Cargo traffic through Russian ports has almost doubled over the past decade (only Corona, a temporary factor, prevented a full doubling), after increasing by a factor of three during the previous decade.
Here is how it looks like per port/region (h/t genby):
The blue section corresponds to Arctic traffic and it had a full doubling.
As I wrote in a previous post, current plans call for an expansion of NSR traffic from 31.5M tons in 2020 to 80M tons by 2025 and 120M by 2030, so that should be another doubling at least.
Port of Murmansk.
The purple section (bottom) corresponds to the Pacific and also saw a doubling. This probably reflects the slow but inexorable reorientation of trade routes towards China and the Far East and away from Europe.
The pink section corresponds to Black Sea traffic and it increased by a more modest 50%, while the green section that corresponds to the Baltic Sea increased by 36%.
It should be set against cargo traffic numbers for the Baltic states, which have stagnated outright over the past decade as Russia has expanded its own capacities.
The Baltics in general have only been holding steady thanks to Klaipeda, which is the main port used for Belorussian sea exports (this largesse is imminently coming to an end). Those ports that were orientated towards Russian exports, especially Ventspils, have seen the most market collapses.
Russia is not obligated to patronize the ports of Russophobe polities, and the Putin government has been successful at provisioning alternatives for Russian exporters, with the result that Russian exports through both Ukraine and the Baltics have been falling.
For completion, here are the numbers for Ukraine:
The numbers for 2020 were 159M tons, so that jump in 2019 wasn’t a one off. Still, it comes from a lower base. The one port of Novorossiysk accounts for almost as much as all of Ukraine combined. Odessa used to be the premier port of the USSR.