

# Negotiating, Soviet Style

by Hannes Adomeit

LOUIS J. SAMUELSON. *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Western View*. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1976.

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy*. Study prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979.

CHRISTER JÖNSSON. *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

UPON his appointment as head of the foreign ministry (the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) of the newly established Bolshevik government, Leon Trotsky thought that he would "issue a few revolutionary declarations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop." As we know, this did not happen. Created in 1917, the foreign ministry is still going strong and is now, as Soviet party leader Brezhnev was to say in 1976, "taking into account, in one way or another, the state of affairs in virtually every corner of the globe."

Like the ministry itself, charges have also persisted through the years that Soviet methods and nego-

tiating style do not conform to accepted diplomatic standards. Many Western political leaders and diplomats have repeated such charges—for example, a German envoy in a letter to his family:

*You can't imagine how much stubbornness and suspicion we have to struggle with. The Soviets don't trust each other, and they don't trust us. Their peasant anxiety that they might be taken advantage of impedes the negotiation as much as the fact that all the substantive decisions are made "higher up." Soviet sensitivity, real and pretended, makes it necessary to handle the Soviets like so many raw eggs, whereas their own "proletarian manners" do not make the slightest provision for such considerations. Thus, to negotiate with them is a real pain in the neck, and this pain has now been bothering us for more than eight months.*<sup>1</sup>

More recently, Henry Kissinger has made similar observations about the conduct of Soviet diplomacy: Foreign Minister "Gromyko's method of negotiation approached a

<sup>1</sup> Rolf Lahr, Special Envoy to Moscow in 1957 to negotiate with the Soviets about the repatriation of an estimated 130,000 German civilians deported to the Soviet Union during and immediately after World War II. Ambassador Lahr's notes and letters have been collected in *Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg* (Witness of the Fall and Rise), Hamburg, Albrecht Knaus, 1981; the above quotation is from excerpts of the book published in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), October 5, 1981, p. 126.

stereotype. It seemed a reflection of the national character and of Russian history." His negotiating method and style as well as that of other Soviet diplomats, according to Kissinger, showed a preference for "steady pressure to the bold move." The style and technique were characterized by a patient accumulation of "marginal gains until they amounted to a major difference . . . endless haggling over 'general principles' . . . innate suspiciousness compounded by the congenital insecurity of the system and the bureaucratic structure . . . [a] profound absence of self-confidence . . . [and] fear of being tricked in the end despite one's most strenuous efforts."<sup>2</sup>

GENERALIZATIONS of this sort about how the Russians negotiate abound. Less prevalent are attempts to examine such generalizations in depth. The books under review represent rare examples of such attempts.

In his brief study, Louis Samuelson compares Soviet and Chinese negotiating behavior in order to determine whether a model can be developed for the seemingly unorthodox conduct of diplomacy by Communist states. In the volume that he prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Joseph

<sup>2</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 789-91.

Whelan provides a survey of the evolution of formal diplomacy in the West and then proceeds to a detailed discussion of the history of Soviet diplomatic practice and Western assessments of it and its practitioners. However, I shall concentrate my discussion primarily on Christer Jönsson's *Soviet Bargaining Behavior*. Jönsson proposes to test assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior against actual Soviet behavior in the course of the nuclear test ban negotiations. Thus, Jönsson's book is explicitly a case study on Soviet diplomatic bargaining.

The structure of Jönsson's book is sound and sets the study on a solid course. Jönsson provides a definition of bargaining, a brief but adequate conceptual framework, and an overview of the background and course of the test ban negotiations from October 1958 to August 1963. He informs his readers that he intends to examine Soviet bargaining at three different levels of analysis: (1) Soviet-American interaction, (2) intra-bloc bargaining between the Soviet Union and China, and (3) internal bargaining between pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces within the Soviet Union. The concluding chapter is to compare the relative influence exerted by the different factors on Soviet bargaining.

