


Kenya and Tanzania: DEVELOPMENTAL CONTRAST

by Peter Edelman

In the course of this decade the politics and problems of Africa have gradually etched themselves into the American consciousness. Repression in South Africa, revolution in Algeria, the murder of Lumumba, the adventures of Tshombe, the secession of Rhodesia, war and starvation in Biafra—all of these have brought us to a level of awareness far more acute than it was when the Kingston Trio used to sing, "They're rioting in Africa."



Yet there are still dozens of nations and millions of square miles about which Americans know very little. And among the nations about which least is known are Kenya and Tanzania. In American lore, Jomo Kenyatta is remembered as the fearsome leader of the Mau Mau, and Julius Nyerere, courtesy of *Time* magazine, is known as "an unabashed admirer of Mao Tse-tung."

Even beyond a correction of such misleading lore, both Kenya and Tanzania are worth knowing a good deal more about. They reflect a fascinating contrast in approaches to independence, economic and social development, and institution-building—a contrast which is instructive about the development process generally, and even about race relations in America. And the two countries present an interesting vignette of American foreign policy during a decade that has taken us from a time of American initiative and mutual respect to a situation of disrepair typical of what the war in Vietnam has wrought for us over much of the globe.

Kenya obtained its independence from Britain in 1963, two years later than Tanzania (then Tanganyika), because of the far greater British economic interests and far larger European population in Kenya. Tanganyika, in fact, was never a British colony, but was rather a trust territory which the British administered after the Germans lost it in World War I. These facts have influenced the paths of the two countries since. Kenya has followed a "trickle-down" theory of development—let entrepreneurial skill and capital, which are scarce indigenously, in from the outside, so that factories and jobs and skills can be created in the country for the future. Tanzania, with far smaller vested interests from outside the country, has followed a line of developing its own

economy and institutions, conscious that a lower growth rate may result but hopeful that more stable progress can be made. The two are a microcosm of the alternatives available to the third world, and, without too much stretching, they may also represent different possible approaches to poverty area development in the United States.

Although only time will tell whether one approach is more successful and helps build a freer, more egalitarian society than the other, this visitor had a distinct preference. It began to develop on my first exposure to Nairobi, a most un-African city. Apart from its African quarters, it looks like a smallish, newish British city, with its modern government buildings, its British street names and British-style street signs and billboards, its traffic circles, and its walrus moustaches around the New Stanley and the Norfolk Hotels. All of this would be no more than just amusingly unreal but for the fact that this Bristol-on-the-equator is not all there is. It has Watts grafted on. The contrast between the squalid, crowded, segregated African sections and the affluent, beautiful, landscaped, sometimes palatial English and Indian sections (segregated from each other) is sickening.

Now the questions about the development approach come a little faster. One does not have to know much about America's racial crisis to know that such disparities are dangerous. Is it really worth having the foreign skill and capital there? Will the Kenyans be able to get control of the economy—and of their society—when they want it? They say privately that they can always nationalize industry if they have to—just throw the outsiders out when they won't let Kenyans onto the boards of directors and into positions of control. But it may not be that easy. If, for example, plants are dependent on European markets to sell their goods, which is likely, it may be very hard indeed.

Peter Edelman visited Kenya and Tanzania, under a Ford Foundation grant, as part of a study of community development and social change. He was formerly legislative assistant to Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

There are further questions. Where do the profits go? Some go outside the country, or to the Europeans who live in the country. That is part of the trickle-down approach—profits to the entrepreneurs and investors in exchange for factories, jobs, and imparted skills. Some go to ministers in the government in exchange for licenses and leases and rulings. That is so prevalent in the third world that it, too, seems part of the trickle-down approach—think of Thailand, Pakistan, Formosa, the Philippines, South Vietnam. Some profits go to the Asians who are the shopkeepers of the country. What goes to the worker and the tribesman out in the bush? Very little.

These tremendous disparities in income and status add up to some big questions about the future. And the future may be the present rather soon. Kenyatta has been in declining health for some time and may even be a little senile now. But Kenyatta is still a great man, loved and revered by all, a revolutionary become national hero, become conservative leader. Despite his failing health, his very being holds the country together. As one American expert on Africa told me, "his government is not anybody's patsy." The development approach I have described is a conscious gamble, albeit influenced by pre-independence relationships. It is not some venal conspiracy to exploit the country, at least not on the part of Kenyatta and the other dedicated, competent, relatively honest leaders like Tom Mboya. Even the corruption in government, mild by Asian standards, is, I am sure, regarded as necessary to keep the wheels greased and to minimize bureaucratic delay. With some, it may not even be inconsistent with patriotism and dedication.

