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Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York, Free Press, 2000)

A Second World War Navy radioman turned journalist, Robert Stinnett was in the National Archives in Belmont, California, researching a campaign-year picture book on George Bush’s South Pacific wartime navy career in aerial reconnaissance — George Bush: His World War II Years (Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 1992) — and encountered unindexed duplicate copies of Pearl Harbor radio intercept records of Japanese Navy code transmissions — documentary evidence of what actually happened at Pearl Harbor and how it came about. After eight years of further research and a prolonged case at law under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain partial release of these materials, Stinnett published Day of Deceit (2000). A Japanese translation appeared within a year, understandably.


Stinnett demonstrates, on the basis of extensive incontrovertible factual evidence and self-evidently accurate analysis that President Roosevelt oversaw the contrivance and deployment of a closely-guarded secret plan to goad the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor and monitor them while they did it. Stinnett hypothesizes that Roosevelt did this in order to precipitate an unwilling American public into supporting intervention in the Second World War, but whatever the motives or purposes, the facts are now abundantly clear. Stinnett establishes and proves his case with voluminous documentary evidence, including forty-seven pages of Appendices [p. 261-308] presenting photographic reproductions of key official records, as well as numerous others reproduced in the body of the text, and 65 pages [309-374] of closely detailed reference notes. This evidence proves Stinnett’s factual assertions, arguments and conclusions. His research files and notes are deposited at the Hoover Institute library at Stanford. Day of Deceit is exemplary documentary historiography. It presents the material testimony on which its analysis and conclusions are based. Its validity will be clear to any fair-minded reader. Stinnett’s book settles and resolves rational, candid, honest, fact-based discussion and debate about the background of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As Stinnett shows, the plan that eventuated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was set in motion in early October 1940 based on an “eight-action memo, dated October 7, 1940 … by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Navy Intelligence.” Of course, it is unlikely that McCollum drafted it on his own initiative, but this is where Stinnett’s paper trail starts. “Its eight actions call for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Dutch colonial outposts in the Pacific region….” [p. 6-8; the memorandum is reproduced on 261-267]:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies [now Indonesia].
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Complete embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.

As the plan unfolded its development was closely monitored through decoded intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and naval radio communications. “McCollum oversaw the routing of communications intelligence to FDR from early 1940 to December 7, 1941 and provided the President with intelligence reports on Japanese military and diplomatic strategy. Every intercepted and decoded Japanese military and diplomatic report destined for the White House went through the Far East Asia section of ONI, which he oversaw. The section served as a clearinghouse for all categories of intelligence reports…. Each report prepared by McCollum for the President was based on radio intercepts gathered and decoded by a worldwide network of American military cryptographers and radio intercept operators…. Few people in America’s government or military knew as much about Japan’s activities and intentions as McCollum.”[8] Knowledge of the plan was closely held, limited to 13 Roosevelt administration members and chief military officers and 21 members of Naval Intelligence and related operations [listed in Appendix E 307-308]. Item C was already US policy when McCollum wrote his memo. Item F was set in motion on October 8, Items A, B and G on October 16, 1940, Item D and E by November 12, 1940. [Chap. 1 n. 8 p. 311-312; 120 ff. etc.].

Meanwhile, also in the fall of 1940, campaigning for a third term in Boston on October 30, President Roosevelt said: “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” On November 1 in Brooklyn he said “I am fighting to keep our people out of foreign wars. And I will keep on fighting.” At Rochester on the 2nd he said “Your national government … is equally a government of peace — a government that intends to retain peace for the American people.” The same day in Buffalo he asserted “Your President says this country is not going to war,” and in Cleveland on the next he declared “The first purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war.” [William Henry Chamberlin, “How Franklin Roosevelt Lied America Into War,” in Harry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton, 1953), Chapter Eight, p. 485-491].

Admiral Richardson, commander of the Pacific Fleet, opposed Roosevelt’s orders [Item F] to station the fleet at Pearl Harbor as putting the fleet at risk, so he was replaced with Admiral Kimmel, with Admiral Anderson of ONI as Kimmel’s third in command at Pearl Harbor, to supervise the radio intercept operation there, unbeknownst to Kimmel. [10-14; 33-34] “Anderson was sent to Hawaii as an intelligence gatekeeper”[36]. When he arrived he established his personal housing well away from Pearl Harbor, out of range of the coming attack. Though he was commander of the seven battleships which bore the brunt of the attack with the loss of over two thousand lives, Admiral Anderson was safe at home on the other side of the mountain when the attack came. [36-37; 244, 247] Meanwhile, the commanders in Hawaii, “Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short, were deprived of intelligence that might have made them more alert to the risks entailed in Roosevelt’s policy, but they obeyed his direct order of November 27 and 28, 1941: ‘The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.'” [6-8] Afterward, they were scape-goated.

In early January 1941 the Japanese decided that in the event of hostilities with the US they would commence with a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. American intelligence learned of this plan on January 27 [30-32]. On July 21, 1941 Lieutenant Commander McCollum’s Item H lit the fuse. Up through late November the White House continued to block concerted attempts by Japanese diplomats to discuss an accommodation. [On this diplomatic history see Charles Beard , American Foreign Policy in the Making (1946) and President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War (1948); Frederic Rockwell Sanborn, Design For War (1951); and Charles Tansill, Back Door To War (1952).]

Beginning November 16, 1941, radio intercepts revealed the formation of the Japanese fleet near the Kurile Islands north of Japan and from November 26 through the first week of December tracked it across the Pacific to Hawaii [41-59 etc.]. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark (one of the 34 informed participants) ordered Kimmel to dispatch his aircraft carriers with a large escort fleet to deliver planes to Wake and Midway Islands. “On orders from Washington, Kimmel left his oldest vessels inside Pearl Harbor and sent twenty-one modern warships, including his two aircraft carriers, west toward Wake and Midway… With their departure the warships remaining in Pearl Harbor were mostly 27-year-old relics of World War I.” That is, the battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor with their crews were employed as decoys [152-154]. On 22 November 1941, a week after the Japanese fleet began to assemble and four days before it sailed for Oahu, Admiral Ingersoll issued a “Vacant Sea” order that cleared its path of all shipping and on 25 November he ordered Kimmel to withdraw his ships patrolling the area from which the aerial attack would be staged [144-145]. FDR kept close tabs on the plot’s final unfolding while radio intercepts continued to track its voyage toward Hawaii [161-176].

Stinnett comments: “Pearl Harbor’s Battleship Row and its old dilapidated warships presented a mouth-watering target. But it was a major strategic mistake for the Empire. Japan’s 360 warplanes should have concentrated on Pearl Harbor’s massive oil stores … and destroyed the industrial capacity of the Navy’s dry docks, machine shops, and repair facilities”[249]. Six months later, at the battles of Coral Sea (May 4-8, 1942) and Midway (June 4-7), the warships of the Pacific Fleet which were at sea when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred permanently destroyed the offensive capacity of the Japanese Navy to operate in the eastern Pacific and permanently crippled its defensive capacity in the western Pacific. Thereafter, as informed observers understood, a Japanese attack or invasion of the West Coast of America was a total logistical impossibility. Nevertheless, two months later, the internment of West Coast Japanese American citizens began in August 1942.

The Pearl Harbor coverup began immediately afterward with the court marshals of Admiral Kimmel and General Short, continued through eight Congressional investigations during and after the war, with the purging and withholding of documents and false testimony by participants and others [253-260 & passim; 309-310] and persisted through the Congressional hearings chaired by Strom Thurmond in 1995 [257-258]. At the date of publication (2000) numerous documents were still withheld from Stinnett or released in extensively censored form. But his case is conclusively proven on the basis of the evidence he presents, as any fair-minded reader can see. The only way to refute or debunk it would be to establish that his documentary evidence is forged, and prove it. In face of the character of this evidence, the idea is nonsensical.

A key break for Stinnett’s research was his discovery of duplicate copies of reports of Japanese naval code transmissions from the Pearl Harbor radio-intercept station routed after the war to the Belmont (California) National Archives, and still there long after the copies in the Washington, D.C. archive files had been disappeared. Recent writers pretending to debunk Stinnett’s evidence have resurrected claims that the Japanese naval codes had not been deciphered and that the Japanese fleet maintained radio silence — claims that have been refuted repeatedly for decades. Famously, the radio operator of the American liner Mariposa intercepted repeated signals from the Japanese fleet steaming toward Hawaii and relayed its progressive bearings to the Navy. This was well-known during the war to American seamen of the Pacific merchant marine and is mentioned in published accounts.

The pretense that the Japanese naval and diplomatic codes had not been deciphered was first refuted in a federal court in Chicago in 1943. As her biographer Ralph G. Martin recounts, Cissy Patterson, managing editor of the Washington Times-Herald on December 7, 1941 (and for decades before and after) was opposed to American intervention in another world war — like over 80% of her fellow Americans, including her brother Joe Patterson, publisher of the New York News, and her cousin Robert McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune. Serving in France as a battlefield officer, Robert was wounded, twice gassed, and decorated for valor. His Chicago Tribune, like his cousins’ newspapers and numerous others, especially off the east coast, was vocally anti-interventionist — until Pearl Harbor.

In Cissy (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1979) Martin writes: “As the news of the disaster [at Pearl Harbor] kept coming in [to the Times-Herald’s newsroom], Cissy bitterly asked [her Sunday Editor] Roberts about Roosevelt, ‘Do you suppose he arranged this?’ Later when she learned that American cryptographers had broken the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor, she was convinced that Roosevelt had known in advance that the Japanese intended to attack”[418]. “The Chicago Tribune, the Times-Herald, and two dozen other papers later printed an article by a Tribune war correspondent which indicated that the United States had prevailed [at Midway] because the Japanese codes had been broken…. The Department of Justice decided to file charges that the Tribune and the Times-Herald had betrayed U.S. military secrets…. Attorney General Francis Biddle felt the disclosure of this breakthrough had been tantamount to treason because it gave the Japanese the chance to change their codes. Waldrop [Times-Herald editor] was called to Chicago to testify before a grand jury… In the middle of the testimony, the Navy disclosed that a Navy censor had passed the Tribune article. Forced to drop the case, Biddle said he ‘felt like a fool.'” [431-432] He wasn’t the only one.

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  1. Stinnett is a true hero and real journalist. For those with time, here he is speaking about all this.

    Here’s some stuff from my blog related to this issue.

    Dec 7, 2011 – Tigers Flying Before Pearl Harbor

    For those who still believe the myth that Pearl Harbor was a “surprise” and “unprovoked” attack, read about the “Flying Tigers.” During the Summer of 1941, President Roosevelt sent 100 American fighter aircraft and 300 American pilots and mechanics to China to fight the Japs. Perhaps the Japanese viewed that as hostile.

    And few know about the 1932 US Navy exercise where Pearl Harbor was surprised by a carrier aircraft attack from the north.

  2. anon[335] • Disclaimer says:

    Leaders manipulate events rather than react to them – it is a sign of great leadership. These are the sordid details of how such sausage is made, and in the end these details are not important.
    The real issue is whether FDR was right in deciding to push us into WWII. The answer all these years later as we watch our Empire decline, is that he was wrong.
    Are you prepared to say no the next opportunity to build an empire? Do you have an alternative model for a nation to be strong without morhping into an empire?

    • Replies: @awry
    , @Wizard of Oz
  3. Paul says:

    Eleanor Roosevelt said that the U.S. expected a Japanese attack. However, she said it was expected to be in the Philippines, not Pearl Harbor. The U.S. had cut off exports (oil being one among others) that were critical to Japanese conquests. And nobody disputes that U.S. Navy codebreakers broke the Japanese code before Midway.

    • Replies: @Fred762
  4. vinteuil says:

    Uh-oh. Here we go.

  5. “Its eight actions call for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Danish colonial outposts in the Pacific region….”

    I am unfamiliar with the Danish colonial outposts in the Pacific region. So is Wikipedia:

  6. It certainly makes sense that a cunning FDR would have deliberately removed the aircraft carriers from harms way (though I haven’t seen the timing of this reliably tied to knowledge of when Hawaii would be attacked). No doubt he wanted war and wanted Japan to strike the first blow**. But you must know that McColl disavowed the motive Stinnett attributed to him and also that there were many critical responses to “Day of Deceit”. E.g. from Wikipedia

    “First released in December 1999, it received a nuanced review in The New York Times and is frequently referenced by proponents of advance knowledge theories.

    Historians of the period, however, generally reject its thesis, pointing to several key errors and reliance on doubtful sources.”

    A footnote refers to

    Greer, Judith (June 14, 2001). “Dive-bombing FDR”. Salon. Retrieved 2010-12-09.

    The NYT review can be read at

    Being one to bet on a cock up rather than a conspiracy when faced with the choice I would be interested to learn, if you have followed it up, what the responders to Stinnett have written.(And have you any knowledge of the time it took for Americans to choose which Japanese transmissions to decode immediately, to decode them, to translate them, to interpret them and then to get them to the right decision making level?).

    My own pretty uninformed view of one relatively minor issue is that Kimmel was badly treated but that, having been warned in July of concern about a Japanese surprise attack, he ought not to have left Hawaii so open to surprise attack on that Sunday morning in December.

    **Japan striking the first blow was almost certain to result in Americans being killed who wouldn’t have been otherwise. I adduce that as evidence that should help reduce one’s scepticism about the disregard of life that the SS is said to have shown wrt Jews in particular (but also Soviet POWs inter alios).

    • Replies: @Wally
    , @Logan
  7. @Carlton Meyer

    The “Flying TIgers”? This is news. It was more properly known as the American Volunteer Group (AVG). The paymaster was Fiorello LaGuardia. Nothing new here, there is an old B&W movie about them. Their organization preceded 1941, I believe it was 1939. Pilots were required to resign their American commissions, but that was just a formality.

  8. @Carlton Meyer

    Yes, and what is your view of the unfortunate Kimmel’s failure to be at least somewhat prepared for an attack which certainly took him by surprise given that he was not unaware of the possibility and intelligence assessments of the possibility of a surprise attack?

    Your last paragraph adds some weight to the idea that he ought to have been better prepared even if his mate Stark and others had let him down.

  9. Assuming for the moment that you have identified “the real issue” please elaborate on your counterfactual history. Who do you see as winners, who the losers, and what struggles would be still now unresolved?

    • Replies: @ploni almoni
  10. alexander says:

    I wonder how many Japanese generals (at the time) thought it would be a stupid idea to attack Pearl Harbor ?

    Does anyone know Japan’s expectation after it hit Pearl Harbor ?

    Was Japan planning, at some point , to seize and occupy Hawaii ?

    Was there a plan in the works to attack the US mainland ?

    If we had “deciphered all their codes”…then what was “Imperial Japan” planning to do …”after” Pearl Harbor ?

    There must have been second , third, and fourth phases to the plan ?

    Does anyone know what they were ?

  11. Mulegino1 says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    On November 27th, after delivery of the State Department note of the 26th, but before receipt of the intercepted communications showing the reaction of the Japanese Government, the “war warning” was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac and CincAF. It read:

    “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, “Thai”) or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavo inform British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage”

    So this directive, sent to Kimmel (I believe a similar directive was sent to General Short by the Army Chief of Staff) ordered precautionary measures against sabotage (such as bunching up aircraft on their tarmacs so they could be more easily guarded) and warned of impending hostilities in the Philippines and the
    Western Pacific and presumably the Indian Ocean, not Hawaii or the Eastern Pacific. Kimmel had no choice but to keep the fleet’s battleships in Pearl Harbor in order to conserve fuel, and was denied more reconnaissance aircraft needed to search the vast ocean surrounding Hawaii.

    It has always been common knowledge that Kimmel and Short were railroaded and scapegoated for the attack.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  12. Parfois1 says:
    @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    Typo carelessly dropped in. Meant to be Dutch East Indies.

  13. peterAUS says:

    I’ll try, briefly.

    I wonder how many Japanese generals (at the time) thought it would be a stupid idea to attack Pearl Harbor ?

    Several. Admirals and Generals.

    Does anyone know Japan’s expectation after it hit Pearl Harbor ?

    To seize as many resources as possible, get into strong negotiating position and negotiate peace with US.

    Was Japan planning, at some point , to seize and occupy Hawaii ?


    Was there a plan in the works to attack the US mainland ?

    Hell no.

    If we had “deciphered all their codes”…then what was “Imperial Japan” planning to do …”after” Pearl Harbor ?

    As above:To seize as many resources as possible, get into strong negotiating position and negotiate peace with US.

    There must have been second , third, and fourth phases to the plan ?

    Exactly as they did up to Midway.

    Does anyone know what they were ?


    Now….this topic, as in comment No.4 here, tends to attract certain, ahm, types and “evolve” in endless “debate”.
    So, after this short comment of mine you’ll plenty of rebuttals etc. Enjoy.
    I’ll pass.

    • Agree: jim jones, Lurker
    • Replies: @alexander
  14. @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    His Autofill or spell check probably prefers Danes to Dutch.

  15. Tom Welsh says:

    I don’t have any deep knowledge about this, but I do know that Admiral Yamamoto – who as commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy was in overall control of the strategy – was deeply opposed to war with the USA. Famously, he said, “I fear that we have awakened a sleeping giant”. That was precisely correct. As Stinnett’s book reveals, FDR had actually placed preliminary orders for 100 aircraft carriers by the end of 1940, clearly showing that he knew what was coming. Japan started the war with about a dozen fairly good carriers,which were sunk one by one (or, at Midway, four at a time) and never really got any new ones. The USA had over 100 by 1945.

    Yamamoto argued passionately that Japan should not allow itself to be trapped into war with the USA, and that almost any alternative would be better. Once overruled by the government, which was dominated by the Army, he threw himself body and soul into trying to get the best result. Even then, he openly admitted that the very best outcome for Japan would be to stun the Americans with an unexpected blow, and perhaps obtain a relatively favourable peace treaty. Like most foreigners, he greatly underestimated the anger that Pearl Harbor provoked in the American people.

    Essentially, the disastrous decision to start a war against the USA arose from incompetence, self-delusion and arrogance – all of them stimulated by the fact that in summer 1941 the Japanese government had been manipulated by FDR into a position where it had no “good moves”. It was like a chess player whose position has gradually become strategically hopeless, and launches a desperate last-ditch sacrificial attack on the opponent’s king.

    • Replies: @alexander
    , @Lurker
  16. Tom Welsh says:

    I recommend the book “Japanese Destroyer Captain” by Tameichi Hara, ISBN-13: 978-1591143840. Captain Hara had a remarkably successful career which spanned WW2 – not the least of his successes being that he survived to write about his experiences.

    I don’t have my copy to hand, but I remember he wrote a very impressive and penetrating passage in which he recalled, as a junior but already highly regarded naval officer, warning that if Japan went to war with the USA it could hope to win or even “draw” only if the Navy won every single battle. Reflecting the very high morale of 1941, he believed that might even be possible if everyone did their best and nothing went wrong.

    Of course many things went wrong right from the start. As others in this thread have explained, the plan to sink the battleships at Pearl Harbor was already strategically wrong, as the battleships – like today’s carriers – were already more of a liability than an asset. Yamamoto aggravated this mistake fatally at Midway, where he seems to have failed to understand that the carriers were the only significant players in the unfolding battle. All four of his fleet carriers were destroyed within a few hours, after which his immense battle fleet had to turn tail and run home as it was defenceless and useless.

    The fundamental organic problem – apart from fighting a war against a vastly superior industrial power – was that the Japanese government was wholly dominated by the Army, whose leaders understood nothing about naval warfare and naval aviation. They thought that, if they could occupy enough of the Pacific islands, the Americans would not be able to dislodge them.

  17. @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    He said Danish there when he meant Dutch, I gather. It says Dutch in the actual 8 points.
    Typo seems pretty obvious.

    • Agree: Alfred
  18. Seraphim says:

    A word would have been apposite about the book of Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald (commander of the Pacific Fleet’s destroyers at the time of the attack and was at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941) “The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack”, published in March 1954!
    His conclusion was that:
    “Everything that happened in Washington on Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, supports the belief that President Roosevelt had directed that no message be sent to the Hawaiian Commanders before noon on Sunday, Washington time … Never before in recorded history had a field commander been denied information that his country would be at war in a matter of hours, and that everything pointed to a surprise attack upon his forces shortly after sunrise”.
    In fact ‘Pearl Harbor revisionism’ was initiated already in 1944 by John T. Flynn who published a forty-six page booklet entitled “The Truth about Pearl Harbor”.

    A short overview of the ‘controversy’:
    “Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy”, by Charles Lutton, in The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1991-1992 (Vol. 11, No. 4), pages 431-467.

    • Replies: @Anon
  19. “The Pearl Harbor cover-up began…with court marshals”.
    It’s courts-martial.

  20. 37 says:

    What should be beyond question is that the onus for proof of truth should ALWAYS be on the government. It has lied so often, so egregiously, so insultingly, and so brazenly, that it should never be trusted again.

    This applies to food, drugs, foreign policy, law enforcement, and to save time, pretty much ANYTHING that is involved with.

    For the terminally dimwitted, Pompeo even boldly declared as much, very openly. Disturbing to the interests of liberty, his comments were actually met with jovial laughter and applause. Those people laughing and applauding deserve to live under a tyranny.

    Is the government even ever honest. (Rhetorical)

    Then again, their father is the Father of Lies.

  21. alexander says:
    @Tom Welsh

    “Japanese Destroyer Captain”.

    Okay, if I get a chance, I will pick up a copy.

    Thanks for the synopsis , BTW, very informative.

  22. @Mulegino1

    Thank you. That certainly does move the spotlight of blame a bit further off Kimmel but also I think highlights MacArthur’s failure. If memory serves he was warned but still didn’t ensure his aircraft were not caught on the ground and destroyed. How did he survive? Was it his immense seniority? Was it that disaster in the Philippines didn’t have the impact on politicians and public that Pearl Harbor did?

    • Replies: @Bombercommand
    , @Mulegino1
  23. The obvious, but unasked question is: why would FDR deliberately provoke Japan into striking the first blow? Why did FDR want war with Japan?

    The answer is neither explored in this excellent book (I bought my copy and read it nearly two decades ago) nor in this review.

    But the late, great American historian Thomas Fleming supplied the answer long ago: FDR wanted war with Japan as a backdoor to war with Nazi Germany.
    To guarantee that Hitler would take the bait, FDR arranged for the leak of ultra-sensitive War Plans, known as “Rainbow Five”. These official plans, ostensibly Top Secret, revealed that America would be unable to bring the full might of her industrial power to bear against Germany until July of 1943.

    Fleming wrote: “(German) Admiral Raeder argued (therefore) that this necessitated an immediate re-evaluation of Germany’s current strategy. He recommended an offensive on land and sea against Britain and its empire to knock them out of the war before this crucial date. He envisaged further incidents between American naval vessels and German submarines in the North Atlantic and admitted that this could lead to war with the United States. But he argued that Rainbow Five made it clear that America was already a “nonbelligerent” ally of Great Britain and the Soviet Union and that a declaration of war was no longer something Germany should seek to avoid by restraining its U-boats. Moreover, Raeder concluded that Roosevelt had made a serious miscalculation “in counting upon Japanese weakness and fear of the United States” to keep Nippon at bay. He was now confronted with a Japanese war two or three years before the completion of a two-ocean navy.

    Meanwhile on December 9, Franklin D. Roosevelt made another address to the nation. It accused Hitler of urging Japan to attack the United States. “We know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations with a joint plan,” Roosevelt declared. “Germany and Italy consider themselves at war with the United States without even bothering about a formal declaration.”

    This was anything but the case, and Roosevelt knew it. He was trying to bait Hitler into declaring war. On December 10, when Hitler resumed his conference with Raeder, Keitel, and Goering, the Führer’s mind was made up. He said that Roosevelt’s speech confirmed everything in the Tribune story. He considered the speech a de facto declaration of war, and he accepted Raeder’s contention that the war with Japan made it impossible for the Americans to follow the grand strategy of defeating Hitler first that had been laid down in Rainbow Five.

    On December 11 Hitler went before the Reichstag and announced that Germany and Italy had been provoked “by circumstances brought about by President Roosevelt” to declare war on the United States. His final decision, Hitler said, had been forced on him by American newspapers, which a week before had revealed “a plan prepared by President Roosevelt … according to which his intention was to attack Germany in 1943 with all the resources of the United States. Thus our patience has come to a breaking point.”

    With a little extra prodding from the White House, the Tribune story – about the leak of Rainbow Five – had handed Roosevelt the gift that he desperately needed to proceed with the program outlined in Rainbow Five. ”

    Fleming’s article is well worth reading in full. I hope Ron Unz himself is reading this comment. He would put Fleming’s article at the top of the masthead of the Unz Review.

    • Agree: nokangaroos
    • Replies: @utu
  24. fnn says:
    @Tom Welsh

    …the Japanese government was wholly dominated by the Army, whose leaders understood nothing about naval warfare and naval aviation

    Some have said (I can’t remember who) the Army favored an attack on the Soviets instead of going to war with the US. It might have worked out better for the Japanese, given that Stalin had his hands full with the Germans at the time.

    • Replies: @Diversity Heretic
  25. Alfred says:

    An essential book to read for any student of that particular period of Japanese history is:

    “Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy Hardcover – June, 1971” by David Bergamini (Author)

    It largely explains the Japanese side of the story. This book was ridiculed by the “experts” when it was published. Since then, it has turned out to be correct on the most imporant matters. Emperor Hirohito was very much a hands-on manager of the conflict with China and the other countries. Hirohito’s interests in marine biology were very much a screen.

    The dispute – which led to assassinations – between the “Go North” and “Go South” factions of the Japanese military are well explained. There are masses of references to original sources.

    The fact that the author grew up in Japan and was proficient in Japanese was a great help. He was interned with his mother by the Japanese in the Philippines.

    Most “experts” on places like Russia and Japan only know English. If you watch Condoleezza Rice mumbling in attrocious Russian, you will know what I mean.

  26. RobRich says: • Website
    @Carlton Meyer

    Libertarian science fiction author Robert Heinlein was present at the 1932 simulated Pearl Harbor attack.

  27. awry says:

    Saying that the US empire is in decline is a bold statement. It is the sole superpower on the planet, its currency is the world reserve currency (backed up by US military and political might).
    Had the US chosen a policy of splendid isolation during WWII it would have ceded at least half of the world to Germany and Japan as they would won had the US stayed out of the conflict.

  28. RobRich says: • Website
    @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    “Its eight actions call for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Danish colonial outposts in the Pacific region….”

    Not to mention the Swedish ones–or were they Swiss?

  29. @alexander

    First off, Japan would have been quite content with being left alone instead of having their sphincters opened by Cmdr. Perry (complete with regime change. Duh!).

    In the (useless) war of 1904/5 Britain backed Japan because Russia seemed the bigger strategic threat
    (Adm. Makarow had it in him to MAKE a navy); Russia´s defeat gave Jacob Schiff, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and their (((henchpersons))) a first shot at revolutzing her (pardon if I get a little broad, but all this is interdependent)

    During WWI Japan took the German possessions in China and the Pacific (amounting to little more than the Tsingtao brewery, still the best beer in Asia) but otherwise concentrated on building infrastructure.
    The postwar years were marked by inner turmoil (my personal favourite the Shimpeitai Shiken, “the case of the god-sent soldiers” who plotted to wipe out parliament by air raid 😛 ), and the military aristocracy won narrowly.
    The US had been at war with Japan since ~1936, ostensibly because of Chinese “human rights” (for reference purposes see US treatment of same rights in the preceding century), more exactly because allowing Japan to live would have rendered the US stance in the West Pacific ridiculous (= classic Thucydides Trap).
    Embargoes (especially but not limited to oil), sanctions, asset seizures, interference with shipping (read: Piracy) – Japan was offered a choice of abject servitude or being starved back to the Sengoku. Inexplicably they chose a third way.

