

the name of loyalty to one's own group, lead to any level of overt, hostile action.

As for what may be done about it, the book itself is the best evidence that something good can happen. Again without knowing it, the author himself has become the example, and in doing so he shows something of how others may achieve maturity. Dr. Overstreet can do this because in his own maturing he grew to identify himself with every living soul, and now he invites us all to share the same identification.

This is what he means when he indicates ways in which One World may yet be achieved, when he speaks of "a maturing person—one whose linkages with life are constantly becoming stronger and richer . . ." (italics his) and when he says "to mature, in brief, is progressively to accept the fact that the human experience is a shared experience; the human predicament, a shared predicament. . . ."

This reviewer does not agree with everything said by the author, but he thinks that the book as a whole is important enough not to worry about minor criticisms. Perhaps the major place of difference is in how much Dr. Overstreet limits himself in recommending what may be done. He recommends much more than broader identifications and ways to achieve them. The suggestions in the last chapter are fine, but the entire content of the book hints at more. In particular, the author's own meanings indicate one broad measure more far-reaching than the proposals actually made. He very much wants adults to seek the insights available today, to achieve the greatest possible awareness of what they do, and he specifies ways by which they may attempt it. But in discussing the teaching of children, he stops short of suggesting education by those same insights. This could be done, beginning in quite early days.

Dr. Overstreet says that really mature adults would know truly how children should be reared. A strong doubt of this may be raised. The most mature of us are by necessity so much the creatures of our own cultures that we must cling irrationally to many of its precepts, even though we know some rearrangements would be an advantage. None of us was reared with the insights we know today as an intrinsic part of our structures. Even those who have learned a great deal as adults, first met the problems of human relations without the insight which would have made the difficulties so much easier. By the time one is grown up disrupting patterns are established. Yet insight has

been a considerable unraveler for those relatively few adults privileged to attain it.

An adult can only imagine the kind of society which would be brewed by a generation reared on the insights we now try to gain only when we have become immature adults. What we can do is promote the idea of making these insights part and parcel of the structure of people by introducing children to them and helping them to experience them as they grow

up. This could be done especially well in school. Children knowing a good deal about human evolution, structure, and behavior would live by this knowledge just as "naturally" as children do now by blind, insightful precepts. Possibly people reared in this way might be trusted to develop a society compatible with human health and life.

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Modern Man's Conflicting Drives

DAY OF JUDGMENT. By David Cushman Coyle. New York: Harper & Bros. 212 pp. \$3.

By PAUL M. O'LEARY

FREQUENTLY when engineers and physical scientists have turned their attention to social phenomena, the results have been distressingly bad, whether written in books or exhibited in acts of public policy and administration. But in books written and public tasks performed, David Cushman Coyle has consistently shown exceptional qualities of perception and understanding of social phenomena even though his training and much of his early experience were in the field of engineering. Beginning with the early days of the Great Depression, he has devoted his attention to thoughtful consideration of the pressing and ever lively political and economic issues of the strenuous twenty years through which we have come. Mr. Coyle has also read

widely in social psychology and in the mass of material covering the now popular field of "human relations" to which sociologists and anthropologists, particularly the Elton Mayo group, have contributed so much in the past fifteen years.

In his "Day of Judgment," Mr. Coyle now gives us some of the results of his thinking for the purpose, as he says, of applying "a crude form of semantics to some of the problems of politics and economics and to outline how they fit into the whole destiny pattern of the moment." The result is a lively and stimulating discussion of positive and negative freedom, political democracy and the pitfalls of carrying the concept of democracy over into the economic sphere, abuse of our limited natural resources and the specter of modern Malthusianism, good economic planning and bad economic planning, and the curse of bigness whether it be bigness of business concerns, labor unions, or government bureaucracies.

Mr. Coyle sees modern man, including the American variety, carried by some of his "drives" or "instincts" along the road toward the "totalitarian ant hill" with its ordered security and its fulfillment of man's need for a sense of "belonging." But other "drives" push us along the road to "liberty" or "freedom" (Coyle uses the words interchangeably). Substantial positive freedom exists only where men are able to "get away," to change jobs, to compare opportunities and choose among them, and, having chosen, to find a sense of fulfillment from "belonging" and being a part, perhaps small but nevertheless important, of where they are and in what they do. "Bigness" in industry and in organized labor curtails the ordinary man's ability to choose, to change, to quit and try elsewhere without inordinate loss and delay. Modern technology and the gradual disappearance of the frontier have inevitably limited man's



David Cushman Coyle analyzes man's pull "toward the 'totalitarian ant hill'."

freedom as Coyle defines it, but he argues vigorously and on the whole pretty convincingly that much of our prevalent "bigness" in industry is not necessary under accurate criteria of technical efficiency, but represents really the result of selfish efforts to twist and manipulate legal devices in order to "control the market." Mr. Coyle does not spare "big" labor unions whose industry-wide powers make them even more of a threat to real human freedom than are many "big business" units. But I do wish he had seen the necessity of cleaning up this situation in the construction industry before approving an underwriting of the industry by a public housing program.

