

The second stabilizing possibility may be stimulated by the economic reforms. Awareness of the importance of maintaining an unofficial coalition with other republics to forestall undue Serbian influence in the federation may, in the future, have the felicitous effect of prodding the richer republics (Slovenia and Croatia) to help the poorer ones (Macedonia and Bosnia). Since 1965 there have been reports of Croatian money moving into Macedonia. And Slovenia, which needs migrant Macedonians to fill unskilled and semi-skilled positions in the labor force, and which has not treated them hospitably in the past, is taking measures to improve their living conditions.

* * *

To sum up, the failure of the reforms would be a bitter disappointment for the Yugoslavs, throwing into precarious condition their international prestige, their influence, and the prospects for a peaceful and less authoritarian evolution of their "opening society." But failure and success—in this

instance—are relative terms. Wisely, there has been no attempt to project an exact definition of what would constitute a successful prosecution of the reform program; in fact, those who drafted the blueprints have allowed for lesser achievements, and no one knows when or where the limits of experimentation will be drawn. Rather what is taking place is a process of change from an old course—and from old forms and procedures—to new ones, and progress is expected to be uneven.

The Yugoslavs refer to the economic reforms as another revolution, as portentous for the system as was the introduction of workers' councils in 1950. The Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists has reaffirmed its commitment to the democratization of Yugoslav life and institutions, in the area of political relationships as well as in the economic sphere. Whatever the outcome, there can no longer be any serious question of the sincerity of this commitment, as Yugoslavia continues to pioneer its way toward a viable, less confining socialism.

Dogmas Under Attack: A Traveler's Report

By Dimitry Pospelovsky

When one travels through Yugoslavia today and sees the changes that are taking place there from year to year, the unmistakable impression one gets is that the country is moving toward an ever

Formerly with the BBC External Service in London, Mr. Pospelovsky is now a specialist on the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia for the Hoover Institution's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. He has contributed previously to Osteuropa (Stuttgart) and Survey (London).

greater dependence on private enterprise. This evolution is likely to continue unless some sufficiently powerful ultrareactionary force within the Yugoslav Communist League should reverse the trend. The latter possibility, however, seems to rule itself out by the simple question: Could Yugoslavia afford a renationalization, resocialization, and recentralization of its economy? Whereas the Soviet Union has managed to struggle along for nearly forty years (since the liquidation of the New Economic Policy) despite the utter wastefulness and

inflexibility of its centralized, planned economy, Yugoslavia, with far less natural wealth, cannot afford such a handicap. It can hardly be doubted that, besides the factor of Western pressure after Yugoslavia had been thrown out of the Cominform and become dependent on Western help, one of the principal reasons that led the country to turn away from the Stalinist economic pattern towards greater pragmatism was the simple fact that Yugoslavia was too poor to go it alone in applying the irrational and wasteful Stalinist economic prescriptions. The process of economic liberalization, however, has been very slow, uneven, and constantly frustrated by the party bureaucracy, with its centralist legacy and instinctive fear of any form of autonomous force in society. The process is by no means complete. And in some ways the frustrating effects of the Marxist-Leninist ideology are more obvious now than ever before, as Yugoslavia approaches the point of some "either or" decisions.

Rise of Private Enterprise

One ironic aspect of the present Yugoslav economic situation is the fact that the country's Communist regime finds itself dependent to a great extent, as far as foreign-currency inflow is concerned, on the private sector. The chief single source of foreign currency is tourism. And with the expansion of tourism, and the hope of expanding it even further, the Yugoslav state has been forced to rely more and more on the private sector and to allow its expansion, thus tacitly—and sometimes even explicitly—admitting that the nationalized sector lacks the flexibility demanded by the tourist industry. It is an innovation, for instance, that the state tourist agencies now display signs saying, "We also provide rooms in private houses." In fact, in a number of government tourist agencies, this author was actually advised by the clerk *not* to take a room in a state-run hotel. "You get much less for your money, and the service is bad and slow," I was told. "Better take a room with private people; we'll arrange it for you." And arranged it was.

