



The Widening Gulf Between Mao and Khrushchev

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MAO TSE-TUNG has issued a new Communist Manifesto, a ringing call to all pure Communists throughout the world to join him in a struggle to the finish against the revisionist leadership in Moscow. The hundred-thousand-character indictment of Khrushchev's heresies published in Peking on March 4 depicts the present ideological struggle as one of such basic principle that it can end only by the rout of Khrushchev and his followers. In effect what Mao has done is to issue the call for a new "colonial International" led by himself, which would place primary emphasis on revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The provocative nature of this Maoist declaration of ideological independence can best be illustrated by a quotation: "Don't some people frequently say that we ought to 'synchronize our watches'? [Khrushchev used that phrase in 1959 in Peking when he appealed to the Chinese to support his leadership.] Now there are two watches. One is Marxism-Leninism . . . and the other is modern revisionism . . . Which is to be the master watch?"

The manifesto calls the debate the

third historic struggle in Communist history, comparing it to Lenin's struggle with Kautsky and Bernstein and Stalin's fight against Trotsky and Bukharin. Since Lenin split irrevocably with the first two and Stalin executed Pukharin and exiled Trotsky, it is clear that the Chinese Communists see their present struggle with Khrushchev as a fight to the finish, even if for tactical reasons they invited the archheretic himself to Peking.

What a Meeting Might Accomplish

This maneuver was consistent with the tactics the Chinese Communists have often used against the "imperialists," namely, setting the stage for bargaining with a big push to show that they are well prepared for further hostilities if negotiations fail. The invitation to Khrushchev was, moreover, not a Chinese initiative but a reply to a Soviet letter calling for a cessation of public polemics, and for talks between the two parties. Nothing in the Chinese reply provided the slightest hint that Peking was prepared to give way on the vital issues.

Khrushchev is under no illusions

that the ideological gulf with Peking can be bridged by a meeting or two. This was shown on April 2 by his rejection of the Peking bid and his counterproposal of a meeting in Moscow about May 15, perhaps at the level of high party officials. The Soviet reply, moreover, was uncompromising in its insistence on the correctness of the Soviet positions, and its firm tone suggests that after some indecision in Moscow, the Russian leaders are now prepared to risk an open break with China. However, the Russians and Chinese may have some common ground in a mutual desire to try to set limits on the conflict. For example, they probably both want to stop short of a break in diplomatic relations and ultimately of a break in their military alliance. A bilateral meeting will probably explore that mutual interest, and it is even possible that the Russians will make a few gestures to improve state relations, perhaps by making some concessions to Albania.

In any case, it seems likely that a series of discussions between the two parties will be inaugurated soon. The negotiations could last a long time and might succeed in lowering the present fever pitch. The Chinese have proposed that "existing differences that cannot be settled immediately may be laid aside pending later settlement." By holding a series of meetings, Russia and China may in fact temporarily avoid an irreparable break, but it is open to doubt that they will be able to arrive at a lasting compromise. Increasingly they are maneuvering against each other, seeking to avoid the blame for the coming split, and lining up support from the smaller Communist Parties. Both sides appear to be playing to the galleries rather than seeking a compromise. Also, there is the increasingly categorical nature of the Chinese demands and claims: Mao increasingly speaks the language of one who believes that he must himself take up the leadership of world Communism if the movement is not to drift slowly toward disaster. His claim that Chinese policies have been consistently correct and his editorial on February 27 in the Chinese party newspaper demanding that Moscow apologize to China and to Albania are typical of his intransigence. Moreover, since

inviting Khrushchev to Peking, Mao has renewed his attacks on "Yugoslav revisionism."

THIS INTRANSIGENCE is not a whim of the moment. Mao's revolutionary concept reflects a fundamental difference in outlook from Khrushchev's. It is deeply rooted in differing national conditions and experiences and particularly in differing relationships with the United States. China is weak, frustrated, and isolated, thwarted much more by U.S. military, economic, and political power than is Russia. Unlike Russia, China is a long way from the goal of great-power status. Nor has China even achieved some of its most urgent national goals, such as reunification. The very legitimacy of the Chinese revolution remains in doubt so long as an alternative régime backed by the United States occupies Formosa. For such reasons, which have no analogy in the Soviet situation, China for the past several years has sought to transform its national weakness into strength by utilizing the international Communist movement as a means of weakening the nation that stands most in its way, the United States.