This promising endeavor soon runs into difficulties. The first problem is the absence of analysis at level one, that is, on the impact of general East-West interaction on the test ban negotiations. There is no examination of the political, military (nuclear or conventional), economic, technological, or ideological dimensions of the relationship between the two superpowers and the impact of these dimensions on Soviet negotiating behavior in general or negotiations on the test ban issue in particular. The section that the reader was led to expect to

feature such an analysis merely advances a set of "prevalent assumptions about a characteristic Soviet negotiating behavior." Oddly enough, the views of both Western and Soviet analysts are lumped together here. These assumptions are then summarized into questions, which are answered in turn by references to Soviet behavior during the negotiations.

At one point, it seemed as if Jönsson were going to analyze the Soviet-American interplay, when he asked: "What effect, if any, did international tension have upon Soviet negotiating behavior?" (p. 75). Not so. On half a page, he touches upon the U-2 incident and the Cuban missile crisis, saying: "Both involved direct Soviet-American confrontation." He then scatters references to these two events throughout his book without ever really examining how they influenced the test ban negotiations.

Even more curious, particularly for a European, is Jönsson's failure to examine possible connections between the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the test ban issue. There is no trace in the book of either the November 1958 or the June 1961 Soviet ultimatums on Berlin. There is no hint that these overshadowed East-West relations for most of the period about which Jönsson is writing. There is no treatment of the fact that Soviet spokesmen put the dramatic unilateral resumption of nuclear testing into the appropriate international context.<sup>3</sup> There seems to be no awareness on Jönsson's part that

<sup>3</sup> The decision was taken despite the Soviet government's often repeated assurances that it would not resume testing unless the West did so first and despite the fact that the announcement that the tests would be resumed coincided with the convocation of the conference of nonaligned countries in Belgrade.

Concerning interrelationships between the resumption of nuclear testing and the Berlin crisis of 1961, see Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 238-56.

on July 23, 1962, after the USSR had again resumed testing of nuclear weapons—a significant fact in itself, given the incipient Cuban venture—an editorial in *Pravda* asserted that a similar resumption of tests in the autumn of 1961 had inhibited the reactions of the USSR's Western adversaries to the erection of the Berlin Wall. There is also no inkling of an attempt to analyze connections between the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, even though other authors, for example, Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, have convincingly demonstrated that such connections do exist.<sup>4</sup>

ANOTHER PROBLEM with Jönsson's study is the emphasis on domestic political conflict as a factor influencing the negotiations. Such emphasis arises quite logically from the lack of analysis at level one: if "rational actor" explanations are not even attempted, "nonrational" explanations will inevitably take over. In fact, the latter's dominance is clearly foreshadowed in the question-and-answer section, where Jönsson states: "In the West it has become habitual and almost axiomatic to characterize Soviet negotiating behavior as propagandistic" (p. 52). When rephrased into a question, the issue is presented as follows: "Was propaganda rather than agreement the primary Soviet objective of the negotiation, or was propaganda at least equally a means of achieving agreement?" The expected reply is: "It seems improbable that propaganda was the primary Soviet objective of the negotiation," because the Soviet Union "willingly deprived itself of important propaganda potentials" (p. 74). Moreover, Jönsson continues, other studies suggest that what little

<sup>4</sup> See their *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp. 105-56.

propaganda accompanied the negotiations might have been instrumental in bringing about agreement because it was aimed, as Walter Clemens and Franklyn Griffiths have argued, "at least in part . . . at covering the Soviet left flank against internal and external criticism from 'orthodox' Communists."<sup>5</sup>

In citing these two authors, Jönsson seems to have in mind only one aspect of propaganda, namely, that for domestic consumption. This propaganda portrays the "madmen" in the imperialist circles as wrecking the prospects of peace and disarmament and thus seeks to dispel illusions about the nature of imperialist policies. However, in order to obtain a balanced picture about the role of propaganda, one should not overlook that part which is clearly and unambiguously directed to Western public opinion. This aspect was quite apparent in Khrushchev's extensive campaign—at times directly linked to the test ban issue—for "general and complete disarmament"; it was present in Stalin's use of the peace movement in the early 1950's; and it is discernible today in Brezhnev's campaign against the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In all three instances, propaganda in Soviet foreign policy has performed the important function of constraining Western negotiating options.

