

The Destruction of East-Central Europe, 1939–41

Robert Blobaum

ERWIN OBERLÄNDER, Ed. *Hitler-Stalin Pakt 1939: Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas?* (The Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939: The End of East-Central Europe?). Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989.

JAN T. GROSS. *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988.

HISTORY, it seemed, had come full circle in the autumn of 1989. The recent resurfacing of East-Central Europe on the world's political map coincided with the anniversary of a treaty between two totalitarian regimes whose collaboration had brought about the region's devas-

Robert Blobaum is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in History at West Virginia University (Morgantown). He is the author of Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish Communism (1984) and, more recently, of articles on the Revolution of 1905 in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire.

KAROL LISZEWSKI. *Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1939 r.* (The Polish-Soviet War of 1939), 2nd ed. London, Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1988.

Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (The Katyn Crime in Light of the Documents), 13th ed. London, Gryf, 1989.

ANTHONY READ and DAVID FISHER. *Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941*. New York and London, W. W. Norton and Company, 1988.

tation 50 years earlier. The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939, with its secret protocols and division of East-Central Europe into spheres of influence and occupation, may have been binding on its cynical signatories for less than two years, but its victims would be counted in terms of generations.

The central question posed by Erwin Oberländer in the title of his edited volume of essays devoted to the Nazi-Soviet Pact has been answered by the revolutions of 1989. The Pact was not the last word on East-Central Europe. Indeed, in a region that was subsequently dominated by the Soviet Union, for decades the Pact was not a word at all,

but instead one of the largest "blank spots" of an officially-administered and interpreted history. The post-war Soviet leadership, not surprisingly, refused to permit an open discussion of the Pact or its direct and indirect consequences. Yet, even this most gaping of memory holes, though covered with denials, disinformation, and dialectical materialism, could not hide the full and active Soviet participation in criminal conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity from 1939 to 1941.¹

Since Mikhail Gorbachev's public pronouncement of February 1987 encouraging frankness and new thinking about Soviet history,² much in the way of historical reclamation has been accomplished.³ Yet, Soviet historians, and Gorba-

¹At the Nuremberg trials of major Nazi war criminals in 1946, the defense, sensing the differences between the Soviet and Western prosecutors, attempted to introduce the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Katyn Forest massacre as evidence of Soviet criminal behavior under the four counts of the Nuremberg indictment. The Tribunal, however, rejected the introduction of "any new issues" that might have produced an irreparable breach among the judges. See Bradley Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg*, New York, Basic Books, 1977, pp. 104–06.

²*Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 15, 1987.

³For a detailed treatment of the fits and starts in this process of reclaiming history, see R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, Indiana University Press, 1989.

chev himself, have found it far easier to deal with crimes against Soviet humanity than with crimes against the East-Central European victims of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Despite his statement about filling in the blank pages of Soviet history, during his major address on November 7, 1987, the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev continued to defend the Nazi-Soviet Pact in traditional terms, describing it as a wise political stratagem that guaranteed the physical survival of the Soviet state. The secret clauses of the treaty, moreover, remained state secrets, an indication of Soviet officialdom's fear of the potentially serious repercussions that their revelation would have triggered, especially in Poland and the Baltic republics.

It was soon recognized, however, that official reluctance to tell the truth about the Pact could have equally damaging consequences. Concessions followed. A joint Soviet-Polish team of historians was formed to "re-investigate" the painful history of the Katyn Forest massacre of Polish officers. More significant, however, was the publication of the secret protocols, first in an Estonian newspaper in July 1988, and then in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* a month later.⁴

MEANWHILE, with the approach of the 50th anniversary of the Pact, new questions were being raised in the West about the nature of Soviet actions in the territories Moscow acquired in 1939-41. Of the works under review, Jan T. Gross's *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Occupation of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* is especially noteworthy for it goes

beyond a straightforward history of the invasion and occupation of East-Central Europe to reexamine and redefine the essence of Soviet state power under Stalin.