State-operated restaurants, garages and camping-sites have also been very bad as well as insufficient in Yugoslavia. So, in the course of the last two years, some restrictions have been lifted on privately-run restaurants, garages and other tourist-oriented businesses, with the result that new restaurants with decent food and service have sprung up all over the place, particularly in Dalmatia. Last spring, the setting-up of privately-operated camping-

sites was also legalized, so that this kind of tourism should likewise improve. Further, in the fall of 1967, the federal government began drafting a new law to abolish restrictions on the number of workers that can be employed in private enterprises serving tourists, and judging from the support the proposed legislation has received from the press and some top party officials,¹ it should shortly become a reality. At least on paper, therefore, it should soon become possible for Yugoslav citizens to set up private hotels of any size. And what difference is there, in principle, between a private hotel and a private factory?

Yugoslavia's second largest source of foreign currency is the remittances sent back home by nearly 400,000 Yugoslavs working in the West. One hardly need point out how this reflects on the so-called economic self-sufficiency of the socialist states, which still remains one of the central themes of Soviet and East European Communist propaganda, supported artificially by withholding the real facts on unemployment and by keeping the frontiers shut.

Farming has also improved considerably in Yugoslavia in the last two years or so, reflecting the fact that private peasants have been given more economic rights and allowed to purchase tractors and other means of modern farming, and that taxation has been made less rigid. More than 80 percent of the country's agricultural land is in private hands. However, real progress in agriculture cannot be achieved as long as the government continues to limit the size of individual private landholdings to some 25 acres, which is far too small for modern intensive farming.²

The Hard Road of Economic Reform

Industry, of course, has always been the pet of Communist propaganda and the central element in its claims of progress achieved under Communist rule. Significantly enough, however, the current

¹ *E.g.*, see *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Sept. 24 and Oct. 7, 1967; *Borba* (Belgrade), Sept. 25, 1967; also, Vladimir Bakarić, in *Vjesnik*, Oct. 26, 1967; and Ljubisa Ristović, in *Komunist* (Belgrade), Oct. 19, 1967.

² Discussion of the desirability of enlarging the maximum permissible size of farmers' private landholdings keeps recurring in the Yugoslav press. For instance, in *Politika* (Belgrade), Oct. 12, 1967, a member of the party Central Committee's Commission on Socio-Economic Relations stated that he did not see why the limit should not be raised to 15 or even 20 hectares (38 or 50 acres, respectively).

Yugoslav economic reform, with its emphasis on the self-sufficiency and autonomy of each individual enterprise, has clearly brought out the fact that a majority of the Yugoslav industrial concerns that do pay their way are in the traditional industrial centers of the country—*i.e.*, Slovenia and Croatia—while, on the other hand, a very high proportion, if not a majority, of the new enterprises set up by the Communist regime, especially those in the traditionally less-developed areas, have not been successful and have been able to operate thanks only to the subsidies given them by the government. These are the so-called “political factories,” and the aim of the pragmatic Yugoslav economic reformers is either to close them down completely or to refashion them from top to bottom along economically rational lines, with the necessary automation and reductions of workers. Attempts on the part of industrial managers to carry out such measures, however, encounter formidable resistance from the local party bureaucracy, which utilizes the so-called workers’ councils to obstruct implementation of the reforms.