Furthermore, the strict separation of "agreement" and "propaganda" is not very helpful in any case. Many agreements, such as those on nuclear testing, on renunciation of first use of force, on the prevention of nuclear war, or even on strategic arms limitation, have included "propagandistic" elements. That is, they are eminently political.

Let me return to Jönsson's assessment of the role of domestic politics in Soviet negotiating behavior. There is merit in his compiling and com-

menting on the numerous Soviet statements concerning nuclear testing and disarmament. Yet, disappointingly, he continues to use the very same framework of analysis so often used by others. There is a clear lineup of hawks and doves in the Soviet leadership and institutions: Presidium members Kozlov and Suslov, together with the military, form the core of a hard-line opposition which takes the offensive after the U-2 incident in order to force upon Khrushchev a series of measures which he really does not want to adopt, including the resumption of nuclear testing. However, all's well that ends well, and the forces of peace, détente, disarmament, and economic cooperation win the upper hand in 1963 and triumphantly conclude the test ban agreement. Jönsson does not explain why this should happen after the Cuban missile crisis. Should not this humiliation of the Soviet Union have strengthened the anti-imperialist, proarmament hard-liners?

Included in this analytical framework are some of the more questionable tools of Kremlinology. One is the attribution of attitudes and policies to the military by drawing inferences from *Krasnaya Zvezda*. To do this, one must be able to disregard the fact that this newspaper is edited under the auspices of the Main Political Administration, an institution of the party. Another is "locusology,"<sup>6</sup> the dubious principle that "when the cat is away, the mice

will play." This art, developed to perfection by Robert Slusser and seemingly received as conventional wisdom by Jönsson, postulates that whenever Khrushchev was on vacation in Sochi, the hard-liners in Moscow would take over and change the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Drawing heavily on Slusser, Michel Tatu, Carl Linden, and Sidney Ploss, Jönsson sets out to prove a point. Unfortunately, it is not the one he promised to prove, i.e., to demonstrate the complex *interplay* between internal and external forces. His primary concerns, perhaps unintended, become twofold: to prove the dominant role of domestic politics in shaping the Soviet negotiation stance on the test ban issue, and to do away with the idea that there is anything different about the way the Soviets negotiate. Perhaps his points are valid. Jönsson, however, undermines his case by instances of questionable methodology and by giving inadequate representation to alternative explanations. It is almost as if such analysts as Thomas Wolfe, Hans Speier, Arnold Horelick, and Albert Wohlstetter had never existed.

MY PRINCIPAL quarrel with Jönsson's book arises from the section dealing with his reconstruction of prevalent Western assumptions about how the Soviets negotiate—a section which appears to be a substitute for the promised analysis of East-West interaction and its influence on Soviet negotiations concerning the test ban treaty. In my opinion, Jönsson's presentation of Western assumptions is neither as differentiated nor as fair as it ought to be. This may have much to do with the author's negative predisposition toward Western analysts who have advanced propositions about recurrent patterns and a specific style of Soviet behavior. Jönsson

<sup>5</sup> Jönsson (pp. 52-53, 74-75) refers to Clemens and Griffiths, "The Soviet Position on Arms Control and Disarmament: Negotiations and Propaganda, 1954-1964," Research Paper, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965.

<sup>6</sup> This is the criticism Arnold L. Horelick, A. Ross Johnson, and John D. Steinbruner make of Robert Slusser's *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961*, Baltimore, MD, and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; see their research paper, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, December 1973, p. 44.

calls this a “mystifying tendency” (p. 77). Among these analysts he counts scholars and diplomats of quite diverse views, including George Kennan, Stephen Kertesz, Philip Mosely, Nathan Leites, Dean Acheson, W. Hayter, Fred Iklé, Richard Pipes, and Vernon Aspaturian (p. 220, fn. 1). Notwithstanding their diversity and the fact that they may have been writing about specific diplomatic instances occurring during any one of four different eras of Soviet policy (under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev), Jönsson states:

*The Western view of Soviet negotiating behavior shows a high degree of consistency. First, there seems to be considerable consensus among Western observers. This can in part be explained by the fact that they apparently draw heavily on each other as can be seen from the frequent references to each other’s works. Second, the set of assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior discussed in the previous sections displays a considerable degree of internal consistency. They all add up to a picture of Soviet inflexibility.* (p. 54)

It would be interesting to discover whether any of Jönsson’s scholars and diplomats actually hold such a view or subscribe to the related assumption that “compromise is excluded from Soviet expectations of outcome” (p. 44). They could not possibly if they—as some of them do—regard Soviet negotiating techniques and operational principles as more or less a continuation of the Bolshevik tradition. Or if they have read—as most of them surely have—Lenin’s *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* or his *“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder*. Or if they have pondered the lessons to be drawn about Soviet diplomacy from the negotiations

leading to the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918.