By virtue of its secret protocols, the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was a misnomer from the beginning. As Rolf Ahmann rightly observes in his essay in the *Oberländer* collection (p. 28), it provided for immediate, joint aggression against the European order. The issue of Soviet co-responsibility for the outbreak of World War II is also raised by Estonian historian Heino Arumae in the same volume. Refuting the long-standing Soviet justification of the Pact as a tactical security measure, Arumae convincingly demonstrates that Stalin chose war over peace in August 1939. Poland and the balance of power that preserved European peace were the first victims of Nazi-Soviet collaboration.

As a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union secretly assisted the German invasion of western and central Poland before launching its own invasion of eastern Poland on September 17. Eastern Poland or "Poland B," as Gross aptly puts it, was "the backward half of a backward European country" (p. 4). The eight eastern provinces of Poland that were subsequently conquered by the Soviet Union were an impoverished agrarian backwater, in which Belorussians and Ukrainians made up an overwhelming majority of the population. With a wary eye still cast on Western opinion, the Soviet leadership, following due consultation with its German ally, justified the Red Army's march into eastern Poland as an "intervention" necessitated by the "non-existence" of Polish state authority in the wake of the Nazi invasion. The Soviets also argued that the "restoration of order" by the Red Army made possible the

"liberation" of western Ukrainians and Belorussians from Polish oppression, although this claim was designed more for domestic than foreign consumption.

As minorities in what was defined by the Poles as an integral Polish nation-state, the Belorussian and Ukrainian inhabitants of "Poland B," as well as the Jews living in these territories, had legitimate and long-standing grievances against a state administration whose policies alternated between discrimination and outright persecution. Yet, in the interwar period, as Gross notes, "the material, spiritual, and political life of the national minorities was richer and more complex than ever before or after" (p. 6).

The Soviet campaign was uncomplicated militarily, but there was sufficient resistance from units of the Polish Border Defense Corps as well as from Polish civilians to belie the image, projected by Soviet propagandists, that moving into Poland was a simple operation for the Red Army. That resistance, documented in detail by Karol Liszewski in his book on the Polish-Soviet War of 1939, also turned against a local population understandably unsympathetic to the Polish cause. The sporadic violence of the scattered Polish army units, the civilians who accompanied them, and the Citizen's Guards who attempted to fill the power vacuum in the first days of the Soviet invasion contributed to an atmosphere of civil war.

This atmosphere is carefully reconstructed by Gross from responses to questionnaires later distributed by the Polish government-in-exile to repatriated Polish survivors of the Soviet occupation. To balance the ethnically skewed nature of these materials, the author also conducted interviews with Ukrainian and Jewish witnesses. Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews all pointed to the generally friend-

⁴See Mark von Hagen, "History and Politics under Gorbachev: Professional Autonomy and Democratization," *Harriman Institute Forum* (New York), November 1988, pp. 2-3.

ly reception of the Red Army by the local population, despite some evidence of coerced attendance at welcoming ceremonies, particularly among the passive Belorussian population. Jews, who were especially vulnerable to pogroms in the initial power vacuum, greeted the Soviet army with joy. Most Ukrainians were also glad to see the collapse of the Polish state, although they may have preferred German to Soviet occupation. Many Poles even preferred the Soviet administration to none at all.

Instead of moving to arrest the chaos, however, the conquering army decreed a period of lawlessness that allowed the long-persecuted minorities to take their revenge. Rampaging peasant bands were frequently given recognition as militias, while appeals of the Polish victims to Soviet authorities for protection were ignored. The immediate political aim of the invasion—the removal of the old leadership stratum from every community—was thereby accomplished without direct intervention from above. Subsequently, social outcasts were often put in charge of the new provisional administration in the villages while large numbers of criminals assumed important positions in the militias (and they abused their positions by appropriating goods and services illegally).

For the Soviet occupier, the arbitrariness of power permitted at the local level served two purposes. Not only were the remnants of the old regime quickly eliminated by the voluntaristic system, but the local communities themselves were undermined by the resulting chaos and corruption, and thus their ability to resist the subsequent infusion of Soviet reality into their everyday existence was weakened.