But when Kenyatta goes, things may be different. The country may not hold. The Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, is regarded as the likely successor.

He is also the Minister of the Interior, and, as such, runs the police. This scares many people. Incipient tribal rivalries simmer near the surface. Mboya, for example, though bright and committed, is a Luo in a country where it is almost essential to be a Kikuyu to wield substantial power. (Arap Moi is a Kikuyu.) And precisely because of his competence, Mboya is viewed jealously and is mistrusted by his fellow politicians. His effectiveness is therefore limited and his future uncertain.

Another problem for the future is that, for whatever reason, there has been too little institution-building in the country. Instead of putting down roots, Kenyatta's KANU party has reinforced its hold on power by doing some dirty political dealings. When local elections were held last year, the opposition candidates found themselves disqualified, on technical grounds, one by one, in every constituency where they attempted to file. And government programs to develop institutions appear weak. The country is richly endowed (and breathtakingly beautiful). It could easily feed all of its people. Yet I saw severe malnutrition and people with nothing to do except primitive subsistence farming. There is a rural settlement program, concentrated mainly in the fertile highlands on the land of former white settlers. There is also a training program for community development workers. But these programs are neither effective enough nor extensive enough. It was my impression that the government is just not putting much priority behind them. For example, I met one lady who was conscientiously trying to develop a home handicrafts industry among women. She was a government employee, but she was getting precious little financial backing from the government for her efforts. She, in turn, introduced me to the man in charge of developing agricultural co-operatives. He was vague as to just

how many of these there were in existence, and whether the emphasis was on marketing or production cooperatives, or both. When I tried to engage him in discussion about the problems he was encountering in making cooperatives work in Kenya, he was evasive and even flip.

The incipient tribalism is just the other side of the coin of the lack of institution-building. When tribal leaders around the country have not been involved in a real nation-building process, as seems to be the case, they may pull away from the center if they have the chance. And they may get it after Kenyatta.

Tanzania is different. Per capita income there is only \$73 annually as opposed to \$119 in Kenya (the average for black Africa is \$123), so the Kenyans would no doubt say that the Tanzanians are merely redistributing poverty. But my impression was that they are doing far more: they are building a stable society. The country's growth rate is somewhat lower than Kenya's. This is at least partly because the Tanzanian government has placed a great emphasis on being involved on a joint-venture basis in enterprises involving foreign capital. But this policy also means that the economic institutions being built will belong at least partially to Tanzania and produce profits for it, thus avoiding major problems for the future. Tanzania's approach to foreign aid is similar: they will take it from anyone but with no strings attached.

Moreover, Tanzania may have the most (maybe even the only) effective anti-corruption program of any developing nation. Parliament members cannot own shares in businesses, cannot be corporate directors, and cannot have both a government salary and an outside income (one must be given up). The government has stopped provid-

ing Mercedes-Benzes for its cabinet ministers. Senator Dodd, Justice Fortas, Senator Dirksen, Judiciary Committee members with law practices, Banking and Currency Committee members who own bank stock and sit on bank boards might take notice.

On the political side, institution-building is proceeding as well. TANU, the nation's political party, reaches to the grass roots, even the bush roots. There are party cells at the village and sub-village level. And if one deplures a one-party system, he should understand that there is full democracy within the party. At the last election, some 60 per cent of Parliament, including a number of President Nyerere's key ministers, were turned out by voters who thought they weren't keeping the village fences mended well enough. (He was able to re-appoint a few of the Ministers to the Cabinet through his authority to put a limited number of non-Parliament members in the government.) And the Tanzanians are fond of poking fun at Western preconceptions by saying that the British are so rigid about a two-party system that when there is one party they call it a dictatorship, and when there are three parties they call it anarchy.

Quite an extensive effort at rural economic development has gone forward. An early rural resettlement program did not work out well—it placed in farm settlements some city people who thought they could strike it rich and go back to the city, and who were bitterly disappointed. But experimentation has gone on with various forms of cooperatives and various mixes of crops, and one American student of the scene now pronounces it "pretty solid."