The motives of the party bureaucracy in opposing the reforms are pretty obvious. For one thing, increasing the economic strength and autonomy of industrial enterprises and their managements is almost certain to mean a proportionate decrease in the political and social power of the bureaucracy—especially in a Marxist state whose whole ideology and political life are, at least theoretically, production-oriented. For another thing, a further increase in unemployment through the laying-off of unneeded workers would create more economic and social problems for the local party administrators and detract still further from the prestige of a party which used to boast its ability to solve the unemployment problem once and for all. So far as the workers are concerned, on the other hand, the unpopularity of measures to streamline factories and lay off surplus employees is even more obvious. Consequently, it has been easy for the local party bureaucrats to get the workers’ councils to use their

demagogic powers to obstruct the modernization of enterprises—in other words, to sabotage the very economic reforms which are officially being promoted by the central government.³

Actually, while the central government continues to press for implementation of the reforms and to blame local obstructionism for delays, one has the impression that its own attitude is somewhat ambivalent. Indeed, there have been increasing indications that the leadership is not of one mind on the issue and that there are those within it who now fear that the full success of the economic reforms would eventually place the political structure itself in jeopardy. In these circumstances, the very decentralization that is a key element of the overall program of social, economic and political reform affords the central government and party authorities with a convenient means of sloughing off responsibility. They can claim that the hindrances to the reforms are none of their doing, and they can put the blame on the local party apparatchiks—as President Tito himself has done in many of his speeches. Even in the Soviet Union, it is standard official practice to blame all failures on individuals at the lower levels, and to credit all successes to the Central Committee; in Yugoslavia this can be done more convincingly thanks to decentralization.

According to fairly reliable unofficial sources, the recent high incidence of fires in Yugoslav factories is directly related to the obstructionism which enterprise managements have encountered in trying to modernize and streamline their plants. Numerous fires in factories previously insured for large sums of money were reported in the Yugoslav press during the summer and fall of 1967—and strikingly enough, most of these fires occurred in the more backward regions which have had the largest number of “political factories” requiring either drastic modernization or closure. Hearsay has it that the fires were actually caused by arson resorted to by desperate factory managers as a means of breaking the deadlock with the workers’ councils over plant modernization and the release

³ The role of the workers’ councils in obstructing the economic reforms is never openly admitted in the Yugoslav press for the obvious reason that the principle of “self-management” is one of the fundamentals of the current ideology. There have, however, been occasional oblique references to it. For instance, writing in the influential Belgrade literary journal *Knjizevne novine* (July 22, 1967), Zarko Vidović, a young professor of philosophy at Sarajevo University, made the statement that “the self-management agencies [workers’ councils] in Yugoslavia cannot become a state within the state”—clearly implying that they do have such a tendency, and that it is a negative

factor. Also, no less a document than the “Theses for the Reform of the Communist League of Yugoslavia,” published in *Borba* (April 27, 1967), accused “bureaucracy” and “pseudo-liberal, petty-bourgeois ideologies” of “sowing mistrust in self-management” by arguing “that self-management was set up too early, that producers [industrial workers] are unable to decide on problems of the enterprise, that they are passive and not interested in technological development” (italics added). Thus, while defending the workers’ councils, the “Theses” took cognizance of the criticisms being levelled by the technocrats and empirically-minded administrators.

of redundant workers.⁴ If this is true, the practice is curiously reminiscent of the earlier days of capitalism. One could argue, of course, that this is a positive development because it proves that the managers have become so materially and socially interested in their factories that they want to make them economically efficient at all costs, even at the cost of burning down the old plants. But this seems a rather wasteful way of achieving efficiency, and one that could have been avoided if the political considerations of the party bureaucracy had not entered the picture.

Workers' Grievances

Despite all the hindrances, however, the economic reform does move slowly forward. One of the results has been to do away with the artificial uniformity of wage norms. Every factory now pays its workers what it can afford to pay. Enterprises which carry on a lively and profitable trade with foreign countries pay their workers (particularly the skilled ones) wages on a par with those paid in the most advanced West European countries, while enterprises that barely make ends meet pay subsistence wages. As a result, wage differentials between individual factories have become absurdly great, and they are growing. A skilled worker can be paid \$400 or more per month in a successful enterprise, and hardly \$30 per month for the same kind of work in a less successful one. An important stimulus to the payment of better wages is the high rate of emigration abroad by Yugoslav workers. The wealthier and more profitable enterprises pay high wages in order to keep the turnover of skilled workers down. But such enterprises are still in the minority.

