If CAIR et al succeed in setting a precedent by removing themselves from this list (rather than simply increasing the threshold for public release of the names) it would have major repercussions.
First, it would foul-up the Holy Land Foundation prosecution by excluding substantial evidence presented under the hearsay exclusion. Second, it would complicate future prosecutions – throwing into question a basic tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal. This would make prosecutions of networks of organizations (such as those supporting Hamas fundraising in the U.S.) more difficult. Prosecutors would be less willing to name organizations unindicted co-conspirators and thus be able to bring less evidence to bear. It is worth noting that Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have a long history of operating in a network of semi-affiliated organizations (as co-blogger Douglas Farah notes here). Abu Marzuk, Hamas’ number two, who established the Hamas network in the United States in the 1980s also reorganized Hamas after Sheikh Yassin’s 1989 arrest into a flatter organizational structure that could better resist the loss of key leaders.
Finally, being de-listed as an unindicted co-conspirator would be an enormous public relations victory.
Maanes compiled the above graph to illustrate the overwhelming evidence of CAIR’s place in the US jihadi network. More here on using the Semantic Web to map the Muslim terror plotters.
Oh, what a tangled web they weave when they practice to deceive.