The same expert, comparing Kenya's and Tanzania's approaches generally, says the Tanzanians have experimented much more, and have done far more "in the direction of truly indigenous operations." Some of Tanzania's

independent approach is possible because it had few pre-existing outside interests in the country when independence came. But more of it is the result of the drive and genius of Julius Nyerere. He has probably the most coherent and articulate philosophy of any world leader today, and he explains it to his people as he tries to move the country along. Not long after he became Chief of State following independence, he resigned for a year and went around among the people to learn what they wanted. It was a tremendous personal political gamble, but it worked. The nation's unique, anti-corruption program stems from Nyerere's Arusha Declaration of January, 1967—he was determined not to have his officials living off the misery of others, determined not to let individual greed get in the way of building the nation. His and TANU's philosophy and program are also articulated through a party training school, to which groups of local party officials, civil servants, and army and police personnel come, in groups of about 100, for 13 weeks at a time to learn techniques of administration as well as TANU-Nyerere theory. The course includes the nuts and bolts of local government, bookkeeping, and community development, as well as the theory and practice of Nyerere's African socialism.

A couple of years ago, Nyerere was faced with a student revolt against national service. Since university students are the most privileged class in the country, he was enraged. When almost 400 of them marched to his offices, he had them admitted to the courtyard, then had the gates shut behind them. "You," he said to them, "are like a man who is sent out by a starving village with its last pennies to get food, and does not return. For what it costs the people to educate each of you, they could be educating 270 children in the first grade." Then, to emphasize his

point about privilege, he announced that he was cutting his own salary by 20 per cent, and the salaries of other government officials by up to 10 per cent. When he was finished, he expelled all of the protesters from the university, including medical and technical students badly needed for the development of the nation. They were granted amnesty a year later, but Nyerere had demonstrated just how firmly he would stand by the principles he had articulated.

Nyerere has studiously avoided the monument-building syndrome with which so many leaders of developing nations are afflicted. Dar-es-Salaam is a rather old, shabby, sleepy-looking city which does not stand out in any obvious contrast to the rest of the nation. Parliament does not even have a building of its own in which to meet. The only "monument" is the beautiful, modern university situated on hills overlooking the city—hence Nyerere's special sensitivity about the privileged status of the university student.

One reason why Americans know so little about all of this lies in the nature of some of the journalism they are exposed to. I was appalled to pick up *Time* one day and find Nyerere described as "an unabashed admirer of Mao Tse-tung, ...[who] has decreed that Tanzania shall copy Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with its rejection of all things foreign." There then followed a silly article about a controversy over mini-skirts in Tanzania, which concluded by irrelevantly making fun of Nyerere's austerity and anti-corruption program as "sackcloth socialism." All I could figure out was that if you act as if you don't want outside people running your country, you are a Mao-lover, and if you try to discourage the use of Mercedes-Benzes in your government (the *Time* man specifically made fun of the

Mercedes-Benz policy), you are an anti-capitalist fink. The whole story was foolish, and the shame of it was that there were so many worthwhile things *Time* could have used the space for.

Of course there are reasons why the *Time* man had his mind set the way he did. Those reasons stem from a couple of American policy lapses in recent years. First, it should be said that there is very little that is newsworthy about our foreign policy in Kenya, other than the fact that our former Ambassador wrote an indiscreet book which made the Kenyans exceedingly angry. But we have basically been nice to the Kenyans all along. At the beginning, some people in the State Department were worried about Kenyatta—they called him a “leader into darkness” (no pun intended, I think). But he welcomed foreign investment and nothing Communist happened there, so there was never any particular reason for us to get upset.

As for Tanzania, we started out liking them a lot and they liked us. President Nyerere visited President Kennedy during 1963, and they got along famously. Those were the days of Soapy Williams and Wayne Fredericks, both of whom cared a lot about Africa and were well liked in the newly independent black African countries, to which they travelled a good deal.

Then came Zanzibar. Britain gave Zanzibar its independence in December, 1963, and put the government in the hands of the Arab minority. It was only a matter of time before the black majority would turn the Arabs out. In fact, it took one month. When the take-over occurred, many Communist-finders found a sinister Communist plot in it. At about this time, army mutinies occurred in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and the leaders of all three countries pleaded with the West to recognize the new regime in Zanzibar in order to help restore stability. Britain's Duncan

Sandys, having been shown to be very dumb for trying to put a minority in power, refused to recognize the new government. The rest of the West followed suit. Soon the East Germans, the Russians, and the Cubans were all over the island. To stop what was happening, Nyerere took it on himself to form a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar during the spring of 1964. That was when he began to appear as a sinister figure in the American press. Our relationship with Nyerere improved again later, but the damage had been done to his public image in America.

Another, similar example: the Tan-Zam railroad. For a number of years Nyerere and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia have wanted to build a railroad from the copper mines of landlocked Zambia to the Tanzanian coast. They tried repeatedly to interest the West in construction and financing of the railroad and were turned down cold. Then the Chinese came in with the offer of an interest-free loan to survey the line of rail. Nyerere and Kaunda accepted. People in the United States said, look, they're accepting Chinese aid; they're going Communist. The American government probably didn't think this, but its policy contributed to other people thinking it, like the man from *Time*.