    Two options presented themselves:
    1) Northwest, meaning Mongolia and Primorye; comparatively safe but poor in resources.
    2) South, meaning Malaya and the Dutch East Indies; oil, tin, copper, rubber, and Big War.

    Their decision for 2) was duly reported by Richard Sorge to Moscow, enabling Uncle Joe to send the Siberian troops to Europe and decide the war there.

    The strategic planning was done by Adm. Yamamoto (who was so good the US assassinated him) who, like all his peers, strongly counseled against war; but if it had to be, the only slim chance was (in order):
    1) crippling strike against US Navy
    2) overrun Southeast Asia, and
    3) shield resources and shipping lanes behind a ring of island fortresses,
    all BEFORE the American industrial juggernaut got in motion.
    (Japan shared with Germany the problem they were better but, as Clausewitz observed, quantity always wins in the end because it can be raised indefinitely)

    – So far, so simple; there were never any designs on Hawaii itself, a seaplane from one of their carrier subs dropped a few bomblets on the woods of Oregon and towards war´s end they sent a few incendiary balloons by jetstream (that were not even noticed).
    And that´s ALL attacks on CONUS in that war.

    -The US had the naval and diplomatic codes (meaning they read the declaration of war before the attack), they had specific knowledge six months before, the Dutch nine (far longer in general terms), and Adm. Kimmel was ordered to stand down which must have come from On High.
    None of this is in dispute …

    The Brits believed Singapore was impregnable; McArthur was less deluded, but both got their asses handed to them by Gen. Yamashita in ways that shattered forever the myth of the White Man´s superiority. Vietnam did the rest. Talk about unintended consequences! 😀

    … but it goes on. Look at the map – the sole reason the US are in Afghanistan is to deny China a pipeline to Iran; and the sole source of the “Rohingya” (Bengal illegals dumped there by the Brits actually, there is no such thing as “friendly denizens of Arakan”) troubles is that China invests in port facilities there, bypassing the Strait of Malacca. Cui bono?
    The Japanese realize they are about to die again for American stupidity and hybris, and they are not amused.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
    , @Epigon
  30. I have the book and it reveals the truth about Pearl Harbor and Roosevelt and the lies that are told to the people by the government that is under the control of evil satanic forces that see war as a means to profit and control and the events in the mideast today are a continuation of these lies and warmongering!

    As Orwell said; war is peace, ignorance is strength and freedom is slavery, and if anyone reads 1984 in the section on wars and why war is perpetual, Orwell lays out the answers!

  31. Alfred says:

    One thing that is rarely mentioned in the various histories of this false-flag is the fact that the British military attaché in Tokyo reported that Japanese bombers were practising the dropping of torpedoes in the shallow waters of Yohohama Bay (near Tokyo). At that time no one else had mastered the art of dropping torpedoes from planes into shallow coastal waters.

    It was obvious to anyone with a naval background that the Japanese were preparing to attack ships at anchor.

    • Replies: @Epigon
    , @Tom Welsh
  32. anonymous[177] • Disclaimer says:

    One can see from this how elites can in cold-blooded manner consign their own citizens to horrifying deaths as mere cannon fodder and then later hold parades commemorating them as heroes. Yet people continue to buy into their government’s lies about all of it as they wave the flag and march in parades. The Gulf of Tonkin fraud led to millions of people dying and let’s not forget the most recent one, the 9-11 event. Where will the next concocted incident be? You know there’ll be more in the future as the need arises for the ruling class.

    • Agree: Alfred
    • Replies: @ThreeCranes
  33. jim jones says:

    Was all that sacrifice worth it to produce the society we have today?

    • Replies: @Fidelios Automata
  34. Wally says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    ” I adduce that as evidence that should help reduce one’s scepticism about the disregard of life that the SS is said to have shown wrt Jews in particular (but also Soviet POWs inter alios).”


    Where? When? How?

    Why have you not given us the specifics?

    What are you afraid of?

  35. Epigon says:

    1. Kodoha faction was purged for a reason
    2. Soviet Far East lacked any meaningful resources the Japanese were interested in – moreover, the infrastructure was bad and the logistical challenge of resupplying the Japanese invasion force was immense.
    3. Dutch East Indies, Malaysia and Philippines could offer a supply of crude oil, rubber, bauxite, copper etc.
    4. Japanese Army humbling at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol persuaded the government that war with Soviet Union, especially an offensive one in Far East and Siberia, would be disastrous and completely different from cakewalk they experienced when subduing Manchuria.
    5. The USA let Japan go into China up to the neck, and then cut off the critical resources through embargo – oil, petroleum products, scrap metal and ores
    6. At the moment they opted for Pearl Harbor, Japan was running out of resources, stocks depleting – if they hadn’t acted, they would have gotten to the point where they were still in China, tied up by numerous foreign assisted and supplied Chinese forces while being unable to equip, resupply their armies in China or use their Navy.
    7. Even after acquiring the European colonial holdings, the Japanese were always faced with fuel shortages.
    8. USA was technologically far ahead – the disparity was even worse in industrial capacity
    9. Japanese Naval codes were broken by British in 1940

    Basically, as Captain Hara wrote, Japan needed a continuous string of major victories at sea – Pearl Harbor + Force Z + Java Sea + Sunda strait + Savo Island + Tassafaronga

    The problem was that Japanese cruiser and destroyer prowess was not at all mirrored by carrier and battleship force.

    Interestingly, Japan would have been far better served had they adopted Kamikaze tactics from the outset – as Coral Sea, Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons and Midway demonstrated – torpedo and dive bombers were mostly on one-way missions anyway.
    Not to mention inexcusable preservation of Nagato, Ise and Fuso classes until they were completely irrelevant.

  36. Epigon says:

    This is nonsense.
    The Japanese were inspired by the British attack on Taranto.

    • Replies: @Wally
    , @Alfred
  37. Wally says:
    @Tom Welsh

    “The fundamental organic problem – apart from fighting a war against a vastly superior industrial power – was that the Japanese government was wholly dominated by the Army, whose leaders understood nothing about naval warfare and naval aviation.”

    Indeed. That fact is highlighted in the well researched Clint Eastwood film, ‘Letters from Iwo Jima‘, obviously much later than Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Army’s ‘samurai spirit’, while interesting in itself, led to great & unnecessary loss of Japanese life, stubbornness, and inefficiencies .

  38. Wally says:

    That is nonsense.

    Aerial torpedoes had been around since WWI.

    The Japanese were testing & perfecting their superior versions using much different & superior aircraft than what the British used at Taranto.

    • Replies: @Epigon
    , @Wizard of Oz
  39. Anonymous [AKA "Sarcasric"] says:

    Well put.

  40. Epigon says:

    21 British biplanes changed the strategic and tactical outlook in the Mediterranean Sea with their inferior torpedoes. Italian naval base was neutralised, the fleet relocated to a more distant one, three fast battleships capable of interdicting the Mediterranean convoys were put out of action and the outnumbered and outgunned British Mediterannean Fleet had its playing field leveled.

    414 Japanese monoplanes achieved – nothing, really.

    The ships they hit were obsolete and would have been very vulnerable in an open sea fleet battle.
    The torpedo hit percentages were poor, and ships sunk in shallow waters were raised and brought back into service. Even Oklahoma could have been restored, but it was pointless.
    The converted obsolete 410 mm AP shells used as bombs performed poorly – misses, duds, break-up on impact – the exception being the magazine penetration that sunk Arizona.

    Japanese dive bombers demonstrated poor discipline – instead of following orders and focusing on cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries in case of absence of carriers, which was the case, they wasted their 250 kg GP bombs on battleships which had decks immune to such light weapons.

    The total aircraft losses suffered by USA were marginal, and really obsolescent types which were replenished in mere days. Pilot losses negligible. The navy personnel losses were enlisted men, not officers who were mostly ashore during the attack.

    The oil storage, drydock, repair facilities were left intact, so all those US carriers, battleships and cruisers suffering damage and requiring repairs in 1942 returned to Pearl. Intact fuel storages allowed US to check Japanese advances.

    To sum it all up – not a single relevant US ship was sunk or badly damaged. US fighting strength in the Pacific was not diminished – the strategic facilities were preserved, the cruiser force (vast US cruiser fleet scared the Japanese in the interwar period) was intact, the carriers untouched and modern fast battleships of NoCal and SoDak classes were on their way to make
    their debut in 1942.
    Helena and Honolulu were modern and relevant but back in action within a month.

    20-knot US Standards with marginal AAA would have been sitting ducks for both Japanese naval aviation and Japanese submarines operating in fleet support role – the old US ships had torpedo protection built with WW1 torpedo warheads in mind, not 300 kg WW2 warheads.

    • Replies: @CMC
    , @Wally
  41. @nokangaroos

    “Kimmel was ordered to stand down”. Elaborate please. (I have just read, in another comment I think, that he was advises in late November that a Japanese attack on the Philippines was likely but that is hardly a stand down order.

    • Replies: @nokangaroos
  42. @awry

    I daresay a German-run Europe and a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere would have made for a far more organic, distinctly improved planet, spared us all loads of shit and tens of millions of lives over the decades and freed up resources for worthwhile undertakings (and I am by no means a New Green Deal fuzzy 😀 ).

    As the Brits learned a century ago – oh, wait: They didn´t 😛 – you WILL be run back to your stinking island in the fullness of time.

    • Replies: @Crawfurdmuir
  43. Epigon says:

    You are peddling the myth of “Siberian divisions saving Moscow”.
    Don’t do that.
    The Transbaikal and Far East Military districts were not left undermanned and weakened (~1 million men December 1941) – but they had their tank and artillery stockpiles depleted, in line with the defensive posture.

    Besides, Siberia is a vast area and raising divisions east of Urals for defence of Moscow has nothing to do with the Primorye frontline.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  44. @Wally

    The real story is that the US navy didn’t learn the lesson from Taranto and understand the vulnerability at Pearl Harbor.

    • Replies: @Lurker
    , @Wally
  45. Alfa158 says:
    @Tom Welsh

    At the beginning of the war, although it was suspected to be the case, no one was entirely sure that battleships were no longer critical to control of the sea. In any event if the US carriers had been in port they would have been attacked first, but they went to sea while the Japanese fleet was on its way. Since they weren’t there, the Japanese had to settle for attacking the US Navy’s charming collection of lovingly maintained, obsolete WW1 battleships. It turned out to be rather like Ford trying to cripple Chevrolet’s competitive ability by blowing up the collection of classic Corvettes at the museum in Bowling Green.

    Shortly after Pearl Harbor Japanese bombers easily sank a British battleship and battlecruiser near Singapore and by then the status of the battleship was clear. At Midway Yamamoto knew the score, and in fact, positioned the surface ships including the battleships and troop transports far behind the aircraft carriers and out of range of air attack. After the carriers were sunk Yamamoto gambled on sending his combat ships forward under cover of darkness hoping to engage the Americans in a gun battle, but Spruance pulled back until daylight then attacked the Japanese as they fled.

    The Japanese thought they could hold the islands because they believed Americans were soft and had little stomach for hard fighting. It didn’t occur to them that if they proclaimed “we’ll fight to the last man!” the Americans would respond “that’s works for us”.

  46. Lurker says:

    My understanding is that the Japanese intention was to damage the USN long enough to consolidate their territorial conquests – fortify islands, build airstrips and suchlike. The theory being to deter a US counter attack. The intention was never to actually overcome the US or invade.

    • Replies: @Anonymous
  47. Lurker says:
    @Tom Welsh

    The USA had over 100 by 1945

    A large percentage of those were small escort carriers.

  48. @Wizard of Oz

    From what I understand he wanted to raise the level of alert, what with being sunday and tension and stuff, and was denied permission, and there´s pertinent paperwork.

    Sorry, no exact quote 😉

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  49. Saggy says: • Website

    I came across ‘Days of Deceit’ on another forum a while back and found a rebuttal …

    A Deceitful Book: Robert B. Stinnett’s book “Day of Deceit” By Rear Admiral Richard E. Young, USN (Ret)

    which convinced me that Stinnett’s book should be viewed skeptically. Now, looking for the paper (about 20 pages as I recall) it has disappeared from the net, that is there are a number of links, but none are active. I did find this quote from the paper ….

    Long overdue is a close examination of Stinnett’s research and voluminous documentation he himself asserts prove his allegations. When one does, it becomes painfully obvious that the extensive research Stinnett did ends up proving just the opposite of what Stinnett was striving so desperately to prove: Roosevelt did not know of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor; he did not deliberately provoke it. And Stinnett himself has proven this beyond a shadow of a doubt through his own painstaking research.

    Thus, I believe that anyone who wants to claim that FDR had foreknowledge of the attack has the obligation to cite and provide references to the actual evidence, not Stinnett’s report of the evidence.

  50. I’m a retired Navy codebreaker. I worked in the field now called cryptologic warfare.

    I need to point out that Stinnett has been thoroughly debunked as a fraud and a conman. He misread archives to come to his fanciful conclusions. This is well documented.

    I have no opinion on whether FDR wanted Tokyo to attack Pearl Harbor. That’s not my lane. However, I am damn sure that Stinnett seriously misrepresented the facts regarding what US Navy codebreakers had access to before the Pearl Harbor attack.

    This is explained in detail here by an actual expert:

  51. Lurker says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    If the narrative of the article is correct then that vulnerability is a feature not a bug.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  52. Jmaie says:

    Sole superpower – overwhelming military superiority but can’t defeat impoverished locals with small arms. World reserve currency – for now, multiple efforts underway to replace with a basket of other currencies. Backed by US military – if China buys oil from Indonesia using Yuan, will we attack? Political might – rapidly disappearing.

    The US seems (at least to me) well down the path towards societal disintegration. We are already in a cold civil war with large swaths of the populace actively hating the “other”. Hundreds of thousands living on the street, in tents/shelters/under bushes. Deep disconnect between folks inside the beltway and out. Government not even bothering to make their lies sound convincing (Iran Al-Qaeda alliance).

    I wonder whether we could pull together as a country under even the worst of circumstances.

    • Replies: @Anonymous
    , @Mr. Anon
  53. Republic says:
    @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    In 1917 the US government purchased the Dutch West Indies (US Virgin Islands) for $25 million.

  54. @jim jones

    Good Lord, I hope that video was a joke. Sometimes it’s hard to tell…

  55. @nokangaroos

    My problem with that is that Kimmel wouldn’t have needed permission from Anyone to “raise the level of alert” whatever that means exactly.

  56. @Lurker

    Possible but why wouldn’t some barriers to torpedoes havevbee installed? Assuming the Jap spies had detected and reported on them what difference would that have made?

    • Replies: @Wally
  57. Gore Vidal, a person you don’t like, pointed this out many many years ago, long before any of you conservatives could stomach it.

    • Replies: @ThreeCranes
  58. So when we are talking about the American traditions that’s what we’re talking about! Now it is better understood from where/when Reagan and GWB/Cheney encouraged Saddam to attack Kuwait and then he was kicked out and later attacked again based on a false pretext! Now we’re working on another scenario to attack Iran. Bravo to America for being such a genius!

  59. CMC says:

    The oil storage, drydock, repair facilities….

    Those were on land, right?

    How were the Japanese gonna hit them with torpedo bombers? Wasn’t that like 40% of their attack force? Wouldn’t loading up the carriers without any torpedo bombers —wouldn’t info like that leak out? Think like a Japanese navy guy. Perhaps any secret plan to concentrate on the capital manufacturing capacity instead of giving a straight fight against military targets would have been impossible to execute—talking bureaucratic, human realities here.

    Plus there’s the known unknowns problem. Are we sure the carriers won’t be there? (Thinking like a Japanese planner now.) If they’re there then we gotta hit em. So we need torpedo bombers —cause, you know, one or two might get up steam and move out, and whatever…

    So (returning to reality here), once you hedge in the torpedo bombers… Look, in practical terms unless Japan set up some sort of Ender’s Game youth pilot camp —a fantasy in itself, focusing on the oil tanks was so never going to happen. Just too far outside the box. Or so I submit.

  60. peterAUS says:

    Good comments in this thread.
    You appear to be onto the subject, so, OT question:
    What’s your take on “Kurita case”, at Leyte?

    • Replies: @Epigon
  61. Anonymous[895] • Disclaimer says:

    Yes, their idea was to set up an outer ring in the Pacific that would deter a US counter-attack and hope that eventually the US would come to terms.
    They had some previous when it came to launching attacks prior to a declaration of war – they had attacked Port Arthur three hours before declaring war on Russia in 1904.

    • Replies: @homahr
  62. Anonymous[895] • Disclaimer says:

    I would agree with much of this but even more people were homeless in the USA during the Depression – the difference is that supposedly there is an economic boom now. Societal tensions towards the “other” are a feature, not a bug.

  63. Ahoy says:

    A good read is the book by General Smedley Butler, “War Is A Racket”.

    The word “racket” contains, amomg other things, and the meaning of deceit.

  64. @SECGRU Sailor

    To be an expert you have to learn to lie early on.

  65. War also had a domestic objective: end the ongoing depression by drafting young men and giving others war jobs. FDR and his Plutocrat cronies were terrified of a fascist or communist coup, and young men would be the ones to instigate it; so send them off to war and eliminate the threat by culling their numbers. All the previous programs to end the depression were ineffective, and all those restless unemployed men could upset the agendas of established 1% of that period. There was also added the bonus of making all that money with an established war industry (which continues to this day).

  66. Anonymous[895] • Disclaimer says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    I would also add that, compared to languages like German, capable translators of Japanese in US Navy codebreaking were few and severely overworked, and this also limited the amount of usable intel. During WW2 American forces had to rely on Nisei, Japanese-Americans, for translation and interpretation much more than they would have liked, given that their loyalties were suspect, and high-security matters like translating messages that had been decoded would not have been entrusted to this group.

  67. Corvinus says:

    There goes Vox Day again promoting a false narrative on his blog. Must be swilling high grade firewater.

    Regardless, the false deceit is all Stinnett.

    “Stinnett could have spared his readers a good deal of confusion and frustration by featuring more prominently a statement, buried at the bottom of a long footnote, that seems to be his clearest and most unambiguous statement on the matter: “There is no reliable evidence, found by the author, that establishes how much of the 5-Num text could be deciphered, translated, and read by naval cryptographers in 1941.” (p. 334, n. 18)”

    • Replies: @geokat62
  68. Mr. Anon says:

    I wonder whether we could pull together as a country under even the worst of circumstances.

    Undoubtedly not. We aren’t a nation anymore. And soon we won’t be anything even like a mere country.

    • Replies: @Ralph Seymour
  69. @awry

    Saying that the US empire is in decline is a bold statement.

    But is it really the US empire? In the past, Anglo-America was indeed greatest power in the world.

    Today, US is really a super-colony of the Empire of Judea, the World Empire of Jewish Power and Zionism. Today’s Anglo-American elites are cucky-wuck collaborators of globo-homo-shlomo world empire. White males are cucks to Jewish and homo power. They suck up to blacks. They have ZERO moral capital as whites or Christians.

  70. @Carlton Meyer

    The American Public and most people in other countries are constantly hoodwinked, lied to and false flagged into wars. In America it’s worse than other countries because of the Jewish control of the media. Americans are too stupid to realize what’s actually going on. The recent expose of Rachel “Madcow” Maddow’s diatribe about wanting to go to war and backing the Neocon Pseudo Jew Bolton should tell you how easy it is to control these talking heads. The Corporate Fascist Military-Industrial Intelligence Police State which is aligned with Global Corporate Interests manipulates all inputs that the average person receives. There is so much money in war and the transfer of stolen resources it is has become an industry unto itself. One only needs to look at the recent clusterfuck with the so called Iranian bombing of the tankers to realize how bad it is. The fact that everyone knows either the US or Israel were the most likely perpetrators means nothing to the governments which are nothing more but proxies for the Corporate Fascist Military-Industrial Intelligence Police State.

    We are nothing more than pawns in their game and this research shows that war is just another way to make money for the Global Corporations. They send young men to war so that old men in corporations can control the world like chess pieces on a board. They speak of democracy and freedom and then spit on the grave of dead veterans while they wish to control anyone’s speech they disagree with. They do not fight for freedom but for control and no matter how bad the war, death or bloodshed they will continue and no one will stop them.

    • Replies: @Carroll Price
  71. @Mr. Anon

    Game Set Match, Globalists

    Not only are we not a nation anymore, the US is an outright joke.

    The sooner the empire crumbles under the weight of its own corruption, the better.

  72. Alfred says:

    The British attack at Taranto was in November 11, 1940. The Pearl Harbour attack was on December 9, 1941. The Japanese were practising their new torpedoes and techniques for dropping them well before the Taranto attack. I don’t have my copy of “Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy” so I cannot give you the exact date when the British Naval Attaché reported what the Japanese were doing. Anyway, I last read this masterpiece around 1972.

    Previously, torpedoes could only be dropped in open sea and a long way from their target – so that the torpedoes would not go under their target ship. I would not be surprised if it were the British who were learning from the Japanese. 🙂

    In any event, it would have taken much longer than 13 months to perfect these torpedoes, flight protocols and train the pilots.

    BTW, when someone uses words like “nonsense” in a rebuttal, it usually means that they have no data to present.

    • Replies: @Epigon
    , @peterAUS
  73. @CMC

    The submarine base, dry docks/repair facilities, and oil storage were the targets of the Third Wave. Admiral Nagumo, wisely, ordered the Third Wave canceled and recover all aircraft/prepare to return to Japan when the First Wave was recovered and its commander reported to Nagumo “No American carriers at Pearl”. A real sickener for Nagumo. It would have been simple for US Naval Intelligence to deduce the approximate location of the Kudo Butai from known approach heading and aircraft range, and if American carriers had been patrolling near Hawaii, it could have been disaster for the Kudo Butai. Admiral Nagumo got another sickener at Midway when Yorktown was detected, no American carriers were supposed to be there. Nagumo was a truely great Admiral, but Japanese reconaisance failures made him appear unlucky at both Pearl and Midway.

  74. As Mike Spahn points out, there were no “Danish” colonies in the South Pacific. This is a mistake for “Dutch”, whether Stinnett’s or mine, I don’t know.

    I want to underline that my purpose in writing this “review” of a book published 19 years ago is emphasize the fact that it presents an “open-and-shut” case, that its evidence is ironclad and incontrovertible, that it SETTLES the question of Pearl Harbor, and that attempts to refute or debunk it (such as those in the wikipedia article on the book) are utterly misguided, do not have a leg to stand on, and whether from ignorance of the subject or bad faith, are, in fact, LIES.

    • Replies: @atlantis_dweller
  75. @Carlton Meyer

    China and The United States were allies, and The Empire Of Japan had been invading China since 1931. The United States aids its ally against Japanese aggression and you say “Perhaps the Japanese viewed that as hostile”??!? Your first language must be Newspeak.

    • Replies: @J. Alfred Powell
  76. Alfred says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    The Japanese Embassy in Washington was busy decrypting the declaration of war as it was arriving from Tokyo so as to deliver it to the US State Department. Meanwhile, the official waiting for the Japanese ambassador to show up and deliver the declaration had already read the version decrypted by the US in-house. He had to keep a straight face while the Japanese ambassador laboriously read his version out – some time after the attacks had commenced.

    I guess the Americans had some smart (White) people in those days. 🙂

  77. @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    This (“Danish”) is a mistake for “Dutch” (i.e. the present “Indonesia”). Thanks for catching it.

  78. Epigon says:

    The “torpedo bombers” were B5N2 “Kates” and they weren’t employed as torpedo-carriers only.

    The battleship row attack wave split them between torpedo duty and medium altitude level bombing carrying converted, obsolete Nagato and Mutsu 410 mm AP shells – the altitude was needed to penetrate the thick decks of US Standards’ All-or-nothing scheme.

    In addition, the Kates possesed the largest payload, so they were the aircraft type that struck hangars and airfield structures as well.

  79. Alfa158 says:

    The torpedo bombers were dual purpose and could carry out level bombing attacks. The Arizona was destroyed by a bomb hit from one of the Kate torpedo bombers that could carry a 1700 pound torpedo and so could carry more than twice the bomb load of a Val dive bomber. For Pearl Harbor the Japanese were not going to attack ship moving in the open ocean, but moored sitting ducks. Some of the Kates were armed with an armor piercing battleship shell equipped with bomb fins and that weighed about the same as a torpedo. They practiced in advance to determine the lead distance for dropping one of those bombs from a known altitude and speed, and were able to score hits from thousands of feet up on targets as long as they weren’t dodging.
    Supposedly the Japanese didn’t carry out more strikes because the remaining oil tanks and machine shops were being obscured by smoke from everything already on fire. Additionally the commanders started getting nervous about the absence of the carriers, worrying that they were out there somewhere working up a counter strike.

    • Replies: @Che Guava
    , @Anonymous
  80. @nokangaroos

    I daresay a German-run Europe and a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere would have made for a far more organic, distinctly improved planet

    A German-run Europe is what the EU is, for all practical purposes – basically Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg’s “September Programme” of 1914, with a few cosmetic changes. Today’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere is being brought to fruition as Red China’s Belt and Road initiative.

  81. Epigon says:

    Pearl Harbor attack plan was proposed in January 1941

    Japanese aerial torpedo Type 91 Mod/Revision 2 was introduced in April 1941.
    A specially modified variant was used in Pearl Harbor attack, utilizing both the wooden box in the rear to level the torpedo in the air and make it impact the water at shallower angle AND anti-roll finns.

    So they couldn’t have practiced for Pearl before they had the hardware capable of pulling it off.

    And despite these modifications, around a third of launched torpedoes failed to hit th target.

    • Replies: @Alfred
  82. @Wizard of Oz

    MacArthur was the coddled pet of the Contard Republicans because he used the US Army to attack the Bonus Marcher camp during Hoover’s administration. MacArthur’s incompetance in the Philippines was awe inspiring. Following Pearl Harbor the B-17 unit under his command asked permission to raid the Japanese airfields on Formosa that would provide air support for the invasion, MacArthur refused. Eisenhower had prepared a defense plan that predicted the EXACT beaches the Japanese would land on, MacArthur never activated it and the Japanese landed unopposed.

    • Replies: @Diversity Heretic
  83. peterAUS says:

    ….it would have taken much longer than 13 months to perfect these torpedoes, flight protocols and train the pilots.

    I know that this type of topics attracts certain characters, but, whenever I think I’ve seen all those ….arguments…..well, a surprise pops up.
    No, sorry, ain’t gonna indulge you. Call it simple “human watching”.
    Just curious how “Epigon” is going to reply to this (or somebody else, for that matter).

    O.T. what do you think:
    Can an average man be trained to hit a man sized target, with open sights, at the range of 300 meters, in a fortnight? Two weeks. 14 days. No, nada, zero previous firearms experience needed.
    This target:
    B-27S Standard Paper B-27 Target Full Size Silhouette Black Size: 24″ x 45″
    300 meters.
    14 days.
    Bolt action, open sight.

  84. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    However, I am damn sure that Stinnett seriously misrepresented the facts regarding what US Navy codebreakers had access to before the Pearl Harbor attack.