The first, heavy dose of that reality, according to Gross, came in the form of elections to the newly con-

stituted national assemblies of western Ukraine and western Belorussia held in October 1939. The pre-election campaign, although it sought to enlist local cooperation, refused to tolerate any community initiative. Where such cooperation could not be ensured, intimidation and coercion were used to prevent abstention. Those who refused to participate, on electoral commissions or as candidates, in election meetings or at the ballot box, automatically incriminated themselves. The Soviets drew up inventories of the population, which were in turn used to compile lists of voters. These lists deprived even the lazy and indifferent of anonymity.

While the occupation regime thus became intimately acquainted with the electorate, most candidates remained shrouded in obscurity. Those who were known to the community were mainly social misfits or had criminal records. Only a few proposed candidates enjoyed the electorate's respect. Participation in the voting therefore remained modest by Soviet standards, despite the varied means used to mobilize the population. Those voters who did go to the polls frequently met with "persuasion" and intimidation, but even these tactics did not ensure the results desired by the election organizers. Official candidates were defeated in 11 districts and election organizers falsified the results in several others.

Where the occupier remained dissatisfied with the results, another vote was held. After the elections, the authorities moved to arrest those voters who had not been successfully "persuaded" to vote for the official candidates. The identities of these voters was not a problem because the principle of secret balloting had been crudely violated by the authorities.

The resolutions of the national assemblies in Białystok and Lwów at

the end of October were foregone conclusions in any case. After two days of "deliberations," they sent delegations to Moscow to request incorporation into the Belorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics. Only after meeting with Stalin and other top Soviet officials in the Kremlin did the delegations proceed to Minsk and Kiev, the capitals of the republics they were formally seeking to join.

Soviet "acceptance" of these requests created the need for another round of elections to Union and republic institutions in March 1940. This time nothing was left to chance. The elections were preceded by a two-month campaign in which the ratio of propagandists to voters, Gross estimates, ranged between 1:20 and 1:30. Again, terror and coercion were used to round up voters. At voting stations, even the pretense of secrecy was abandoned and open ballots were used. Not surprisingly, all approved candidates scored electoral victories.

In this "spectacle" of elections, the Soviet authorities never sought the support of the population, only its complicity. For Gross, this practical lesson of intimidation and collaboration, in which "all are shown to each other in an act of betrayal for fear of sanction" (p. 113), suggests the necessity for rethinking the nature of social control exercised by the totalitarian state. Whereas existing theories of totalitarianism have emphasized the state's confiscation of the private realm, leaving a direct, unmediated relationship between the individual and the state, Gross focuses on the "privatization of the public realm" (p. 117), in which everyone not only has access to the state apparatus, but is encouraged to use it against other members of society. In his case study of the Soviet-occupied Polish territories, Gross demonstrates how the state's encouragement of vio-

lence led to a privatization of the instruments of coercion. As authority was vested in a mafia-like network of families throughout western Ukraine and western Belorussia, the pursuit of private interests became the principal way for carrying out official duties.

If, as Gross argues, the real power of the totalitarian state "results from its being at the disposal of every inhabitant, available for hire at a moment's notice" (p. 120), then the Leninist phrase "*kto kogo*" is more properly translated as "your life or mine." The dekulakization of the early 1930's, Gross reminds us, was accomplished by imposing on communities quotas that had been arbitrarily set by the central government, thus condemning them to be all-powerful and powerless at the same time. Similar means were used to promote the self-destruction of peasant communities in western Ukraine and western Belorussia. Here, as in Stalin's Soviet Union of the 1930's, the decision of who would go to jail was left to the discretion of ordinary citizens. Gross thus explains the well-known social atomization under totalitarianism as the result of the fear and distrust promoted by a state "that allows individuals to cause harm to one another and at the same time renders each defenseless against such attempts by others" (p. 122).

THE second part of Gross's study, entitled "Confinements," analyzes the various means by which civil society was destroyed in the occupied territories. He begins with the subversion of traditional educational processes and the "socialization" of youth. Young people, incited by the occupation authorities to follow their natural inclination of rebellion against their teachers and parents, were especially attracted to the new regime. The occupier encouraged youth to participate in a

broad assault on the traditional culture, religious beliefs, and family relations of the indigenous population. Breaking down discipline and promoting disorder, whether at home or in the schools, were essential to a regime bent on changing the population's perception of the source of authority.