The contrasts in wage rates are one of the effects of opening up a society which ideologically is a closed one. Had there been trade unions free from centralized party control and capable of intervening on the workers' behalf, such huge wage differentials would have been out of the question. One could, of course, convincingly argue that the early

stages of industrial development—particularly in the case of an industrial latecomer like Yugoslavia, faced with the competition of more advanced neighbors—require that the worker be left defenseless against the strictly economic and expansionist considerations of the manager. But this again evokes parallels in early capitalist development and raises the question: What has Marxism done in this field to save the Yugoslav worker from the injustices of unqualified capitalism? The workers' councils? As pointed out above, the councils have proven themselves an unconstructive, short-run help, if any.

As for the trade unions, they are committed to promote production and not to protect the worker or act as an organizing agent and champion of workers' grievances. Just as in the Soviet Union, strikes are neither forbidden nor allowed under the law in Yugoslavia. But in fact a strike can be treated by the authorities as sabotage, and the participants punished, although this does not actually occur any more in Yugoslavia and strikes are quite numerous.⁵ In the present circumstances in which the local trade union committees do not act as a grievance-organizing mechanism, these strikes are simply anarchic outbursts, or "wildcat strikes" as they are called in Britain and the United States. They occur when the atmosphere of tension in a given enterprise becomes overcharged, and they are more outbursts of anger than they are a calculated tactical weapon. Consequently, they often cause more disruption of the economy and achieve less for the workers and the enterprise as a whole than would a premeditated, well-organized strike preceded by proper warning. In fact, this is the main complaint of certain Yugoslav writers—and even officials—who have been advocating the full legalization of strikes and of trade union participation in them.⁶ If such legalization materializes and the official function of the trade unions changes accordingly, we shall be witnessing the beginning of Yugoslavia's transition from a stage displaying many of the features of early capitalism to one having more of the characteristics of modern capitalism, with greater welfare elements in it—comparable to the develop-

⁴ According to Radio Zagreb (Nov. 22, 1967), Croatian Secretary of Interior Mato Krpan stated in the Croatian Executive Council that an inquiry into the fires "which have recently been numerous in Croatia" had come to the conclusion that the rumors of deliberate arson were unfounded. Krpan's denial lacked conviction, however, inasmuch as it admitted that the number of fires had shown a sudden and unusual increase which could hardly be satisfactorily explained on accidental grounds.

⁵ See, e.g., report in *Politika* (Sept. 5, 1967) regarding a strike against the Autotrans bus service in Rijeka (quoted in Radio Free Europe Research Report, (Nov. 2, 1967).

⁶ E.g., article by Milorad Mandić in *Nedeljne informativne novine* (Belgrade: Oct. 29, 1967); also statements by Croatian Communist leader Vladimir Bakarić (*Vjesnik*, Oct. 26, 1967) and Yugoslav party theoretician Veljko Vlahović (*Borba*, Oct. 26, 1967). On these and other statements on the legalization of strikes, see RFE Research Reports of Oct. 30 and Nov. 2, 1967.

Towards Political Pluralism?

On Proletarian Dictatorship

Instead of a dictatorship of the proletariat, there is the likelihood of a dictatorship over the proletariat coming into being.

—Djuro Susnjić in *Praxis (Zagreb)*,
No. 5-6 (September), 1967.

. . . the political power of industrial workers as a separate group has been disappearing in proportion to the disappearance of social classes.

—Stefan Vracar, *Gledista (Belgrade)*,
No. 8-9 (August-September), 1967, pp. 1053-66.

. . . no dictatorship can bring about any [degree of] equality and freedom.

—Djuro Susnjić, *loc. cit.*

On Conformity

Due to such intense . . . indoctrination, no wonder that monopolistic ideology frequently becomes extremely simplified, schematic, one-sided, intolerant, petrified, sterile, and almost a caricature.

