show the value of some tensions and suggest a widened role in Africa for the United Nations—"if the cold war can be kept out of West Africa" (as in the Congo?).

Editor-scientist Eugene Rabinowitch eloquently dilates on the possible role of science as a catalyst between rival nations. Scientists on both sides (mostly) speak the same language. Thus though the world "is now further from fundamental unity than it seemed to be a hundred and fifty years ago," science offers a reasonable prospect for a common enterprise of all nations, (would it did!).

Adlai Stevenson and Lester B. Pearson, two politicians, seem the furthest from political realities. Adlai sees the USA and the USSR as two armed men feeling for each other in a dark room, neither of whom "dares put his weapon down for fear the other may not." (Actually, Russia is feeling for our throat; the USA wants out.) Mr. Pearson notes that the "winds of change" are against any war as a method of settling anything. But all he recommends as substitute is more non-governmental meetings. The three policy papers at the end of the book, while nobly motivated, provide nothing new.

To repeat, the interest of this volume lies in its enthusiastic description of what people might do to "relax tensions" provided they got an opportunity. Even here the authors fall somewhat short. There is too little stress on the absolute need for world authority as the only reliable safeguard of peace. There is too little insistence on the need for proclaiming that our American purpose is a free and peaceful world order under law and that we propose to start realizing it immediately by organizing such countries as care to join.

Instead, Adlai Stevenson bemoans "our horrible war-games. . . this gang warfare of a delinquent universe." But fixing up the universe is quite a job even for what Lester Pearson called a "three-day concentration of unparalleled brain power."

After reading and rereading "World Tensions" I turned with relief to our new President's Inaugural Address:

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—[welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation.

And it is in the cause of freedom that the authors urge us to enter the lists far more aggressively.

With much that the authors have to say about the military aspects of "protracted conflict" few qualified students of the subject would dissent. The strengthening of our alliances, and particularly of NATO, the building up of conventional forces, and the attainment of the highest degree of invulnerability for the nuclear deterrent are familiar themes. That we can do whatever needs to be done on a broad front without "undue sacrifice or unmanageable inflation, much less economic ruin" is powerfully argued. "We shall contend," say the authors, "that America can afford to survive and must make almost herculean efforts to do so within the next few years."

But in the struggle for the maintenance of freedom these efforts are designed to bridge the gap until the time when some durable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union can be achieved. They are aimed at reaching a position in which nuclear warfare from the point of view of both antagonists will in fact become "unthinkable." It is on this account that the following formulation is highly disturbing:

... U.S. national and Free World strategy must rest on the people's will to face up to the possibility of total war and their readiness to marshal the efforts that will assure them victory in such a conflict.

This possibility, of course, must be envisaged until, by appropriate measures taken by us, the balance of power has been restored. But the idea that under any circumstances victory could be assured in such a conflict runs counter to prevailing views. Certainly the cause of freedom—which is our cause—would become a highly theoretical concept for a decadent population surviving amidst the ruins of its cities and the destruction of much of its literary, artistic, and cultural heritage.

After all, in the age of thermonuclear weapons we arm to prevent war, not to win it. This would seem the only realistic view. Yet the thought conveyed in the passage quoted above recurs throughout the book. For example: "If it is our purpose to combat Communism, then it follows that our overriding objective is not to preserve peace at all costs, but to destroy the aggressive power of Communism." And somewhat further, "But without the willingness to use force and without the sacrifice which the use of force as well as the prevention of war entails, no major international crisis ever has been set-

Freedom on the Offensive

By Frank Altschul, who is the chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association.

In THE preface to "A Forward Strategy for America" (Harper, $5.95) the three principal authors—Robert Strausz-Hupé, William B. Kinther, and Stefan T. Possony—describe in some detail the methods followed in the preparation of this volume, published under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and with the collaboration of a number of its research assistants. To examine the "full range of our foreign policy problems" was the ambitious task undertaken. To do justice to it "many academic institutions, research organizations, and governmental agencies" were consulted, together with countless other sources of relevant and valuable information. The material thus assembled was then subjected to a "systematic process of synthesis" to the end that from the mass of expert and at times conflicting views an orderly and logical presentation of the subject matter might emerge.