Contrary to what Jönsson would have us believe, “the Western view,” to the extent that it exists, posits the necessity of drawing distinctions between strategy and tactics in Soviet foreign policy, between long-range objectives and day-to-day business, and between goals and their implementation. It also encompasses the notion that Soviet strategy and long-range goals have been fairly constant while the pursuit of these goals—by negotiations or other means—has been characterized by flexibility, pragmatism, and even opportunism.

Since Pipes, together with Mosely and Kertesz, is used by Jönsson as one of the star witnesses for “the Western view” that Soviet negotiating tactics are rigid and inflexible and that compromise is excluded from Soviet expectations of outcome, it may be useful to read what Pipes actually does say:

*Frustrations experienced in negotiating with Communists derive from the fact that the latter often engage in talks in order not to reach an agreement but to attain some other, incidental objective, such as ascertaining how strong is their opponents’ determination on a given issue, splitting hostile alliances, or influencing world opinion. When they intend to use negotiations in this manner, Communist diplomats indeed display an intransigence which can be mollified only by full acceptance of their terms. . . .*<sup>7</sup>

In other words, it depends on the international circumstances and the objectives to be pursued whether Soviet diplomats are using intransigence as a tool or not. On the other hand; “Whenever they are interested in a settlement, Communist diplomats act in a traditional manner, efficiently and undeterred by

difficulties.<sup>8</sup> There is no need to belabor this point further.

Another Western observation or assumption, one that is indeed widely shared, is that suspicion is deeply engrained in the Russian psychological makeup and influences Soviet negotiating behavior. However, Jönsson’s rephrasing of the problem into the following question—“Were Soviet expectations of U.S. behavior invariably characterized by suspicion and anticipated hostility?”—makes the issue disappear as if by sleight of hand. Hardly anyone is *invariably* clever, stupid, silly, or suspicious. Hence, the answer is foreordained: The Russians, contrary to what the Western analysts say, are not invariably suspicious. “In short, Soviet expectations of U.S. behavior were not unchanging over time. Neither were they characterized exclusively by suspicion and anticipated hostility” (p. 60).

ONE OF THE REASONS why Jönsson’s reconstruction of prevalent Western assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior must remain unconvincing may have something to do with the fact that almost all the observations by Western diplomats and scholars which he quotes apply to or were written in the 1940’s and 1950’s. They were, thus, appraisals of Soviet wartime and cold war diplomacy. This is a problem of which Louis Samuelson, in his booklet *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior*, is at least conscious. He writes:

<sup>7</sup> Richard Pipes, “Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy,” memorandum prepared for US Senate, Committee on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* Although Jönsson does quote this latter observation by Pipes (p. 77), he does not draw any conclusions from it for his assertion of “considerable consensus” and “internal consistency” of views among Western analysts about Soviet “inflexibility.”

Indeed, much of what appears in the present study represents western attitudes and perceptions formulated during that time of overt East-West political hostility; and it is recognized that if the writers of that period . . . were to reevaluate their work in view of contemporary political conditions, many might choose to revise their views. (p. 55, fn. 2)

Being aware of the problem, Samuelson does at times provide some hints and clues about differences in the Western view and about changes in Soviet (and mutatis mutandis, Chinese) negotiating behavior. This can be seen, for instance, when he writes: "Negotiations are most properly viewed as dynamic processes wherein the choice of methods does not remain static, but is subject to important forces of change." Such forces include changes of leadership, e.g., from Stalin to Khrushchev, or changes in international conditions, e.g., from cold war to détente (pp. 7-9).

