and Berlin in January 1940 confirmed suspicions, prompting Daladier to speak of Germany’s ‘growing control’ of the Soviet economy.

"The fear inspired by the combination of German organizational skills and Soviet resources is clearly evident in a January 1940 analysis by Maurice Dejean, a Quai official and close advisor to Daladier:
The day when German engineers take control of Russian factories . . . when Russian troops welcome German officers, the shape of the war will change. No doubt it will take some time for Germany to benefit from Russia’s potential. But nothing says that Hitler, while waiting for this, will not continue his policy of delay and prolong the war. Nor is it absolutely certain that, between now and then, we ourselves can win the war without very great sacrifices."

The opportunity to express this view more fully came in late December 1939 when Gamelin solicited Admiral Darlan’s advice on how best to aid the Finns. In his response, the naval chief largely ignored Finland, concentrating instead on the need to forestall the developing Soviet-German alliance, to cut German raw material imports, and to force Germany to disperse its forces by opening new fronts.

Once again, the French took the lead. Following the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish War in November 1939, French planners began to consider the possibility of military action against the Soviet Union. From the outset, moreover, the aim was not to help the Finns but to inflict a blow against the Soviets. With this in mind, in January 1940 Daladier instructed Darlan and Gamelin to draw up staff studies of three possible operations: naval action in the Black Sea, fomenting local anti-Soviet disturbances in the Caucasus and air attacks on the Soviet oil industry.

Naval action in the Black Sea to intercept Soviet oil transports was initially viewed as part of the effort to open a Balkan front. But if by March 1940 both the Quai and the naval staff appeared interested, the stumbling block proved to be the need for Turkish bases for Allied submarines, which Ankara was loath to offer.

This left air attacks on the Soviet oil industry – the ‘Baku project’. The initial task of planning the operation naturally fell to the air force. Keenly aware of France’s relative weakness in the air, General Joseph Vuillemin, the air force chief, was generally loath to see the Allies take the military initiative

Although Quai officials initially opposed a ‘rupture’ with Moscow, the fear that the Soviets might eventually supply large quantities of oil and other goods to Germany produced a change of perspective.110 Mesmerized by the potential benefits of the Baku project, they now insisted that the destruction of the oil fields would deal a crushing blow not only to the Soviet Union but also to Germany. As a March 1940 Quai paper read:

"As for the destruction of the oil fields in the Caucasus, the immediate result would be to disrupt Russia’s industrial and agricultural economy and progressively to paralyze its functioning. It will eliminate all the hopes Germany has of rationally organizing Russian production for its benefit and will, from this viewpoint, have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war."

As a result, in April 1940, the local French air force commander in the Levant received a ‘voluminous dossier’ on the Baku project with instructions to proceed with preparations. Air bases were accordingly readied in Syria and bomber aircraft modified to increase their range, thereby allowing them to reach the Caucasus. By mid-April, Weygand, now back in the Middle East, could inform Paris that everything would be ready for operations to begin by the end of June or the beginning of July provided that sufficient bombers were available.

The Baku project generated enthusiasm not only in Paris but also in London.

Replies: @Colin Wright, @PaleoAtlantid