    Conspicuous by its absence at the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association’s review of Stinnett’s Day of Deceit by your actual expert is any mention of telling reports by 2nd Radio Officer Leslie Grogan, who was serving aboard the SS Lurline as it transited the Pacific en route from Los Angeles to Honolulu in late November 1941

    True, Grogan wasn’t a US Navy codebreaker, but he did some pretty good work despite this handicap.

    On Nov. 30, 1941, Grogan notes he began picking up unusual Japanese radio traffic on frequency 375 kilocycles, which was reserved for radio direction finding and not normally used for communications. In addition, it was the time of day when he heard the unusual traffic that alerted Grogan that these signals could not be coming from mainland Japan, and therefore had to have been sent by ships at sea.

    The Japs are blasting away on the lower Marine Radio frequency – it is all in Japanese Code, and continues for several hours. Some of the signals were loud, and other weak
    Having crossed the Pacific for 30 years, never heard JCS Yokohama before 9 P.M. our time on the lower Marine Frequency, and then rebroadcast simultaneously on the lower Marine Frequency from some point in the Pacific. If anyone should ask me, I would say it’s the Jap’s Mobilization Battle Order.

    Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai
    Brian Villa and Timothy Wilford

    Villa and Wilford note that the Japanese were aware and worried that the USN was using 355 kilocycles for RDF and chatter, but seem to have been entirely unaware that the USN also monitored and used 375 kilocycles (since 1929), the same frequency the Imperial Japanese Navy was sending general orders to the IJA’s carrier strike force sailing toward Hawaii.

    And you know, something tells me that by 1941, the USN may have had a radio traffic analyst or two every bit as sharp, capable, and resourceful as Leslie Grogan, and probably with much better equipment as well.

    It is therefore entirely inconceivable and completely beyond belief that these tell-tale signals from Kido Butai on 375 kilocycles heard by Grogan and Rudy Apslund aboard SS Lurline between 11/30 and 12/2/1941 were not picked up as well by the various U.S. radio monitoring and RDF facilities on Hawaii, and elsewhere, including the USN’s.

    • Agree: Haxo Angmark
    • Replies: @SECGRU Sailor
  85. Truth3 says:

    How long before the Truth of 9/11 is fully documented?

  86. peterAUS says:

    ….it would have taken much longer than 13 months to perfect these torpedoes, flight protocols and train the pilots.

    Just curious how “Epigon” is going to reply to this (or somebody else, for that matter).

    Pearl Harbor attack plan was proposed in January 1941

    Japanese aerial torpedo Type 91 Mod/Revision 2 was introduced in April 1941.
    A specially modified variant was used in Pearl Harbor attack, utilizing both the wooden box in the rear to level the torpedo in the air and make it impact the water at shallower angle AND anti-roll finns.

    So they couldn’t have practiced for Pearl before they had the hardware capable of pulling it off.

    In normal world this would’ve worked.
    In this post-modern paradise not necessarily.
    Let’s see…..

  87. Epigon says:

    If you are inquiring about Battle off Samar, then I may have a surprise for you.

    The “heroic American victory” is a joke narrative. The battle happened due to abysmal failure of US command, intelligence and reconnaissance.

    Naturally, as in case of Bomber mafia delusion of self-escorting B-17 being scraped off by concocting a narrative that only P-51D could escort them and they unfortunately arrived late in the war, the “heroic victory” and “Japanese battleships and cruisers running away from US destroyers and destroyer escorts” is a joke.

    The 6 CVEs of Taffy 3, and combined 10 CVEs of Taffy 1 (60 miles away) and Taffy 2 (30 miles away) together had 400+ planes and could relentlessly attack the Japanese fleet which had no fighter cover. To put things into perspective, it was roughly the same number of planes that attacked Pearl, and 150 more planes than Midway Japanese force.
    The added bonus is that American planes at this stage of war carried more (and better) ordnance, were better protected and could do their attack runs, drop their loads, and be back quickly due to proximity.
    People then go to great lengths claiming these were just CVEs, they weren’t outfitted out for anti-surface work etc. etc. but in reality, they had torpedoes, they had torpedo bombers and if anyone was wondering, a 454 or 227 kg HE bomb hitting the superstructure wasn’t pleasant. The rockets, HVAR and Tiny Tim would certainly wreck ships.
    But the most important thing to remember is the fact that Japanese anti-aircraft mounts were open, unarmoured in vast majority of cases.
    So even fighters and bombers that expended their heavy ordnance could suppress the flak of Japanese ships and make false attack runs and force the Japanese ships to take evasive maneuvers and prevent them from catching up with slower CVEs.

    US escorts’ crews performed heroically but the odds were overall extremely agains the Japanese.

    Besides, Mikawa retreated from a won battle (Savo Island) to “conserve strength”.
    Yeah, conserving your Yamatos, dreadnoughts (Nagato, Fuso, Ise), and heavy cruiser strength up to 1944 and 1945 really paid off.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  88. Anon[132] • Disclaimer says:

    Indeed. Untruth usually takes some time to take root and prevail to the point of overshadowing opposing views/accounts. It takes some time, but it reliably succeeds.

  89. peterAUS says:

    Well, should’ve phrased the question better:
    Did Kurita have any chance of reaching landing zones (with transports, TROOPS, material) with a credible force?
    Would that (assumed) credible force really have inflicted heavy loses on MEN and material there?

    My take: maybe the former; not the later.
    That was apparently his take at the time and the cause for the decision to abort and retreat.

  90. geokat62 says:

    There goes Vox Day again promoting a false narrative on his blog.

    Speaking of false narratives, Corvy, this one’s for you:

    MSNBC in Turmoil, Ratings Crash 32% After Relentless Lying About Russiahoax

    Reports are surfacing about a quiet shake-up of personnel at MSNBC after the cable news station lost more than 30% of their audience after the Mueller debacle.

    • Replies: @Corvinus
  91. @Rhett Langston

    And if my memory serves me correctly from having read my Grandmother’s copy of Chenault and the Flying Tigers in 1968 or so….the P40 plane (with the iconic toothy grimace painted on the front) flown by the Americans was not equal to the Japanese Zero in climbing ability but it was more heavily armored and armed and could dive faster. It could take more punishment than a zero and as well as deal out more. Their best tactic was to wait for the zeros at high altitude and attack by diving upon them. I think.

  92. Epigon says:

    Hailstone, sweeps ahead of and Philippine Sea battle itself cleared the sky of Japanese aircraft – removing any doubts, so my take presumes these events didn’t happen.

    Armchair admiral me would have gathered all surface combat ships and thrown them against a major amphibious invasion in progress – Saipan for example, to make it impossible for Americans to simply disengage and flee. Ideally, I would have awaited bad weather for the charge to diminish the US carrier airpower impact on the ships underway to engagement range.

    Ideally, the Americans would engage the older 25 knot dreadnoughts first, while the fast fleet of heavy cruisers and 2 remaining Kongō ships would be detected and attacked later. Yamato pair would be going on a one-way mission as well.
    The battle plan would envision only fighters being launched to provide aircover, both from carriers and island airfields.
    The torpedo and dive bombers would only be thrown into the fray once the US fighter CAP were tied up in dogfights and refuelling/rearming on carriers.
    The action would see first Kamikaze strikes, as Yokosuka D4Y with a 500 kg bomb was a perfect anti-US carrier kamikaze plane. Among dense proximity fuze 5 inch AA fire and US fighters, the attacks were suicidal anyway – Kamikaze or not – might as well make them count (USS Franklin, USS Princeton).

    Nothing would change in the grand scheme of things, but at least the Japanese Decisive Battle Doctrine would get its decisive battle, and the losses wouldn’t be so one-sided as they were in reality, with piecemeal deployment of Japanese forces, both in attack waves savaged at Philippine Sea battle, or several naval actions fought in 1944 that saw crippling Japanese losses.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  93. @alexander

    The other commenters have covered the points that I would have made, but there were also officials in the Japanese government (Prince Konoye) who were tired of the war in China and becoming convinced that it could not be won. The Prince proposed a meeting to try and obtain a relief from sanctions for an end or scaling-back of the Chinese war but the Roosevelt Administration refused to meet with him. Herbert Hoover (admittedly a biased observer) extensively documented the efforts of the Japanese government in a book that was not published until 2011

    All in all, a tragedy. President Calvin Coolidge referred to Japan as “America’s natural friend.”

  94. peterAUS says:

    Yes, something like that.

    It’s hard, really.
    For me it goes way above and beyond military, even politics/economy.

    Goes primordial, I guess, in a sort of tragic way. Sort of…what’s a man spirit against machine?
    Or, if Japanese (spirit) can be crushed, whose can’t?

    How to accept you are weak, can’t win, but can’t live as weak looking up that power over you?
    Accept US dominance and you’ll be fine. As second, at best.
    Don’t accept, challenge, and get smashed to pieces.
    What a choice.

    Something like that.
    At least on the bright side.

    On the dark side, well, that weak really unleashed hell on those weaker than him/them. China and treatment of Western POWs.
    And those mass suicides. And plans for fighting invasion of mainland.
    When a courage becomes cruelty? Worse, stupidity. Hehe…who can make that judgement call?


  95. @anonymous

    Not to mention the many people of good will like Lindberg whose reputation and life was ruined by his activism on behalf of non-involvement, who, in other words, didn’t buy into the lies and misdirection of the administration.

  96. @Bombercommand

    I remember once reading that the Japanese bombers on the way to attack the Phillipines were astounded that they did not see the American bombers on their way to attack Japanese installations on Formosa. MacArthur’s failure to be prepared for the Japanese attacks has, to my understanding, never been fully explained. His defense of the Phillipines was “amateur night at the movies,” although, in fairness, he redeemed himself in the island-hopping campaigns in the South Pacific. The argument of Kimmel and Short was that their derelictions were at least no worse than those of MacArthur and that they too should have been given an additional chance to prove their mettle as commanders.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
    , @Bombercommand
  97. @fnn

    The Japanese fighting at Khalkhin gol in 1939 generally impressed the Japanese with how tough the Russians would be as opponents. Advances into British Burma and possibly all the way into India probably seemed to be the better bet for the land-oriented Japanese Army.

    • Replies: @fnn
  98. @peterAUS

    300 yards, open sights?


  99. peterAUS says:
    @Diversity Heretic

    MacArthur’s failure to be prepared for the Japanese attacks has, to my understanding, never been fully explained.

    It was.
    Mental breakdown when his hubris faced reality. He was WRONG and fell apart when proven so.

    The argument of Kimmel and Short was that their derelictions were at least no worse than those of MacArthur and that they too should have been given an additional chance to prove their mettle as commanders.

    MacArthur was lucky. Events, not him, “clicked” well enough to give him the chance.

    It’s naive to think that the best commanders, even in hard war, get the best.
    Lucky and connected get the best.

    Spruance/Halsey is good example.
    No, won’t debate that.

  100. Stinnet, while a good read with some significant discoveries, overclaimed re US crack of JN-25B. Looks to me like US codebreakers had c. 5%-10% of the 5-digit groups deciphered, and that’s not enough to make much of most intercepts. But sombody else did. Right now I’m leafing through all 6 volumes of the Brit Official History of their own WW2 intel/cointel ops. And you know what? It’s all about ETO and Med/N. Africa…zippo re Far East Intel. Not one chapter, not one sentence, not one word. And this silence speaks louder than words: something very big is being concealed, and that could only be a substantial crack of the Jap Naval code. Fortunately (Brits have said they’ll de-classify everything re Brit Far East Intel in “2042” or “2060”…a likely story) we have firsthand accounts re this break in Rusbridger and Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor (NY, 1991) and Peter Shepherd, Three Days to Pearl (Annapolis, 2000). So by 26 November, 1941, Churchill knew all about the upcoming Jap attack on Pearl Harbor and, beset with nothing but bad news from the Eastern Front and from North Africa/Med (plus evidence that Hull and Roosevelt via the modus vivendi proposal, were suddenly going squishy on the provoke Japan policy), decided to contact FDR directly. He telegrammed FDR 3 times during the early AM of that day and got no response…’cause Roosevelt was still asleep. Finally, desperate, he went to the trans-Atlantic radiotelephone room @ 10 Downing, picked up the scrambler phone, and called FDR @ 8:35 AM (DC time)…the two allied warmongers then decided how to play the upcoming attack so as to get a war declaration out of a ’til-now reluctant Congress. How we do we know this? The Germans had an RT intercept/de-scramble op on the Dutch coast and, from September onward, were picking up the Churchill-FDR conversations: cf. Richard Montpelier, “…a little-known agency was was tapping the FDR-Churchill ‘hot line’”, WWII Magazine, III/1, May 1988, pp. 12-17; Gregory Douglas, Gestapo Chief – The 1948 OSS Interrogation of Heinrich Mueller, vol. I (San Jose, 1995), pp. 42-55; and Christo’s Military and Intelligence Corner @ Incidentally, the preliminary Warning Order re getting the 2 carrier battle groups out of Pearl Harbor on (plausible deniability-providing) “air reinforcement missions” to Wake and Midway went from Adm. Stark in DC to Adm. Kimmel at Pearl Harbor precisely 12 hours later.

    • Replies: @Saggy
  101. @peterAUS

    The answer is yes, and I will even say it is possible up to 500 meters because this is exactly what the Marine Corps does with its recruits.

    Not sure how that relates to your original point but it is possible.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  102. AmRusDebate says: • Website

    The essential flaw in the logic of the FDR set-up Pearl Harbor argument is to forget that the Japs pulled the trigger. No one forced them to do it. Just as no one forced them to invade China, Laos, Burma, etc.

    By the same token, nothing obliged FDR to preempt the attack, unless his information was 100% certain, which it never was, since the sheer audacity of Japanese plans was beyond comprehension, No one could take it at face value is how stupid it was. The Japanese never stood a chance and all American forces had to do was bid their time.

    It’s instructive that no one bothers with sources in German or from Soviet archives . Did Hitler know about Pearl Harbor, the plans? Did he take them seriously? Did Stalin?

    I hope some readers understand the importance of this question.

    Japanese expansionism necessitated a response. Without US entry into the war, the USSR would have been engaged on two fronts, and certainly collapsed leading to even more European deaths (Slavic, Jewish, German), and by the time the Japanese and Germans met up in the Urals, they’d either confront one another (Nazi planning was considerably anxious about such an outcome – know they were more opposed to genuine Asiatics than semi-Asiatic Eastern-Europeans) or establish a hegemony that would render America a secondary power. If Japan had chosen not to attack the USSR, it would have been seen as an opportunist, waiting for Hitler and Stalin to exhaust one another, which implies that sooner or later it would have benefited from a collapsed European order.

    FDR wasn’t given much choice by the Nazi sponsored “Anti-war” opposition to maneuver in any other way. He did the right thing, he played the game well, and no one is owed the slightest apology.

  103. @ThreeCranes

    You’re incorrect. The USMC does this with its recruits every training cycle. And yes, I was.

    • Replies: @ThreeCranes
  104. @Diversity Heretic

    The Island Hopping Campaign stratagem wasn’t MacArthur, it was created by Admiral Nimitz and his staff. It was absolutely brilliant as it allowed concentration of US assets on the critical line of approach to Honshu and made the vast Japanese holdings from Burma to Rabual a liability instead of a strength. However, The Island Hopping stratagem meant the victory over Japan would be an all Navy show with the Marine Corps as ground troops. Interservice rivalry kicked in and the US Army wanted a piece of the action. Hence, Dumbshit Doug MacArthur got his gigantic, idiotic campaign through the Lesser Sundas to the Phillipines, which accomplished nothing to push forward the timetable of victory, useless bloodbaths like Peliliu, and horrible suffering to the Phillipine people. Regarding Kimmel, he was Navy, and CINCPAC fer chrissakes, and historically in all navies, commanders are given vastly greater freedom of action(and very distant overwatch by higher ups) compared to Army commanders. Hence, when a naval commander screws up, it is courts martial time(eg the captain of USS Pueblo),although why Halsey wasn’t sacked after his epic screwup at Leyte is a mystery to me. I am certainly with you on not understanding MacArthur’s bungling, and I doubt it will ever be explained. Truman was of the opinion that MacArthur was mentally ill, and the corncob pipe and aviator shades do appear to be the costume of an absurd, terminal narcissist. IMO, the Island Hopping Campaign represents clarity of military thinking that would humble Napoleon. It is a working backward from the Strategic Objective: Tokyo. To get to Tokyo, we must land on Honshu, to reach Honshu we must have a close staging area, that would be Kyushu, to reach Kyushu we must take Okinawa, to reach Oki, we must take Saipan, to take Saipan we must neutralize Truk naval base, to reach Truk we must take the Caroline Islands outposts of Tarawa and Kwajalien. And ass clowns like Andrei “The Faker” Raevsky think Americans are stupid….

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  105. I have no dog in this fight: I don’t really care whether Stinnett’s thesis is correct. I am just interested in knowing the facts, whatever they may be. To that end, it is unhelpful to appeal repeatedly to the fairmindedness of readers, as if that were more important than evidence. Regarding the latter, Wikipedia says,

    Reviewers were generally dismissive of Stinnett’s claims …. Basically, the author has made up his sources; when he does not make up the source, he lies about what the source says. … Stinnett attributes to McCollum a position McCollum expressly refuted. … Stinnett’s claims of ‘intercepts’ are contradicted by Japanese testimony, which unequivocally state there were none …. Stinnett makes numerous and contradictory claims of the number of messages originated by the Kido Butai.

    And so on. Less negatively, but still far short of Powell’s credulous reception here, the New York Times (Bernstein, 1999), concludes that

    [Stinnett’s] failure to take into account other, less drastic possible analyses of the way intelligence was disseminated and interpreted leads one to read his book with both interest and a strong dose of skepticism.

    I shared Bernstein’s doubt that a scheme of the nature Powell describes would have left the U.S. so terribly passive in the Philippines.

    I do like conspiracy theories. They can provoke reconsideration of the received wisdom. In the case of 9/11, for instance, I’m still undecided, even if others sneer. My primary point here is that Powell’s review would have been far better if it had displayed a stronger inclination toward critical thinking.

    • Replies: @J. Alfred Powell
  106. peterAUS says:

    The answer is yes, and I will even say it is possible up to 500 meters because this is exactly what the Marine Corps does with its recruits.


    Yep. Although, for that 500 the guy/girl does have to have some talent. For two weeks and zero experience I mean.
    No way in hell we can talk details here but, it boils, IMHO, simply to COACHING well.

    I am sure if I get a couple of average, but willing guys, on a farm, for 2 weeks, at the end they’ll be able to do that. Start at 6, finish at 9. 14 days. Drills, exercises, lectures. Not necessarily in that order.
    Good old Winchester 70 on a bipod, easy. And, of course, plenty of other stuff we can’t talk about here.Coaching is the key, again.

    Not sure how that relates to your original point but it is possible.

    It relates to some other train of thought. Say, the concepts of “getting even” and/or “influencing people in power”.Nasty concepts in civilized world.
    Something like that.

    • Replies: @MikeatMikedotMike
  107. @awry

    The US is in decline and if it is still a superpower it is only a matter of time and Russia/China combined easily outmatch it today.

  108. @Rhett Langston

    John Wayne made a movie about them!

  109. @anon

    Sorry, bungled. #9 is a reply to you..

  110. Wally says:

    Agreed, the really valuable US ships were not at Pearl.
    So what? That wasn’t your point which I refuted.
    Please, no false strawman arguments.

    What Britain did with out-moded weaponry is also irrelevant, as I said. The Japanese were using much newer and advanced torpedoes & planes. Please pay attention.
    We all know about the irrelevant Taranto.

  111. Wally says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    “The real story is that the US navy didn’t learn the lesson from Taranto and understand the vulnerability at Pearl Harbor.”


    The real story is in the article above. Pearl Harbor was allowed happen, please pay attention.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  112. Wally says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    Why? Seriously?

    Again, read the article above.

    FDR wanted the ships destroyed and / or damaged.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  113. Ron Unz says:

    First, I should emphasize that I’m absolutely no expert on Pearl Harbor. Over the years I’ve read quite a lot of seemingly persuasive material arguing that FDR was aware of the impending attack and deliberately let it take place, but without detailed investigation, I couldn’t really say.

    However, I read the Stinnett book a few days ago, and found the weight of evidence he provided absolutely enormous and totally convincing. Here are a couple of my related comments from a different thread:

    Stinnett notes that as the Japanese fleet was slowly making its way toward Pearl Harbor, FDR issued an order absolutely banning all American ships from the part of the sea along the Japanese route. Our fleet commander had sent some ships into the general area, and they were ordered removed.

    Unless FDR (1) knew the Japanese fleet was approaching and (2) wanted to make absolutely sure no American ships detected them, I just can’t see why he would have done that.

    For 25 years, our military had (quite reasonably) assumed that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be one of the most likely opening events of a war with Japan. So although Kimmel was explicitly excluded from receiving the intelligence information provided to all our other commanders, the rising tensions with Japan naturally made him a bit nervous. Therefore, he sent some of his ships to patrol around in the seas off Hawaii, roughly in the path of the approaching Japanese fleet.

    When DC found out about this, they ordered Kimmel to return all his ships to the harbor, implying he might be court-martialed if he disobeyed.

    Also, Kimmel and the local army general were explicitly ordered to take absolutely no actions that might “alarm” the local residents of Hawaii. Obviously, putting their forces on any sort of serious military alert would have been very “alarming,”so that seems to have been completely prohibited.

    There really seems to be an absolutely massive collection of independent evidence that FDR was not only aware of the impending attack but wanted it to produce maximal loss of lives and destruction of our (obsolescent) ships, thereby fully enraging the American public.

    For those so interested, here’s a very long and detailed review of the existing major literature in 1991, a decade before the Stinnett book:

    And here’s a chapter in a 1953 book by one of the leading Pearl Harbor experts:

    • Replies: @Haxo Angmark
  114. Mulegino1 says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    Correct. Pearl Harbor, like 9/11, was a “catalyzing” event for the American public and Hawaii was considered “our territory” while the Philippines were so remote that most Americans probably didn’t even know where they were located. MacArthur, despite his utter failures to protect his planes, was a well known and useful propaganda figure whereas Kimmel and Short were not.

    I have mixed feelings about “Dugout Doug” but he really messed up that one., But MacArthur had his own ready scapegoat in General Wainwright.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  115. Anonymous [AKA "Tamquam"] says: • Website
    @SECGRU Sailor

    Debunked, and yet some odd coincidences remain. From American Betrayal by Diana West, pp. 256-7, mentions the activities of the Soviet agent Richard Sorge in Tokyo who worked to redirect Japanese military adventurism south, away from the Rodina. Coupled with the deep and widespread Soviet penetration of the Roosevelt administration, some of whom (Harry Dexter White) altered State Department cables putting Japan in an impossible situation given their lack of natural resources. Also see KGB: The Inside Story of It’s Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordeivsky. There is also the curious case of the Soviet freighter Uritsky sighted by the Japanese on the way to Pearl, but left unmolested (And I Was There Pearl Harbor and Midway Breaking the Secrets, pp. 101, Layton, Pineau and Costello).

    I doubt that Roosevelt schemed war with Japan into being, but he was surrounded by schemers who did, his administration by that time well on the way to becoming the extension of Soviet foreign policy it later grew into.

    • Replies: @Seraphim
    , @SECGRU Sailor
  116. @obwandiyag

    “Gore Vidal, a person you don’t like…”

    Funny, I have a shelf half-filled with Vidal’s American history series and social commentary. Your shots fall wide of the mark.

  117. @MikeatMikedotMike

    in only 14 days?

    Count me amazed. Seriously.

    • Replies: @MikeatMikedotMike
  118. @AmRusDebate

    the Japs didn’t “pull the trigger”:

    blockade is an Act of War, and the Japs decided to fight back against strangulation rather than surrender. Moreover, FDR didn’t care two beans about “Japanese aggression” in Asia; he was a liberal anti-imperialist and had no love for any of the White Empires, including Britain’s. The actual sequence of events, your nonsense notwithstanding:

    1) 1940-41: Roosevelt attempts to provoke Hitler by waging an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic; US destroyers escort British convoys and attack U-boats while several heavy naval units, including battleship Texas and cruiser Vincennes, do lazy circles amid the wolfpacks. Object: get torpedoed. But Kriegsmarine command (and the US Congress) knows exactly what FDR is up to and gives strict orders not to fire back or attack any US ships ID’d by silhouette. When, in August-September, 2 US destroyers were finally torpedoed during nighttime convoy battles – one damaged, the second sunk with heavy loss of life – Roosevelt put out war declaration feelers to Congress, and got slapped down by his own party. Meanwhile

    2) along comes 22 June, 1941: Germany attacks the Red Empire, and Stalin activates the Jew-communist (Harry Dexter White et al.) cell @ Morganthau’s US Treasury Department. White concocts a plan to a) draw the Japanese away from Russia and b) provoke Japan into attacking the
    USA (& thus, it was hoped, provide an back door into the European War) via economic strangulation: a trade cut-off followed by an oil embargo, and then a seizure of all Japanese foreign exchange to prevent purchase of oil anywhere else. That worked, alright. Read and study: Romerstein and Breindel, The Venona Secrets – Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors (DC, 2000), pp. 29-53; John Koster, Operation Snow – How a Soviet Mole in FDR’s White House Triggered Pearl Harbor (DC, 2012); Edward Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy – The U.S. Financial Seige of Japan Before Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, 2007); and Roland Worth, No Choice But War – The U.S. Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific (Jefferson, 1995)

    3) “…unless his information was 100% certain…”. It was 100% certain, via the Roosevelt-Churchill exchange of 26 November – see my comment #105 – and via subsequent US direction-finding and triangulation of IJN low power talk-between-ships signals sent by the Japanese attack force as it proceeded eastward. FDR didn’t “pre-empt” because, in order to prod an unwilling Congress and an even more unwilling nation into another catastrophic World War, he had to maufacture an “Infamy”. We know now that the real infamy was his. Not Japan’s.

    4) “did Hitler know? Did Stalin?”. Hitler, probably, via the RT intercepts. Stalin, certainly, via the Sorge spy ring in Tokyo. Point is, during 1941 EVERYONE was manuevering to avoid a potentially fatal multi-front war…even the US wasn’t ready, that’s why the sudden modus vivendi proposal that Hull floated on 24-25 November…which a desperate Churchill shot down on the 26th. BUT only Stalin succeeded. Which is why the real winners of WW2 were the communist and Zionist wings of organized Jewry: Judeo-communism wound up astride half the planet, and the Zionists got hold of Palestine, a base of operations later parlayed into complete domination of the war-wounded White nations…which (((they))) are now finishing off.

    • Agree: Maowasayali
    • Replies: @AmRusDebate
  119. @Wally

    You may well be right and it only adds to the picture of FDR’s ruthlessness if he waa aware of what I understand to be the failure to inform Kimmel that, whatever they thought about torpedoes and water depth before Taranto that was all past its due date.