Whereas Samuelson limits himself to hints and clues about changes in Soviet negotiating behavior and Western perceptions, Joseph Whelan deals quite extensively with this problem in his voluminous study, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior*. He does so by assembling an impressive number of case illustrations, ranging from Soviet negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in 1917-18 to Genoa in 1922; from the negotiations for collective security against Nazi Germany in the 1930's to the establishment of the postwar international order at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam; from the management of the East-West confrontations such as the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis in the era of the cold war to cooperation in the era of détente with the adversary superpower, as shown mainly by SALT I. In the proc-

ess, he provides assessments—his own and those of contemporaries—of the major figures in the evolution of Soviet diplomacy: party leaders as well as commissars and ministers of foreign affairs (Trotsky, G. V. Chicherin, M. Litvinov, V. M. Molotov, and A. Gromyko) and other Soviet diplomats and negotiators (A. Dobrynin, V. V. Kuznetsov, V. S. Semënov, N. V. Ogarkov, and L. V. Smirnov). This is indeed a very commendable job of compilation as well as analysis.

What emerges from Whelan's material, vividly and clearly, is that changes have taken place over time, both in the institutional setting and in the style of Soviet negotiation. There is today a greater degree of professionalization and sophistication of Soviet diplomats and negotiators. In recognition of the increasing complexity of international issues, there is a much greater input and sometimes participation by experts from the various international relations institutes at the USSR Academy of Sciences in the preparation and evaluation of Soviet negotiating positions. In contrast to the rough-and-tumble in-fighting, abuse, distortion, crude deception, rude behavior, and shock tactics of the past, there are approaches that are more and more polished, polite, and "businesslike." Compromise, even more than in the past, seems to be regarded by the Soviet leadership as a necessary and useful tool of foreign policy. And there appears to be a greater Soviet readiness to look for possible agreements on a broader range of issues than in the past.

It is tempting, on the basis of this evolution, to agree with Jönsson after all and to dismiss the idea of a specific, unique Soviet negotiating style as a "mystifying tendency." Whelan, too, concludes that "there is no single comprehensive style in [Soviet] diplomacy and negotiations,

but rather a behavior that is generally adapted to the specific needs of the times," e.g., unmitigated hostility toward the Western powers in the periods of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the cold war, or calculated conciliation during the wartime Grand Alliance and the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era of peaceful coexistence and détente (p. 521).

Nonetheless, Whelan's study also notes that this temptation should be resisted, since "certain characteristics . . . are common to all eras" of Soviet diplomacy and are "enduring" (p. 521). Among them are:

- a strong sense of realism, which Soviet negotiators demand of themselves and respect in others;
- toughness, i.e., the attempt by Soviet negotiators to take what they can get and then demand more;
- the distrust of agreements and understandings based on goodwill rather than on the balance of forces and interests;
- the view that negotiation at the conference table is but one aspect of a broad bargaining process that often necessitates the use of a variety of supplementary instrumentalities, including military maneuvers, threats, the launching of peace campaigns, and the mobilization of "progressive forces" to exert pressure on opposing governments and negotiators;
- secrecy, more specifically, the disinclination to provide information conducive to the speedy conclusion of agreements or to facilitating the course of future negotiations (e.g., the refusal to provide reliable statistics on agricultural output, on the production rates and probable depletion of oil and gas fields, and on weapons expenditures, deployment, and programs);
- the tendency—a corollary to secrecy—to let the other side take the initiative and offer proposals, thus to encourage it to reveal its

plans and dispositions, and possibly to confuse it to the point of bringing on a process of "self-negotiation."

WHELAN'S conclusions also throw some light on the purposes and, as Soviet analysts would put it, the "motive forces" behind Soviet negotiations. Among them is a relentless accumulation of power, notably military power. In all arms control negotiations so far, the Soviets have allotted an important role to the military establishment and to military rationales. They have done so, it would appear, as an integral part of their attempt to establish, as the current jargon has it, "escalation dominance" at every level of the East-West military balance—conventional, theater nuclear, strategic nuclear—and to gain the ability to project power along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass.

