

Tidbits and Outrages

Knight in Tarnished Armor

One of the few Republican Party leaders who has come through the Watergate affair with virtue unblemished is George Bush, now chairman of the Republican National Committee. Last summer Bush even assumed the role of defender-of-fair-play, publicly rebuking the Ervin Committee for hiring an investigator, Carmen Bellino, who Bush said had bugged Richard Nixon in 1960.

It is disheartening to note that Bush's accusation did not indicate a renaissance of scruples at the RNC. His accusation largely depended on an affidavit prepared by John Leon, a Washington private detective who died of a heart attack 11 days before Bush aired his charges. What Bush failed to mention were some of Leon's other interesting theories.

According to Jonathan Kwitny of *The Wall Street Journal*, who talked with Leon a week before his death, Leon claimed that "Watergate was a frame-up" and the "man behind it all is Edward Kennedy." His reasoning: The Democrats intended to use the burglary as a campaign issue.

The Republican National Committee chairman used Leon's charges against Bellino, even after Kwitny informed Bush's administrative assistant about Leon's other bizarre ideas. But there has been a happy ending for all sides, as Bellino was completely cleared by a special subcommittee formed by the Ervin Committee, and Bush's reputation for fairness has remained unscathed. He continues to insist that the new Republican National Committee would never get involved in an operation as "dirty" as Watergate.

'The Friends of Tony Boyle'

Now that the full flavor of Tony Boyle's leadership of the UMW has become apparent to everyone, it is interesting to recall the prominent Washington citizens who lent their names to one of his more charming projects. We refer to the operation under which Boyle kept the miners' pension fund in a non-interest-bearing account at the National Bank of Washington, which was owned by the UMW. This had the effect of taking money from the widows, orphans, and other beneficiaries of the pension fund and putting it—through dividends transformed into salaries—into the pockets of Boyle and other UMW bureaucrats. The directors of the bank during this fleecing of the

$$+ \left[\frac{(\$1,800,000,000)}{2} \right] \times \left(\frac{\begin{array}{l} [15\% \times \$Pa. \text{ Income Tax}] = \$\text{option}^a \text{ only if } b \text{ or } c \text{ inapplicable} \\ [6\% \times \text{U.S. Income Tax from Pa.}] = \$\text{option}^b \text{ if } < \text{option}^a \\ [1\% \times \text{U.S. Income Tax from Pa.}] = \$\text{option}^c \text{ if } > \text{option}^a \end{array}}{\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{End Product in Numerator} \\ \text{Derived from each state} \end{array} \right\} \text{Sum}} \right)$$

By the Numbers

"Revenue sharing formulas" have become lexicon, but we hadn't seen one until a copy of the computations used in Pennsylvania to distribute federal funds to local governmental units arrived in the mail.

We wish we could reproduce the formula in its

entirety, but we are faced with the sort of problem that confronts an art magazine when it has to reproduce a 40-foot fresco on a standard-sized page. Following this lead, we offer a small but representative segment of the formula. Since an expensive computer is needed to complete the calculations, we do not believe that the

armchair mathematicians among our readers should feel cheated.

All this can be seen simply as an object lesson in the federal government's unflinching ability to make everything it touches unbearably complex. But for the more paranoid, there is an alternate explanation. The complexity of the revenue sharing for-

needy included such people as: Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense; Crosby N. Boyd, chairman of the Board of the Washington *Star-News*; Patricia Roberts Harris, chairman of the Credentials Committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention; Joseph Danzansky, president of Giant Foods; Liz Carpenter, former aide to Lady Bird Johnson; Stephen Woodzell, president of Potomac Electric Power Company; and Elwood R. Quesada, former head of the Federal Aviation Administration. A refreshing though remote legal possibility is that each of them could be held personally liable for an \$11-million judgment recently rendered against the bank and the union in behalf of the pension fund.

$$+ \left[\left(\frac{\$1,800,000,000}{2} \right) \times \dots \right]$$

mula was designed as a way of removing the allocation of federal money from the political thicket. But since local governments cannot check these computations without blowing their revenue sharing checks on computer time, they themselves are at the mercy of whoever controls the revenue sharing computer.