Now American policy in East Africa—after our warm embrace of the newly independent nations in the early 1960's (“we worked at it and listened to them,” says one former diplomat)—has deteriorated into indifference punctuated by mistakes like the ones I have mentioned. Fortunately, we have had able, sensitive ambassadors in both Kenya and Tanzania, but there hasn't been any White House interest to speak of since 1963. Of course President Kennedy had a special rapport. His Senate speech on Algeria is a legend in Africa, and he

inspired a respect and affection in nearly all the developing nations, which no American leader since, except Robert Kennedy, has been able to approach. Then, too, Vietnam has taken a heavy toll. It has unduly concentrated our energies in one small part of the world, and it has poisoned our relationships with dozens of small countries all over the third world. To them, our involvement there is what they fought against and freed themselves of when they gained their independence. They can hardly trust us while we fight such a war—and are unlikely to for a long time to come. Incredible damage has been done to our position throughout the developing world in just half a decade. The only exception to this is a handful of countries in Southeast Asia, and even in those countries there is substantial feeling that we didn't have to go to the point of fighting a land war with 500,000 troops to protect their interests.

So we are at a stand-off in countries like Kenya and Tanzania. They don't want to have too much to do with us, and there isn't much we can do for them. Our foreign aid program was always tiny in East Africa—\$15 to \$20 million a year, on the average, in the three countries (including Uganda) combined. It continues at about that level, and consists primarily of technical assistance, teacher training, and the like. The only important capital project is a regional road in Western Tanzania. The Peace Corps continues in Kenya, but in Tanzania, where Nyerere is much more insistent about doing things his own way, the ups and downs of our policy have strengthened his resolve to be independent, and the Peace Corps is now almost totally out of business. From having 400 volunteers—and the enthusiastic support of Nyerere—at its peak, it is now down to eight. The Peace Corps people themselves have mixed feelings about the decline, because they deeply respect

Nyerere's desire to develop his country without outside interference—whether it be American, Chinese, or Russian.

Our policy now is no policy, except that Nyerere is held in special respect by most of our diplomats who have responsibility in the area. The Kenyans and Tanzanians would all like to have Wayne Fredericks back, but if we are not going to have that kind of special energy and effort and sensitivity, then no policy is probably the best policy. Until the war is removed from the world's consciousness, there may be little we can do with any conspicuous success in the third world anyway. We can send good ambassadors, as we did in Glenn Ferguson (Kenya) and John Burns (Tanzania), and they can maintain good personal relationships with the host governments, but there isn't much we can do to reach large numbers of the people. This is especially true when Congress is in the process of mindlessly destroying foreign aid, which, bad as it has been, has still been a force of positive value on our behalf. Thus it might well be said that, under the circumstances, the countries where we have "low" visibility—Tanzania, Indonesia, Hungary, to name three—are the countries where our foreign policy is most successful. Not incidentally, all three of those countries impose a ceiling on the size of our embassy staff.

The effect of the war on our relationships with East Africa, and really with black Africa generally, is unfortunate in another respect. In a time of racial crisis in America—of serious, unmet black demands and inadequate, even repressive, white response—we would do well, just in our own self-interest, to be nurturing black self-respect in America by embracing black nations abroad. Still, even if we have painted ourselves into a corner from which we

cannot now reach out to black Africa, we can find out whether what is going on in Kenya and Tanzania teaches us anything about our problems at home. I think it does.

In a sense, we have the same development choices in the ghetto as do emerging nations. Of course the first hurdle in America is to choose to do something rather than nothing. But once over that, we can either emphasize a straight-out approach of white capital giving jobs to blacks and getting the profit from their labor, which we might call, very loosely, the Kenya model; or we can emphasize the building of new institutions, both economic and social, in the ghetto, controlled by the community, which we might call, again very very loosely, the Tanzania model. The analogy is weak, to be sure, but there are some lessons. For just as I believe that Kenya will not succeed as a nation unless it concentrates more on the leveling of income disparities and the building of institutions, so I think we will perpetuate our problems in America if we do not couple the provision of jobs with a profusion of other programs which recognize the need for the building of black identity.

There, perhaps, the analogy stops. For the fact is that in America we must pursue both approaches. There will never be enough good jobs for the unemployed and underemployed of our nation unless there is a massive infusion of funds from outside, both government and private. If we left the black community to fend for itself, "Tanzania-style," we would not only foster separatism but it would be separatism at a very low economic level. On the other hand, we must also come to recognize that independent black development—black power, if you will—may be the only long-range road to a truly open society in America.