  120. @Mulegino1

    Thanks. I was a little surprised that you gave credit to McArthur for the island hopping campaigns as I recalled that Admiral Nikita was in command of the northern half of it. The dreaded Wikipedia says the strategy was devised by the navy decades earlier though McArthur claimed credit. He also turned back and violated its principles according to the same source.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  121. Wally says: • Website

    “Without US entry into the war, the USSR would have been engaged on two fronts, and certainly collapsed leading to even more European deaths (Slavic, Jewish, German), and by the time the Japanese and Germans met up in the Urals, they’d either confront one another (Nazi planning was considerably anxious about such an outcome – know they were more opposed to genuine Asiatics than semi-Asiatic Eastern-Europeans) or establish a hegemony that would render America a secondary power. If Japan had chosen not to attack the USSR, it would have been seen as an opportunist, waiting for Hitler and Stalin to exhaust one another, which implies that sooner or later it would have benefited from a collapsed European order. ”

    – Give us proof that Germany was “anxious” to fight Japan. That’s just more laughable Zionist propaganda which you cannot prove.

    – You also imply that Slavs & Jews were targeted just for being Slavs & Jews. Once again, you have no proof for yet another Zionist lie.

    also said:
    “FDR wasn’t given much choice by the Nazi sponsored “Anti-war” opposition to maneuver in any other way. He did the right thing, he played the game well, and no one is owed the slightest apology.”

    Only a Zionist would say that sacrifing 3,000 men & women was the “right thing”. After all, they weren’t Jews, so no worries.

    – Please tell us about your “Nazi sponsored “Anti-war” opposition”. Of course Germany wanted to avoid a war with the US, in spite of the “neutral” US aggression against them; but to claim that the overwhelming opposition to war was because of German efforts is laughable and one again, you have no proof.

    Lies, the Zionist’s game.

  122. Seraphim says:

    It is hard to believe that Roosevelt was not scheming with Churchill, when both were on the same boat, so to speak, when they facilitated (if not organized) the ‘Lusitania’ event.

  123. Alfred says:

    Japanese aerial torpedo Type 91 Mod/Revision 2 was introduced in April 1941.

    I don’t like referring to the Wikipedia – which I think of as the Ziopedia. However, here is a reference that ought to put an end to this discussion (but probably won’t) 🙂

    The Type 91 was an aerial torpedo of the Imperial Japanese Navy designed to be launched from an aircraft. It was in service from 1931 to 1945. It was used in naval battles in World War II and was specially developed for attacks on ships in shallow harbours.

    IMHO, this torpedo and its development long preceded the Taranto attack by the British.

    Please note the sort of time scale it takes to develop a new weapon. For heavens sake, the F-16 is still flying with many airforces and it first flew 45 years ago.

    • Replies: @Epigon
  124. @Ron Unz

    Ron Unz: “…but wanted it to produce maximal loss of lives and destruction of our (obsolescent) ships, thereby fully enraging the American public.”

    almost so, I think, but not quite. FDR had been de facto Secretary of the Navy (Assistant Sec., in fact, but Josephus Daniels was a political hack who knew nothing about ships and the sea) during the Woodrow Wilson regime, and kept in touch thereafter. He knew the ships and he knew the Admirals. The Navy was (as with Churchill) his favorite service. That’s how, when Adm. Richardson in 1940 confronted FDR over the too-far-forward basing of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl and Roosevelt fired Richardson, FDR knew just the perfect midwit “yes sir, absolutely sir” Judas Goat to replace him with: Husband E. Kimmel. And then, after the attack, reached all the way down to #35 in the seniority list to appoint the one man who had the near-perfect combination of competence and sang-froid to win the Pacific War: Nimitz. IOTW, FDR, Stark and the other conspirators (Marshall, probably also R.K. Turner at Navy Plans and Ops) were trying to achieve a balance point that would give Kimmel and Short sufficient information to put up a decent defense while preventing them for making preparations so aggressive that the Japanese would get wind of them and turn back. An impossible balance, as it happened. That explains the divergent accounts of Roosevelt’s reactions immediately after the first post-attack damage reports came in: looking like the cat-that-swallowed-the-canary, but also shocked at the (apparently) horrendous damage that had been inflicted; it wasn’t immediately evident that the Japanese had missed everything that mattered.

  125. Forty years ago, deep in the underground stacks of a central library, I found by chance Tandsill’s Back Door To War which contains the thesis that Roosevelt knew of the Pearl Harbor raid in advance and let it happen as well as the thesis that Japan “tried to surrender”(whatever that is supposed to mean) but Stalin and Roosevelt wouldn’t let them(whatever that is supposed to mean). I’ve had forty years to think about it, and both those theses stink more of excrement the older and wiser I get. However, I am interested in the dynamics of fantasyland stupidity, so I carefully read this article, as well as the links posted by those who support the thesis of the article, as I carefully read the numbskulls that argue that “global warming is a hoax” or the ravings of a muzzie propagandist. I think this interest comes from having been sent to a high school run by Christian fundamentalists who would preach “creationism”, and screech with mentally ill rage at the mere mention of “evolution”(as well as being ” crypto-muzzie), the self righteous certainty of stupidity is fascinating. The thesis that Roosevelt let Pearl Harbor happen is supported by what amounts to Tortured Argumentation, and that’s a telltale of crackpotism, but that won’t faze a believer. The central problem with the thesis is, it wasn’t necessary to rig the Pearl Harbor raid in order to get The United States into WWII. Japan would do that simply by the arc of their expansionist program that began after the fall of the Shogunate. First they invaded Okinawa, in 1895 it was China’s turn, 1905 Russia’s turn, 1910 Korea’s turn, 1914 Germany’s turn, 1931again tear off a chunk of China, in 1937 go for the whole carcass of China, 1940 French Indochina’s turn. At that point, the combination of the inertia of 70 years of berserking and a defeated Holland and nearly defeated Great Britian meant that for Japan the next move was irresistible. The problem for Japan was that meant the certainty of invading The Phillipines, and war with The United States, and that solved a major problem for The United States, for despite being allies of England, France, Holland etc, The United States wanted the European colonial empires dismantled, but it needed someone else to go to war with them to achieve that goal. The goal of The United States was for Germany, Japan, England, France et al to be defeated, leaving a new order with The United States on top. The Soviet Union wasn’t a problem, and actually very useful as a bogey man to cement American power. This was the culmination of a long program that started with The Monroe Doctrine.

  126. @Bombercommand

    Actually American corporations were selling the means of war to both China and Japan up until mid 1941.

  127. Ahoy says:

    @ Truth3 #89

    “How long before the Truth of 9/11 is fully documented?”.

    Never. In the meantime the factory of pseudo science (The Voice of Israel Harvard) will inundate us with tons of fairy tales until we get dizzy and fall asleep.

    • Replies: @alexander
  128. @AmRusDebate

    “Yes, of course” one is forced to think when the likely influence of Soviet agents and sympathisers has to be considered. And now you raise the equally unsurprising fact or allegation of Nazi-sponsored “Anti-War” opposition. But what is known about it?

    Unz Review carried interesting material on British manipulation of American politics before FDR got his way, even claiming that they got up FDR’s only pro intervention opponent as Republican candidate if my memory is correct. But German sponsorship of anti-war activists is completely new to me, however obvious that there must have been some attempts. Can we follow the Benjamins? Equally, is there any documentary proof? To what effect?

    • Replies: @AmRusDebate
  129. utu says:
    @Paul Jolliffe

    What was Hitler’s calculation to declare war? Why give FDR what FDR wanted? Japan did not declare war on USSR in June 1941? So, Japanese were kind of smarter? Though not by much. Still they got provoked to attack Pearl Harbor.

  130. Fred762 says:

    Fact: 1. US broke the Jap Diplomatic codes in 1929..[“American Black Chamber”, by Yardley] and the Jap Naval codes by 1940[Percy Greaves}..well b4 FDR even sent the fleet TO Hawaii. 2. There were code machines in many cities, including several in London ENGLAND, but NOT at Hawaii. 3. Top commanders at Hawaii said the fleet could NOT be defended there and wanted iot to bee sent back to San Diego. 4. They begged for 6 months [b4 Dec 7, 1941] to try to get more patrol planes, more AA guns and more no avail. 
    5. At the US Cabinet meeting in July 1941 it was discussd .”how to maneuver the Japs into firing the first shot”. 6. Subsequently the Cdrs at Hawaii were only warned by DC to prepare for sabotage. 7. carriers & escorts were ordered OUT of Hawaii 2 days b4 the attack to allegedly “ferry fighters to Guam”, but in reality to save the indispensable carriers. 8. Jap long range patrol float-plnes were known to be planning to refuel at French Frigate Shoals, but we sent a destroyer to sit there to prevent the Jap ‘tanker-submarine’ from doing the refuelling..thus the Japs never found out that the carriers were NOT at Pearl. ie…Dec 7th was not a surprise….

    • Replies: @Haxo Angmark
  131. Alfred says:

    As a 17 year old, at an English Public School, I was a member of the shooting team. The year was 1967. My school had been attending a big yearly competition at Bisley for over 40 years. But I was the first person from the school to become a member of the “Public Schools 100”. I still have a shoulder badge to prove it.

    We were shooting at 200 and 500 yards. With adjustable sights and recently-rebored Lee-Enfield 303 rifles.

    Schools Imperial Meeting

    I think it was a fluke that I did so well. At 500 years, the bulls eye was barely visible. We had very little practice at those distances – merely over the preceding days. England is a crowded place and these bullets can travel for 3000 yards. The Hurricanes and Spitfires used them.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  132. Fred762 says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    Kimmel and Gen Short had begged DC for fighters, B-17s and AA guns to defend the fleet..none were senrt Hawaii received orders to “guard against sabotage” and to “save fuel” by keeping grounded planes’ tanks only half filled w gasoline..perfect targets for strafing runs and fires. The fleet had been ordered to be in port on weekends to “allow sailors more liberty spend $$$ help out the poor Hawaiian economy”
    There was NO code machine at Hawaii..but 8 in London…and several in many other places…

    Thern there is this, as told to me (in 1977) by a retired USAAF Colonel, [now deceased] a relative of mine.:
    His Quote..”in May 1942, my pilots came crying w rage to me..bks they had just received orders to put all 3 Far Eastern oil refineries (captured intact by the Japs) “off limits” to US bombing.” This was b4 the battle of Midway BTW. 
    They said ..”we can end this(Pacific) war in SIX WEEKS if they’d let us bomb those refineries and CUT OFF THE JAPS’ FUEL SUPPLIES”. They stayed off limits for 3 years…BP and SHELL at Singapore and ESSO up in Hanoi (Fr IndoChina at the time). You may have heard of Hanoi. .
    BTW have you figgered out how in heck 3 mir refineries could have been allowed to be captured intact??

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  133. @Bombercommand

    You are obviously very well informed so I add a modification to your account with modest hesitation. The island hopping plan was indeed the brainchild of the navy (and marines) but went far further back than Nikita and his staff. Apparently there were such plans in 1911 and 1921 and, unfortunately the Japanese absorbed the idea from a 1921 book by a Brit called Bywater and were the first to use island hopping. I trust Wikipedia on this.

  134. @J. Alfred Powell

    All very praiseworthy. However, I wonder about the exact motivation behind such a labour. If it is scholarly, all is fine with me. If it is political/social, I have to raise my doubts, because in politics and social matters all that can be done is substitution of new untruths (or lies…) for the former ones — something that both facilitates and consolidates, and most often marks, a change of rulers (at least in the West. In the East new rulers may maintain the untruths or lies of those who were before them).

  135. @Sparkon

    The NCVA piece did not mention Grogan because no expert takes the story seriously. At most, Grogan was listening to Japanese commercial communications in home waters, not Kido Butai. As LCDR Jacobsen (same author) explains in detail here:

    Your implication is that a bunch of USN radio intercept operators heard comms from Kido Butai en route to Hawaii but failed to report it up their chain of command. You clearly have no idea how the military — any military — works. Moreover, are we supposed to believe that FDR’s conspiracy to let the Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor was SO VAST that it included a bunch of E-4 radio intercept operators at multiple sites across the Pacific?

    Nobody intercepted Kido Butai comms because there were none. IJN implemented a highly effective denial and deception plan that worked as intended. Hard as it may be for you to believe, the Americans didn’t really screw up — the Japanese were just that clever and disciplined. This, again, is well documented.

    Read and learn:

    • Replies: @peterAUS
    , @Sparkon
  136. @Anonymous

    Coincidences are….coincidences.

    West is not a serious source.

  137. @peterAUS

    “Yep. Although, for that 500 the guy/girl does have to have some talent. For two weeks and zero experience I mean.”

    Some people are just naturals. I was in recruit training with a few guys who had never fired a rifle before and at the end of the rifle qualification portion of RT they had not only qualified, but qualified expert. One of those guys was the platoon high shooter. Further, if a recruit “unks,” as in does not qualify, they cannot continue through the training cycle until they do. There were two guys like that who had to requalify because they unked the first time.
    The training period for rifle qualification was about 2 weeks. And to your point about instruction, the PMI’s are picked because they are in the top 5% of marksman in the MC. The instruction is very good; teaching proper breathing, bone support, natural point of aim, and how to calculate windage and elevation into the rear sight aperture.

    The MC known distance course for qualification is 25 rounds at 200 meters, 15 rounds at 300 meters, and 10 rounds at 500 meters.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  138. @ThreeCranes

    See my detailed reply to PeterAUS’ comment #111 when it pops up for more details.

  139. Corvinus says:

    You’re exactly right, the report you provided is a false narrative. It was only one source that made a claim about the apparent cause-effect relationship. However, this “shake-up” was in the works prior to the loss of viewership. “It was widely expected that Dan would be running things sooner rather than later after he came over from the main net’s weekend news department,” a source at the cable newser told Deadline today. Arnall got the daytime exec editor gig in February. Moreover, given how the Mueller Report was released, and its subsequent dissemination by that and other networks, insiders anticipated falling ratings, as big news stories “ebb and flow” along with viewership.

    Regardless, there are several ongoing investigations about Trump malfeasance.

  140. @alexander

    Alexander’s questions are the very same questions I have (and I suspect many other readers too).

  141. alexander says:

    Can you explain what you mean by ” The Voice Israel Harvard ” ?

    I have never heard that expression used before.

    • Troll: S
  142. Saggy says: • Website
    @Haxo Angmark

    How we do we know this?

    The link does not confirm it. Can you be specific?

    • Replies: @Haxo Angmark
  143. camillus says:

    Total bull. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise. Our involvement in WWII was necessary. If you’re trying to revise history, you’re failing. No one outside of a few internet kooks believe you. Take off the tinfoil hats and have a great day! lol

    • Replies: @Seraphim
  144. @Fred762

    My usual scepticism requires me to ask how the US Air Force was going to bomb targets in Singapore and Hanoi in May 1942, especially if they intended the crews to live through it and return to base afterwards. I note btw that it probably wouldn’t have resulted in destroyed refineries anyway judging by the inaccuracy of bombing in Europe. They might still have been optimistic. There is also the problem of believing that the Japanese had been depending on production from those refineries before they were captured. It would be surprising if they were supplying the Japanese at all.

    As to their being captured intact Hanoi presents no problem but Singapore does need some sort of explanation. Incompetence and chaos is the obvious answer. The British defence of Malaya and Singapore was shamefully incompetent.

  145. fnn says:
    @Diversity Heretic

    But the Soviets were worried that the Japanese might attack:

    In mid-September 1941, he informed the Soviets that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union in the near future. Various writers have speculated that this information allowed Stalin to transfer 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to the Western Front against the western Axis Powers during the Battle for Moscow. However, Soviet code-breakers had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes, and Moscow already knew from signals intelligence that there would be no Japanese attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.

  146. Seraphim says:

    It certainly was a surprise for the crews of ‘Arizona’, ‘Oklahoma’… actually of all ships present at Pearl Harbor. It was a pleasant surprise for FDR that the ‘Japes’ rushed so quickly into the trap.
    Your involvement in WWII was obligatory once your masters declared war on Germany and cracked the whip: All Americans to war!

    • Replies: @Tom Welsh
  147. Che Guava says:

    I will use your comment as a hook, and reply to many points raised by commentors and in the article. BTW, I was reccomending Day of Deceit here not long after making my account.

    Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to make a second attack on Pearl Harbour`s infrastructure, as other commentators have said would have been a good idea, but Nagumo, feeling that he had won a great victory like Admiral Togo’s in the Russo-Japanese war, ignored the order.

    The army was dominated by what is termed the control faction, their idea was to attack the USSR, which may have been effective at the time, who knows?

    On the other hand, there had been the sound defeat at Nomonha, only four years earlier, and the Minister for
    Foreign Affairrs (I think it was Kishii), who had been in Berlin, was told ‘Turn to the south’ by the Sovs when he stnpped in Moscow on theway home.

    The article is mainly accurate, but not om the `carrier battle group’, a concept that did not exist at that time, while Nagumo`s attack was in progress, the two carriers were not on their way to Midway or anything like that, just lurking in a gyre.

  148. Tom Welsh says:

    Actually the Japanese got the idea from the British attack on Taranto the previous year. Although on a far smaller scale, this attack showed that even a handful of obsolete biplanes could sink and severely damage capital ships in a shallow harbour well defended by AA guns.

    Knowing that such an attack was possible, the Japanese practiced it assiduously.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  149. Tom Welsh says:

    In fact it was Adolf Hitler who personally declared war on the USA. Although the US Congress went through a pantomime of declaring war on Germany, that was redundant as a state of war already existed after Hitler’s speech.

    Ironically, that was the last time the USA declared war on anyone!

    • Replies: @Seraphim
  150. @niteranger

    Very well said, and thanks. With full Jewish control of the media being what it is, Americans have zero chance of ever becoming anything other the dupes they are and have been for the past 100 years.

  151. Stinnett in his book mentions Gen. Elliot Thorpe. Gen. Thorpe’s grandson, a close friend, remembers his grandfather telling him that the code had been broken long before Pearl Harbor. He knew this because he was stationed in Indonesia and the Dutch had intercepted Japanese communications mentioning an attack on Pearl Harbor. Gen. Thorpe sent a least 4 telegrams to Washington and all were ignored.

    Day of deceit? How about century of deceit.

  152. peterAUS says:

    Bislye, a?
    I do stand corrected re rifle marksmanship and your “handle”, apparently.

    So…what’s your take:
    You get a couple of motivated average young persons on a farm, one side facing steep hill/desert/beach with a view to sea, and, for two weeks, a good coach works with them.
    Yeah, that’s good idea (adjustable sights and recently-rebored Lee-Enfield 303 rifles). I’d add a custom stock, a bit worked on trigger and a bipod. Custom loads, just for consistency.
    So, in two weeks work, could those guys hit that target at 300 meters? Hit it anywhere.
    My take: of course.

  153. peterAUS says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    Hard as it may be for you to believe, the Americans didn’t really screw up — the Japanese were just that clever and disciplined.

    No and yes.

    Americans made a fundamental error: they underestimated the enemy. That does qualify as screw up.
    They, Americans, were overconfident.

    It is not convenient, today, to accept the deep racism re Yellow race at the time in US military. That’s of course O.K. for today’s paradigm.
    To see that fact constantly omitted HERE, of all places is…….haha….I mean, just funny.

    Americans simply believed that “Japs” were incapable of pulling anything of the sort.

    BTW, I don’t believe in the premise of the article. All that, IMHO, was simply the result of the organizational culture at the time combined with bold and, as you say, “clever and disciplined” Japanese effort.

    • Replies: @dfordoom
  154. peterAUS says:

    Some people are just naturals.


    I was in recruit training with a few guys who had never fired a rifle before and at the end of the rifle qualification portion of RT they had not only qualified, but qualified expert.

    Sounds very familiar. I could post here several similar stories, but, no desire to make “monitors” job that easy.

    The training period for rifle qualification was about 2 weeks. And to your point about instruction, the PMI’s are picked because they are in the top 5% of marksman in the MC. The instruction is very good; teaching proper breathing, bone support, natural point of aim, and how to calculate windage and elevation into the rear sight aperture.

    Yep. COACHING is the key.

    The MC known distance course for qualification is 25 rounds at 200 meters, 15 rounds at 300 meters, and 10 rounds at 500 meters.

    I know.

    In my scenario it would be 300 meters only, but, of course, the rifle would be nicely customized (adjustable stock etc).
    Bottom line, IMHO: easy.

  155. peterAUS says:
    @Tom Welsh

    ….the Japanese practiced it assiduously.

    That is the only element in this story that is, for me, interesting.

    Anyone here has any idea why/how the US intelligence community, at the time, didn’t get that information?
    You have modified torpedoes. You have precedent in Taranto.
    You have pilots/planes/carriers not in the port but somewhere, doing something, for months.
    And, no penetration, no information.

    Any document pointing to the possibility that information was received by top brass of US Navy?

  156. Ron Unz says:

    Incidentally, with regard to deliberately provoking Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor, a few years ago I discovered that just a couple of months earlier, Argosy Weekly, one of America’s most popular fiction magazines had published a cover story about America’s Pacific Fleet attacking and destroying Tokyo!

    Here’s the PDF of the entire story (which I haven’t actually read).

    I assume it was noticed by Japan’s US-based diplomats or intelligence agents, and it wouldn’t totally surprise me if FDR had arranged its publication.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  157. fallout11 says:
    @Tom Welsh

    The US carriers were the priority target for the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor. The old battleships were merely secondary targets of opportunity.
    The IJN only discovered the carriers were not there on the morning of December 7th, 1941, and the strike force missed encountering them by mere hours (they were returning to Pearl at the time and were only hours away), and had the Japanese launched a third wave of strikes on that fateful morning, rather than leaving after only two strikes, the delay might have caused them to encounter the returning US carriers.

    Yamamoto’s problem at Midway was in locating the US carriers. The one the Japanese did locate was attacked and sunk.
    The US had the same problem, but got incredibly lucky…..he who sees the enemy first usually wins, much as in infantry ground combat.

    • Replies: @Epigon
  158. Epigon says:

    You somehow missed the part about successive Mod 1, Mod 2, Mod 3 introduction dates.

    The year 1939 saw the aft wooden fins introduced to no avail – the torpedo couldn’t perform in shallow water, nor run true. The anti-roll stabilizers would only be added in 1941.

    Instead of looking for the specific model/revision (Type 91 Mod 2) for which I provided the month of introduction AND additional modifications done to that revised, improved model with the aim of enabling it to perform at Pearl, you go to wikipedia and call it a day.

    Even worse, you didn’t bother checking the wikipedia:

    • Replies: @Alfred
  159. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    The NCVA piece did not mention Grogan because no expert takes the story seriously. At most, Grogan was listening to Japanese commercial communications in home waters, not Kido Butai. As LCDR Jacobsen (same author) explains in detail here:

    Far from going into any detail, Philip Jacobsen’s article is behind a paywall.

    In the abstract to Jacobsen’s paywalled article, he argues that the signals Grogan heard were from Japanese commercial vessels that were “bunched up in home waters,” but the clandestine “repeat-back” signals on 375 kilocycles were tracked by Grogan with RDF on successive nights showing that the signal transmitter was moving eastward across the N. Pacific heading away from Japan and toward Hawaii, proving these transmissions could not have been made by commercial vessels “bunched up in home waters,” nor would Japanese commercial vessels have had any need or possible use for the covert “repeat-back” transmissions on 375 kc. But distant submarines did.

    What’s missing is any rational explanation of how or why Grogan would suddenly misidentify the routine Japanese commercial traffic he’d been hearing for 30 years. I suggest there is no such rational explanation, and you and your actual expert are reduced to special pleading. In the final analysis, Leslie Grogan had it exactly right. That fact trumps all else.

    Grogan: Having crossed the Pacific for 30 years, never heard JCS Yokohama before 9 P.M. our time on the lower Marine Frequency…

    It was an unprecedented event in Grogan’s 30 years experience as a seafaring radio operator and it seized his attention. Grogan correctly deduced that IJN’s use of the reserved 375-kilocycle RDF frequency for clandestine communications was an indication that the Japanese were up to something big and something sneaky.

    Grogin: If anyone should ask me, I would say it’s the Jap’s Mobilization Battle Order.

    Again, Leslie Grogan had it exactly right.

    He made his detailed report to the USN on Dec. 3, 1941 upon arrival in Honolulu. When the SS Lurline docked back in San Francisco on Dec. 10, 1941, a USN boarding party seized the ship’s log. Thereafter, Grogan made his own “Record for Posterity” which was an abridged version of the report he and Asplund had submitted to 14th Naval District in Honolulu on 12/3.

    You said:

    Your implication is that a bunch of USN radio intercept operators heard comms from Kido Butai en route to Hawaii but failed to report it up their chain of command. You clearly have no idea how the military — any military — works.

    I served two hitches with the USAF, so I’ve got a reasonable understanding of how the military works. During that time, I did write many formal and timely reports for the Air Force strictly according to regulations, and the distribution of those reports was also strictly according to regulations and entirely out of my hands, but among the things I wrote for the Air Force, none of them were regulations. The only thing I could be absolutely sure of was that anyone who ever read my reports would have had the famous “need to know.” But I suggest that if word comes down from the top, any kind of official report can be squelched at any time, in any place, and all copies of it seized and destroyed.

    Brian Villa and Timothy Wilford:

    …it may be said that the methods by which Japan attempted to conceal necessary radio transmissions, methods which Grogan thought were so ingenious and subtle, were in fact known to the USN. Quite surprisingly, records show that USN radio operators sometimes used the reserved direction-finding frequency of 375 kHz to exchange radio intelligence, including the exchange of detected radio bearings. For example, a letter of 6 October 1941, sent from Station Cast to Washington, explained that Station Baker in Guam had transmitted radio bearings to Station Cast on 375 kHz. Most revealingly, W.J. Holmes, a traffic analyst at Station Hypo in 1941, later explained that “the lower frequency used to assist navigators sometimes produced more accurate direction-finding intelligence than on the high frequencies.” Evidently the USN already monitored this frequency.

    — ibid.

    So there is good reason to think that USN personnel were sitting on 375 kHz. If Grogan aboard SS Lurline was able to pick up Japanese traffic on 375 while still far east of Hawaii, surely listeners on Hawaii and elsewhere with the very best equipment and latest technology would have taken notice of those signals too.

    Moreover, are we supposed to believe that FDR’s conspiracy to let the Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor was SO VAST that it included a bunch of E-4 radio intercept operators at multiple sites across the Pacific?

    Since when have the rats ever been E-4s? Where’s that clarity about how the military works when you really need it?

    One well placed 0-8 can easily squelch the work of many good enlisted men, even mighty E-4s. The buck stops where the admiral says it stops. Just ask the sailors on the USS Liberty.

    Indeed USN Admiral Walter S. Anderson in charge of intelligence at Pearl Harbor maintained his residence away from the harbor, across the mountains, and on the other side of the island. Stinnett claimed Adm. Anderson was at home for the weekend on distant Diamond Head when the Japanese attacked, so at least somebody benefited from the intelligence.

  160. Epigon says:

    Yeah, the US Navy was incredibly “lucky” to locate and strike the Japanese carriers first in every single carrier vs. carrier battle in the Pacific.

    Talk about the coincidences pilling up.

    We are supposed to believe the codes were only broken after Pearl and before Midway.

  161. @Sparkon

    You do not indicate you worked in intelligence in the USAF, so I assume you did not and therefore you have no expertise in this area.

    You: “What’s missing is any rational explanation of how or why Grogan would suddenly misidentify the routine Japanese commercial traffic he’d been hearing for 30 years”

    Of course there is. People make things up all the time. They misremember events and, over time, they get increasingly inventive. Especially over issues like Pearl Harbor, which brings every nutcase out of the woodwork for 75 years and counting now.

    Grogan’s account is what I’ll call “fanciful” when I seek to be charitable.