Mass arrests and deportations were also used as more immediate means to the same end. At first, only the old elite was removed, but in time arrests swept from one social group to another so that, in Gross's words, "anyone, at any time, in any place, and for any reason" became vulnerable (p. 151). The quotas and categories came from the top, but the actual choice of victims was left to local enforcers who themselves became vulnerable as the system of denunciation was institutionalized. Class and ethnicity, in the end, proved irrelevant in this system. Moreover, as Gross points out, the social and ethnic conflicts that had typified life on the outside subsided in the grim conditions of the improvised and overcrowded Soviet prisons. Ironically, the shared experience of a prison system that drove prisoners to the outermost limits of human endurance nurtured the very forms of spontaneous social interaction that were fast disappearing among those who retained their "freedom."

The deportation to the Soviet Union of half a million civilians, along with hundreds of thousands of prisoners from the occupied territories, though known generally to the interested Western public, is analyzed in detail for the first time by Gross. Early relocations involved the depopulation of the frontier strip, the displacement of many urban residents by new tenants, and the voluntary departure of approximately 50,000 people for work in the Soviet Donbas. The first and largest coordinated shipment of civilians

took place in February 1940. This deportation was carried out on the basis of a secret administrative order, yet depended heavily on the complicity of ordinary citizens. With this measure, the regime sought to remove the Polish element from the countryside with the aid of community resolutions. By contrast, a deportation in April 1940, which affected mainly families of arrested individuals, was a straightforward police operation.

A third major deportation, which took place in June 1940, began with the registration of refugees, ostensibly for repatriation to German-occupied Poland or for applying for Soviet citizenship. Ironically, many of those registering for return to the territory of the General-Gouvernement were Jews who had reevaluated their earlier view of the Soviet regime as the lesser of two evils. They were wrong, of course, but according to Gross their decision to return to Nazi-occupied territory "tells us much about the experience of Stalinism in the lives of common people" (p. 207). But in the end, even those refugees who had opted for Soviet citizenship were not spared forcible deportation to the east.

The children and elderly who were among the deportees in the February shipment died in large numbers from exposure to freezing conditions, suffocation in freight cars locked-up for days at rail stations before departure, and lack of food and water on the road. Those not singled out for resettlement were physically liquidated. Again, class or ethnicity did not necessarily determine a deportee's fate. As many as half the deportees came from the non-Polish and therefore underprivileged population.

The fourth and final deportation, which began on June 20, 1941, was curtailed because of the German invasion. Still, despite the reassignment of transportation for other pri-

orities, the rapidly spreading chaos, and German bombardments of rail lines, the Soviets managed to remove another contingent of 60,000 to 80,000 people. At the same time, the Soviets either evacuated or killed the remaining prisoners. Survivors' accounts, attached to the new edition of *Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów* (The Katyn Crime in Light of the Documents),⁵ provide terrifying testimony to the massacre that was carried out in orderly fashion at the Lwów prison, to the death by torture of prison inmates in the smaller towns, and to the killing of weak, ill, or exhausted prisoners during long marches. Gross, whose study is based on these accounts, provides eloquent commentary on this "final spasm" of Soviet state power (pp. 184–85).

AS THE author of the definitive study on the German General-Gouvernement,⁶ Gross is unable to resist the temptation to compare the Soviet activities in eastern Poland to those of the Nazis in western and central Poland. Restricting his discussion to the years 1939 to 1941, he argues that Soviet actions were far more injurious. That Soviet measures against private property were far more comprehensive than those on the German side is not surprising. Although neither regime hesitated "to tamper with the biological substance of nations" through mass deportations (p. 224)—according to Gross, the same proportions of population on each side suf-

⁵Most of the materials in the *Zbrodnia katyńska* collection inform a far more readable study by J. K. Zawodny. See *Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre*, South Bend, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.