To begin to achieve some of their goals, the Chinese leaders required four things of the Soviet Union: a massive dose of capital investment and substantial help in developing a strategic nuclear-weapons system; a greater share in decision making in the international Communist movement; considerable Soviet backing for Chinese foreign-policy goals in Formosa, India, and elsewhere in Asia; finally, a radical shift in Soviet strategy that would result in the fomenting and support of revolutionary wars throughout the underdeveloped areas, thereby forcing the Americans to divert and squander their power.

The Russians have refused to give in on any of these demands because to comply would mean indefinite postponement of any substantial rise in Soviet living standards and possibly the risk of serious popular disaffection, a greater risk of war with the United States, and a weakening, if not the loss, of Moscow's pre-eminent position in the Communist world. Given the fundamental incompatibility of many vital Soviet

and Chinese interests, Mao will probably continue to be intransigent until there is some evidence that Khrushchev or his successor will give him the support he needs to make China a great power. In this connection, there are several indications that Mao's power position in China is stronger than Khrushchev's in the Soviet Union. For example, Mao has felt strong enough to publish most of the attacks made on the Chinese party by Khrushchev and his allies, whereas Khrushchev has not allowed a full airing of the Chinese argument in Soviet media. This does not imply the existence of a "China lobby" in the Kremlin, but it does suggest that Khrushchev is fearful that an open airing of the Chinese case in the Soviet party could only weaken his hand. Indeed, the Chinese claim that Khrushchev has gone so far as to jam Chinese broadcasts to Russia.

Mutual Incompatibility

The incompatibility of the Soviet and Chinese concepts of Communist unity is another major obstacle to any compromise. The Chinese have repeatedly called for a world-wide conference of Communist Parties and the Russians have repeatedly stalled. The Chinese are convinced that once the other parties, particularly those in the underdeveloped areas, understand the logic of their case, a case which they justifiably feel has been distorted by the Russians, the balance of power within the Communist movement will slowly pass to them. The recent movement of the North Vietnamese party from a neutral to a pro-Peking position will certainly strengthen the Chinese hand. Indeed, one of the most interesting developments of the past year is the increasing support the Chinese are picking up among the Communist Parties of Asia and Latin America. At the recent meeting in Tanganyika of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, the Chinese evidently succeeded in taking the initiative away from Russia, which, Peking argues, is not even an Asian power.

Many of the smaller parties—particularly in underdeveloped areas—are clearly dissatisfied with Russian leadership of the world movement, and this dissatisfaction provides the Chinese with leverage on the Rus-

sians because it raises the spectre of a Communist world divided largely on racial and color lines.

Until Peking becomes strong enough to take over leadership of world Communism, it wants a permanently institutionalized minority faction within the international movement. The Chinese concept of unity, in short, is one in which the minority faction they head will maintain a veto power over Soviet diplomacy and continue to press its views against the will of the Soviet-led majority, on the ground that the Soviet majority is only temporary. To put it another way, the Chinese conceive of international Communist meetings much as the Soviets conceive of meetings of the United Nations—as forums for propaganda and arenas for struggle pending the day when they are able to dominate the organization.

Naturally, the Russians are not interested in holding periodic international conferences that would be used by the Chinese to undermine Soviet leadership of world Communism. The Russians would prefer to handle their relations with other parties on a bilateral basis. Conferences provide opportunities for the smaller parties to coalesce and to demand from the Russians greater support in pursuing their local objectives. Increasingly, the Russians are put on the defensive at such meetings because they have to justify their foreign policy to parties whose interests frequently conflict with their own. Thus, the only basis on which the Russians are apt to agree to the Chinese request for another world-wide conference is a Chinese pledge to abide by the decisions of the majority. Peking is not likely to give such a pledge or, if it does, to live up to it.

ANOTHER REASON for believing that the rift will eventually widen is the recent record. There have been three crises in Sino-Soviet relations in as many years, each of them lasting longer than the previous one, and the grounds for compromise have become increasingly narrow. The first crisis, which began in the fall of 1959, reached its climax at the eighty-one-party Moscow Conference in 1960. That conference was followed by an uneasy truce, which

Khrushchev broke at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October, 1961, by excommunicating the Albanian party in a surprise move obviously aimed at Peking.