—Stefan Vracar, *loc. cit.*

[A bureaucratized party structure produces] cowards, conformists, petty bourgeois, careerists, and frequently . . . individuals whose moral integrity is completely in contradiction with the moral integrity of the average Communist.

—*Ibid.*

On Intraparty Opposition

[A party member should have] the right to express his opinion freely in the course of the decision-making process . . . [Such a member], while respecting the views accepted by the majority, [should be] allowed to advocate his own views both in public and in the party as long as he is deeply convinced his views are right.

Pedrag Vranicki, "State and Party in Socialism,"
Knjizevne novine (Belgrade), Oct. 14, 1967.

[It should be possible] to allow within the framework of a political party the unhindered activities of an organized opposition; this opposition would present minority views but would

have normal political dialogues with the majority within the party and would support a mutually accepted policy. In this way it would act as a corrective to the policy line advocated by the majority in the party. Thus the worst aspects of the one-party system would disappear without threatening socialism as such.

Stefan Vracar, *loc. cit.*

There can be no self-management without the strengthening of democracy, without the conflict of opinions and interests, and without the formation of majority and minority views concerning all important problems. Still less is it possible for the vanguard [the party] to encourage such processes if its own internal life is not based on this very principle [of democracy]. The vanguard cannot be more narrow-minded, more timid, more intolerant and more incapable of winning . . . ideological clashes and controversies than the people whose vanguard it is supposed to be.

—Pedrag Vranicki, *loc. cit.*

On a Two-Party System

Would it not be more natural to have two parties, both of which would fight for socialism? Of course these two parties would, perhaps, differ in structure, followers and in ideological approaches concerning some questions of the construction of socialism. In such a case the majority party, as the ruling party, would face an organized opposition.

—Stefan Vracar, *loc. cit.*

* * *

Who are the "Conservatives"?

Knjizevne novine has become an important [source of] conservative and bureaucratic tendencies and, as a periodical, typical . . . of the negative [approach to] the social relations and practices of the League of Communists . . . *Knjizevne novine* is . . . trying to create doubts among its readers as to whether the program of the League of Communists and the Constitution are being implemented at all. *Knjizevne novine* wants to transform the League of Communists into separate, equal centers, each of which would have the right to its own position and independent opinions.

ment in the West between a century and fifty years ago. But where are the merits of Marxist socialism here?

If the state has not given the workers institutionalized means for bettering their lot, neither has it been capable of coping with the unemployment problem—although by Marxist definition there should be no unemployment in a socialist state. According to official data, there are nearly 400,000 Yugoslav workers employed abroad, and nearly as many unemployed in Yugoslavia.⁷ If we add to this the latent unemployment in the still overstaffed “political factories” and on the primitively exploited farms, the potential figure of unemployed could easily run into the millions in a country of only 20 million inhabitants.

Neo-capitalism: The New Stage?

All this goes to show that practically all the elements of early capitalism, either in actuality or *in potentia*, are present in Yugoslavia, thus destroying another of the Marxist-Leninist myths—namely, that socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat make it possible to transform a primitive country straight from a state of semi-feudalism to that of an advanced modern industrial society, bypassing all the injustices of classical capitalism. The Yugoslav example shows that when a totalitarian Marxist state, after all the injustices and hardships that are its attributes, finally opens up and enters upon the road of less rigidity, it throws its population open to the injustices of the classical form of capitalism that has almost been forgotten in the West, such as the lack of proper protection for the worker and the absence of real workers’ organizations which can fight for his interests.