⁶Jan T. Gross, *Polish Society Under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 1939–1941*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

fered forced resettlement—on the German side the conditions of deportation and the ultimate fate of the deportees were far less harsh. For many, this meant the difference between life and death.

One saving grace for the Soviets was that they lacked the *Übermensch* mentality, the sense of pervasive contempt for the conquered peoples that accompanied German actions. Still, the total list of casualties was much longer on the Soviet side during the first two years of the war.

In the era of *glasnost*' and *perestrojka*, one may soon expect studies of the impact of Soviet totalitarian state power in the Baltic states and Bessarabia, which were also incorporated into the Soviet Union as a consequence of its alliance with Nazi Germany. This scholarship would do well to take as its premise Gross's theory of Soviet totalitarianism. Although much of what Gross describes in western Ukraine and western Belorussia occurred somewhat later in the Baltic republics and Bessarabia—mainly after their liberation from German hands in 1944—the destruction had already begun in earnest in 1940 during the brief Soviet occupation. Most immediately affected, according to Gert von Pistohlkors in *Hitler-Stalin Pakt*, were the more than 100,000 Baltic Germans, whose removal from Estonia and Latvia to German-occupied Poland came as a "dictated option" that ended their 700-year presence in the region. However, the fate of Baltic Germans pales in comparison with that of the hundreds of thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and especially Lithuanian victims of Soviet deportations.

IN MARKED contrast to the bold interpretations presented by Gross, the interesting new questions raised in *Hitler-Stalin Pakt*, and the detailed reconstruction of Polish resistance to the Soviet invader as presented by Liszewski, *The Deadly Embrace* by

Anthony Read and David Fisher does little to advance existing scholarship, despite its 650 pages.⁷ The authors, a producer and writer, respectively, for BBC television, have composed a popular history of the "chess game" that characterized relations between the two totalitarian regimes between 1939 and 1941. The book is filled with digressions about the major and minor personalities of the Pact that make for lively reading but fail to address the larger issues.

Read and Fisher accept uncritically, for example, the traditional Soviet justification for the Pact, as well as the Red Army's aggression against Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Romania, as tactical defensive moves against a future Nazi opponent. Since they do not consider any other possible motivations for Soviet actions in East-Central Europe beyond "power politics," it is small wonder that they are forced to speculate, without result, as to why the prescience that led Stalin to enforce his control on East-Central Europe betrayed him on the eve of conflict with the Nazi war machine. Finally, *The Deadly Embrace* concludes with the dramatic understatement that "the legacy of the broken pact is with us still," but merely defines the legacy in terms of the most obvious features of postwar Soviet foreign policy.

BY CONTRAST, Gross and the contributors to the Oberländer collection seek to view the legacy of 1939–41 from the perspective of nations and countries occupied by the Soviet partner to the Pact. These nations and countries witnessed wholesale

⁷Even as diplomatic history, *The Deadly Embrace* adds little to such older works as Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939 to 1941*, New York, Lounz, 1954, which Read and Fisher nevertheless failed to consult.

destruction of their societies methodically carried out by what Gross defines as a totalitarian "spoiler state." The fact that no distinction was made between those responsible for and those subject to the public order in a system based on the participation and vulnerability of all led to the demolition of individual conscience. The state implored people to hate each other, but the people also grew to hate themselves. The first victim of Soviet "spoilation" was therefore the individual, now transformed into "Soviet man" or "a ragged urchin, aimless and alone" (p. 240).

The destruction of the individual was the key to the destruction of civil society, the means by which the "spoiler state" achieved absolute political power. Yet, with that power

the Soviet regime could only destroy and prevent, not create or produce. Gross thus becomes the first to formulate a theory of totalitarianism that addresses "its historically unprecedented waste of human potential" (p. 235). The Soviet state could and did launch a universal effort to prevent all association; it could and did corrupt language to the extent that people could neither make moral judgments nor draw independent conclusions. By destroying civil society, it ensured that "no one else could get things done" (p. 234).