The resultant study furnishes a vivid example of some of the advantages and some of the limitations of pure research. The wide range of the problems confronting us in the field of foreign policy is explored with insight and deliberation. But those who are at all familiar with the wealth of literature currently available in this field will hardly find any novelty in the solutions proposed. Yet if for the initiated this compendium has little to offer, it may serve as a useful text for a wider and less well-informed audience as it presents on the whole a challenging analysis of the principal problems which perplex and perplex us in the international field.

The idea of "protracted conflict," originally developed in an earlier volume by Dr. Strausz-Hupé and his associates, has found general acceptance in our thinking. That it has penetrated the highest level of government was evidenced by a revealing paragraph in President Kennedy's Inaugural Address. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict is no longer obscure. It is not a struggle between a capitalist or a Communist form of economic organization, but rather between freedom and tyranny.
Spying on the Future

By August Heckscher, formerly of the Office of Strategic Services, at present the director of the Twentieth Century Fund.

WILLIAM M. McGovern, professor of political science at Northwestern University, was with Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during World War II; he has been a frequent lecturer on intelligence problems before such institutions as the Army War College and the Navy War College. In "Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow" (Regnery, $4) he sums up much of his experience. A man of strong opinions, Mr. McGovern admits he has been often wrong, but makes it clear that he has seldom been uncertain.

This provocative little book focuses on strategic, as opposed to tactical, intelligence. It aims to describe the ways the larger choices of policy can be guided, both in times of war and peace. The more striking and glamorous forms of secret intelligence—Mr. McGovern shared in many of them in the company of General "Wild Bill" Donovan of OSS fame—too often have little bearing except on immediate tactical decisions. The brave men dropped behind the lines were usually poorly equipped to judge accurately the deeper trends of policy or action. The prisoners who were painstakingly interrogated knew little about what the generals or statesmen planned. Mr. McGovern, who was evidently fascinated by this side of intelligence work, speaks of it with crisp detail. But he is not misled in assigning it an undue importance at the strategic level.

More relevant—and hardly less fascinating—is economic intelligence. The author recounts how an analysis of the sources of vital raw materials made it possible to predict accurately the major lines of the Japanese advance; how on the basis of economic capacities the ability to resist could be calculated, and effective targets picked out. From here he enters a discussion of "ethnological" and "ideological" intelligence; and his work from that point becomes less convincing.

The trouble, I think, arises from a gradual blurring as to the nature of intelligence and the role it can legitimately play. An understanding of other countries, their history, culture, and national character, is certainly necessary in setting the national course. Without such understanding there is always a tendency, especially among military men, to equate what a potential adversary is capable of doing with what he will do. All too easily is it assumed that the existence of power is by itself a motive for attack. Mr. McGovern avoids this fallacy; but he substitutes for it what seems too broad and general a definition of "strategic intelligence."

The scholarly and philosophical tasks of evaluating cultural patterns and assessing a country's national character are so far removed from the gathering of intelligence in the ordinary sense as almost to make the word meaningless. Moreover, there are no intrinsic standards of objectivity or discipline which make it possible for the intelligence officer to appraise these exceedingly subtle and complex factors. Mr. McGovern himself, when he comes to deal with "ideological intelligence," resorts freely to a priori judgments and inductive reasoning. As a political scientist he may often be right. But as a collector of "strategic intelligence" he has neither special sources nor valid criteria for judgment. His most fruitful insights are actually those of the scholar in the library, not of the expert on intelligence.

Attempting to predict "the shape of tomorrow" the author reveals a Congery of opinions with which the reader may or may not agree but to which we can hardly attribute any authoritative sanction. These opinions are supposedly the fruit of "strategic intelligence." More accurately they can be said to be the fruit of observation and reflection, of deep-rooted values and vigorous prejudice. All these qualities, including the vigorous prejudice, have a place in the evaluation of intelligence data. It seems unfortunate, however, to confuse these qualities with intelligence itself, and thus to attribute to military sources a gift of prophecy beyond their just claims.