That said, in demographic terms, I am an exception.
As a young(ish), university educated, self employed (sort of) person, I am in a decided minority amongst my “peer” group, if not the country as a whole.
According to an independent poll commissioned by Roman Yuneman, a Russian liberal nationalist who ran a grassroots campaign for the Moscow Duma and was only deprived of a win thanks to the “nationalist” Navalny endorsing his unpopular Communist opponent (the split in the opposition vote enabled the United Russia incumbent to pull off a narrow victory), some 46% of Muscovites said they are in favor of the amendments while 43% voiced their opposition.
However, do recall that as with most capitals in the world, Moscow is one of the most oppositionist regions to the conservative status quo. Moreover,a significant percentage of the opposition will not turn up to vote, as elements of it have called for a boycott while others have asked their supporters to vote No. So even a completely “fair” result should give a resounding – well over 50% – victory for Yes, even in Moscow. My guess would be around 55% in Moscow, and 65% in the country as a whole.
However, what is much more interesting according to this poll – you can access the complete data here – is that it shows that what has previously been a growing gap in sentiment towards Putin/the “regime” across age groups has now widened to a chasm. While 72% of over 60 y/0 Muscovites support the amendment, only 25% of 18-29 y/o’s do. This is a very interesting finding, and it would be good to see if it is replicated in other polls.
I do not think there are deep ideological reasons behind this; even in Moscow, the typical Russian zoomer is far from a West-worshipper. My guess is that a major consideration for younger millennials and zoomers may be the prospect of seeing Putin, who has ruled Russia for their entire political lives, continue doing so until 2036, and approaching their 50s. The older generations are still beset by the memory of the 1990s and are more at ease with potentially indefinite Putinist stability.