

of the Communist movements in the colonial and underdeveloped areas. If, on the other hand, he moves much farther toward the Chinese revolutionary strategy, he must forfeit his hopes of achieving Communist world supremacy peacefully—a project on which he has staked his reputation.

In the long run, it seems very likely—as Chinese Communist Vice-Premier Chen Yi has already sug-

gested—that the Marxist-Leninist flower will develop Soviet and Chinese petals; that there will be two centers of Communist leadership, with Moscow directing the Western branch of the faith, and Peking the Eastern. How long this process will take, and whether a “division of labor” can function within a friendly and at least ideologically cohesive framework, only time and future developments can tell.

Right and Left—A Brief Survey

By Paul Katona

IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES Communist strategy envisages the propagation and support of popular movements, making use of the aspirations of the masses—such as the desire for peace—in order to mobilize them behind Communist leadership. In colonial and so-called “semi-colonial” areas, the Communists regard nationalism as the main revolutionary factor and have used it as a convenient vehicle for achieving their objectives. This, of course, is an oversimplified statement of a complex phenomenon, for ever since the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, the “colonial question” has occupied a key place in Communist theory, strategy, and propaganda.

The time, the field and the extent of cooperation with non-Communist elements represent the main criteria of rightist or leftist trends. But it is misleading to divide Soviet history into epochs, as some authors do. For example, to suggest that 1918-21 and 1928-36 were periods of leftist tactics, and that the tactics of the years in between were rightist, could give rise to misconceptions. Paradoxically, the two tendencies, as a rule, go hand in hand. One of them may, of course, temporarily predominate, but the other meanwhile remains as a subsidiary, a balancing factor, or an under-

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current. The presence of both opposing tendencies may manifest itself in a press campaign directed against the tendency which is currently in opposition to the prevailing one. Or it may be evidenced by a divergence between Comintern and government policy, or even in the form of contradictory utterances from the same source or in contradictory diplomatic maneuvers.

Early Appeals

One of the first acts of the newborn Soviet government was the issuance, on December 7, 1917, of a proclamation to the “Laboring Moslems of Russia and the East”, jointly signed by Lenin and Stalin, the latter as Commissar of Nationalities. It appealed to the Moslem peoples of colonial Asia to rise against their oppressors and put an end to foreign domination. This was the forerunner of a whole series of moves by the young Soviet state to promote Communist-nationalist alliances in the colonial world.

The appeal to the Moslems was revolutionary, to be sure; yet it was addressed to a *religious* group on *nationalist* lines. The Comintern did not as yet exist, but the Soviet government itself at that time had no scruples about openly advocating subversion—something it could no longer indulge in after Lord Curzon’s insistence in 1923 on the observance of the “non-propaganda clause” of the Russo-British Trade Agreement.

By 1920 the Comintern had been established as the primary instrument of Communist world revolution, and in September of that year it organized the "Congress of the Peoples of East" which was held at Baku under the direction of the top Comintern leaders—Zinoviev, Radek, and Bela Kun. The Soviet government was careful not to commit itself directly. Thirty-seven eastern nationalities were represented at the congress by almost two thousand delegates, over a third of them non-Communists—the first fellow-travelers in the history of international communism.

This spectacular affair was, indeed, a revolutionary event; the more so since the allies of the Communists were disorganized groups and individuals incited to embark on subversive activities upon their return home. The delegates swore to take up arms against imperialist oppressors. Slogans of a Holy War were chanted and cheered. In that sense, the Baku Congress was a leftist event. It must be borne in mind, however, that it was organized by the Comintern—not by the Soviet government.

At the same time, Lenin established direct contact with Moslem leaders who enjoyed popularity, influence, and political power. By 1921 the Soviet government had signed treaties of friendship and economic—though not military—cooperation with Amanullah of Afghanistan, Reza Khan of Persia, and Mustafa Kemal of Turkey. All three were figures of the Colonel Nasser type: leaders of nationalist, anti-imperialist, revolutionary movements; but while admiring Soviet Russia for spearheading what they regarded as "an unparalleled struggle for the emancipation of the whole world", they took energetic measures against Communists in their own countries. In Turkey and Persia the Communist movement was banned, and in Afghanistan it was non-existent. This, however, was of minor concern to Lenin, who was essentially uninterested in the Turkish or Persian Communists. He failed to react to reports that Turkish delegates, upon returning from the Baku Congress, were arrested and tortured to death. Both in theory and in practice, Lenin advocated the "stages of development" doctrine: he held that colonies and semi-colonies were not ripe for "socialist" revolution, and he therefore regarded Communist movements in them as premature. In his view, the national liberation movements were the natural allies of communism in those areas.