    Believe in whatever you like, it’s clear you have no interest in facts.

    Since you went there, I’m sure I know a lot more USS LIBERTY survivors than you do.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
    , @Sparkon
  162. Che Guava says:

    To do so was an order from Adm. Yamamoto, which Adm. Nagumo chose to ignore.

    Sure, the latest in torpedo tech. was impressive, but the aircraft weren’t specifically designed only to drop those.

    Nogumo was, tn some extent, a fool.

    • Replies: @CMC
  163. peterAUS says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    ….issues like Pearl Harbor, which brings every nutcase out of the woodwork for 75 years and counting now.


    I’m sure I know a lot more USS LIBERTY survivors than you do.

    Batten down the hatches!

  164. DB says:

    His premise is faulty. We knew hostilities would eventually occur but to equate somehow our complicity in the conflict is an abomination. Bottom line the Japanese surprise attacked us and we eventually nuked them. Game over. Typical lefty from California making crap up.

  165. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    You do not indicate you worked in intelligence in the USAF, so I assume you did not and therefore you have no expertise in this area.

    Careful with those assumptions. I thought you might be able to read between the lines, but perhaps “need to know” is too cryptic?

    In truth, I was shanghaied not long after my enlistment in the AF because of my high score on the MLAT, and eventually after many adventures, some academic, I served two overseas tours with Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), ultimately sat in the top analyst’s chair out on the floor, and had fairly demanding responsibilities for shoving finished reports into the comm center window, along with blah blah blah. On an earlier assignment, at the time of the attack on the USS Liberty, I had more routine, less frantic duties that included regular interactions with an NSG guy sitting at the next desk.

    Sad to say, that summer, some Air Force guys at my unit started wearing a small round button with “55” on it. In Japanese, 55 is pronounced go-ju-go. Easy to say, I guess, until they start shooting at you.

    Anyway, I think my argument here is sound, and again, events on Dec. 7, 1941 proved that Grogan’s analysis was entirely correct.

    • Replies: @SECGRU Sailor
  166. @Saggy

    that’s right. The link is re the German RT-intercept station and its operative technology. To get the rest (in full context), you will have to spring for all 3 volumes of Gestapo Chief….available @ Amazon the last time I looked. That said, there’s some interesting Court Historian attacks on the 26 November intercept out and around the ‘net. My favorite is by (((John Lukacs)) – a standard Churchillian buttlicker – “The Churchill-Roosevelt Forgeries” @ Other than the usual non-sequiters & insults – “Revisionists…fascists…liars….Nazis!” – (((Lukacs))) has one substantial argument. Apparently there was a a female monitor of the trans-Atlantic FDR-WC trans-Atlantic RT calls (Lukacs refuses to name her, so let’s call her Miss Prunella Blimp) who had the power to hit a cut switch whenever “sensitive” topics were broached. Now that’s interesting: Miss Prunella Blimp, grrrrl secretary, breaking in on the PM of the British Empire and the President of the United States and telling them what they could and could not say to each other. So Haxo crawled around cyberspace for awhile and found this: “Listening in on Churchill” @ @ Prunella’s real name turns out to be Ruth Ive and, whatever and how successful/unsuccessful her interruptions were, they began sometime in 1942…months after the 26 November intercept. Essentially, the reason “we can’t learn anything from History”, is that 99% of it is written by the Victors’ Court Historians…well-paid establishment sleazebags and apologists like Lukacs, Prange, Steven Ambrose, Beschloss, and all the rest.

    • Replies: @Saggy
    , @Wizard of Oz
  167. @Sparkon

    The level of technical knowledge required to prove or disprove this particular issue is beyond most people’s here, certainly mine. The cocksure manner in which “Sailor” presents himself certainly makes him look biased.

    Ultimately, like 9/11, the issue is less technical than political. As in 9/11, there is a boatload of evidence of motivation, intent, and circumstantial happenstance. As in WW1, Vietnam, Spanish-American: the overwhelming preponderance is towards let-it/make-it-happen.

    • Replies: @Parsnipitous
  168. @Parsnipitous

    The fact that snide habitual pro-mainstream commenter Aussie Peter “yep”s Sailor’s comment makes me even more confident of the above.

  169. @Fred762

    re your #8: the “French Frigate Shoals” incident was pre-Battle Of Midway, not pre-Pearl Harbor. Your #7 is pretty much right…though the dates & destinations are a little off. Roosevelt’s co-conspirators at the Navy Deppartment (Stark, Turner) had to come up with a mission that would a) get the carriers more-or-less out of harms way through 7 December, and b) doing something sufficiently useful in-and-of-itself as to provide plausible deniability. The fact that the first Warning Order for the “airplane reinforcement” missions to Wake and Midway (not Guam) came out barely 12 hours after the 8:35 ff. AM 26 November FDR/Roosevelt conversation re the upcoming Jap attack on Pearl Harbor speaks well of R.K. Turner at Plans and Operations, who was apparently the idea guy. In the event, Adm. Halsey with carrier Enterprise + escorting cruisers and destroyers left Pearl carrying 15 Marine F4F-3 Wildcat fighters on the morning of 28 November…and didn’t arrive off Wake to do the fly-off until the morning 0f 4 December…2,000 miles in 6 days….that’s about 12 knots, less than half-speed. Looks like a go-slow order was in effect. Then, apparently smelling a rat, Halsey blasted back toward Oahu at 2X that speed…but still didn’t reach a position c. 240 miles to the south and west of Pearl Harbor until the morning of 7 December. That one worked, though just barely. It’s the second, and much less known, plane reinforcement mission that exposes the pre-Pearl Harbor attack Conspiracy in even higher relief. Adm. John Newton with the Lexington battle group left Pearl on the morning of 5 December carring 18 Marine Vindicator dive-bombers and was about halfway to its Midway Island fly-off when the Japanese attack began….550 miles in 48 hours…another slow-boat. And Lex didn’t even bother to fly-off the planes. Instead, it manuevered around south of the Hawaiian Islands until 11 December, and then brought them back to port and off-loaded. On 17 December, all 18 Vindicators had their fuel tanks topped off and Marine pilots then flew them all the way out to Midway non-stop. No carrier needed.

  170. crimson2 says:

    If we had “deciphered all their codes”…then what was “Imperial Japan” planning to do …”after” Pearl Harbor ?

    We broke all their codes, but it took a while after they changed them . This article doesn’t acknowledge that Japan changed their codes just prior to Pearl Harbor. We broke them after a few months and we discovered their plans, which is why we routed them at Midway.

    Actual historians know this stuff. Morons like Stinnett do not.

  171. @Sparkon

    You’ve posited a conspiracy in 1941 that involved hundreds, perhaps thousands of US military personnel, not one of whom has come forward in the last 77+ years, not even with a deathbed confession.

    Occam, I hear, has a razor.

    • Replies: @Sparkon
    , @Haxo Angmark
  172. Saggy says: • Website
    @Haxo Angmark

    all 3 volumes of Gestapo Chief

    This is a link to the text of parts 1 and 2 –

    and we read in the intro …..

    his is a work, extracted from thousands of pages of secret fdes, that will jolt the complaisant in every chapter. One section deals with highly classified German intercepts of private trans-Atlantic telephone conversations between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Of these, the most shocking is one dealing with Pearl Harbor.

    Yet I can find anything about Pearl Harbor in parts 1 & 2 using the search function.

    • Replies: @Haxo Angmark
  173. CMC says:
    @Che Guava

    In a second attack/third wave. Not the first attack or first wave. So we’re talking about at best a secondary target, at worst third or even fourth since if the carriers were there they would have bumped it down a notch.

    Not primary. Not the top priority. Not the main focus.

    Maybe a better way to say it would have been to say, ‘once you make carrier’s the high priority target, all sorts of other possibilities and probabilities (and problems) come into play.’

    • Replies: @Che Guava
  174. dfordoom says: • Website

    It is not convenient, today, to accept the deep racism re Yellow race at the time in US military.

    Agreed. And the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were ignored because it was assumed that although the Russians were white they were a slightly inferior grade of white. Semi-Asiatic and no match for civilised western Europeans or Anglos. So the defeat of the Russians was not the wake-up call it should have been.

    It was incredibly hard for most Americans and Englishmen and western Europeans in general even to consider the possibility that mere Asiatics might be able to defeat white men.

    In retrospect the 1941-45 war against Japan was possibly more momentous than the war in Europe. It ensured the victory of the communists in China. It ended the British Empire. It demonstrated to Asians that white fantasies of racial superiority over Asians were just fantasies. White men were quite capable of running away and then shamefully surrendering when faced by an Asian army, as the British did in Malaya and the Americans did in the Philippines.

    From the point of view of Asians those surrenders in Singapore and the Philippines were a much bigger deal than Pearl Harbor.

    • Replies: @Che Guava
  175. Seraphim says:
    @Tom Welsh

    That was another egregious mistake of Hitler, irrespective of the high moral stand he occupied. He underestimated both the capacities of USA and the Anglo-Americans resolve and overestimated the valor of the ‘best soldiers in the world’, as he did with USSR.
    The declaration of war was made in due form, invoking international law and making Germany technically appear as the aggressor. He was not obligated by the Axis treaty to come to the help of Japan, unless Japan was attacked. Neither was Japan obligated to come to the help of Germany unless Germany was the part attacked. That’s why Japan did not attack USSR (with which it had a Non-Aggression pact) concurrently with Barbarossa.

  176. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    not one of whom has come forward

    Not one actually but several. I guess you’ve never heard of Special Investigator Robert Ogg, (DIO), or his boss, Lieutenant Ellsworth Hosmer, or Captain Richard McCullough, the District’s intelligence chief. all of whom saw Ogg’s plots of the Japanese fleet in the N. Pacific moving eastward.

    According to Ogg, Hosmer identified the radio transmissions as Japanese, since the vessels used the unique kana telegraphic code of Japan’s navy. He was certain that the radio signals did not originate with American or Allied vessels, for there were none at sea in the area. Two separate bearings were obtained. One took off from north of San Francisco, the other south. When Ogg traced the two bearings on his chart they intersected in the North Pacific, north of Hawaii. Hosmer was sure that the bearings plotted by Ogg had located warships heading for Hawaii.

    Captain Richard McCullough, the District Intelligence Officer, sent these findings in a report to the Navy Department.

    Once received in the nation’s capital, the Japanese warship locations were delivered to President Roosevelt in the White House, according to district intelligence chief McCullough. In a handwritten memo filed by Hosmer with the Twelfth Naval District’s intelligence office, Hosmer wrote that around November 28 he learned that: “at least six, possibly eight Jap [sic] units were operating between Hawaii and the Aleutians and clearly indicated that a force was to steal out on a secret [mission] and attempt to obtain mastery of the air.


    The Lurline’s radio operators weren’t the only ones recording the Japanese radio “blasts.” Station SAIL at Seattle confirmed the reports of Hosmer/Ogg and the Lurline. On December 3, operators at SAIL said that strong radio signals were originating in the North Pacific. By the next day three other Navy intercept stations reported the same signals. But 98 percent of the intercepts acquired by the four Navy facilities have been hidden from public view. Included are radio messages to and from the Pearl Harbor-bound warships Kirishima, Akagi, and Tone and Admiral Nagumo commander of the raiding force. Radio logs of the three monitoring stations found by the author in Archives II provide the evidence.

    Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor, by Robert B. Stinnet

    Despite what you assert, this is all pretty strong evidence that Kido Butai was heard by multiple stations, civilian and military, as it wallowed its way across the stormy N. Pacific on its way to Pearl Harbor.

    • Replies: @SECGRU Sailor
  177. Alfred says:

    I am compelled to agree that the Japanese copied the British success at Taranto and worked assidiously for 13 months so as to produce their version of this complex weapon system – torpedoes plus aircraft plus pilots. All their earlier efforts since 1931 had been in vain.

    Happy now? 🙂

  178. Christo says:

    The IJN , Imperial Japanese navy changed their codes right before sailing for the Pearl Harbor Raid. The Raid was in conjunction with their invasions of the Philippines and Malaysia. There really was no “secret” about the Pearl Harbor Raid . The US Navy had battled it out sevral times in previous FleetEX exercises going back to the 20’s ( Using US CV’s to raid Pearl and or the Panama Canal) .

    What made it such a surprise, was that the director of Naval Itelliengence/War plans for the Navy at the time was Amd. Kelly Turner who simply did not believe that the Japanese would Attack Pearl Harbor and was such a drunk curmudgeon as to over -rule any intel to the contrary. this combined with the fact the japanese navy had switch their operational code version (which the USN genrally could work out in about 6 months ) and their usage of radio deception to disguise where their carriers were , was the USN simply lost track of them for that week, there fore the “raid” was not expected . However it was a certainty, given that the US knew invasions convoys were bound Malaysia and the Philippines, that the US government -Roosevelt knew we would be at war that week.

    Debates could be made as to whether , it was better off to have US forces “sleeping ‘ at Pearl Harbor. Most of our battle-line had been at sea the week before, and the Battleships were safer in the harbor than at sea. Yes, could have had fighters on alert . but agin i point toward all the intel provided to Am Kimmel and Genral Short was to expect 5th column attacks not a raid. Pearl Harbor was simply considered safe and it was not understood the vulnerabilities that were present that morning, weigh against no-one expected a 6 CV raid, maybe a 2 like the US practiced and that would not have accomplished much. Japanese CV doctrine of concetrating CV’s was not understood on Dec7. However 6months later , when the USN could read the op codes again and knew how the Japanese operated their CV’s in one mass , it was soundly smashed at Midway, and when they attempted an earlier small op with 2 CVs-(2Cv+1 CVL) at Coral Sea it was defeated as well.

    I have a theory the Japanese were suckered into the Midway attack , not just by the Doolittle raid , but with some propaganda tricks that no-one has discovered but me buried in some naval records. May write a book one day, but it is going to take alot more research to built it into a consise book.

    As to Stinnet, he is “good” in a way, but you have to take alot of the stuff he claims with a grain salt about Japanese “Diplomatic” code” decrypts and the allusions he draws from them. The ones he builds on were decrptyed post-Dec7. However on the flip side , some of his claims and discoveries have great merit , not for what he alludes to them , but of what you can make out of them from neutral prospective about how both sides approached the war, and why things happens . stinnet is good for “the reality” and the realities on the conspiracies going on at the time, not his conspiracies that Roosevelt knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl . From what FDR knew based on bad intel provided by Adm turner it was not going happen. However FDR also , knew , wanted and planned and forced the war to happen in the Pacific, He really wanted it to happen and planned it to happen a few months later though.

    My biggest wonder, is if they(FDR/TPTB) were planning the Doolittle Raid before Pearl Harbor? LOL

    • Replies: @Marcus
    , @Che Guava
  179. AmRusDebate says: • Website
    @Wizard of Oz

    Well, I don’t want to shitpost here but read up about the German American Bund, Friends of the New Germany, the Swastika League, and the Teutonia Association.

    More important was the persistent support of “Isolationism” by US corporate interest in collaboration with Hitler’s regime, via the National Association of Manufacturers.

    There is The Nazi Hydra in America by Glen Yeadon

    specific episodes of bribery:

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  180. @Haxo Angmark

    oh I see. Japanese and Germans, like blacks and “minorities” in America today, were merely passive victims. If they “choose” to pull the trigger, that’s because evil Jew-scheming FDR forced them to.

    Yah, very convincing argument.

    You have zero knowledge or even a vague question forming in whatever may be a brain, about Soviet or German knowledge of anything. When you don’t know something – just man up jew-hater.

    The average Unz reader is too smart not to know that what one network of agents may or may not claim (Sorge) is meaningless unless there is absolutely certitude, which, frankly, there never is, unless there is an absolute dimwit at the helm (which no leader of the period was).

    When one of you anti-FDR hysterics actually reads a pro-FDR biography, learns something about “liberal internationalism,” reads a book about Japanese aggression and attrocities, then we can have an informed discussion.

    Until then, go back to your “FDR forced Japan to pull the trigger” whining in which an embargo is the equivalent to a declaration of war. I didn’t realise we “owed” Japan our trade! Just like we owe minorities reparations, etc. Powerful nation of Japan you are defending there.

    A laughingstock.

    • Replies: @Anonymous
    , @refl
  181. Anonymous [AKA "Soul Asylum"] says:

    Roosevelt was a 33rd degree Freemason, nuff said.
    The Delano family are interesting as well.

  182. @Sparkon

    Citing Stinnett to prove Stinnett — you’re descending into farce.

    Speaking of farce, the Ogg fairytale was unmasked as such 35 years ago, see pp. 60 below. Nobody in earth orbit takes Ogg’s account seriously.

    • Replies: @Sparkon
    , @Wizard of Oz
  183. @AmRusDebate

    Thank you. Interesting. And particularly interesting as it omits anything about British intelligence and Wendell Willie’s candidature which, from memory, Ron wrote about last year – or maybe 2017.

  184. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    Nobody in earth orbit takes Ogg’s account seriously.

    And no True Scotsman is in earth orbit. I guess you’ve worn yourself out trying to move the goalposts, but arguments by assertion and other logical fallacies carry no weight with me. They are however, fairly reliable signs of an insincere or deceitful interlocutor. That’s you.

    Meanwhile, many of us with both feet planted firmly on planet Earth have long ago realized that FDR schemed and plotted to get the United States into WWII, and goaded the Japanese into attacking. Indeed, there was no other purpose for moving the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor, and most of the top brass in the Navy knew it.

    Back to Ogg, I found this about “Seaman Z” in your blurb from Tom Johnson

    He only assumed that he was following a Japanese carrier task force but had no technical basis for this and did not inquire as to how his supervisors had identified the transmissions as Japanese.

    That’s just nonsense. In fact, it would have been relatively easy if not trivial for any experienced Morse code operator, Japanese linguist, or traffic analyst to ID Japanese Wabun code (和文モールス符号). For Johnson to make this claim shows he is grasping at straws and engaging in special pleading. He concludes:

    With rigorous analysis of all sources is is hard to see how we could have missed the signs. There were too many of them to miss. Sigint and Humint (there was no Photint) provided enough information to alert even the most complacent. But they were not being integrated in thoughtful prescient reports. They were being shuttled about Washington in black bags, fragmented and uncorrelated. Wohlstetter’s “noise” thesis applies to the situation as it existed in 1941. It was a situation made to order for surprise.

    Ah, black bags! That must be it.

    • Agree: Haxo Angmark
  185. Anonymous [AKA "willful knowledge"] says:

    Yeah, but everyone knows the wily FDR manipulated Japan into attacking China in 1931 and forcing Hitler to invade the USSr, not to mention Mussolini invading Ethiopia.

  186. Ron Unz says:

    I should mention that I just finished reading the short 1954 book by Admiral Robert A. Theobald, who commanded the destroyers at Pearl Harbor, but was never accused of any errors in judgment.

    I think he makes an overwhelmingly compelling case that FDR was entirely aware of the impending Japanese attack and did his utmost to ensure that it would entirely succeed. His introduction is by Admiral William Halsey, among our most celebrated WWII naval commanders and one of only four individuals in US history to have reached the rank of “fleet commander.”

    Offhand, I can’t quite see why such extremely distinguished individuals would be lying, and if they weren’t, the case against FDR seemed exceptionally strong, even almost 50 years before the publication of Stinnett’s book added an enormous wealth of additional evidence.

    Here’s the Amazon link, although the prices are exorbitant:

  187. @AmRusDebate

    Without US entry into the war, the USSR would have been engaged on two fronts, and certainly collapsed … the Japanese and Germans met up in the Urals

    Communism wiped off the face of the Earth… a bad thing?

  188. refl says:

    Correct – an embargo is no declaration of war, but undeclared warfare:

    In military operations, economic warfare may reflect economic policy followed as a part of open or covert operations (…) during or preceding wartime. Economic warfare aims to capture or otherwise control the supply of critical economic resources so that the military and intelligence agencies can (…) deprive enemy forces of those resources so that they cannot function properly.

    That’s simply Wikipedia. An embargo precedes the actual shooting war.
    In our era you just have to look at the murderous economic strangulation of Irak 1991 to 2003, which in hindsight everyone can recognize as a preparation for the second round, most likely more deadly then the actual shooting.
    Japan had invested in Mandchuria and had come there in cooperation with the British empire. They certainly had a better justification to colonize that land then any European power anywhere in Asia, and they were keeping the Bolsheviks in check in the Far East.
    It is arguable that Mandchuria was not even China (I do not have the expertise).

    On some other thread here someone with actual knowledge on the issue debunked the Nanking massacre (if he is right, I don’t know – he just stated that in a City with back then 60 000 inhabitants there can be no massacre of 300 000, which is a reasonable argument).
    And so on. You will be shocked to read how Hitlers Sudeten crisis actually happened in real life (I recommend Carol Quigley’s Angloamerican Establishment, easy to get on the Internet).

    I would like to post again the following link
    with thanks to the commenter who originally provided it.
    The first time I ever heard about Rainbow Five was recently in John Wear’s book “Germany’s war”.
    If after several decades of studying history you only come across such essential information in revisionist books that – at least in my country – no bookstore will put on its shelves, then something must be wrong.

    By the way, regarding your argument about “Jewhate” – can we say that the Zionists owe a huge Thank you to the Hitler guy? Where would they have ended up without him!

  189. Anonymous[895] • Disclaimer says:

    The anti-aircraft fire was also improving and some US fighters were getting into the air and intercepting – I believe only nine Japanese planes were downed in the first wave but 20 were in the second. A third wave would have had higher casualties.

  190. Richard B says:


    The hostile elite are doing the same thing today, and not just in Silicon Valley.

    Not that they weren’t a hostile elite back then. They were. Most just didn’t know it.

    The real owners of the country were good at hiding and we weren’t good at looking. We are now. And that’s why they’re pulling all of the stops to take us out asap.

    Us being the host population of the entire Western world. A plan underway long before FDR took office to do his part.

    What better way than mass immigration and a corresponding 24/7 propaganda empire that would have made Hitler, Stalin and Mao drool with envy?

    Propaganda for deifying their migrant proxies, while demonizing dissent, pathologizing opposition, criminalizing normality and normalizing criminality.

    Dostoyevsky didn’t call them “merciless” for nothing.

    Who needs a Conspiracy Theory when you have the facts of Cultural History, the patterns of Human Behavior, and the reality of Current Events aligned like a Perfect Storm and staring us all right in the face?

  191. @Ray Woodcock

    The writers you cite and others like them IGNORE Stinnett’s evidence, which you can consult for yourself in his book. Some of them make gestures that pretend to challenge it, but really don’t. In order to discredit his argument it is necessary to discredit his evidence, which is overwhelming and which presents an open-and-shut case. So, do you contend that he forged it? Or that “someone” else forged it to sucker him? Or what? Because unless his evidence can be seriously dismissed, his case stands.

    • Replies: @Ray Woodcock
  192. @alexander

    They wanted to cripple the US Pacific fleet. What could be more obvious?

  193. @Ron Unz

    Yes, the literature on Pearl Harbor established an excellent case for facts such as Stinnett reveals decades ago. The one thing Stinnett adds is DOCUMENTARY PROOF. The value of his PROOF is that it takes the discussion beyond the level of argument. The conclusion is now not merely argued; it is DEMONSTRATED.

  194. @Saggy

    I didn’t tell you to dig up some nonsense on the ‘net.

    I told you to buy the books. Like 70,000 other truth-seekers have.

  195. Vinnie O says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    One of the first books I ever read on Pearl Harbor was “Kimmel’s Story”, by Admiral Kimmel himself. The previous COMPACFLT was fired for refusing to GUARANTEE that the Pacific Fleet would be in port EVERY weekend, which didn’t seem to make any military sense. Several other admirals refused the position for that reason. Kimmel unfortunately accepted it, and the Fleet (primarily the battleships; aircraft carriers were part of the Scouting Force mixed with cruisers). Kimmel was removed from command and NEVER offered another position during the war. He REPEATEDLY asked to be court-martialed and was consistently denied.

  196. homahr says:

    The attack on Pearl Harbor was not without precedent as you mentioned Port Arthur. Teddy, FDR’s cousin was impressed with this Japanese attack.

    Earlier the US had invaded Josean Korea but had little success. They eventually ended up with the Shufeldt treaty which basically offered Korea assistance in case of attack but of course the US did not protect Korea against the upcoming Japanese occupation.

    Korea also appealed to Russia to help them against the Japanese. Not sure, but there might have been a deal: the Japanese get Korea and in exchange they don’t interfere with US interests in the Philippines.

  197. @SECGRU Sailor

    don’t pick it up or you’ll cut yourself. The pre-Pearl Harbor conspiracy didn’t involve more than a half-dozen people (FDR, Stark, Turner, maybe 2-3 others) who sat on the discrete attack information – given to FDR by Churchill during their 26 November RT conversation – and simply let matters proceed to a required bloody conclusion. In fact, Stark ‘fessed up during the subsequent Congressional Hearings on the attack. Asked if something decisive had been learned on 26 November, Stark replied:

    “I can’t anwer that question, as it involves a national security issue.”

    just to translate Stark’s apparatchik gibberish back to normal human language:

    “of course I did. But I’m not going to say so in so many words, ’cause if I did, I’d be hung it to dry.”

  198. @SECGRU Sailor

    Stinnett has not been “debunked” at all, although a fair number of fake debunkings have appeared — see wikipedia for a number of them. BUT, in order to actually “debunk” Stinnett it would be necessary to discredit his documentary evidence, which is presented at length, in facsimile, in his book. It would be necessary to show that it is forged, whether by Stinnett or by others. Any open minded reader who examines this evidence will realize that this is not credible. The evidence stands. And it also shows that people who make a pretense of “debunking” Stinnett are not credible, and are either incapable of evaluating Stinnett’s documentary evidence, or ignorant of it, or acting in bad faith. And any way you slice it, they are liars.

    • Agree: Che Guava, L.K
    • Replies: @SECGRU Sailor
  199. @SECGRU Sailor

    Very interesting link. I’ve only skimmed it and would be interested to know what you think it says about the precise knowledge that FDR had at relevant times and what he intended to happen at Pearl Harbor.

    BTW, not relevant specifically to your comment but to the broader argument….. I am reminded by some of those citing Stinnett of a crusty old Queens Counsel, renowned for his thoroughness, discovering a serious error in an opinion by a truly distinguished and rightly famous QC and saying wryly ” Oh yes, X caught by the footnotes again”. Footnotes and citations may be impressive but you need to read what they refer to to be sure.

    • Replies: @Che Guava
  200. Che Guava says:

    No, you are missing the point.The reason a second attack was ordered was not on the chance of the sudden return of the carriers,
    which remained lurking in the western Pacific gyre, before setting out to Midway etc.

    It was, as several astute commentors here understand and have said, to destroy as much of Pearl Harbour’s infrastructure (fuel depots, dry docks, any other essential on–shore facilities) as possible,

    That would clearly have made some difference, so Nagumo, it seems a very vain man, and he certainly was a pretty boy as a very young officer, returned to Japan, expecting the tribute he thought he deserved for sinking the decrepit decoys.

    Sure, the USA may have re-fitted the not sunken ships, but it was not until the eighties of last century that the battleship found a new role, but it had nothing to with naval battle, only with battleships as missile launchers, acting for gunboat diplomacy, e.g., in the process of dIsmembering Yugoslavia.

    • Replies: @CMC
  201. Che Guava says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    You are a fool, I am genuinely shocked by the Clown World level of your post.