Extremists and "one remedy" addicts will not like "Day of Judgment." Mr. Coyle is too "well-adjusted" a person to please them. But it seems

to me that he has written a book which most of us can read with satisfaction and benefit, particularly those of us who like to think of ourselves as "liberals" but who in increasing numbers have become unsure of just what liberalism is and what it is that we are really for. Many who fancy themselves "liberals" will be taken aback by parts of "Day of Judgment." Its author never makes the common mistake of assuming that anyone who, with or without financial compensation, takes or at least purports to take a beneficent interest in the welfare of "poor people" is necessarily a "liberal."

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The History of Human Whiskers

BEARDS. By Reginald Reynolds. New York: Doubleday & Co. 310 pp. \$3.

By JOHN T. WINTERICH

THE full title of this book is "Beards: Their Social Standing, Religious Involvements, Decorative Possibilities, and Value in Offence and Defence Through the Ages." That seems to indicate a humorous treatment—humor combined, in the nature of the subject, with a certain amount of esoteric erudition. I am sorry to report that I found the humor ponderous and the erudition spotty. Here are examples:

Those who have experimented with a large moustache must have learnt from that experience the difficulties which it can create, as described already in the case of the Gauls and Britons. It was possible that this fact was partly responsible for the nineteenth-century *Varmer Joiles* style of beard, as described at the end of the last chapter, and it has been said that Abraham Lincoln adopted a similar fashion merely in order to avoid unnecessary complications with the soup. . . .

Abe Lincoln's beard. The beard was so important in America by 1860 that Abraham Lincoln occupied valuable time during the Presidential elections of that year by staying at home in order to grow one, evidently regarding it as a valuable asset at the White House—a beard was becoming almost as necessary as a Bible to a rising demagogue, and Lincoln was a shrewd observer.

This business of the beard in politics moved me to spend more time

than I thought it was going to take in investigating the beardedness and beardlessness of the Presidents of the United States. I was astonished to discover that of the thirty-two occupants of the office, twenty-two were smooth-shaven. Three wore moustaches, one sideburns, and one sideburns and moustache. Only five were bearded, and all five held office between 1861 and 1893. The first seven Presidents were smooth-shaven, and the last six have been smooth-shaven. Mr. Reynolds is welcome to this data if he wants it.



—From the book.

Ideas and Ideologies

PHILOSOPHY IN LITERATURE. By Julian L. Ross. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press. 286 pp. \$3.

By JULES SCHWERIN

THE motto that opens this book offers the key to the subject matter: "Only literature can describe experience, for the excellent reason that the terms of experience are moral and literary from the beginning." Thus, continues Santayana, life, concerned with practical matters, is transformed by the mind into "pleasures and pains, and into many-colored ideas."

In literature of serious content ideas are ever-present specters hovering over that which has been consciously realized. Admitting readily that philosophical beliefs have "a tendency to become too abstract," Professor Ross evolved a course for undergraduate philosophers that coats the abstract theories with concrete literary references.

As an intellectual assault upon the tendency of American universities to departmentalize knowledge, this work is justifiable. It is doubtful to what extent Professor Ross explores new territory; essentially a work of exposition in which original literary productions are evaluated in terms of areas of philosophical investigation, the book succeeds in offering a rich tapestry of "ideas and ideologies."

Hedonism, the pleasure principle, is exemplified by such diverse items as "The Rubaiyat," the "Maxims" of Epicurus, "Point Counter Point," and Sir John Falstaff. Professor Ross is next concerned with Stoic Endurance, a category into which are placed all the anti-hedonists such as Marcus Aurelius, Wordsworth, Arnold, Hemingway, and Iago. The five remaining chapters reveal the divergent views of the Rational Ideal of antiquity; Christianity and critics of its ethical distortions, Shaw and Dostoevsky. Considerations are given to the nature of reality, practitioners of optimism and pessimism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and, in conclusion, evil, the "vicious mole of nature," is investigated from a point in Hamlet through Keats to Thomas Mann. As Professor Ross makes no special claims for literature to solve the questions of suffering, he looks for "an attitude of mind, an emotional set."

Like the author of this intellectual survey, we must agree that the reconciliation of "a world of good and evil with an emotional insight beyond the reach of logic" is the province of the creative imagination that perhaps not even philosophers can seize.