Yugoslavia today stands out as the foremost example of this process because it is in the vanguard of the movement within the socialist world towards a less rigid and more open type of society. Yet, the Soviet Union itself will probably be re-

peating the same process tomorrow, even though the current Soviet program of economic reform is much milder than Yugoslavia’s. The point is that the Soviet government’s determination to compete with the United States economically requires that its economy be made infinitely more sophisticated and flexible, and hence more decentralized, with much greater autonomy for the managers and technicians, greater incentives, and more freedom of action. All these elements are interconnected, and no halfhearted measures will do. Stopping halfway would mean stagnation and loss of the competition with the United States, and with it of the hope of remaining a first-rate power. This the Soviet rulers will hardly accept. On the other hand, the Yugoslav example should warn them that there can be no marriage of totalitarianism with liberalism within the same society. The present anomalies of the Yugoslav regime are the result of such a misalliance.

A Bankrupt Ideology

So far we have been speaking about the ideology only as a kind of latent factor hindering the free and normal development of the economic and social reforms. Beyond this, one encounters virtually no signs of the Marxist ideology as an active and continuing intellectual force in Yugoslavia today. One leading Yugoslav intellectual, formerly a partisan and Communist, confided to the author his view that the Communist regimes will be remembered in history only as provisional governments which took over power in *backward* countries in time of crisis and transformed them into more modern states. Once this task is accomplished, these regimes become obsolete and find themselves beset by problems which cannot be solved within the framework of their own ideology—an ideology of social tension, class antagonism, suspicion and fear, an ideology of crisis. The Communist society, he remarked, is a war society, and if there is no war, it has to be invented in order to justify the system.

Indeed, one finds confirmation of this thesis even in the relatively free Yugoslavia of today. One of the chief factors which led the south Slavs to accept incorporation into a Yugoslav federal state was the constant fear of extinction by their more powerful neighbors: Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Italy. Now, however, the danger of invasion from any of these countries seems negligible, and at the same time the experience of the Second World War has shown that the Yugoslav federation would probably be no match for a really powerful aggressor

⁷ Radio Zagreb (Oct. 11, 1967) gave the number of unemployed as 260,000, with another 60,000 new graduates still seeking work—nearly four months after graduation! However, a journalist’s report published in *Vjesnik u Srijedu* (Zagreb: Oct. 25, 1967) claimed that the number was much larger (see RFE Research Report of Oct. 31, 1967).

Unemployment in the Soviet Union is about as large as in Yugoslavia, although no official figures on it have yet been released and Soviet writers refer to it only under the guise of camouflaging clichés. See this author’s analysis of unemployment in the USSR in *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), April 1967.

anyway. Consequently, the key rational arguments for keeping together the various south Slav nationalities in one federation have lost much of their force. A spreading consciousness of this may, indeed, have underlain the notorious "Declaration on the Croatian Literary Language,"⁸ which caused a huge uproar in Yugoslavia last year and led to the expulsion from the Yugoslav Communist League of some leading Croatian intellectuals, including the writer Krleža. At the same time, in an attempt to stir up opposition to nationalist-separatist tendencies within the federation, the party has been resorting to such naive tactics as indoctrinating its members at party meetings with the idea that Yugoslavia is still surrounded by enemies who are waiting only for a propitious moment to invade it. According to this propaganda, the foremost potential invaders are the Italians, who are even said to have attempted repeated landings on Yugoslav soil which were happily thwarted by the Yugoslav navy. Other ludicrous variations on this theme are that Yugoslavia is being "encircled" by NATO forces,⁹ and that the Israeli-Arab conflict poses a threat to the very existence of the country!

How reminiscent this is of Stalin's notorious thesis of the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union! Similarly today, the conflicts that beset many parts of the world serve the same purpose for the Soviet regime, enabling it to rationalize the abnormalities, tensions and lack of freedom at home. It is in this context that the war in Vietnam, the Middle East conflict, etc. are absolutely necessary for the Communist states. If any of these conflicts are eventually resolved, new ones will have to be created or instigated. It is easy to see that an unsuccessful but persistently militant Nasser is of much more use to the Soviet Union than a victorious Nasser from this standpoint—not to mention other considerations of a purely economic nature, such as foreign trade and the sale of surplus military goods, which are now capitalistic attributes of the policies of the socialist states.