With the "black identity" sense which Nyerere projects, his nation

seems to have a better relationship with its white fellow citizens than do his neighbors in Kenya, whom the whites still too often treat condescendingly and paternalistically. It is interesting that Kenya has felt the need to harass its Asian shopkeeping minority, making it uncomfortable for those who did not choose Kenyan citizenship to stay in the country. There are many reasons for this, but at least one seemed to me to be a desire to take the focus off the exploitation which characterizes too much of the black-white relationship. Tanzania has engaged in no such behavior toward its Asian minority. Black identity, I am saying, is dignity and self-respect and the basis for a healthy relation with the white man. And black economic security is the ticket to buying one's way into an integrated America.

Therefore, if the black community can control the process of rebuilding the ghetto, if it can make the plans and build homes and schools and clinics with its own labor, if it can hold the schools and hospitals accountable for the quality of their product, if it can participate in the ownership of new business and enterprise—if it can do all of these things, it can develop the badge of ownership of a full place in American society. That, in some sense, is what I think Tanzania teaches us. These things will not end white racism by themselves—we must also look to that—but they will erode the hostile, condescending mentality which now corrodes relations between the races.

Tanzania is therefore instructive to us in many ways. But the finest application of Tanzanian ideas in America would be to have the kind of leadership here which Julius Nyerere is providing there. When I was there, Lyndon Johnson was still President here, and I proposed a Presidential exchange program. There weren't any takers, but I think I'll revive the idea anyway. ■

Obiter Dicta

Marlboro Country Woodshed

Representative Frank A. Stubblefield (D-Ky.): Mr. Speaker, a distinguished committee of the House of Representatives is now deliberating the difficult and controversial question of whether cigarette smoking is dangerous to health. But I have made up my mind. I am convinced that anti-smoking pressure is dangerous to the health of this Congress.

I am not being flippant. The threat of the constitutional lawmaking function of this body is real. It is particularly galling that it comes from two regulatory agencies which are the very creatures of Congress itself.

Not content to wait for the House to complete its decision-making, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission have served notice that they will act against cigarette advertising. The FCC intends to ban all cigarette advertising from radio and television. The FTC proposes to force every cigarette advertisement to carry a warning far harsher than any yet put forward.

Mr. Speaker, the two regulatory agencies are in effect holding a gun to Congress and saying, "Do it our way, or else." The overwhelming majority of Members denounce the violent tactics and non-negotiable demands of student radicals on campuses across the Nation. But I ask, are the FTC and FCC pressure tactics any different? I submit they are not. I submit that the breakdown of constitutional processes and traditional practices is not confined to the college campus or the ghetto streets.

I submit that the two regulatory agencies are behaving with the same disregard for lawful and orderly processes as student radicals and street-corner militants. It is unseemly behavior for a group of beardless, middle-aged commissioners. And I think it is high time for this Congress to exercise some parental discipline on its offspring. A trip to the woodshed may be definitely in order.

Dissenters from Dissent

Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) [on April 3, 1969, two months prior to the President's Air Force Academy speech]: The dissenters from dissent have taken up arms again, and, as before, it is not the right of dissent that is objected to, but the exercise of that right. Criticism is fine, we are told—the very stuff of democracy, a blessing of liberty, the true source of our strength—but, as the editorialists intone, it has got to be "responsible" dissent—"responsible" in time, "responsible" in place, "responsible" in form.

That is where all the dissenting about dissent begins. Applied to public criticisms of foreign policy, the term "responsible" usually turns out to mean: some other time, some other place, and some totally different form.

Take this matter of timing. When I criticized the Johnson Administration for its intervention in the Dominican Republic, I was criticized not only for the "aid and comfort" I was alleged to be giving to some unnamed enemy, but also because I had waited until after the crisis had abated, with the result—so said my critics—that my observations were "gratuitous" and "irrelevant." Thus enlightened, I did not wait for the Vietnam war to end before revealing my objections to it, and for that I—and many other war critics—became targets for a rich array of epithets, among which "demagoguery" and "irresponsibility" are among the more charitable. What is a dissenter to conclude except that, in the minds of the dissenters from dissent, the only time when criticism is "responsible" is some other time?

...It is all very puzzling. "Responsibility," it seems, means silent acquiescence in a policy which you deplore, while "courage" seems to connote an indiscriminating, though highly entertaining, bellicosity. Lacking more reliable guidelines for the discharge of his responsibilities, what can a politician do except to rely on his own fallible judgment? ■