    Droning on with bullshit. Why not find Stinnet’s book through your public library system, if they don’t have it, you may make them order it.

    It is always nice when one only suspected of being a paid or voluntary propagandist, this post says that this one sure is.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  202. @Che Guava

    There are millions of books. How do you choose which to read and how many do you choose to spend your no doubt valuable time on reading?

    Now you have implicitly claimed to have read Stinnett’s book. You have read it haven’t you? Why else would you suggest I get hold of it? And you can therefore confirm that Stinnett’s persuasiveness depends on evidences of his copious research honestly reported. Which brings us to the footnoted citations and quotes from original sources. How would you stand cross examination in your knowledge of those. I like my witnesses, people I rely on, to be able to stand cross examination.

  203. @J. Alfred Powell

    Stinnett’s case, such as it is, is centered on decrypts of IJN JN-25 messages which were cracked and translated by the USN long after the attack on Pearl Harbor — years later, in many cases.

    These are facts. The dates of decryption and reporting are TYPED RIGHT ON the JN-25 message intercepts.

    Either Stinnett had no idea what he was looking at or he chose to be fundamentally deceptive about the core of his argument.

    I spent my career in Navy codebreaking. There are many people in that secret world who are well aware that the US Government lies. Nobody in that world takes Stinnett seriously. Accept it and move on.

    • Replies: @Sparkon
  204. mushroom says:

    Both WWI & WWII were primarily designed by the “deepies” to be fought with borrowed money
    [compound interest generation] and to destroy monarchies where the royal families could not be bribed to create goodies against their interests for the “deepies”.

  205. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    I spent my career in Navy codebreaking …

    So you say.

    Strange then you seem to have no appreciation at all for Traffic Analysis, but I suspect you’re just being disingenuous, or perhaps as you described it “fundamentally deceptive”about the core of his your argument.”

    Despite what you’re claiming here, surely you must know it is not necessarily to read an adversary’s communications in order to gain important intelligence from his radio transmissions, such as his location, for example, which is probably the single most important intelligence point about any military formation, especially if the formation is on the move, all the more so if it is a powerful formation.

    Any movements of a active radio transmitter can be detected by a change in the bearing returned by RDF. The more RDF stations you have providing timely especially contemporaneous bearings for any mobile radio transmitter, the greater likelihood you will be able to make a precise plot of the transmitter’s location and movements for any given period where enough timely bearings are available.

    But even just a few bearings taken on successive days are adequate to detect movement and general direction of travel of the target transmitter, as was the case with Kido Butai in late November and early December 1941, the passage of the Japanese ships reflected in RDF bearings returned by civilian and military facilities throughout the Pacific region, and plotted by Grogan, Ogg, and others.

    Because of the nature of its mission, it was entirely impossible for the IJN’s carrier strike force to transit the N. Pacific in stormy weather, arrange rendezvous for refueling many ships, and shape up to launch a precisely timed air attack on Pearl Harbor, all the while maintaining strict radio silence.

    見ざる, 聞かざる, 言わざる

    Mizaru, Kikazaru, Iwazaru
    See nothing, Hear nothing, Say nothing

  206. peterAUS says:

    For that RDF you mentioned: fake transmitter(s).
    For : was entirely impossible for the IJN’s carrier strike force to transit the N. Pacific in stormy weather, arrange rendezvous for refueling many ships, and shape up to launch a precisely timed air attack on Pearl Harbor, all the while maintaining strict radio silence.seaborne operations

    low power transmitters/reflectors and simply well trained people used to work well together.

    No way anybody into this topic shall change his/her opinion for a milometer; we know it.

    What I find interesting is overlooking HUMAN factors here.
    Or, simply, expertise, at the time and place of US military. Not so much knowledge and or/skillset, but mindset.
    Add to this organizational culture and that’s it.

    Yes, of course, had Americans done everything by the book, of course we wouldn’t have had Pearl Harbor as it is.
    The relaxed, in essence peace bound military, all the way up to the very top, made a mistake, IMHO.

    BTW, a question for resident “real truth” around:
    Why so much interest in THIS and so little in MacArthur fuckup in Phylippines?
    Same thing. Worse, actually.
    Any….hehe…theory as to why?

    Mine is simple: obvious mistake by LOCAL commander. Can’t blame any evil conspiracies.
    Just from Wiki:

    News reached the Philippines that an attack on Pearl Harbor was in progress at 2:20 am local time on 8 December 1941.[32][33] FEAF interceptors had already conducted an air search for incoming aircraft reported shortly after midnight, but these had been Japanese scout planes reporting weather conditions.[34][35] At 3:30 am, Brigadier General Richard Sutherland, chief of staff to General Douglas MacArthur heard about the attack from a commercial radio broadcast.[32]At 5:00 am FEAF commander Gen. Brereton reported to USAFFE headquarters where he attempted to see MacArthur without success. He recommended to MacArthur’s chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard Sutherland, that FEAF launch bombing missions against Formosa in accordance with Rainbow 5 war plan directives from which an attack was likely to come. Gen. Breteron was further made aware of an attack against the USS William B. Preston at Davao Bay.[36] Authorization was withheld, but shortly afterward, in response to a telegram from General George C. Marshall instructing MacArthur to implement Rainbow 5, Brereton was ordered to have a strike in readiness for later approval.[35][37]

    Through a series of disputed discussions and decisions, authorization for the first raid was not approved until 10:15 am local time

    Ah, yes, here is the truth:
    Roosevelt earlier instructed MacArthur to fuck everything up. As reward he was later rescued from Corregidor etc…..
    Neat, a?

    • Replies: @Christo
  207. @Sparkon

    In 1941, the USN maintained a whole network of DF intercept sites across the Pacific region.

    None of them picked up any Kido Butai comms — for TA or any other purposes.

    None = not one.

    Again, facts.

    As a look at the declassified NAVSECGRU records would show you.


    • Replies: @peterAUS
    , @Sparkon
  208. peterAUS says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    In 1941, the USN maintained a whole network of DF intercept sites across the Pacific region.

    None of them picked up any Kido Butai comms — for TA or any other purposes.

    None = not one.

    Don’t say.

    As a look at the declassified NAVSECGRU records would show you.

    Ah, but, you see, the conspirators managed to erase all those records.
    And then to erase all records of erasing the records.

  209. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    Your denials — and the Navy’s declassified records — can’t erase the detailed and specific evidence uncovered by Robert B. Stinnett and presented in Day of Deceit, some of which has been patiently presented to you several times over here, including by author J. Alfred Powell, but sure, you’re a sailor and the Navy is innocent, and of course the Navy would have no reason to lie, or destroy evidence.

    I’ll use the occasion to present another short excerpt from Stinnett’s Day of Deceit, three worthwhile paragraphs that refute what you say, and give an interesting example of the typical heavy hand of a cover-up:

    Why were the RDF reports missing from Admiral Kimmel’s copy? Rochefort’s original Communications Summaries were found by the author stored among Navy records in the National Archives, but all the RDF reports for November and December 1941 were crudely cut from the copy of each report that had been prepared for Kimmel. Every RDF fix had been excised some time after Kisner delivered the complete reports to Station HYPO. No one at the National Archives could explain the deletions. When were they cut? Before they were delivered to the admiral? Did the deletions trigger the “Where are the carriers” question Kimmel directed to Layton?

    In 1993, the deletion questions were posed to Richard A. von Doenhoff, a specialist in the Pearl Harbor section of the National Archives. He {p. 208} confirmed that more than sixty-five of Rochefort’s November and December Summaries intended for Kimmel had been mutilated. Von Doenhoff wrote the author that the RDF pages which listed Japanese warship locations had been cut prior to the start of the 1945 Congressional Hearings. “We examined the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Summaries and found that those summaries had indeed been cut off from the bottom of the pages. We have no idea why this was done, but it appears that the documents were entered into evidence during 1945 and 46 in this manner.

    Layton’s claim about the carrier commands’ radio silence does not hold up to scrutiny. There were 129 Japanese naval intercepts obtained by US naval monitor stations between November 15 and December 6 that directly contradict Layton’s figures. The intercept rate can be documented from the records of Stations CAST and H. For the 21-day period, it averages 6.3 intercepts per day. All categories of Japanese carriers and carrier commands cited by Layton as on radio silence either originated radio broadcasts or received messages during the three-week period, according to an analysis of the intercepts conducted by the Navy’s 1941 radio traffic experts, Captain Duane Whitlock of Station CAST and Homer Kisner of Station H.l8

    Kisner’s reports and intercepts collected in Hawaii have been preserved.

    Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor, by Robert B. Stinnett

    Crudely cut, excised, and mutilated. Occam’s Razor?

    • Replies: @SECGRU Sailor
  210. @Sparkon

    Again citing Stinnett to prove Stinnett.

    You’ve got nothing, in other words.

    Have you ever bothered to look at the declassified JN-25 files?

    They’ve been in the National Archives for decades.

    • Replies: @Sparkon
  211. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    Yes, and the Warren Commission proved Lee Harvey Oswald killed Pres. Kennedy, and did it all by his lonesome with a magic bullet.

    And the 9/11 Commission proved that a gang of Arab suicide pilots really did destroy the entire WTC with two 767s.

    Through it all, we may be entirely certain that the military and government are eager to implicate themselves in monstrous crimes, and therefore we can be sure that such reports about these crimes from the government and military tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 100% of the time so help them God.

    Yeah, right.

    See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil - The Three Wise Monkeys, Nikkō Tōshō-gū

    Kikazaru, Iwazaru, Mizaru

    Photo: Ray in Manila, from Flickr

    • Replies: @SECGRU Sailor
  212. Marcus says:

    Didn’t the IJN task force break radio silence during its voyage?

    • Replies: @Christo
    , @Haxo Angmark
  213. CMC says:
    @Che Guava

    We’re talking past each other. Which is probably my fault since I started off a bit snotty and attacked a position Ep didn’t quite forward (straw man).

    Let me put it this way: you’re the Japanese planner in chief and you can only destroy one set of things, either the US carriers OR Pearl’s oil tanks and the industrial capacity of the Navy’s dry docks, machine shops, and repair facilities. Pick one.

    My argument is that certain probabilities follow from that choice. That’s all.

    (What might be really interesting and relevant to the main thread is if the US knew which one the Japanese picked.)

  214. @Sparkon

    So, you’ve never seen the declassified JN-25 records.

    Got it.

    • Replies: @Sparkon
  215. Christo says:

    No, they maintained strict radio silence for actually a period of around 20 days. All ships involved disconnected if not disassembled their radio transmitters and key pieces locked up to avoid any accident. Blank pieces of paper or wood were inserted into their Morse code transmitters to avoid even a single dot/dash. It was so serious and long in duration that that some transmitters and Morse contacts had rusted over when they reconnected and cleared them the day of the raid to use. The orders for “unmost’ secrecy which included strict radio silence came down from Nagano, Yamamoto , and Nagumo,three highest IJN officers. there was no-one, certainly no Japanese officer or ship crew that would have dared violate such order, or could have given the dissembled radios transmitters,nor are any recorded doing so.

    They also took all their regular radio operators that had done all radio traffic for the 1st airfleet of the carriers and command ships off of those ships in “mid- November and had them stay in Japan faking the normal message traffic those ships did by their regular operators so no-one would notice the difference of location or a change in the “fist” of those ships. Fist being that each morse code operator can be recognized by how they hit the morse code keys , by other experience listeners much as you can recognize someone’s voice.

    here is an article on this, The Japanese for the raid did an excellent job in their radio deception, that was why it worked.

    • Replies: @Christo
  216. Christo says:

    addenda:for clarification to above post

    “they maintained strict radio silence for actually a period of around 20 days- Before Dec 7 1941. ”

    Thereabouts ‘mid-November’ they disconnected/dissembled their radio transmitters on ships that were part of the Raid Force and its supporting/supply ships, so there was no chance of RDF possible to those ships

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  217. @Wizard of Oz

    I suggest you read “A Matter of Honor” by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan to get an accurate view of Admiral Kimmel.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  218. peterAUS says:

    Correct, both comments.
    Well thought out and executed deception and radio silence.

  219. Sparkon says:
    @SECGRU Sailor

    The NSA on its page about JN-25 acknowledges that it was being “worked by Navy cryptanalysts” before JN-25B was introduced in early December 1941.

    Note that the NSA’s preferred term is “cryptanalyst” not “codebreaker.”

    Supporting and adding to Robert Stinnett’s work, Timothy Wilford’s article “Decoding Pearl Harbor: USN Cryptanalysis and the Challenge of JN-25B in 1941” appeared in The Northern Mariner 12, no. 1 (Jan. 2002):

    “We are reading enough current traffic to keep two translators very busy,” explained Lt. John Lietwiler to the Navy Department in a letter dated 16 November 1941, in which he discussed American efforts to decrypt the principal Japanese naval code.

    The Japanese named this code Kaigun Ango – Sho D, but in 1941 American cryptanalysts referred to it as the 5-Numeral Code or AN-1 Code, although it was later known in Allied wartime reports as JN25B.

    Lietwiler was co-commander of Station Cast, a United States Navy (USN) radio intelligence station located on the island of Corregidor in the Philippines. One of his primary responsibilities in late 1941 was the penetration of JN-25B. The Imperial Japanese Navy sent the bulk of its encrypted radio messages in this code and, needless to say, the Navy Department in Washington wanted to read these messages, despite its limited cryptanalytic resources.

    New evidence released by the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, sheds light on the controversial question of how well the USN could read Japanese naval traffic in late 1941. Certainly, Navy cryptanalysts faced many obstacles in their quest to understand Japanese intentions in the Far East.

    Yet on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, USN cryptanalysts could partially read JN-25B, a code in which the Japanese transmitted numerous messages suggesting their intention to conduct a trans-Pacific raid against anchored capital ships.


    The task at present, however, is to emphasize that the USN could partially read JN-25B in 1941, that the USN intercepted over 26,000 Japanese naval messages between September and December 1941, and that about 90% of these messages were in JN-25B. But what important intelligence did these messages contain?

    Apparently, message headings alone revealed the existence of a Strike Force.

    (my bold, paragraph breaks)

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  220. Christo says:

    Hi Pete,

    I might recommend “Days of Infamy” by John Costello, though you may have it.

    My personal opinion of Douglas MacArthur , was he “went native” due to his high position of Generalissimo of the Philippine Armed Forces after retiring from Chief of Staff of the US armed forces. He had “roots” there from his father and maybe his grand father as well being a former commander/overlord of the Philippines for the USA. Been a while since I thought, read seriously about this topic.

    Then there is the fact his ” Patron” the president of the Philippines thought the Japanese would not attack if no offensive attacks were conducted from PI. And paid Dugout-Doug several million dollars the day after he evacuated for LOSING.

    IDK, I consider old Dougie a spoiled brat who got pampered worse after he retired and he got soft living the life of a king. And then as the war clouds came , he expected FDR’s plan to ship enough B-17’s to cower Japan into submission while he whipped the PI army into shape along with receiving tons of US reinforcements would work.

    Did not turn out that way. But he knew enough of FDR’s B-17 bombing plan where FDr could not afford to have him captured or worse evacuate and come home to runaginst FDR in the next election. That was why Dug-out doug got the Medal of Honor while his soldiers ended up in the Bataan Death march. Doug learned ‘politics” from his father and grandfather . FDR being a master politician himself treated him accordingly.

    But yea, check out Costello’s book if you have not already.

    • Replies: @peterAUS
  221. @Minnesota Mary

    Can you elaborate on Kimmel (And Short?) being denied enough reconnaissance aircraft?

    Turning just the layman’s mind to what Kimmel might have done. He starts with the knowledge that the Japanese *might* launch a surprise attack on Hawaii. Even when it is suggested that the Philippines or Borneo is likely to be the main initial target he can’t have dismissed the possibility that there would be a subsidiary attack or may be a distracting faint on Hawaii.

    So he considers submarine defences and that seems to be OK. Sabotage? Some extra guards posted and a few proactive measures. But what about a couple of carriers sneaking up to launch bombing and/or torpedo attacks?

    Against that last possibility let’s just suppose he thinks of the possibility of carriers coming from different directions but rightly dismisses it and assumes the attack would be from the north. Above all he must sure that the battleships (And cruisers) are not sunk, aircraft are not caught on the ground and fire services quickly get to anyboil storages that are hit. He must have plans for all that.

    He contents himself with the false assurance that torpedoes won’t work in the harbors shallow waters. But he still must ensure that at least some anti aircraft guns on the ships are ready to fire by the time the first bomber makes its run. So he needs to have planes in the air – any planes are better than none – and aim to ensure 15 to 20 minutes warning to, in particular, anyi-aitctaft gunners on ships and on land as well as pilots ready to fly.

    In particular he must anticipate attacks in daylight but when many on Hawaii will still be asleep. So he must ensure there are observers with radios who will see incoming aircraft , if not ships, 70 miles offshore…..

    At this point I decided to ask Google for the speeds of the Japanese aircraft and came up with an account of six US Navy dive bombers arriving at the same time as the Japanese. From the excerpt below it appears to have taken an hour and 23 minutes to travel 250 miles, so they would be flying at about 185 mph and it would take them 22 minutes to fly the last 70 miles. But the Japanese aircraft had already been detected by radar at 7.02am, 46 minutes before the first attacks though presumably not identified as Japanese (I know there is plenty on that).

    Would it have been so difficult to arrange for whatever aircraft were available or some small vessels (cp. Dunkirk) to identify the incoming Japanese aircraft, at least well enough to be alarmed, 20 minutes before they arrived every morning when most servicemen would still be just awake and getting ready for the day? Given the Navy’s traditional high standards is it surprising, and also unjust, that Kimmel – though also let down by Stark and others – was found to have made inadequate preparations?

    As to the extent of the failure and/or treachery in DC I note that some commenters have pointed to there being too much information to process in a timely fashion and also to many signals/messages only being decrypted and translated days after they were sent. Maybe all the precise answers are to be found somewhere in the 2000books and 5000 articles I haven’t read. Likewise when I speculate that orders which seem designed to prevent Kimmel discovering the attack which FDR knew was coming may have originated in a fear that action would be taken that would disclose the extent to which [some] Japanese codes had been broken.

    ** ** **

    “Both the Japanese and American forces had launched aircraft at first light. At 0615 on December 7, the Japanese carriers sent their first attack wave aloft 250 miles north-northwest of Oahu. At exactly the same moment, the Enterprise launched what was thought to be a routine patrol directly in front of the ship’s advance. As usual, the patrol would search a hemisphere of 180 degrees directly ahead of the task force. The flight consisted of nine pairs of SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bombers, mostly from Scout Squadron Six, but including a few planes from Bomb Squadron Six. Each pair of aircraft would conduct a zigzag search in an arc 150 miles long and approximately 10 degrees wide. Instead of returning to the ship, they would then continue on to land at Ford Island, thus getting a jump on shore leave.

    At 0645, the destroyer USS Ward fired on and sank a Japanese midget submarine operating within the defensive perimeter of Pearl Harbor. Seventeen minutes later, the Army radar station at Opana Point picked up the first wave of Japanese attackers. Thirteen minutes later, the second Japanese wave was launched. At 0748, Kaneohe Airfield was strafed and bombed. At 0752, Lt. Cmdr. Mitsuo Fuchida, tactical commander of the first wave, sent the message, “Tora, Tora, Tora,” meaning that surprise had been achieved. At the same time Scouting Six planes began to arrive over Oahu…”

  222. peterAUS says:

    Well, I am not much onto this topic (Pearl Harbor, Philippines etc). We could add Singapore.And Maginot Line. Whatever.

    I would, though, like to read a book about Pearl Harbor, accusing FDR, written by an ex-Naval officer who had at least several years service in higher Headquarters.
    Somebody with real life experience in how all that works.
    Say, a full Captain (retired of course), working in Operations and/or Intelligence there.
    Somebody with EXPERIENCE before the age of digital revolution would be ideal.

    Any such book/material around?

    It just occurred to me:
    Hirohito got lenient treatment by Allies because he allowed IJN to proceed with the plan Shō-Gō 1 and leaked those plans to Americans. On top of it he instructed Kurita to do what he did.

    I’ll come with something about Germans shortly.

    • Replies: @Christo
  223. @Marcus

    the Jap task force was several times scattered by storms during the North Pacific voyage toward Hawaii. In order to re-assemble and get back on schedule, they HAD TO use low-power Talk-Between-Ships (TBS) to re-group. So they simply put their equipment back together and did so. Normally this type of signal doesn’t carry very far and that would have been the IJN expectation. However, under certain atmospheric conditions, such signals can bounce and carry much longer distances. That’s what the USN intercept stations and other listeners (steamship Lurline) picked up and triangulated, and that’s the source of the approach map that the Dutch naval attache saw at the the Navy Dept. a couple of days before the attack. Another example: during the Battle of Midway, Pearl Harbor picked up low-power TBS calls between Fletcher on carrier Yorktown and Spruance/Enterprise…distance: 1,100 miles.

    • Replies: @Hibernian
  224. @Sparkon

    As your comment was highlighted I read virtually every word of the two links that you provided. While I found some later stuff from Wilford (2006 I think)

    under the heading

    Signals intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The state of the question: Intelligence and National Security: Vol 21, No 4

    I would be astonished if there hasn’t been, in recent years, disclosures and analysis which would take one well beyond Wilford’s carefully qualified conclusions. As it is your second last bolding greatly exaggerates the import of what Wilford said because it apparently remains quite uncertain how many of the >26,000 JN-25B 1941 messages were decrypted and translated until a few hundred of them were fully decoded after the war. The task was vast and the resources small as indicated by a late 1941 request to stop bothering about pre July messages.

    There seems to be no question that the sudden introduction of additive 8 in substitution for the JN-25B additive 7 in early December 1941 was not critical (indeed it occurs to me that it might have been a warning flag for the USN) because, *if they had been decoded and translated in good time” there were many JN-25B7 messages which would clearly have pointed to Pearl Harbor. If they were not then the signals intelligence required lots of hard thinking and shrewd guesses from direction finding data, unencrypted message headings etc. It seems reasonable to suppose that some sharp minds had taken note of kido batai [or butai] meaning, apparently “strike force” coming up in partially decrypted messages from September on.

    In addition to hoping that there is later material on just how much was obtained before Pearl Harbor of the detail in JN coded transmissions I note that there was apparently some successful deception by the Japanese. Thus the radio activity ordered by a Vice Admiral of the kido butai appears to have deceived the key radio intelligence station on Corregidor into thinking it was coming from a source which had not left the Kuriles. One can’t help wonder BTW, until some omnivorous searcher and reader can provide an answer just how efficient communications were which regarded American encrypted summaries of the hottest radio intelligence to be sent to DC for evaluation and on to poor Kimmel on Oahu. (No real excuse for Kimmel though. He belonged to a service in the tradition which hanged Admiral Byng pour encourager les autres).

    • Replies: @Sparkon
  225. Anonymous [AKA "Skeptik"] says:

    Let’s say FDR did provoke Japan, and thanks to military intelligence even knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. Why not use that intelligence to ambush the Japanese fleet or air squadrons during the attack, and have the base on high alert for a “possible” surprise attack? FDR still has his war, but you don’t sacrifice as many of your servicemen or risk having your naval base destroyed. It would be really pointless to just ‘let it happen’.

  226. peterAUS says:

    Not quite.
    Disclaimer: I, obviously, don’t believe in conspiracy. Just in a failure due to organizational culture at the time. Peaceful military does it all the time. Or, you need certain type of people in military in peace; different in wartime.
    Those, especially on top, in peace are, how to put it….good administrators/bureaucrats. Not great forward thinkers and/or warriors.
    Of course, the same works the other way around.
    As soon as war is over TPTBs change them back. Remove the warriors, that is.

    Back to answer:
    Emotional/motivational value.

    Destroying/damaging IJN strike force and/or preventing the huge loss of LIFE wouldn’t have created the emotional response in US society at the time, necessary for executing the war effort.

    Something similar happened, actually, in Falklands
    Images of British Marines triggered a certain response in British society. Not that Argentinians wanted it but it did happen.
    And, of course, 9/11.

    A great politician knows how the game of ruling the plebs is played. You manage emotions of your populace and you are good.

    Again, in this case, I don’t think FDR did it.
    He (and people behind/around him) of course, used the event to the max.

  227. Sparkon says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    You wrote:

    I read virtually every word of the two links that you provided. … As it is your second last bolding greatly exaggerates the import of what Wilford said

    Really? Perhaps you missed Wilford’s remarks beginning on pg. 13 (pdf), where he writes:

    Meanwhile, Station Cast successfully decrypted JN-25B throughout 1941. Equipped with IBM machines, Station Cast mechanically processed great volumes of intercepted traffic.

    [pg. 14] Yet Station Cast made even greater strides in decrypting JN-25B7 in late 1941. In a letter of 6 October, Lietwiler explained to Densford how Station Cast’s “Jeep IV” mechanical tabulator aided in the decryption of Additive 7. “We … hit the jackpot on the second trial, so the Jeep made a lot of face in a hurry.

    In a letter of 16 November 1941, Lietwiler, responding to Parke’s letter of 24 October, explained this process:

    Using the 400 high frequency groups we have compiled a table of 24,000 differences. … Two days ago I saw MYERS walk right across the first 20 columns of a sheet using this method almost exclusively. In view of this I do not believe we want a new Jeep IV.’

    Lietwiler also furnished definitive evidence of Station Cast’s ability to read JN-25B7.

    [pg 15] In the same letter of 16 November, Lietwiler explained to Parke how Station Cast successfully read JN-25B7, requesting that OP-20-GY assist with current traffic decryption:

    We have stopped work on the period 1 February to 31 July as we have all we can do to keep up with the current period. We are reading enough current traffic to keep two translators very busy, i.e., with their code recovery efforts, etc. included.

    In this connection, I certainly wish you could see your way clear to drop the ancient history side of this cipher and work with us on each current system…

    [pg 16] The translators at Station Cast not only read current traffic, but also assisted in the recovery of code values. Lietwiler’s remarks clearly show that JN-25B7 was readable in 1941…

    Captain Laurance Safford, head of OP-20-G, discussed JN-25 reading ability in a memorandum of 17 May 1945: [pg. 10]

    Com 16 [Station Cast] intercepts were considered most reliable … not only because of better radio reception, but because Com 16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System (5-number code or JN-25) and was exchanging technical information and translations with the British at Signapore [FECB]. As regards the JN-25 system the current version (JN-25b) had been in effect since 1 December 1940 [and] remained in effect until 27-31 May 1942, and was partially readable in November 1941

    In August, 1970, Safford reaffirmed his views :

    “By Dec 1/41, we had the code solved to a readable extent.”

    [footnote 78 pg 16]
    As previously mentioned, the COM16 report of 29 November 1941 (COM16-291029-TI) demonstrates that Station Cast could read encrypted addresses. Furthermore, an original, uncensored copy of SRH-406 shows that the external address of a message could be compared with its internal encrypted address to compromise the identity of the address list.

    To sum up, there are enough statements from various personnel doing the work on JN-25 in 1940 and 1941 with enough details to for me to determine that some significant portions of it were being read well before Pearl Harbor.

    I maintain my use of bold was justified to emphasize what Timothy Wilford wrote about the USN’s ability to partially read JN-25 by Dec. 1941, which I suggest is a very conservative estimate. At any rate, I can hardly exaggerate the man’s own words merely by putting them in bold, and indeed these are my bolds throughout my comment, which I put there to help virtual readers with points of emphasis, so they’re not missed.