Thus, both in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union and the other "well-established" Marxist-Leninist

states, ideology is a *raison d'être* and an instrument for the rationalization of actions and situations. That and only that.

There is other evidence to confirm the observation that the Marxist-Leninist ideology has ceased to be an intellectual driving force in Yugoslavia. The same ex-Communist scholar referred to earlier told the author that virtually the only Yugoslav intellectuals who are still sincere Communists today are the editors of, and some of the contributors to, the revisionist philosophical journal *Praxis*. He and a number of other intellectuals stated in private conversations with the author that they subscribe to *Praxis* only because there is no other journal in Yugoslavia which, at least philosophically, goes counter to the present regime. Had Mihajlo Mihajlov's project of a really free journal been realized, they said, *Praxis* would have lost a substantial part of its present subscribers, who are few anyway.

Ideological degeneration also manifests itself in more mundane ways. On public holidays, for instance, local party organizations charter buses to take groups of their members on one-day or weekend trips to Trieste to engage in blackmarket trading. The Yugoslavs sell leather and other goods that are cheaper in Yugoslavia than in Italy, and in exchange they buy gold, silver and cloth for blackmarket resale in Yugoslavia at much higher prices.

Still another illustration of ideological degeneration—as well as of the relative tolerance of the present Yugoslav regime—is provided by what has become of former Ranković henchmen since their demotion from the secret police. Most of the lower officers either have opened up private restaurants or are serving as waiters in such restaurants. Others who had some legal education have started thriving private law practices. For instance, the author learned from well-informed professional circles that Lukić, one of Ranković's former chief aides who was ousted from the secret police and expelled from the party, has become the most prosperous private lawyer in Belgrade, and probably in the whole of Yugoslavia, earning millions of dinars per month. It is said that these lawyers are very much in demand because they still have their old connections and are able to win the most complicated cases for their clients. Many intellectuals are becoming increasingly disturbed over the growing popularity and success of these ex-police officers turned brilliant lawyers and the new connections they are developing. But that is another subject. . . .

⁸ See preceding article by Prof. Rubinstein, p. 39.—Ed.

⁹ See, e.g., *Ekonomska politika* (Belgrade), Oct. 14, 1967; *Komunist*, Oct. 5, 1967; and the trade-union newspaper *Rad* (Belgrade), Sept. 1, 1967. The current attempt to revive the thesis of enemy encirclement is certainly dictated by the desire to divert public attention away from economic and socio-political difficulties at home towards external security problems, and to justify President Tito's unpopular policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union and his passionate support of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Many Faces of Ceylonese Communism

By Justus M. van der Kroef

Like many of its counterparts elsewhere, the Communist movement in Ceylon today finds itself torn between two rival parties, both of which claim to be the legitimate Communist Party of Ceylon (CPC), and whose conflicting policies and programs reflect in large degree the opposing viewpoints of Moscow and Peking. Nowhere is the conflict more apparent than in the two parties' divergent assessments of the tactical road to power, as expressed by their leading spokesmen in personal interviews with the author in Colombo last summer.* According to Pieter Keuneman, Secretary General of the Moscow-oriented CPC:

The main task of the Ceylonese Communist Party at present is to join with the center and with other leftist

A well-known authority on communism in Southeast Asia, Mr. van der Kroef is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bridgeport (Connecticut). His last contribution to this journal was "Communist Fronts in the Philippines," (March-April, 1967).

groups in a progressive united front and thus achieve power.¹

On the other hand, Nagalingam Sanmugathasan, the acknowledged leader of the pro-Peking CPC, told the author:

The tactic of building a parliamentary united front is an illusion and a dangerous distraction; only unrelenting militancy against the neo-colonial structure of our country can bring success.²

As the two opposing Communist parties—both complete with their own separate central commit-

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¹ Interview with Pieter Keuneman, Colombo, June 18, 1967.

² Interview with Nagalingam Sanmugathasan, Colombo, June 26, 1967.