The second crisis was also followed by a short-lived truce. It began about March of last year when five of the smaller parties, probably led by the North Vietnamese, sought unsuccessfully to bridge the gap between Moscow and Peking and ended with Khrushchev's rapprochement with Yugoslavia last summer and the Soviet commitment to send a squadron of MIG-21s to India and to help India manufacture supersonic aircraft engines. In late October the Chinese attack on India was greeted by the Russians, after some initial hesitation, with disapproval. At about the same time, the Chinese accused the Russians of selling out Cuba to the imperialists.

Just as they had done two years earlier in response to similar Chinese attacks on their policies, in November the Russians began to mount a heavy counteroffensive probably designed to intimidate Peking. In rapid succession, party congresses in Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany were utilized by the Russians as forums for attacking Peking via satellite proxies. At the East German congress, the Chinese representative was jeered, booed, and hooted at, and the translation of his speech had to be stopped. For the first time the satellite leaders made direct references to China rather than to unspecified "dogmatists," and the Soviet press accused the "dogmatists" of "subversive actions against the international Communist movement." By early January it began to look as if Khrushchev were going to top it all off at the East German congress with a final warning to Mao. Instead, Khrushchev backed down. He called for a cooling-off period and publicly acknowledged for the first time the uselessness of excommunication: "It does not befit us to proceed like churchmen and engage in 'excommunicating' from socialism."

This surprisingly conciliatory move was similar to the one Khrushchev made in the fall of 1960, when the conflict seemed to be heading for a dramatic climax. Thus, Khrushchev's bluff has been called twice by Mao

and it seems clear now that Soviet pressure tactics and intimidation have no chance of success against the Chinese.

Perhaps sensing weakness in the Soviet position, the Chinese at once began to mount their strongest attack to date, which culminated in the March 4 declaration. In one of the most revealing of these attacks, the Chinese responded to Soviet taunts about the continued presence of the British in Hong Kong and the Portuguese in Macao by asking the Russians whether they really meant to have a "general settlement" of all the unequal treaties "forced upon China by imperialism" in the nineteenth century; they spe-



cifically mentioned a number of treaties signed between China and Czarist Russia. This provided vivid insight into the deep nationalist feelings of the Chinese leadership.

No Compromise on Tito

One of the biggest obstacles to any Sino-Soviet *modus vivendi* will be Yugoslavia. The rapid progress toward readmission of Tito into the Communist fold does not imply any substantial change in Tito's position but does imply a substantial change in Khrushchev's. At the East German party congress, with a Yugoslav delegation in the audience, Khrushchev said that it was possible for Communist states to diverge even on important ideological questions. The basic question is "who owns the means of production, who holds the power, and on what lines the state

is developing." Thus, Khrushchev was redefining the criteria for membership in the Communist camp in the broadest conceivable manner. By moving so close to the broad Yugoslav concept of relations between Communist states and parties, Khrushchev may hope that he can eventually satisfy Peking as well as Yugoslavia and all the smaller parties eager for greater tactical autonomy and independence. But the immediate effect can only be to worsen the chances of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, inasmuch as Mao has made it clear that he will not be a part of any Communist fraternity which includes the "renegade" Tito and that he regards any move in that direction as further evidence of a Russian drift toward the reefs of revisionism.

From a tactical point of view, however, Khrushchev's rehabilitation of Tito may be a shrewd maneuver against Peking. If Mao continues to insist that Khrushchev take the initiative to improve his relations with Albania, Khrushchev can counter by insisting that Mao do the same to improve his relations with Yugoslavia. The smaller parties of international Communism, which may assume increasing prominence as arbiters of the Sino-Soviet dispute, will probably be sympathetic to such a Khrushchev maneuver, since few of them care one way or another about either Albania or Yugoslavia. Their main concern is to avoid a split, which would be disastrous for most of them because it would lead to splits in their own parties. In any case, it seems certain that Yugoslavia is now another intractable problem added to the long list that Moscow and Peking must try to resolve. It is difficult to see how either Khrushchev or Mao can compromise on this issue, since it is a question of both principle and prestige for both.