In his thesis for the Second Comintern Congress, Lenin advocated the closest alliance between Soviet Russia and the national liberation movements in the colonies. He said that "it would be utopian . . . to pursue Communist tactics and Communist policy in backward countries without having definite relations

with the peasant movement and without effectively supporting it."¹ At the Congress, however, Lenin took a firm stand against cooperation with the "reformist bourgeoisie" who, he said, had established close ties with the bourgeoisie in the exploiting countries. His criterion in distinguishing between "reformist" and "revolutionary" movements was obviously political rather than ideological, and he felt perfectly justified in nourishing and supporting anti-Communist nationalists, provided they were effective leaders of "liberation" movements against imperialism, and especially British "imperialism."

Stalin's Policies

After Lenin's death Stalin elaborated upon the "stages of development" doctrine, dividing the dependent countries into three categories. In countries of the lowest category, he maintained, no attempt should be made to form local Communist parties, and efforts should be concentrated instead on creating national fronts against imperialism. In countries with some industrial development and a small proletariat, the workers should form a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie, and the Communists should conduct unrestricted agitation and propaganda. The formation of independent Communist parties, however, was recommended only in countries more or less developed capitalistically, where the vacillating section of the bourgeoisie would dread revolution more than imperialism.

Stalin expounded this amplification of Lenin's doctrine in an address delivered in May 1925 at the "University of the Peoples of the East" which had been established in Moscow as a special training center for Asian revolutionaries. Declaring that the revolutionary possibilities of the national liberation movements, and of united national fronts, must be neither overrated nor underrated, Stalin warned his audience against two deviations. Deviation to the right, he said, would "submerge the Communist elements in the general welter of bourgeois nationalists", while deviation to the left would "isolate the Communist Party from the masses."²

Stalin's warning against rightist deviation would seem to have been hardly more than lip service to the revolutionary mission of the young recruits. On the other hand, his fear of left extremism was undoubtedly genuine, for in the same breath he spoke of the Javan-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *The Communist International*, (London) 1938, p. 241.

² J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, (London) 1947, p. 219.

ese Communists who had "erroneously put forward the slogan of a Soviet government for their country." Despite Stalin's admonition, the Communist leaders of Java did in fact embark on the road of immediate revolution and, in November 1926, launched an uprising. The Indonesian Communist leaders, Alimin and Musso, sought to obtain Soviet help and support; but Moscow turned a deaf ear, and the revolutionary movement was quickly smashed by the Dutch East Indian colonial administration. The Indonesian Communist revolutionaries paid the price of their leftist deviation by being isolated not only from the masses of their own country but from Moscow as well.³

In China, which was a far bigger prize than the Dutch East Indies, the Soviet Communists were more cautious, but equally unsuccessful. As early as January 1923, collaboration with the Kuomintang, a bourgeois-nationalist movement *par excellence*, had begun, and Borodin, a Russian propagandist, was appointed "instructor and adviser" to the Kuomintang. He drafted a Kuomintang Manifesto and a program for the first Kuomintang Congress, neither of which was of a socialist character.

Borodin hewed to Stalin's line that a Communist revolution would be premature, and to a resolution passed in 1923 by the Executive Committee of the Comintern in favor of cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. In spite of the Trotsky opposition, which later demanded an open struggle with the Chinese bourgeoisie, Borodin showed concern for the merchants, intellectuals, manufacturers, rich artisans, etc. But while lenient in the program of internal policy, he called vigorously for the cancellation of foreign concessions and extraterritoriality. Borodin held that China was ripe for a nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution, but for nothing more.⁴

When Stalin, in the summer of 1927, qualified the policy of cooperation with the bourgeoisie in semi-colonial countries by saying that "it was essential that the working class movement should be prepared to seize the appropriate moment to break away from its allies and begin to fight for its own objectives",⁵ it was too late. By the end of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek had crushed the Chinese Communists. It was this failure

³ For details on the Java revolt, see J. H. Brimmell, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, (Oxford), 1959, and Malcolm D. Kennedy, *Communism in Asia* (London), 1957.

⁴ A biased but highly illuminating account on the Chinese experiment is given by Louis Fischer in *The Soviets in World Affairs*, (London) 1930.

⁵ Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, (London), 1947, p. 213.

of "rightist" tactics in China—and, to some extent, the fiasco in Java—that prompted Stalin to concentrate on industrialization and military power at home rather than on efforts to foster revolution abroad.

Shifts and Turns

The "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries," prepared by Otto Kuusinen for the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, essentially upheld the Lenin-Stalinist doctrines. By 1935, however, the Leninist differentiation between revolutionary and reformist national movements was overshadowed by the new policy of United Front against Fascism, and, accordingly, the resolution adopted by the Seventh Comintern Congress (August 1935) called for joint action with both. During these years Soviet policy and propaganda in the colonial world stayed very much in the background, and a new upsurge came only with the end of the Second World War. The milestones of the post-war period are Zhdanov's report to the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, and the Khrushchev-Bulganin journey to India and Burma.

