I have written that Moscow – not to mention the rest of Russia – remains an overwhelmingly (that is, 85%-90% Slavic) megapolis.
I don’t see the need to reiterate something that only remains an obsession for a few liberal racists masquerading as Russian nationalists, wishful Ukrainian svidomy, and the sprinkling of /pol/tards who take them seriously.
That said, over the past few years since I’ve covered that topic, I have further pinpointed my views on precisely what will happen.
First, I no longer think there is a substantial Central Asia demographic “threat.” Yes, on paper, the number of births in Central Asia has converged with Russia’s. And almost uniquely amongst countries that keep adequate demographic tallies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have seen an increase in fertility rates over the past 5 years (from 2.7 to 3.1 and from 2.5 to 2.9, respectively) while Kyrgyzstan has dropped but only modest from 3.2 to 3.0.
However, at least in Uzbekistan, this is very likely just the last splurge before it enters a rapid demographic transition.
See one of the latest posts at the blog of stranger233*. The percentage of 3rd+ order births in Uzbekistan – that is, the number of births where the baby is a third children or higher – is at just 23.5% actually lower than Russia’s 25.2%. This is down from 43.4% in 1991, whereas Russia’s number is an increase from 13.9% during that same year.
This is a cardinal change. What this means is that over the past generation, Uzbeks have transitioned from the multiple children model of traditional societies, to one where 1 or 2 children is the norm. Fertility is currently very high by developed world standards because many couples are now having that first or second child. But once that process finishes up, as it imminently will – and assuming there is no reversal of this trend – then TFR should begin to plummet.
As it indeed has in Azerbaijan over the past few years. Aliyev picked a good moment to finish up business with Armenia.
Meanwhile, the process of demographic transition in Russia bottomed out over the past century, and the only way is up, increasingly driven by the emergence of “breeder” groups such as Orthodox priests and possibly some religious rural communities in the Far North. Nowhere near the scale it’s already at in Israel, of course, but certainly one can make out resemblances to Bible Belt communities in the Netherlands or the Laestadians in Finland.
Bold PREDICTION: Russia (as well as most of Europe and probably even Japan) will have a higher TFR than the Central Asian countries come 2050.
Separate but adjacent is the immigration question. Although many Central Asians come as Gastarbeiters to Russia, it seems that few of them are getting Russian citizenship. The Interior Ministry maintains statistics on this. Whereas there were 3.5M Uzbeks, 0.8M Kyrgyz, and 0.4M Kazakhstan with an immigration status in Russia in 2020, only 23,000, 12,000, and 43,000 of them, respectively, got Russian citizenship. The fact that Kazakhs got the most citizenships clearly reflects the fact that it’s still mostly ethnic Russian (other Slavic/German/Korean) returnees who must be acquiring them.
The one and only exception are Tajiks, of whom not only 1.9M had a registration status (that’s almost 25% of their 9M population), but 64,000 acquired citizenship. Considering only 30,000 Russians remain in Tajikistan, this means virtually all of these new Russian citizens are Tajiks. This Tajik transition from Gastarbeiters to citizenship has exploded in the past few years and is almost as high in per capita terms as Armenians, who have a huge diaspora and of whom 30,000 got citizenship in 2020.
PREDICTION: Consequently, I foresee the emergence of a ~1M strong Tajik diaspora within Russia over the next 20-30 years, or a quintupling of the 200,000 Tajiks in Russia fixed during the 2010 Census. They might even overtake Uzbeks, of whom there were 290,000 and who will probably double or triple.
Is this a big issue? I suppose if you’re trying to maximize for “white” ethnic purity, I suppose it is. Russia will become marginally more “Asiatic” and svidomy can crow about it. On the other hand, salaries in Ukraine are not much higher than in Uzbekistan, so I don’t know how much of an “achievement” Ukraine remaining 99% white is. So far as daily life is concerned, I don’t see there being a big difference. Central Asians are, in socio-demographic terms, much like Latinos in the US – lower IQ and more blue-collar than the natives, but much less of a criminological or ethnic nepotism problem than Caucasians. Georgians constitute an outright majority of the so-called “Russian” mafia authorities, i.e. vory v zakone, whereas Uzbeks are – if anything – underrepresented.
If fairly rapid convergence to developed world status resumes after the post-2014 interlude – as I for various reasons expect it will – then possibly immigration pressures from Central Asia intensify. (Paradoxically, visa restrictions may actually hasten that, because they’d give an incentive for Gastarbeiters to legalize their status; commenter German_reader once explained that this is what happened to Turks in Germany from the 1970s). OTOH, from various conversations, my anecdotal impression is that most Kyrgyz Gastarbeiters (taxi drivers) don’t plan on remaining in Russia indefinitely. More typical is a desire to make money and start a business back home. Also, sub-TFR=1 South Korea has been drawing more and more Central Asian Gastarbeiters since 2015, which is also something I picked up in conversations and is confirmed by statistics. With China now showing advance signs of plummeting to “lowest low” fertility levels like South Korea, we may well see the main focus of Central Asian emigration switch to China from 2040.
There were some other interesting observations from the Interior Ministry immigration statistics.
410,000 Ukrainians became Russian citizens. The passport-giving program in the LDNR is evidently advancing at an increasing clip. This makes the prospect of a Ukrainian “Operation Storm” increasingly unfeasible.
Hopefully it also reflects at least in part my proposed “31 Steps for the Ukraine” program.
There’s very few Blacks becoming citizens, e.g. 49 Nigerians. 1 Somali. I happen to live in the part of Moscow that happens to have the highest density of Blacks in Russia. There is an “Afroshop” a few blocks from where I live. When I paid them a visit, the female shopkeeper asked me, in English, “What are you doing here?” in a surly tone. Certainly the Indians, the Chinese, Central Asians are much friendlier and speak in Russia (or at least make an effort to). So yes, perhaps even 49 is too much. But you’ll see 5 times as many in Warsaw.
Just 68 Indians. Surprising, given the long history of communion between Russian and Indian culture (Afanasy Nikitin, Russia’s Marco Polo, went to India). It is Poland that is becoming East Europe’s subcon central, them already being quite visible (~1%) on Warsaw’s streets. Would probably sooner have Indians than Tajiks if I had to choose (better cuisine), but whatever.
810 Syrians, and a few hundred other Arabs. There’ll probably eventually be a modest-sized Christian Arab diaspora.
148 Americans. It’s good to have a bolthole these days. Especially since as of 2020 you no longer even have to give up your US citizenship to get a Russian one.
* In general, I don’t endorse all of his analysis – but he certainly has a knack for digging up interesting data.