  228. @Anonymous

    during the c. 8:35AM – 9 AM 26 November 1941 trans-Atlantic RT call between Churchill and FDR, something along those lines was Roosevelt’s initial reaction to news of the oncoming Japanese task force: “good…we’ll give them a hot reception.” But Churchill talked him out of it. First, because any heavy American prep to receive the attack would have been noticed by Jap agents on Oahu and, when learned of in Japan, would likely have resulted in the Jap fleet being recalled: in fact, the final “Climb Mt. Niitaka” go-ahead wasn’t signaled to Nagumo until 4 December. Also, given the reluctance of the US Congress to declare war on anybody and a mass population that supported Lindbergh not Roosevelt, Churchill – correctly – thought that a massacre would be just the ticket. As always, with Churchill.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  229. I read all of that and I see that the codebrakers/cryptanalysis were getting excited by their progress in what was obviously a laborious and time consuming task that required their limited resources to abandon still undecrypted messages from months back. Not a word about anything of substance. All about technical matters.

    It would be encouraging to think that a President who knew a Japanese attack was likely would have had some smart person looking at what intelligence was providing and could provide and working on the ability to put together multiple clues *even though they couldn’t rely on reading all the Japanese encrypted messages, let alone in real time*. The bulk of decrypted translated messages don’t appear to have given much help in preparing for Pearl Harbor.

    Station Cast was at Cavito in the Philippines after moving from Shanghai and, however well it communicated with DC and provided intelligence to critical levels of the Navy or Administration, it is reasonable to suppose that it was concentrated on Western Pacific traffic. Note in the following from Wikipedia that the different stations “shared” tasks – so clearly they didn’t all cover the whole field.

    “Stations HYPO and CAST were assigned responsibility for work on Japanese Navy systems, and after the agreement with the United Kingdom and Netherlands to share the effort, worked with crypto groups in Hong Kong then Singapore (Far East Combined Bureau) and Batavia (Kamer 14 or Room 14)”.

    Can there really be no up to date account of everything decrypted, translated, analysed and communicated upwards and when that happened in DC?

    Here’s another Wikipedia quote that comes from the article on Station CAST (not likely to be the last word but also not likely to assiduously maintained propaganda)

    “Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the amount of available traffic was low, and little progress had been made on the most important Japanese Navy system, called by US analysts JN-25. JN-25 was used for high level operations: movement and planning commands, for instance. It was a superencrypted code, eventually a two-book system, and joint cryptanalytic progress was slow. JN-25B was introduced on 1 December 1940, but was broken immediately by FECB as the additives were not changed. Most references cite about 10% of messages partially (or sometimes completely) decrypted prior to 1 December 1941, at which time a new edition of the system went into effect and sent all the cryptanalysts back to the beginning.”

    As I noted the change to additive 8 on 1st December was not critical if all the additive 7 messages had been available in real time but I am tending at this point to read our amateurs’ thread as supporting a view that the imminence and weight of attack on Pearl Harbor was not made known to DC from reading whole decrypted, translated Japanese Navy messages but that Kimmel should have been better prepared anyway It doesn’t detract from the conclusion that Roosevelt may have put the effect of a Japanese attack in getting America into the war well ahead of the lives of American servicemen on Hawaii or the preservation of a few old battleships. (It would be interesting to know what FDR had said about aircraft carriers and modern naval warfare. A few minutes search has shown me nothing).

  230. @Haxo Angmark

    Plausible enough but I have tried to find the archived transcript or summary of such a telephone conversation and all I could find was this indirect communication by telegram between WSC and FDR on 26 November:

    “711.94/2472: Telegram

    The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 96
    London, November 26, 1941—6 a.m.
    [Received November 26—12:55 a.m.]
    5670. For the President from the Former Naval Person.

    “Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.”

    Sent to President Roosevelt on November 26 at 9:05 a.m.↩

    That was at

    So…. can you help with the conversation.

    • Replies: @Haxo Angmark
  231. Discussion (argument) focused on the dates when intercepted radio transmissions from the Japanese fleet were de-coded is beside the point as far as the Navy’s ability to track the fleet’s movements, for which interception of undecoded signals sufficed. And discussants pursuing this line of argument above meanwhile ignore the documented order to dispatch the carrier fleet, removing it from Pearl Harbor, the documented order of the 25th ending patrols of the area from which the Japanese attack was launched, the documented order of the 26th clearing its path, and the documented orders of the 27th & 28th informing Kimmel that the government wanted Japan to strike the first blow. Taken together, these orders, coupled with the Navy’s tracking of the fleet (which people disputing the dates of decoding of the intercepts admit), proves Stinnett’s case and the accuracy of his account as summarized above. This obvious and indisputable conclusion also places the good faith of the discussants pursuing this argument in a very poor light and suggests that the discussants do not regard the intelligence of their readers very highly, to expect people to fall for this silly dodge.

    • Agree: Hibernian
    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  232. SafeNow says:

    As Spruance pointed out, the Japanese “didn’t finish the job” because after the successful attack rendered the U.S. defenseless, it would have been easy to destroy the oil “tank farms,” the sub base, and the machine shops. Most importantly, this would have destroyed all of the U.S. fuel in the Pacific, and changed the course of the Pacific war, and perhaps changed history. If indeed Roosevelt allowed the attack, did he count on the Japanese to not “finish the job”? Or was he willing to risk Japanese initiative, and its devastating consequences. Besides a prolonged war, the consequences might well have included an invasion of Hawaii, attacks on the west coast, and even a peace treaty.

    • Replies: @Che Guava
  233. Che Guava says:
    @Wizard of Oz


    Of course I have read Day of Deceit closely, and criticallly more than once.

    As another comentor has said. Stinnetet’s case is based only on documentary prnof, ergo facto.

  234. Che Guava says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    Another point, raiseed in reverse, also by another poster, why did Hitler declare war on the USA when Japan attacked, but lapan demurred on the USSR in a near-equivalent situation?

    IMHO, Hitler was in grievous error there. If our govt. was not to help against the USSR, why declare war on the USA in response to an attack by Japan?

    It is an interestining counter-factual excercise, to consider if Germany had not declared war.

    Then again, the USA had been in de facto naval war against Germany for some time, perhaps it would have made no diference.

  235. Che Guava says:

    I was addressing this in an earlier post. Nagumo was, in fact, ordered to do a second attack, with all of the objectives you list, but disobeyed, as I said in the earlier post, he thought he had won a great victory like Admiral Togo in the Russo-Japanese war, and couldn’t wait to get back to a home port and party. Fool.

    • Replies: @J. Alfred Powell
    , @Christo
  236. @Wizard of Oz

    As the article states, Stinnett prints dozens of photographic facsimiles of his documentary evidence. The only way to disprove or debunk his analysis would be to prove that this evidence is forged. Which is nonsensical. Your efforts to skate around this basic fact betray your bad faith. On the strength of this betrayal of your bad faith, there is no reason to pay any attention to anything you say.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  237. @Che Guava

    None of your three comments addresses the subject of this article in any meaningful way. On the contrary, they amount to throwing dust in the air. This implies bad faith on your part. On this basis there is no reason to pay attention to anything you say.

    • Replies: @Che Guava
    , @Che Guava
  238. @Anonymous

    The orders sent Kimmel telling him that FDR prefered that Japan be allowed to strike the first blow answers your question. Stinnett hypothesizes concerning FDR’s reasons. See the article. And try — try really hard, just to see if you can — to think.

    • Troll: Che Guava
    • Replies: @Che Guava
  239. @Wizard of Oz

    the telegram you cite (sent 6 AM London time, received in DC c. 1 AM local) was Churchill’s initial & carefully mild reaction to the modus vivendi proposal floated on the 25th by Hull and FDR: if Japan agrees to a token troop withdrawal from Indochina, US will begin resuming oil shipments and etc. In fact WC considered that a “Far Eastern Munich” was in the works (Martin Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol. III, pp. 1507-1508) and, as the morning wore on in London, finally decided that he had to take more decisive action: talk directly to FDR via trans-Atlantic RT and tell FDR what his own Far East code-breakers had just told him: IJN strike force headed toward Pearl Harbor so “just let it happen and we’re in the war together”. That’s why, a couple hours later, FDR in turn called Hull and told him to throw out the mv and issue instead an Ultimatum. Which Hull did….an ultimatum already at hand, as submitted on 17 November by Soviet agent (((Harry Dexter White))) @ (((Morgenthau)))’s Treasury Dept. And why, @ 8:30 PM same day, the first warning order re getting the carriers out of harbor via the “air reinforcement” missions to Wake and Midway went out. I don’t think a full transcript of the German intercept and de-scramble of the 8:35 AM (DC time) WC/FDR conversation is anywhere on the net. Which does not surprise me. It (and other German RT intercepts and related documents) are in Gregory Douglas, ed., Gestapo Chief – The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Muller, vol. I, pp. 42-55, 246-254; and vol. III, pp. 48 ff. Vol. I is available @ Amazon via Kindle or hard copy, Vol. III hard copy only.

  240. Che Guava says:
    @J. Alfred Powell

    No bad faith on my part, that Nagumo was ordered to make a second attack, and received and chose to ignore the order is a simple fact.

    If anybody is posting in bad faith, it is certainly not moi.

  241. Che Guava says:
    @J. Alfred Powell

    I can only surmise that you have read very little, but gain all of your ‘knowledge’ from the dreadful Michael Bay movie.

  242. Che Guava says:
    @J. Alfred Powell

    The initial letters of your pseudomynous u-name are constructed to spell ‘JAP’, it is difficult not to notice that, also you are a very new commentor.

    The secondary point that I am making, also well-attested, the USN carriers and accompanying craft were lurking in an ocean gyre, until our fleet was on the way home, so the disobient and vain fool Nagumo got to have his victory party, at least.

    Yamamoto well understood that after Nagumo’s refusal to follow orders, the victory had little chance of being more than Pyrrhic. It must have made him (Yamamoto) feel terrible at times, also I would guess very angry at Nagumo.

    Try to study a little if you want to try trolling your betters who actually have.

  243. @J. Alfred Powell

    No doubt there are “discussants” who are, from your point of view, not writing in good faith, but there would be many who do not take all or even many of the UR contributors as balanced, sane, meticulously scholarly, and honest. They nonetheless may hope to learn much of interest from contributors and commenters who have read and checked much relevant material that most people do not have time for. If so it is clearly appropriate to cross-examine the witnesses or at least ask the questions which a lawyer would ask of his own client before he takes his case to court. With that in mind it occurs to me to be a little hesitant about your broadly asserted case, apparently based on Stinnett’s book which few on the thread will have had a chance to read, when you write “the documented order of the 25th ending patrols of the area from which the Japanese attack was launched” because the Japanese fleet didn’t set out till the 26th. It follows that was not the undecoded messages which allowed the fleet to be tracked which caused such anticipation of the attack from the north west. And if not that then what was it? That you think your broad brush is enough and apparently haven’t seen how that order being on the 25th is significant can only make a careful reader reluctant to suppose that the story is as straightforward as you say.

  244. Che Guava says:

    If you actually bothered to read comments, you would have seen that, well before I had assumed you to be a trollish commentor, I had stated that I have the Stinnett book, have closely read it more than once, and find it, as you do, convincing. OTOH, I don’t try to misrepresent it.

    You are seriously wrong on the point of the carriers being on the way to Midway, etc., that was after the attack, and after they had confirmed that Nagumo had been an idiot, and disobeyed orders.

    AFAIR from reading, that was precisely the reality.

    That the carriers were lurking in the gyre was stated by Stinnett, on the basis of his usual research of documents.

    You may try to more closely read an account (which I have also stated I am agseeing with in general, but the account that I agree with is not your careless reading of Stinnett,

    At that time, U.S. naval aviation was no match for Japan’s.

    You say I am throwing dirt in the wind, that would imply you have some paleolithic connection to Israel, dust in the wind, from the OT.

  245. Che Guava says:


    I try to be a responsible poster. Sometimes too tired, drunk, and a bad everyday experience, so a mess or a misguided reply. However, I will stand by more than 95% (really almost all, I have made a few posts that are clearly baiting, but I don’t care, those that I was baiting fully deserved it).

    As for the interesting military question that you raise and I have continually been raising, there is so much behind the Pearl Harbour attack.

    The point I want to emphasize was that Nagumo acted like the precsice opposite of a mialitary leader,

  246. @Haxo Angmark

    I haven’t gone to the extent of getting a Kindle version of the book you say contains the Roosevelt-Churchill conversation intercepts but have read a lot of interesting stuff as I have tried to find even mention of the 26th November call on the internet.

    While the logic of the story stands up, and I am not, at this point disposed to put preservation of the secret of US codebreaking ahead of ensuring maximun political outrage as certain motive for any FDR orders which crippled Hawaii’s defence, I am wary of the Churchill and Roosevelt cooked it up on the 26th version because
    1. It seems unlikely that the Brits in Singapore would have been so far ahead in decrypting and translating Japanese Naval messages from , than the relatively large US teams in their three stations, not least when the Brits were rightly concentrating on their part of the Far East
    2. I simply can’t find what one would expect on the internet if any significant number of people were giving credence to the reality of that call
    3. There is this from just the one Wikipedia account I have read (definitely not on the conspiracy side but quite professionally dispassionate for the most part**)


    A purported transcript of a conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill in late November 1941 was analyzed and determined to be fake. There are claims about these conversations; much of this is based on fictional documents, often cited as “Roll T-175″ at the National Archives. There is no Roll T-175; NARA does not use that terminology.”

    **As I said, not on the conspiracy side e.g

    “Robert Stinnett, Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct the military to clear Kimmel and Short’s records. Full of questionable claims, unsupported allegations, and errors of fact and reasoning. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9”

    *** *** ***

    In the same Wikipedia article there is a not entirely conclusive discussion of Japanese radio deception measures from taking radios apart to ensure absolute radio silence to sending false signals from regular radio operators left behind. E.g.

    “The Japanese practiced radio deception. Susumu Ishiguru, intelligence and communications officer for Carrier Division Two, stated, “Every day false communications emanated from Kyushu at the same time and same wavelength as during the training period.” Because of this, Commander Joseph Rochefort of Hawaii Signals Intelligence concluded that the First Air Fleet remained in home waters for routine training. The ships left their own regular wireless operators behind to carry on “routine” radio traffic. Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka stated, “The main force in the Inland Sea and the land-based air units carried out deceptive communications to indicate the carriers were training in the Kyushu area.” The main Japanese naval bases (Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo) all engaged in considerable radio deception. Analysis of the bearings from Navy DF stations account for claimed breaks of radio silence, and when plotted, the bearings point to Japanese naval bases, not where the Kido Butai actually was. On 26 November, CAST reported all Japan’s aircraft carriers were at their home bases. Rochefort, with Huckins and Williams, states there were no dummy messages used at any time throughout 1941 and no effort by the Japanese to use serious deception.

    When asked after the attack just how he knew where Akagi was, Rochefort (who commanded HYPO at the time) said he recognized her “same ham-fisted” radio operators. (The Japanese contend that radio operators were left behind as part of the deception operation.) The critical DF-tracked radio transmissions show bearings that could have not come from the strike force. Emissions monitored from CAST, or CAST’s report Akagi was off Okinawa on 8 December 1941, are examples, though some transmissions continue to be debated.”

    It casts doubt on the accuracy with which kido butai could be tracked simply by triangulation.

    Must rush.

  247. @Haxo Angmark

    I forgot to mention that for some odd reason the British Ultra decodes of the Japanese [I thought Ultra was only about German codes] seem to be closed till 2025…. One virtue of that Wikipedia article is that it seems quite open about what is not yet open to FOI.

  248. @J. Alfred Powell

    It seems likely that you got your chance to have Unz Review run your article on a book published about 20 years ago because Mr. Unz had just read the book and been impressed by it. I am not sure that means his considerable intellectual credit should be added to that of an anonymous reviewer of a 20 year old book who does not appear to be a known authority. Maybe you submitted your article and that prompted Mr. Unz to read the book. I haven’t read it but am in the course of ordering it.

    It is a little unseemly it might be said for accusations of bad faith to be tossed round by a new anonymous contributor whose main claim, though I am going to reread your article to check this, seems to be that you find Stinnett’s book reliable and persuasive. But you write of critical facsimiles without reproducing them. It would be helpful for readers still waiting for a copy of the book to arrive (it could take a month) if you were to select the most important 10 or 20 and reproduce them in Comments.

    While I accept that Ron Unz has articulated a strong case that, somehow, Roosevelt knew enough about the imminent attack on Pearl Harbour to allow him to ensure that it would give him the war he was seeking, I shall read Stinnett’s book as offering a special bonus in the way it can be used to test how those who claim to have read it have actually remembered it accurately, and how their express or implicit analysis based on it stands up.

    • Replies: @J. Alfred Powell
  249. @Wizard of Oz

    The reason to renew discussion of this 19 year old book today is that it presents conclusive evidence resolving the questions about what happened at Pearl Harbor that have been in play since that day, and yet supposedly “informed” discussion continues as if it had never been published, and as if anyone who had read it had failed to grasp that it does PRESENT EVIDENCE which amounts to conclusive PROOF. My own reading of it leads me to the view that I twice voice in the review, that fair-minded readers will find it conclusive. So your proposed course of reading it and examining its evidence appears the sensible one to me. What I wish to emphasize is that Stinnett’s analysis and discussion rest squarely on the EVIDENCE he PRESENTS. To challenge his analysis would require one to falsify his evidence — to demonstrate that it is forged. This is, as it seems to me any reasonable and fair-minded reader will agree, utterly unlikely. So Stinnett’s argument stands. See for yourself. That’s the essence of science: interrogate the evidence.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  250. @J. Alfred Powell

    I hope the book arrives before I get to Sri Lanka for my winter getaway. I am bound to find some sophisticated people there to discuss matters of high level conspiracy and botched intelligence. Interesting that the subcontinent is about the only important part of the world (Australasia being a merely happy Brigadoon) that the Unz Review hasn’t turned scathing attention to. Can you conceive of the Sri Lankan police and defense forces having been warned at high level by Indian intelligence that the Easter suicide bombings by Muslim fanatics were coming and yet doing nothing to stop it? [The sackings and/or resignations appear to validate that account]. It’s hard to believe that Muslims present a big problem in that multiracial multifaith society despite attempts by the Rajapakse family (now out of power) to pick up where the manipulative Bandaranaikes left off in cynically beating/heating up Buddhist (Sinhala) ethnocentrism in much the same way as the Burmese army and the Midi led BJP beat up respectively Buddhism and Hinduism.

  251. @AmRusDebate

    Clearly you are blissfully ignorant of the fact that Roosevelt’s maneuvering in European affairs circa 1937-39 contributed heavily to the beginning of the war that killed so many Europeans.

    I suppose you like Roosevelt for “saving” Russia from Hitler but in reality, the war may have never reached Russia if not for Roosevelt’s meddling in 1937-39.

    Also, your assertion that the America First movement was “Nazi sponsored” is either a disgusting lie or a mark of incomparable ignorance. The America First movement was an organic expression of the American people who had seen one hundred thousand good men die in World War 1 in a European fracas. No wonder over 90% of Americans were, in 1940-41, opposed to entering the war.

    You have an awful lot to learn. Start here:

    ‘President Roosevelt’s Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents’ by Mark Weber

    • Replies: @Hibernian
  252. Lots to digest from people who are obviously knowledgeable.

    As to why Japan would attack first? Because Japan was convinced that these uSA was going to attack Japan, no matter what. Now-a-days is called preemptive strike. Hoover covers this issue in Freedom Betrayed. Whatever you think of Hoover, he was one heck of a writer and curator.

  253. Che Guava says:

    You are wrong on at least one point, it was the late intervention of the Soviet Red Army in Manchuria that gave the CPC a stable base there. Without that, they would have lost.

  254. Che Guava says:

    That is a very interesting question. The answer may be ‘yes’, but I suspect we will never have it.

    The small time difference (a few months), to launch medium bombers from a carrier (and never forget that the carriers were hiding during and after the Pearl Harbour attack) was unprecented, I found the article at the link below of interest on a few points I had not known before.

    • Replies: @Christo
  255. @J. Alfred Powell

    It’s not up to me to contend anything. I believe you: I’m sure he offers a great deal of evidence. What I’m missing is critical literature that evaluates his evidence in light of opposing views.

    For example, the Wikipedia article that I cited didn’t IGNORE Stinnett’s evidence. It cited articles that seem to rebut Stinnett’s claims. For instance, it cited a now-archived Salon article that criticized Stinnett for claiming to discover “129 intercept reports that indicate that the Japanese didn’t maintain radio silence during the approach to Hawaii” and yet failing to reproduce any of those intercepts in his book.

    Maybe Salon was right. Maybe it was wrong. I don’t know. And I don’t care enough to devote months to retracing Stinnett’s steps. When I can readily find several seemingly competent sources that allege virtually universal rejection of Stinnett’s thesis on multiple grounds, it’s the turn of Stinnett and/or his defenders to respond cogently to those critical sources — not to keep looking for naive readers willing to accept whatever they’re told.

  256. @Ray Woodcock

    Your social media and blog use should be monitored carefully. You are obviously not with it on diversity. The internet should not be an unfriendly place for people with IQs under 100.

  257. Christo says:

    Not really. Rochefort worth and memoir and it can be found at Hyperwar IIRC. Layton the only thing left from him his an oral history Q&A of which small bits can be found or have been cited it various other works.

    You end up researching Generals such as Kelly Turner and their interactions with others at the War Plans division .

    There is though Lt Col. Ellis ,, if you REALLY want to know what the “plan” was , though he wrote it in 1921! before there were good long range bombers . It all centered on taking the Marianas Islands(The Central Pacific Thrust). Not intelligence , pure strategy and it is what we did minus the MacArthur sideshow in the south to PI. which was largely to accommodate Doug so he did not run against FDR in 44 IMO

    Ellis’s work nothing to do with the intel picture, but he was a visionary and an accurate one

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  258. Christo says:
    @Che Guava

    Basically what I found was a photocopied listing of call signs used either during a us FleetEX naval exercise in the 1930’s or a lsting of call signs for the Pan Am Clipper that had “Shangri- La as the call sign of MIDWAY ISLAND. this was pre-war.

    The joke that FDR was asked about at a very public press conference after the Doolittle Raid ” Where did the Doolittle bombers come from?” He said “shangri-La” , which was from his favorite book Lost Horizon and was also the name of Camp David , his presidential rest area.

    However , IMO, the Japanese monitored all Us commo pre-war , and especially watched the exercises, so when FDR said Shangri-La they would have made the connection from their old signals intel .

    The japanese were interested in “Shuttle bombing” and they original thought the Dollittel bomber s had flown from somewhere to refuel on carriers before attacking a long range target. They had studied this with there own bombers as a means of possibly bombing Hawaii or California.

    When he said Shangri-La , Japanese eyes looked at Midway. Boom, the hook was in the water.
    And the Desalinization Plant gimmick ensured the Japanese took the bait.

    That is the basis of a book I have planned. The Shangri-La call sign reference is in the Naval Institute archives, I wont say exactly where , becuase that little gem I found .

    Lots more details , such as about the “top-secret” B-25 used etc, ect. If I ever get around to it should be interesting

    • Replies: @Che Guava
  259. @Ray Woodcock

    Stinnett does reproduce many dozens of key documents which do suffice to make his case, as an open-minded reader can see by reading his book. He also cites literal thousands of other documents. Writers who criticize him for not reproducing facsimile’s of “129” more of these documents, while ignoring the conclusive evidence he does reproduce, appear to be acting in bad faith, to distract discussion from what Stinnett’s evidence does appear to prove. And of course there is sufficient other evidence that the Japanese fleet did not maintain radio silence, that began with the reports of merchant marine radio operators of their interception of these signals starting days before Pearl Harbor. It appears to me that an open-minded encounter with Stinnett’s evidence and argument is convincing and conclusive, not only as to the facts Stinnett establishes but also as to the bad faith of his attackers.

    • Replies: @Ray Woodcock
  260. Logan says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    It certainly makes sense that a cunning FDR would have deliberately removed the aircraft carriers from harms way

    Actually, it makes little sense at all. By a little way into WWII it became obvious that carriers were the dominant weapons system in naval warfare, but at the time of Pearl Harbor this was by no means so obvious. Battleships were still thought by many to be the main striking force of a navy.

    I’m sure FDR was cunning, but it’s by no means obvious that he was as prescient about the importance of carriers as this implies.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  261. @Logan

    Your reasoning tends to disrupt the favored UR narrative which sees many signs of FDR’s active intervention to ensure sufficient impact on the isolationist American public, of which taking steps to save the carriers is an important one. You may be right but it seems also possible that FDR listened to someone who pointed out that the carriers would be vital because they were much faster than the battleships could project power flexibly over a much greater range – and that there were only 3 in the Pacific. Or maybe some admiral knew what FDR was up to and simply took it on himself to save the carriers by selling the President some specious story about the need to ferry planes to Wake Island or whatever the story was.

    • Replies: @Logan
  262. @Christo

    What’s the evidence that anyone was pushing the idea of MacArthur for President at relevant times? Wouldn’t the FDR team have been confident that they could change the public view of him from hero to cowardly incompetent the monent he put his hand up for the primaries? The fate of the Bataan death marchers while he was scuttling out to Australia would be upfront though the loss of aircraft on the ground despite warnings might have had to be handled in a way that concealed the source of the warning. Not a problem. It could be widely leaked and asserted that the Japanese engaged in so much radio chatter that direction finding radar had picked up the attacking planes in good time. MacArthur wasn’t going to tell the true story. The Japanese would be left with the impression (if they noticed the radio traffic story was false) that the American were contriving a way to make MacArthur do what any honorable Japanese general would have done if he had been responsible for such a disaster.

  263. Christo says:

    Well, that has been been acknowledged since then , Douglas MacArthur gave thought to and was actually candidate for the Republican nomination for the 1944 ​election. He did not campaign (of course) because he did not resign his commission and stayed out in the Pacific, but that threat to FDR ensured Mac got what he wanted out for his crusade back to PI. Should be some info in American Caesar(the goto Mac bio by Manchester ), but it has been a long time since I read it. .

    FDR could not change the “public view” because both him and Mac were pretty “dirty” as to their pre-war actions and the entire PI command debacle and the info behind it was still secret at the time

  264. Logan says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    Let us assume FDR indeed knew all about Pearl Harbor and let it happen anyway for deep, dark reasons.

    Nobody has ever given me a logical explanation why he had to allow it to be so effective. To bring America into the war all he had to do was allow the Japs to attack. He didn’t have to let them win the battle.

    Not my area, but I would assume even a few hours of warning would have resulted in a rather different loss ratio.

  265. @Logan

    Good to find another willing to ask the questions of the interested intelligent amateur on UR. Of course one can annoy the main contributors when they can claim to have covered the ground already – particularly our host – but it’s OK to have been passing the port when the guru explained the key facts as long as one isn’t in a drunken muddle.

    We would both be interested in diaries and letters shedding precise light on FDR’s thinking and judgment from time to time and also who was telling him what and precisely when. That would extend to any apparently callous statements about the human costs which might be worth bearing. After all, there need be little fear that he would match Mao’s expressed willingness (don’t ask me for the 100% reliable source) to see 300 million Chinese killed to achieve his goals.