The accumulated bitterness of the past four or five years will not be swept away by a few meetings. Communist China will never again put itself in a position of dependence on the Soviet Union; nor will its leaders be likely soon to forget the day when a Chinese representative was publicly humiliated by delegates of most of the "fraternal" parties. The prospects are that the Communist world will remain ideologically at war for many years.



The Uncuttable Budget

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OCCUPYING Washington's center ring for the first time since 1957 is a battle of the budget—set off this time, in roughly equal degree, by President Kennedy's tax-cut proposals, the fact that annual Federal spending is nearing the magic figure of \$100 billion, and the lack of anything much better to do in one of the dullest Congressional sessions in memory. But as in most of these recurrent Congressional rebellions against the inexorable climb in government spending, the budget cutters seemed doomed to defeat before the battle is under way.

"Sometimes even I get cynical," confessed one of the most outwardly enthusiastic of the young House Republicans who are masterminding the economy drive. Cynicism is altogether understandable for anybody who has been around Capitol Hill long enough to have observed the nature of these periodic budget fights. The high resolve of the budget cutters invariably softens as spring turns into summer, disintegrates during the compromises of the dog days, and finally disappears in tacit surrender by Labor Day. Barring something very close to a legislative miracle, this year's budget cutters will fall far short of their hoped-for reduction of at least \$4.5 billion in President Kennedy's estimated \$98.8

billion in spending for the fiscal year beginning July 1. They will be fortunate to wind up with a cut as high as \$1.5 billion and might not do anywhere that well.

A majority of Congress—almost all Republicans and a surprisingly large number of Democrats—truly would like to curb Federal spending. Congress, which probably reflects public opinion more accurately than its critics like to admit, has by no means accepted the argument of administration economists that simultaneous increases in spending and reductions in taxes lead to national well-being. In a sense, Congress and the nation at large remain wedded in theory to Calvin Coolidge's economic cure-all of ever-lower taxes and ever-lower spending. Moreover, the Republican Young Turk budget cutters are far better organized and far more serious in purpose than were the leaders of the unsuccessful 1957 economy drive, which seldom rose above the level of farce.

Meaningless Economies

Why, then, are the budget cutters fighting such a hopeless struggle? The answer can be found in the general impotence of Congress today. Hampered by cumbersome procedures and shackled by the realities of practical politics, Congress simply cannot do what it wants to do. And

nowhere is this Congressional incapacity more apparent than in the budgetary process.

From the outset of any budget battle, the economy bloc is very nearly stymied by a Federal budget system too convoluted for the mind of man. Contrary to widespread belief, Congress does not approve or disapprove actual spending; it acts on new spending authority, usually in the form of appropriations. And except for appropriations permitting the payment of salaries, a dollar cut in appropriations does not mean that a dollar will be cut in spending the same year.

In the aggregate, appropriations are a bewildering amalgam of past, present, and future. A farm appropriation often constitutes legislative sanctioning for price supports actually paid out the previous year; thus, a cut in farm appropriations may be a meaningless gesture that has no effect on spending. Sums appropriated for defense procurement may not be paid out for a missile for several years; thus, Congress may whack away at defense appropriations with little immediate impact on spending. Moreover, once an appropriation has been voted, the Executive branch is able—in the Budget Bureau's jargon—to obligate, deobligate, and reobligate the money in an intricate game of fiscal musical chairs. Although the President is asking for an additional \$108 billion in new spending authority, he has some \$87 billion in unused spending authority previously approved by Congress—about half of it unobligated for a specific purpose.

All this gives the Executive branch considerable latitude in preventing a cut in appropriations from immediately resulting in a cut in spending. In truth, the Republican leaders are just plain guessing when they predict that a \$10-billion cut in new spending authority will yield a \$4.5-billion reduction in spending. Although Congress cut appropriations by \$4 billion last year, actual spending for the fiscal year now ending will be higher than Mr. Kennedy first estimated.

But the primary reason why Congress finds it nearly impossible to reduce spending significantly goes deeper than the procedural miasma. Actually, the red tape of the budgetary process can be swept away in