"The ruling classes of the mother countries can no longer govern the colonies according to the old fashion", Zhdanov declared. Speaking of the pillars of the anti-imperialist camp, he pointed to the "nationalist fighters for freedom in the colonies and dependent countries" together with the Communist parties and "progressive democratic forces" of all countries.⁶

The doctrine of "stages of development" and the distinction between reformist and revolutionary movements were not invoked, but the approach remained substantially the same. Soviet policy towards the colonial and former colonial world continued to be based on the assumption of inevitable colonial wars, and on the forecast—or wishful thinking—of the Second Comintern Congress twenty-seven years before that "the separation of the colonies and proletarian revolution at home will overthrow the capitalist system in Europe". In postwar terms, the underdeveloped areas of the world were merely secondary fronts in the cold war. Colonial policy and propaganda for the remainder of Stalin's lifetime were submerged in the general campaign against the West: harassing tactics and the threefold method of propaganda-infiltration-subversion with the help of "front" organizations. The activities

⁶ Reports to the conference of nine Communist parties held in Poland in September 1947 (Szikra Publications, Budapest 1947), p. 14.

of the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth were extended wherever possible to the underdeveloped countries. Later on, a permanent "Asian Solidarity Committee" and an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Council" were formed.⁷ The activities of these organizations centered—and still center in—"persistent attempts to exploit nationalist ferment to Communist advantage wherever it may occur."⁸

Despite their disruptive character and despite militant slogans echoed on occasions like the annual celebration of February 21st as International Day of Struggle against Colonial Regimes, the pronouncements of these organizations have been characterized by a rightist flavor. As a rule, pro-Communist mass propaganda is avoided in order to gain the sympathy and cooperation of innocents. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo at the end of December 1957, for instance, passed a typical resolution calling on the peoples of the two continents to accord the fullest assistance to the fighters for freedom and independence. The resolution, like all similar documents and manifestos, was devoid of Communist slogans and allusions. Since 1954-55, however, even this aspect of Communist maneuvering has been relegated to the background. Khrushchev—like Lenin in the period of the Baku Congress—has gradually broadened the vistas of Soviet diplomacy. This, rather than noisy propaganda and silent infiltration, constitutes the new element in the attitude of the Soviet leaders towards underdeveloped countries.

New Concepts, New Alliances

The Khrushchev-Bulganin journey to India and Burma was the first sign of a radical change in the Soviet attitude. Like their visit earlier that year to Belgrade, it was the outcome of a careful reappraisal of Soviet international policy. It was indicative of the Soviet leaders' realization that it was possible for a country to be a valuable ally of the Soviet Union without being reduced to a satellite, and even without being actively engaged in a fight against "imperialism." This discovery of the advantages to be gained by cultivating benevolent neutrality required farsightedness, flexibility and, above all, faith that communism would ultimately triumph and therefore that precipitate revolutionary action is unnecessary.

⁷ For a comprehensive study see Robert H. Bass, "Communist Fronts: their History and Function," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct. 1960.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Oddly enough, it was Molotov who first acknowledged India's genuine independence by stating, in his report to the Supreme Soviet in February 1955, that it was of great historical significance that colonial India no longer existed. This was in sharp contrast to the official Soviet position in Stalin's lifetime, which had maintained that the independence granted to India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and even the Philippines was fictitious, and that these countries still remained semi-colonies of the imperialist powers. Thus, Bulganin, in his Rangoon speech on December 1, 1955, said that since the proclamation of independence, Burma had embarked on the path of national freedom. This statement and others to the same effect indicated clearly that the old concept implicit in references to Burma's "so-called independence" and in attacks on U Nu's "terrorist regime for the suppression of national liberation movements"⁹ were relics of the past.

The new line was codified, as it were, by the 20th Party Congress, at which Khrushchev recognized that the new nations had become truly independent in their foreign policy. As pointed out by Mr. Richard Lowenthal in the January 1961 issue of *Encounter* (London), subsequent Soviet policy has been directed toward aligning these countries with the Soviet bloc in a "peace zone." This new strategy, based on the concept of a broad, non-doctrinaire alliance of Communists, Socialists and neutrals, was re-emphasized a few months after the 20th Congress in the "obituary" of the Cominform, which was dissolved in April 1956. According to this document, the Cominform had ceased to be consonant with developing international conditions, notably with the contemplated "formation of a vast peace zone including both Socialist and non-Socialist peace-loving States of Europe and Asia."¹⁰ However, Moscow's design for a global ideological entente of Communists and fellow-travelers was frustrated, first by the repercussions of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, and later by the left-turn of the Chinese Communists.