    • Replies: @anonymous
  266. anonymous[340] • Disclaimer says:
    @Wizard of Oz

    Before interacting with this “Wizard of Oz” character, be aware that he/she/they often draw other commenters in with questions and requests that are seldom resolved to his/her/their satisfaction.
    The same person also fuzzes up threads by pretending to be more than one commenter, the technique known as “sock puppetry.” See under Mr. Derbyshire’s February 15, 2019, article comment ## 28, 42, 43, 44, 68, 122, where he/she/they got sloppy also posting as “Anon[436].”

    Among this website’s oddest, sophisticatedly trollish commenters.

    • Replies: @J. Alfred Powell
  267. @anonymous

    Yes, this fits my impression also.

  268. Che Guava says:

    Thank you. Some interesting points. I like the okd fhlm of Lost Horizon, it is really weird, especially the early scemes.

    The book? Not so much. Puerile in parts. Good luck with your source that is not to be revealed.

  269. Che Guava says:

    I think you miss the point. It is not regular Japamese grammar, but a word play. The zaru part means monkey. I think the English term is ‘the three wise monkeys’.

    • Replies: @Sparkon
  270. Two Hawaiian newspapers ran headlines of an imminent Jap Attack days before the actual attack on December 7, 1941.

    The Honolulu Advertiser (dated November 30, 1941)

    The Hilo Tribune Herald (dated November 30, 1941)
    I’m not a crazy conspiracy theorist, but I couldn’t help to notice that the date December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy--FDR started his famous “Infamy speech” with that line and specifically with those numbers–has “9-11” and also “7-11” as integral numbers.

    9-11 and 7-11 are highly occult and Kabbalistic numbers. The PTB live and die by their Masonic and Kabbalistic numbers and numerology.

    Was Pearl Harbor the first 9-11? The (((neocons))) often refer to the attack on 9-11 as the “Pearl Habor” event of our times.

    At the risk of being castigated as an antisemite and conspiracy kook, I’m going to say that not only did FDR know in advance about the attack, but that the attack was planned to happen on that specific date in order to implement an occult Jewish agenda.

    • Replies: @Maowasayali
  271. Sparkon says:
    @Che Guava

    Yes, I know all that. Why do you think I missed the point? Was it perhaps because I didn’t include a Japanese grammar lesson on the slightly oddball verb form?

    Kido Butai was supposed to maintain radio silence, even if it couldn’t. But if it didn’t maintain radio silence, you didn’t see anything, you didn’t hear anything, and you won’t say anything, because you are a wise monkey that knows how to avoid trouble.

    The meaning or lesson of the “three wise monkeys” is to See No Evil. Hear No Evil. Speak No Evil. The monkeys are called wise because by following those 3 admonitions, they not only avoid trouble, but maintain honor, which is always a good plan, especially for a sailor of the IJN, or for others who may know more than they are willing to say…

    Now the grammar, and the kanji…

    -(a)zaru is a strange alternate of -(a)nu (apparently a contraction of -(a)zu aru) that caught on in Japan long ago and is still used for its classical flavour.

    The Japanese word for monkey is saru (サル,猿), which sounds like the zaru ending. Hence “Don’t see, don’t hear, don’t say,” can be written as mizaru, kikazaru, iwazaru (見ざる言わざる聞かざる) or sometimes 見猿言わ猿聞か猿 using the kanji for monkey, 猿. This is translated into the “See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” of the three wise monkeys.

    What is the zaru verb ending?

    Which is almost there, but the author got his kanji crossed, and it should be like this:

    mizaru, kikazaru, iwazaru (見ざる聞かざる言わざる)

    or sometimes 見猿聞か猿言わ猿 &c

    Where “speak no evil” always comes last. In English, we often say “don’t tell.” At Nikko, Iwazaru is in the middle, so go figure, or read my subsequent comment with image of Nikko monkeys.

  272. Hibernian says:
    @Haxo Angmark

    Some people have trouble understanding that military men pledged, and trained, to risk death from enemy fire, might risk death by firing squad, for disobeying orders, in order to save themselves, their ships, and their men, from death due to a storm.

  273. Hibernian says:
    @John Burns, Gettysburg Partisan

    Many of the America Firsters, before Pearl Harbor, were members of the Eastern establishment, usually young and idealistic ones.

    • Replies: @J. Alfred Powell
  274. @Maowasayali

    I just rewatched FDR’s “Infamy speech” and note that the date “December 7, 1941” is repeated two times. Once at the beginning and then at the end of his speech.

    Upon reflection, it’s a rather robotic use of a phrase that has no intrinsic literary value. Its repetition seems more to do with Jewish Kabbala than with rhetorical speech writing. 

    I wonder who wrote that speech for him? I bet it was a Jew or Mason because no God-fearing goy speechwriter would ever think it necessary to bookend a speech to start WWII with the phrase, December 7, 1941. Indeed, the idea and decision to do so is bizarre, if one really thinks about it.

    Was December 7, 1941 an occult Jewish shibboleth and incantation?

    In any event, December 7, 1941, is certainly a date that continues to live in infamy, just like September 11, 2001, which most of us know as “9-11” and, I would strongly argue, that it was no accident that we remember that attack and fateful day as “9-11”.

    You see, our Jewish controllers ascribe occult meaning and magical powers to numbers and none are more magical and powerful than “9-11” and “7-11”. Viz. September is the 7th month in the old Julian and Hebrew calendars.

    By the way, I ain’t no crazy conspiracy theorist: even regular Jews at the Forward Magazine openly admit that:

    When you walk into your local 7-Eleven today to get your free Slurpee — this being July 11, or 7/11, or, as it is celebrated everywhere, “7-Eleven Day” — consider for a moment that the convenience the store brings is based upon gematria, or the hidden meanings of numbers in Judaism.

    Source: The Secret Jewish History Of 7-Eleven

    Mazel Tov!

  275. @Hibernian

    Prominent America First members included President Hoover, Ambassador Joseph Kennedy and his son John F. The people who smear them as “nazi-sympathizers” and “anti-semites” defile themselves as slanderers, whether from ignorance, stupidity, programming or partisan malice hardly matters. Two excellent books on this subject are Bill Kauffman, America First (Amherst, New York, Prometheus, 1995) and Justus D. Doenecke, Storm On The Horizon (Lanham, Maryland, Bowman & Littlefield, 2000). Herbert Hoover’s Freedom Betrayed (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2011) is also an important text — so important and so plainspoken that its publication was delayed for FIFTY YEARS by the usual suspects. People who care about America’s America (as distinguished from Wall Street’s Mammon America Inc.) will find it an enlightening read.

  276. Christo says:
    @Che Guava

    “I was addressing this in an earlier post. Nagumo was, in fact, ordered to do a second attack, with all of the objectives you list, but disobeyed, as I said in the earlier post, he thought he had won a great victory like Admiral Togo in the Russo-Japanese war, and couldn’t wait to get back to a home port and party. Fool.’

    None of this is correct. The “RAID” on Pearl Harbor was strictly that a “Raid” . The Japanese had planned to send their two waves and withdraw. That was the plan. That was it. The only allowance for any “second strike” was to defend the 1st Airfleet from US Naval forces and aircraft IF they were discovered , located and attacked. There NEVER was a plan to launch a second strike only the allowance to Nagumo to launch attacks based on his own digression in the event that a navl battle developed. The rest , pushed so much by Gordon Prange’s editors and based his interviews of Commander Fuchida many years after the war. Fuchida in so many words , started adding a lot of colorful bullshit as the years past post war, about a second strike /3 rd wave. None of which is found in his interviews immediately after the war 1947/1948.

    There never was any talk by Nagumo/Genda/Fuchida after Fuchida returned from the first strike.
    The Japanese lost 29 planes , many more “totaled” upon landing(26) , and many planes were shot up as to be incapable of further combat(111). To the tuned of being out about 130+ airplanes . The Japanese were prepared to lose two carriers and 200 planes if they had been forced into a fight and/or lost surprise, which they did not. As it was , the US fleet was considered “hors de combat” and the 1st airfleet had not seen or sunk any of the 4-5 US carriers which they thought were in the Pacific. It was a successful raid , they did not know were the Us CV were so Nagumo withdrew, after running a perfect op with minimal losses.

    On top of all this , there were the three simple facts ,1. that the Japanese Aircraft returned too late to re-arm and launch another attack and return before nightfall.
    Then there was the real problem that the sea state was worsening even as the aircraft returned which caused many damaged planes when they returned , and would have made arming and launching another strike very hazardous and would have made landings at night in a bad sea state , a disaster, causing the loss of many planes/pilots, not even adjusting for losses /damage from the massive AA fire any second strike would have suffered attacking again against a now fully alerted US forces..

    You see the Japanese approached Hawaii hiding in a storm front, then they shot out in front of it to launch the raid, however as the planes returned that afternoon and as it got later the IJN position 200 miles north-northwest of Hi. the storm front they used as cover was catching back up with them . The worsening “sea-state” the evening of the raid, also precluded any opportunity for launching an attack the morning of the next day.
    3. Staying another day would have seen the Japanese destroyers running low or out of fuel upon withdrawing at a later date and the Japanese tankers had withdrawn days before. The japanese fueled up before their storm from run, so the destroyers had been running at high/battle speeds
    for two days adding another day , would havebeen three , and destroyers didnt carry much more than 3 days of fuel running at full speed. And trying to slow down to refuel them from carriers or other warships while being so close to US forces/bases and the possibility of naval combat would have been of extreme risk.

    All these consideration was why Nagumo withdrew, he was a highly experienced admiral who knew his profession and was highly respected by his sailors(a father figure). Only a lying fool like Fuchida , who personally hated Nagumo, started all the bullshit stories of oil tanks and a ‘second strike/third wave” made-up second-guessing 20 years after the fact, who conveniently forgot all the realities of that day, and had no knowledge or experience of naval ship/fleet command is why there are people filled with Fuchida’s self-aggrandizing misinformation about the Pearl harbor raid and the myth of the Second Strike/Third Wave.
    It was not going to happen and itwas not talked about after the raid nor was it planned or ordered or thought about beforehand.

  277. @Wally

    Bombs would have damaged them enough. Actually you don’t have to interpret FDR’s restraints on Kimmel – whatever they were – as designed to do anything more than to ensure that the Japanese weren’t forced to turn back or otherwise to fail to drop bombs on Hawaii. In fact the Japanese kido butai was so powerful (six carriers) that there was probably no danger of that.

  278. Arnieus says:

    FDR’s guilt goes much deeper in my opinion.

    There was a time I would have scoffed at this:

    But no more. As I learn more about the financial elites who manipulate wars against potential rivals like Napoleon, or a unified Germany under the Kaiser the truth about “the good war” seems clear.

    Not so well known is the story of Roosevelt’s enormous responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War itself. This essay focuses on Roosevelt’s secret campaign to provoke war in Europe prior to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939. It deals particularly with his efforts to pressure Britain, France and Poland into war against Germany in 1938 and 1939. Franklin Roosevelt not only criminally involved America in a war which had already engulfed Europe. He bears a grave responsibility before history for the outbreak of the most destructive war of all time.

    Jewish financial elites declared war on Germany in 1933 as soon as the anti-zionist, anti-communist Hitler came to power. As the debt free German Economic Miracle developed the anti-German propaganda in the US media and Hollywood became deafening, much like the Russian hysteria currently. Churchill is quoted numerous times insisting Hitler would have a war whether he wanted it or not. A line in the sand at the Polish border was drawn and Poland was encouraged to defy any reasonable accommodation with Germany to allow access to Germany’s only port city. England would not have declared war on Germany over Poland without assurances from FDR of US support. Does anyone think England cared about Poland? Russia invaded Poland as well but there was no war against Russia.

    To imagine that Germany set out to conquer the world is ridiculous.
    Germany just lost a war. They had enjoyed a few years of prosperity. They had the smallest military in Europe and no Navy other than submarines and a couple of battleships. Hitler wanted no part of a war with France or England which he considered natural allies. Germans are Saxons and Franks at one time united under Charlemagne. No one (especially Hitler) could have expected that France and England would be knocked out in 2 months. Stalin became the new best friend of the panicked banker clans that ruled the British Empire since before Napoleon. As the Germans came within a few miles of Moscow FDR was indeed desperate to start a war with Japan. This would and did allow Russian forces guarding against Japan in the East to reposition to the west to face Hitler.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  279. @Arnieus

    When you want to push a dubious line the least you could do is to avoid factual howlers. Just to mention one so absurd that one wouldn’t have expected it from a school child who could read: “Germany’s only port city”!! Try looking up Hamburg, Kiel and Bremerhaven.

  280. @Wizard of Oz

    Oops! The damned artificial stupidity seems to have insisted on substituting Nikita for Nimitz [interesting: it has tried it again] but you would have assumed that I trust.

  281. @Logan

    I have just received Stinnett’s book and I am clearer about a few things as a result. (Despite the criticisms of it that I found I am willing to go along with Ron Unz’s poaitive assessment of it). Amongst the now clear points is the fact that cracking of the Japanese naval codes had little relevance. Together with the reading of diplomatic messages it was inferences from radio direction finding that made it pretty clear that a substantial fleet was on its way from the Kuriles to north of Hawaii. There is no support for the “maximal civilian casualties” version of FDR’s political requirement but, rather, for a version which ensures that kido butai was not intercepted on the high seas (I.e. in international waters) and prevented from attacking, indeed worse, attacked so Japan could complain of an unprovoked attack that plenty of FDR’s American enemies would have latched on to.

    • Replies: @Wizard of Oz
  282. @Haxo Angmark

    Your a bold man. I read the linked americanheritage piece by Lukacs and, even without considering comparison with the snarky views of an anonymous commenter, found his arguments compelling, and extending far beyond the trivial detail about the female censor. You may be beyond help but others should be encouraged to read it. It confirms my suspicion that the 26th November call from Churchill simply didn’t take place.

  283. @Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)

    it does not state: “Its eight actions call for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Danish colonial outposts in the Pacific region….”

    Danish is Dutch. The Danes are not the Dutch and vice versa.

  284. @Ron Unz

    And now that we have the Argosy Daily Tweet by Tweet from the White House what may we infer about what the the great Tweeter is hoping for from Iran and what he then aims to do? Actually, amidst the myriad questions which are prompted by UR Comments I note that I have no idea of what war aims wrt Japan FDR may have uttered. (Anything known?). And what would Trump aim to achieve if Iran attacked the US in a way that he might represent as justifying massive retaliation and ???? Invasion so as to find and destroy nuclear facilities? Decapitation of the theocracy? Withdrawal from control of its oil industry only on condition of cessation of support for Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas – but how to be guaranteed?

  285. @J. Alfred Powell

    I agree that Stinnett could not reasonably be expected to reproduce endless numbers of documents, trying to anticipate what some random critic might consider important. But when critics do identify specific deficits, an informative review can be encouraged to grapple with those criticisms — to address what seemingly knowledgeable readers consider flaws in the book. This is the nature of intelligent discussion: not to appeal to the intuition of the uninformed reader, as if the critics had not spoken, but rather to home in on points of controversy.

    • Agree: Wizard of Oz
  286. @Wizard of Oz

    Correction. Now that I have done the reading Ron’s retarded step brother J.A.P didn’t realise he should have done if he was to go on insisting to us all that Stinnett should be accepted as providing overwhelming proof of, basically, an FDR policy of following McCollum”s 8 point prescription and making sure some such effective provocation was achieved as the attack on Pearl Harbor. The deficiencies of his article and Comments are so many it is hard to know where to start. But start I must and fire off instalments while my using a smartphone with intermittent WiFi on a tropical holiday doesn’t lose me a lot more stuff than has gone already.

    So, let’s note that Mr. J.A.P hasn’t bothered to follow up Saggy’s reference to Admiral Richard Young’s truly devastating 16 page review #52. It wasn’t all that difficult to find a .pdf version even if copying and pasting from it isn’t easy. And there is a lot of other stuff that can be linked from the relevant Wikipedia article that needs to be dealt with even if you don’t end up, like Young, saying that Stinnett proved the opposite of what he alleges – as to which I take a grateful Aistralian’s point of view that whatever FDR did was good for us so I can happily enjoy the fight being over the honesty and competence of the historians and fabricators.

    No one seems to have mentioned, let me interpolate, the fact that if it wasn’t for an incompetent and inexperienced radar officer Kermit Tyler’s woeful performance there could have been planes in the air and crews at their guns in good time to give the Japanese a seriously damaging response. Kimmel and Short might then have been applauded for their vigilance and effective response without affecting the willingness of Congress to back war. Tyler’s appointment without supervision should have been condemned as one rationally condemns the management that put Chelsea Manning in a position to leak what she did. It hasn’t got much to do with the President for the time being.

    I am struggling with Copy and Paste of Young’s take down of Stinnett on McCollum but, before I take the precaution of sending this, I add the following to Saggy’s quote:


    “Stinnett’s second major allegation is that Roosevelt prevented Admiral Kimmel trom conducting
    a training exercise that would have uncovered the oncoming Japanese Fleet. Stinnett provides no
    relevant documents to support his allegation. Stinnett does quote Admiral Richmond Turner (at
    the time of Pearl Harbor, Director of Navy Plans in Washington, D.C.), testifying before Congress after the war, as proof that the Navy had been ordered out of the ikea here Nagumo’s
    task force was headed:

    “We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed that war was imminent.
    We sent the traffic down via Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese task
    force would be clear of any traffic.”

    What is extremely bothersome to this writer (and to any historian as well as the publisher) is that
    Tumer never made: this statement. What Stinnett deliberately did was to cobble together phrases
    of Admiral Turner’s testimony from different sentences to arrive at the above quoted statement.
    The reading of Tumer’s actual testimony leave:s an entirely different meaning.

    Imagine what would happe:n to a high school history stude:nt trying to pull such a trick on his
    teache:r by making up a quote? A college: professor would be laughed off campus. It makes
    plagiarism seem mild in comparison. And none of the reviewers of Stinnett’s book, including the
    publishers, even bothered doing any due diligence: on Stinnett’s writings. ”

    *** *** ***
    I don’t know whether J.A.P was relying on the supplementary material included in the paperback edition that I have. As far as I can see it wouldn’t be an answer to Young’s criticisms anyway even if he had only seen the hardback. But what an examination of Stinnett’s no doubt genuinely reproduced evidence does indicate is that J.A.P may have been impressed by its volume but probably hasn’t cast a critical eye on it. See e.g. p.315 for sheer gobbledygook. And look at notes said not to have been shown as received by Kimmel and ask yourself what the hell he was meant to have made of them. J.A.P should have and obviously hasn’t.

    The manufactured case that FDR was following the 8 point prescription of the junior officer McCollum – who apparently denied the Stinnett version on oath and doesn’t seem to have reported to the President – I defer quoting but recommend Young on the subject.

    I suspected that Ron had let J.A.P loose because he didn’t want to risk his own credit which, on more recent mysteries is normally fortified by more close reading than any Commenter is likely to match. However FDR defenders (which I am not) and critics of Stinnett must have been slow off the mark and Ron’s enthusiasm for finding wickedness (not hard to find) seems to have been let off the leash in Comments on this thread beyond his saying in the thread on his own article on intelligence that “FDR was not only aware of the attack but wanted to produce maximal loss of lives”. While I adduced that sort of view of Roosevelt as one which made resistance to the idea that Hitler and other Nazis would be quite ruthless in seeking to carry out their subsidiary war aim of eliminating Jews harder to argue for, I cast an objective eye on it because I like to regard Ron as a great provider of enlightenment and don’t like to see his credit diminished by the extravagant or implausible. My initial reply to him was that there was nothing to show that anything beyond avoiding having the US make the initial attack was necessary. However, after reading Stinnett’s book, because I couldn’t care less [why do Americans say “I could care less”] about what FDR knew or how he arrived at the war he almost certainly wanted I simply took to examining the evidence for Ron’s maximalist statement. I found none in Stinnett or anywhere else. (I could quote a few notes which are notable for restraint in expressing the universal desire for Japan to be the aggressor, and even Harry Elmer Barnes seemed to think FDR wanted to avoid Pearl Harbor).

    Moving on as I became aware that my initial enthusiasm for Stinnett’ s book was not soundly based I realised that more was in doubt than the degree of Roosevelt’s possible callousness. He may even have hoped to avoid having to accept an attack on Pearl Harbor by having three small ships sail North from the Philippines into the path of the Japanese fleet sailing South. I suspect that he knew an attack on the British and Dutch wasn’t guaranteed to allow him to fulfill the promise he had almost given them so, indeed, an attack at least on the Philippines might have been seen as the minimum.

  287. @Logan

    My long #291 is a further reply to you.

  288. @Ron Unz

    Dear Mr Unz, I have come out of retirement to act as agent and attorney for the inimitable Margot, fiancée of the mysterious late J.Alfred Powell (as she knew this remarkable man), hereinafter referred to as J.A.P . She wishes to commission her brother Ernest to write “The Short Happy Life of J. Alfred Powell” and was quite excited to find that, by trying several search experiments on the Unz Review – Mobile App, she found evidence of a J.Alfred Powell Archive, albeit puzzlingly, with only one item in it. (Easier to locate his work through Google indeed, at least for a Mobile App user). She believes, after looking at your own treatment of J.A.P’s favorite subject, that you may have been mentoring him.

    We take particular note of your robust defence of his enthusiasm for the late Robert Stinnett’s work where you blithely comment

    “Greer, Judith (June 14, 2001). “Dive-bombing FDR”. Salon. Retrieved 2010-12-09.

    *** ***
    “Hmmm…so some unknown, random writer in Salon said “nothing to see here!!”


    *** ***
    We are attracted by such insouciance to mere Wikipedia slanders and wonder if you would care to counter the impression that J.A.P was negligent in response to having attention drawn to Admiral Richard E. Young’s detailed 16 page review #52 by Saggy. Full disclosure: A quick search “Admiral Richard deceitful” through up a complaint about Wikipedia sources and editing which was derogatory about the Salon article and said this

    “Rear Admiral Richard E. Young

    Several of the footnotes on this article refer to a PDF written by this Rear Admiral and published on the site of a “Now dissolved” venture called “Art Barn” for which Google shows a (current as of this comment) total of four pages, one of which is the PDF itself. Dscotese (talk) 23:25, 20 September 2014 (UTC)”

    Nonetheless there is much solid material in the Wikipedia article on the book, and it’s footnotes, even if the NYT review, for example, accepts too many perhaps of Stinnett’s while refusing to draw his conclusion of a conspiracy headed by the President.


    We have been unable to check the NYRB and Foreign Affairs critical reviews of “Day of Deceit” referred to in Wikipedia under Reception but do raise the possibility that J.A.P was killed by malign Democratic FDR cultists when found to be trying to edit this Wikipedia article which, though he could be thought to have neglected it, he may have been aware of as a high circulation contradiction of his essay.

    Here is what we refer to (and see too #291)


    Reviewers were generally dismissive of Stinnett’s claims, as many of his claims appear to be baseless. An article in Salon quotes CIA historian Donald Steury:

    [Stinnett] concocted this theory pretty much from whole cloth. Those who have been able to check his alleged sources also are unanimous in their condemnation of his methodology. Basically, the author has made up his sources; when he does not make up the source, he lies about what the source says.
    Critical points in Stinnett’s argument were disputed by military historians. His characterization of the McCollum memorandum was not accepted by Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Services and Support at the United States Army Heritage and Education Center, who wrote: “A close reading shows that its recommendations were supposed to deter and contain Japan, while better preparing the United States for a future conflict in the Pacific. There is an offhand remark that an overt Japanese act of war would make it easier to garner public support for actions against Japan, but the document’s intent was not to ensure that event happened.” This means that Stinnett attributes to McCollum a position McCollum expressly refuted. Furthermore, McCollum’s own sworn testimony also refutes it.

    Philip Zelikow, writing in Foreign Affairs, objected to Stinnett’s claim that the Japanese naval code was being read at the time (the JN-25 code was changed shortly before the attack and was not decrypted again until May 1942), an objection also raised by Crane. A review posted on the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association website addresses the intelligence issues in greater detail and disputes claims that the fleet was detected through direction finding; the author also criticizes Stinnett’s use of testimony from Robert Ogg, originally identified as “Seaman Z” by John Toland in his 1986 book. Indeed, Ogg expressly denies saying what Toland quotes him as saying. In their annotations on the 1995 Pentagon study of the attack, Frederic Borch and Daniel Martinez, chief historian at the USS Arizona Memorial, also dispute these claims and call his claims “totally false”.

    Stinnett’s claims of “intercepts” are contradicted by Japanese testimony, which unequivocally state there were none, and even transmitter keys were removed from radios of ships in the task force. (The claim of a need for “low-power radio” made by Stinnett[page needed] ignores standard fleet practise under radio silence, use of flag or blinker.) Moreover, his “intercepts” do not amount to direction finding bearings, contrary to his claims, while his document allegedly showing the plot of these nonexistent bearings contains nothing of the kind.

    “If there was this vast and humongous conspiracy”, its members had to number in the hundreds. Among them would have to be Lt. Kermit Tyler who, on the morning of 7 December, was contacted about a radar contact on an inbound flight, and told the operators to forget about it. One would also have to include the Navy duty officer, who was asleep when the destroyer USS Ward first tried to report a minsub contact, thereby losing over three hours’ warning. It would also include the officer who ordered USAAC fighters be parked in close proximity to avoid sabotage. Also included would be the senior antiaircraft officers, who ordered ammunition to be locked up far from the guns.

    Furthermore, Stinnett makes numerous and contradictory claims of the number of messages originated by the Kido Butai, attributing to it messages from shore stations, Yamamoto’s flagship (which was not accompanying the task force), deception measures, and traffic from before the task force even sailed. Moreover, he finds “not a single one” originating from the Kido Butai after it sortied 26 November.

    David Kahn commented on the book, stating that it had “basic errors of fact” and “tendentious interpretations” and was “an extraordinarily sloppy book”. Examples include Stinett commenting on Japanese code wheels which did not exist, and misreading a date that said 15-5-41 as December 5, 1941. Stinnett also mistakenly believed that provoking Japan into an act of war against another nation would trigger the mutual assistance provision of the Axis Tripartite Pact.

    Historian Gordon Prange noted that Stinnett ignored the fact a war between the U.S. and Japan was contrary to Roosevelt’s desire to aid Britain in her fight against Germany, and Prime Minister Churchill’s desire to avoid “another war”. Prange, the foremost authority on the Pearl Harbor attack, characterizes the conspiracy theory as “an absurdity.” British historian John Keegan writes that Stinnett’s charges of conspiracy “defy logic”, and fail to show how Roosevelt could have succeeded in bringing US Army Chief George Marshall and US Navy Chief Harold Stark into the conspiracy. Another British historian, Ronald Lewin, calls Stinnett’s theory “moonshine.” Military intelligence historian Roberta Wohlstetter wrote that Stinnett conflated FDR’s desire for an incident which might serve as a catalyst for war against Germany, with FDR’s supposed foreknowledge of such an incident provoking war with Japan. Presidential historian Joseph E. Persico found that FDR drafted an appeal to peace to the Emperor of Japan the night before the Pearl Harbor attack, which historian Hervie Haughler said could not be the action of someone who wished for war with Japan.”

    *** ***

    In the latter part of that passage the over egging of the pudding by defenders of the President seems apparent. Unless the case against the Stinnett book is seen as too depressingly strong there might perhaps, in honour of the late J.A.P, be some Unz Review based attempts to edit that Wikipedia article to at least achieve balance and ensure that J. Alfred Powell will not have lived his brief life in vain.

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