What Is a Bureaucrat?

In a recent letter to *Time*, Nathan T. Wolkomir, president of the National Federation of Federal Employees, answered an article charging that federal bureaucrats were too many and too well paid:

... wage surveys have repeatedly shown that when viewed alongside his counterparts in private industry, he is on the wrong side of the stick at every turn.

And what is a bureaucrat? A Customs Service border guard risking his life daily in the war against drugs and contraband? A Veterans Administration nurse laboring to restore the nation's Viet Nam wounded to health? The Forest Service fire fighter breathing smoke in Oregon and California at this very hour? A cancer researcher? The FDA technician whose revelations on thalidomide saved untold numbers of unborn babies from hideous disfigurement? The clerk who dispatches a Social Security payment to a senior citizen in your own family? Which of these bureaucrats would you trim from the federal payroll?

The answer to this final question is, of course, none of the above. For years we have been trying to identify those government employees whose work contributes directly and in an irreplaceable way to the public well-being, and we are grateful to Mr. Wolkomir for having pointed us in the right direction. Unfortunately, for every one of these people there is at least one planner, analyst, or manager who does nothing and gets a larger salary for doing it than do the nurses or fire fighters.

A Dash of Nepotism

The situation sounded like grist for a week of angry Jack Anderson columns. A leading congressional figure is discovered to have placed his niece on his committee's payroll. And if that weren't enough, he also got his two daughters summer jobs on a related subcommittee. The culprit, according to the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, was none other than Sam Dash, chief counsel of the Senate Watergate Committee. Both daughters were employed by Sam Ervin's separation-of-powers subcommittee and the eldest, a Brown University senior, was earning \$657 a month. Niece Barbara Shatten is still on the payroll of the Senate Watergate Committee.

When it comes to trying to explain, it is obvious that Dash has picked up some techniques from the witnesses he has interrogated. Taking the "I don't recollect that at this time" approach, Dash has claimed total ignorance of a 1967 law designed to curb nepotism on Capitol Hill. He has also learned the importance of semantic hair-splitting when cornered. Dash described Ms. Shatten as a "distant niece" because he wasn't "close to that side of the family." As for his daughters, they are "independent, bright, and hard working." But we suspect that the ghosts of Tom Dodd and Adam Clayton Powell may have looked up with a smile when Dash asked plaintively, "Why should my daughters be penalized just because I'm chief counsel?"

ITT and Watergate: The Colson Connection

by Timothy H. Ingram

The Colson memorandum was introduced to the Watergate Committee on August 1, 1973, without fanfare, almost as a throwaway. Sam Dash, the Committee's chief counsel, had obtained it the night before from a secretary who worked at the White House, and he wanted to slip it in somehow during the third day of H. R. Haldeman's testimony.

Dash was asking Haldeman whether he always informed the President of potentially embarrassing developments—and he offhandedly cited the Colson memo as an example. It was a truly astonishing document. Dated March 30, 1972, the same day Jeb Magruder said that final plans for the Watergate break-in were approved, it warned of the existence of other internal memoranda that would “directly involve” President Nixon in arranging the favorable settlement of the government's antitrust suit against

the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT). The evidence “would lay this case on the President's doorstep,” warned White House Special Counsel Charles Colson.

Thanks to Senator Edward Gurney, the Committee's attention was deflected from the Colson memorandum before anyone had a chance to gauge its importance. Overshadowed by the Haldeman testimony, it was soon forgotten by both the Committee and the press.

Failing to pursue the logic of the Colson memo, both the Watergate Committee and the press lost a golden opportunity to try to answer that often-forgotten, but fundamental, question: Why, on June 17, 1972, did seven men burglarize and bug the offices of the Democratic National Committee? What was it that was worth the high risk, the \$250,000 cost, and the amount of planning and energy that went into the Watergate operation? What, in God's name, were

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