But the Soviet state couldn't get things done either. Having monopolized political power at the expense of civil society, the "spoiler state" could never become "all-powerful," as measured by its own performance. Although Gross could not

have anticipated the revolutions of 1989 in East-Central Europe, his theory of Soviet totalitarianism is useful in explaining recent events. A Stalinist-style communist regime, whether in Lithuania or East Germany, could destroy but not replace civil society—the repository of "real power," the power to create and produce. The ultimate bankruptcy of the wasteful Stalinist "spoiler state," despite its possession of absolute political power, was inevitable. By the same token, the first, most difficult tasks of the new post-communist regimes are the rehabilitation of the individual and the reconstruction of civil society from the atomized, or at best, clump-like remains left behind by totalitarianism. Only then will it be possible to speak of the rebirth of the entity once known as East-Central Europe.

INDEX TO VOLUME XXXIX

Annual indices for volumes IV-XXXVIII appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954). Numbers appearing at the right in the columns below refer to bimonthly issues.

THE SOVIET UNION

The "Abalkanization" of Soviet Economic Reform (Note) by Boris Rumer	1
Breakdown and Reconstitution: Thinking About the Russian Revolution (Essay-Review) by Lars T. Lih	2
Checklist of Communist Parties in 1989 (Note) by Richard F. Staar	2
Consequences of <i>Glasnost</i> ' (Essay-Review) by Marc Raeff	2
Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Essay-Review) by Robert Otto	6
Economic Conversion in the USSR: Its Role in <i>Perestroika</i> (Note) by William H. Kincade and T. Keith Thomson	1
First Party Secretaries: An Endangered Soviet Species? by Vladimir Brovkin	1
The Future of the KGB by Amy W. Knight	6
Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power by Hannes Adomeit	4
Gorbachev's Dual Role by Elizabeth Teague and Dawn Mann	1
Gorbachevian Contradictions by Aurel Braun and Richard B. Day	3
The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia by Yaacov Ro'i	4
The "Karabakh Syndrome" and Azerbaijani Politics by Mark Saroyan	5
Kirgizia-Kazakhstan: A Hinge or a Fault-Line? by Guy G. Imart	5
Moscow and the Congo by Mark V. Kauppi	2
A New Security Regime for Europe? (Essay-Review) by Philip A. Petersen	2
On Communist Agriculture (Essay-Review) by Barbara Ann Chotiner	2
<i>Perestroika</i> and Beyond (Essay-Review) by Ronald Tiersky	2
<i>Perestroika</i> in Kazakhstan by Martha Brill Olcott	4
<i>Perestroika</i> , Social Justice, and Soviet Public Opinion by David S. Mason and Svetlana Sydorenko	6
The Secret Police and Soviet Politics (Essay-Review) by William C. Bodie	1
Soviet Agriculture's Halting Reform by Karen M. Brooks	2

Soviet Federalism by Stephan Kux	2
Soviet-Latin American Relations (Essay-Review) by Roger Hamburg	5
The Soviet Military in Transition by William E. Odom	3
Soviet Nations (Essay-Review) by John A. Armstrong	4
Soviet Propaganda and Active Measures (Essay-Review) by James P. Nichol	1
Soviet-Type Societies: The Need for New Theory (Essay-Review) by Ferenc Fehér	3
Toward Lithuanian Independence: Algirdas Brazauskas and the CPL by Alfred Erich Senn	2
The 28th Congress of the CPSU by Giulietto Chiesa	4
The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR Under Gorbachev by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw	6

EASTERN EUROPE

Agricultural Price Reform in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland (Note) by Nancy J. Cochrane	1
East Germany's Disappearing Future (Essay-Review) by Jeffrey Gedmin	2
Eastern Europe in Flux (Essay-Review) by Trond Gilberg	3
Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power by Hannes Adomeit	4
Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989-90 by Rudolf L. Tőkés	6
The Destruction of East-Central Europe, 1939-41 (Essay-Review) by Robert Blobaum	6
A New Security Regime for Europe? (Essay-Review) by Phillip A. Petersen	2
On Communist Agriculture (Essay-Review) by Barbara Ann Chotiner	2
The Past in Bulgaria's Future (Essay-Review) by Philip Shashko	5
Poland: Phase Two and Beyond (Essay-Review) by Christine M. Sadowski	4