In the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, on the other hand, Soviet diplomacy persistently followed a policy of piecemeal intrusion, difficulties and setbacks notwithstanding. This intrusion has been primarily economic. It began in 1955-56 when the Soviet Union signed a long-term credit agreement with Afghanistan to finance several development projects, and similar agreements followed with Burma, Indonesia, India and Egypt. These are, in fact, investment contracts involving the export of capital, which Communist doctrine holds to be the main criterion of im-

⁹ *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 4, 1951.

¹⁰ *Soviet News* (London), April 18, 1956.

perialism. But while the early European colonizers indulged in political conquest in order to find economic outlets, the Soviet imperialists have tried to work it the other way round. Capital investments, as well as Soviet bulk purchases of Egyptian cotton and Burmese rice, represent penetration tactics rather than economic ventures.

THE STRATEGIC POLICY underlying these Soviet maneuvers does not always appear acceptable to the rank and file of the international Communist movement. At the Leipzig Conference of May 1959, where Marxist theoreticians discussed Communist strategy and tactics for Africa, Asia and Latin-America, conflicting views were aired about the "correctness" of cooperating with bourgeois nationalist and anti-Communist governments.¹¹ It is quite understandable that many Communists look askance at Soviet policies of friendship and aid for regimes, such as that of Nasser in Egypt, which

¹¹ The conference took place under the auspices of the Leipzig Institute of World History and included a discussion of the "National Bourgeoisie and the Liberation Movements." See *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 1959, p. 61 ff.

have openly persecuted the local Communist movements. A permanent and satisfactory solution of this dilemma seems impossible. Indeed, historical examples suggest that the Soviet Union has always been ready to sacrifice the local Communists in any country for the sake of long-term Soviet objectives. Lenin preferred Kemal to the Turkish Communists, and Khrushchev apparently finds Nasser's contribution to Soviet diplomatic goals more important than the momentary fate of the Communists in the UAR.

The most important question, however, is not the outcome of the inherent conflict between Communist ideological solidarity and tactical expediency, but whether or not Khrushchev's "rightist" tactics will ultimately pay dividends in furthering Soviet and Communist aims. Lenin's alliances with Amanullah and Kemal proved useless in the end, as did the Comintern's early policy of alliance with Chinese nationalism. Now, as then, expediency is a two-edged weapon. The Communists cultivate the friendship of non-Communist governments and leaders to serve their own ends, but the other side does the same. Who is using whom? When the friendship ceases to be useful, either partner may drop the other like a hot brick.

Contrasts and Comparisons

EDITORS' NOTE: Whether or not Moscow still subscribes to the principle of "different roads to socialism"—as proclaimed at the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP in February 1956—the fact is that in several important respects the East European bloc today is hardly as homogeneous in its make-up as it was in the days of Stalin. The differences between the individual countries do not, of course, pertain to goals, but rather to methods of achieving the selfsame goals; as such, they reflect Moscow's understanding that an enforced uniformity which does not take into account basic geographic, political, economic, and cultural differences between the individual countries is in the last analysis self-defeating. On the other hand—as is clearly brought out in the article by Messrs. Bromke and Drachkovitch—any attempt to attain a greater measure of autonomy (say, in the realm of foreign policy) is bound to end

in failure: Khrushchev, in short, is not a Stalin; but neither is he a Djilas. The process of complete Sovietization of the East European bloc may vary with each country: in Czechoslovakia, for instance (see article by Mr. Taborsky) the pace is fast—so much so that this country no longer calls itself a "people's democracy," but a "socialist state"; in Hungary, on the other hand (see article by Mr. Ignatus), the process is equally dogged, but the pace is slower, the concessions to some parts of the population (e.g., the intelligentsia) greater. The fact that the system imposed on these countries is essentially the same gives rise to certain phenomena that hold true for the area as a whole (article by Mr. Landy); more important, it also disposes of illusions that any real liberalization within the Soviet empire will ever come from above, through the conscious efforts of those in power.

What Price Corruption?

By Paul Landy

AMONG THE MANY problems besetting the governments of Eastern Europe, none seems more pressing than what is commonly called "economic crime" or, as a Polish paper aptly put it, "institutional demoralization,"¹ revealed by mounting evidence of theft, fraud,

¹ *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), November 12, 1960.

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bribery, and blackmarket activity. Vehement propaganda campaigns as well as theoretical discussions of this phenomenon in the official press have revealed the extreme gravity with which the ruling party in every East European country views the spread of economic corruption. Yet the Communist approach is essentially a surface therapy, moving on the fringes of the real issues, and carefully avoiding the deeper sources of the admitted examples of widespread moral disintegration. Despite the growing awareness of a moral erosion of the system from within, the Communists publicly blame most of its manifestations on that perennial scapegoat: the inter-