Another "motive force" is ideology, and the constraints set by the Soviet system, a point on which many observers agree. Kissinger

has suggested there can be "no doubt [that] the Soviet system shaped Gromyko's style."<sup>9</sup> US Ambassador Jacob Beam has commented that negotiating with the Russians is "always unpleasant" or at least "mostly unpleasant" since they "antagonize you right away when they start out; they try to put you on the defensive right away" (Whelan, p. 50). This is, of course, not surprising since Soviet ideology posits the existence of an unbridgeable, "antagonist" relationship between two radically opposed social and economic systems and requires constant initiative so as not to be left behind and thrown upon the proverbial "rubbish heap of history." Probably for the same reason, Helmut Sonnenfeldt has observed that when negotiating with the Russians "you do not ever have the sense of the degree of comity, commonality of approach; there is always a strong

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<sup>9</sup> Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 790.

residue, and more than a residue, of antagonism so that you recognize that by and large negotiations with the Soviets are adversary proceedings" (*ibid.*, p. 507).

The determined Soviet effort to gain military advantages despite (or perhaps with the aid of?) arms control negotiations and the perceived lack of a basic commonality of approach ought to serve as a necessary reminder not to pay too much attention to the form—the techniques and style—of Soviet negotiating behavior, important and interesting though the subject may be. Matters of content, that is, the possible reasons for such behavior, the meaning of Soviet proposals and counterproposals, and the likely goals such proposals are meant to achieve, must ultimately take precedence in any analysis of Soviet foreign policy. After all, polite manners, professional competence, and occasional concessions do not add up to a qualitative difference in the substance of Soviet policies.

# The Politics of Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe

by Jacques Rupnik

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. *East European Economic Assessment*, 2 Parts. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981.

NATO, ECONOMICS and INFORMATION DIRECTORATES, Eds. *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Prospects for the 1980's: Colloquium, 16-18 April 1980, Brussels*. New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980.

EGON NEUBERGER and LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, Eds. *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. New York and Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1980.

AT THE TIME of the great depression of the 1930's, the Soviet economy—whatever its other problems—found itself effectively insulated from the disruptions of the international market by Stalin's "socialism in one country." By contrast, the international economic crisis of the 1970's has revealed a "parallel" and to some extent related economic crisis in the Soviet bloc, particularly among its East European components. This development raises a number of intriguing questions of economic and, perhaps even more important, political analysis.

Coming a decade after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia had put an end to the theories of "convergence" popular in the 1960's, the crisis suggests a remarkable degree of interdependence between the economies of Eastern and Western Europe, or at the very least a common vulnerability to similar phenomena. The difficult task is to assess the degree to which dislocations in the East European economies can be attributed to this mutual dependence on the international economic environment and the degree to which they have specific indigenous sources.

The three volumes under review provide considerable information for examining this issue. The first two collections—the one assembled under the aegis of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress (hereafter, *JEC*) and the other compiled for the Economics Directorate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, *NATO*)—offer surveys of domestic economic trends and policies in individual East European states. The volume edited by Egon Neuberger and Laura D'Andrea Tyson provides a fruitful complement,<sup>1</sup> addressing the critical question of whether international

<sup>1</sup> This complementarity is further evident in the considerable overlap among the contributors to the three collections.

economic disturbances have been transmitted to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and if so, how. The work is the most comprehensive and theoretically elaborate attempt yet to address this subject.

THE SIGNS of crisis in Eastern Europe are unmistakable. The combined average annual rate of economic growth (in GNP) of the European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) has dropped from 10 percent in the 1950's, to about 7 percent in the 1960's and to less than 5 percent in the 1970's, and forecasts for the early 1980's are extremely gloomy (at best, half the rate of growth of the last decade).<sup>2</sup>

While performance to date might seem "adequate to excellent" by international standards, as John P. Hardt suggests in his introduction to the *JEC* volume, it is certainly not viewed that way by either the ruling elites or the populations of Eastern Europe. Economies historically geared to achieving growth at all costs are now moving

<sup>2</sup> For assessment of economic performance in the 1970's, see Paul Marer in *JEC*, Part 1, p. 35; and "Comecon's Widening Gap Between Plan and Reality," *The Economist* (London), May 29, 1982.