"leaders" and "people," it is clear where the ultimate discretion lies, although it is not impossible that at times Mao may align himself with the "people" against the "party."

The areas in which "contradictions" are possible remain hazy. The definition of "normal" error also remains vague. In fact, all formulae are so ambiguous that the government can use them alternatively to encourage real and wide-ranging freedom in the marketplace of ideas or to retreat to the situation as it existed before 1956. It may also use them to create—as it seems to be doing at present—certain contrived, intentional deviations.

Quite apart from the ultimate domestic effect of these formulae, however, they remain significant for what they are intended to suggest to the countries of the Communist world and the countries of non-committed Asia. Above all they confirm more decisively than ever the ideological autonomy of Communist China.

Tito and Gomulka:

Some Contrasts and Comparisons

By Andrew Haven

THE DRAMATIC SUCCESSES of Wladyslaw Gomulka as the spearhead of Poland's "peaceful revolution" against Moscow and as leader and launcher of an independent Polish "road to socialism" have led some observers to equate his role in the Communist orbit with that of Tito—and therefore Poland's role with that of Yugoslavia. In particular, there has been a growing tendency since last October to treat Gomulka as synonymous with Poland and Polish policy, in the same way that Tito, to the world at large, has come to personify Yugoslavia. There are some valid bases for these parallels, but there is also a danger of serious over-simplification. For while both leaders have emerged as courageous and shrewd challengers of the Soviet Goliath, vastly different circumstances have governed their actions and currently affect their status at home and in the world. An examination of their relative roles affords a useful framework for some observations on the important shifts of power and policy now going on in Eastern Europe.

Tito, to begin with, has long been firmly entrenched as master in his own house; his final authority in shaping Yugoslav policy has never been seriously questioned, and he has become the object of an indigenous personality cult which is unparalleled today in the satellite countries. From the outset of Tito's quarrel with Moscow he was able to maintain his position as undisputed boss of his party and people, a support accorded to him in part because of his wartime role as a resistance leader. The Communist bureaucracy in Yugoslavia was —and remained— his personal instrument of power, and it has had a vested interest in the maintenance of his regime.

The rift in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was more a matter of personal antagonism between Stalin and Tito than of nation-wide antagonism toward the USSR, as is the case in Poland. Moscow was far away, and there were no Soviet troops on Yugoslav soil. There was no deeply ingrained tradition of anti-Russianism in Yugoslavia—certainly, at least, among the Serbian majority for whom pan-Slavism historically has had a certain appeal—whereas the Polish people for centuries have looked upon Russians with fear and hatred as the heriditary foe. In short, Tito was able to make his challenge to Moscow from a position of absolute authority, knowing that national sentiment was behind him but not having to fear that it would get out of hand; his feud with Stalin built up gradually, and even at the time of their final break there was still sufficient room for maneuver to have allowed a compromise solution had either leader sought it.

Andrew Haven is the joint pen-name of two British journalists who collaborate on articles dealing with Communist affairs. Their first contribution to this journal, "The Time Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy," appeared in No. 1, January-February 1956.

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By contrast, Gomulka's challenge to Moscow has been made under conditions of precarious instability. Gomulka found himself on the way to power at a time when anti-Soviet feeling had reached a boiling point, when the entire Polish nation was seething with discontent, and when one wrong step might well have led to a bloodbath. The intervention of locally-stationed Soviet troops in the Polish "revolution" was avoided only because Gomulka was able to prevent the pressures of popular feeling from pushing him farther than he knew Moscow would let him go. This became increasingly difficult after the profound impact of the Hungarian uprising on the Polish people, and it is a measure of Gomulka's political skill and iron nerve that he succeeded. Today he is still faced with an extremely fluid and potentially explosive situation: he has the arduous task of establishing a course which will preserve the fundamentals of the Communist system while managing to meet popular demands for greater freedom and an amelioration of living conditions. At the same time he must satisfy Moscow's strategic demands arising out of Poland's geographic location. And he must accomplish all this in the face of continuing opposition from the die-hard Stalinist faction in the party, and therefore without full control over the party bureaucracy.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT factor affecting Gomulka's position *vis-à-vis* that of Tito is the entrenched power of the Catholic Church in Poland. For centuries the Church has been a dominant influence in the religious and secular lives of the Polish people. It has always been identified with national resistance to foreign encroachments, and by its very creed it has become an important source of resistance to the Communist ideology. In order to establish himself as a national rather than as simply a Communist leader, Gomulka has had to deal with the episcopate on more or less equal terms to accept the fact that the Poles remain a Catholic people. By his own admission he has been forced into a compromise which cuts right across the accepted tenets of Marxism. In a speech of last May 15 to the Ninth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, he announced:

> We have made an agreement with the Catholic Church, and we even agreed to voluntary religious instruction in the schools. . . . It goes without saying that this situation is not in accordance with out party's ideology. However, the party cannot close its eyes to reality.

Asserting that the Church and the State would have to co-exist for a long time to come, he went on to plead that ideological competition between the party and the Church never grow into political strife:

> In matters which concern the vital interest of People's Poland we would like to see the Church follow the Polish road together with us.[1]

Tito has faced no comparable problem. In Yugoslavia the Serb majority adheres to the Orthodox Church, which has had little of the pro-Western orientation of Catholicism and which has accommodated itself to the Communist regime, as have Orthodox Churches throughout Eastern Europe. The Catholic Church has some strength, but only in Croatia has it posed a potential source of resistance to the regime. Tito has been able to contain this threat, relying in part on the religious and ethnic feelings of the majority of other South Slavs.

Gomulka's approach to solving the problems posed by the position of the Catholic Church certainly warrants identification as one aspect of a unique and specifically Polish "road to socialism." Whether coexistence between church and party is compatible with Communist concepts of progress along that road remains to be seen.

The Map: Poland's Permanent Predicament

Perhaps above all, the factor of geography—with the complex political and strategic considerations that it raises—has profoundly influenced the relative positions and policies of Gomulka and Tito.

Moscow, in short, might put up with a Tito in Yugoslavia but it could never tolerate an anti-Soviet Poland on its Western frontier. Throughout the "peaceful revolution" in Poland Gomulka and his supporters went to great pains to curb public expressions of anti-Soviet sentiment, not only because of their own interest in preventing reforms from going "too far" but also to dissuade Moscow from deciding that Soviet military intervention was necessary to its own security. To remain in power, the Gomulka regime must keep Moscow so convinced.

Poland, moreover, is dependent on the USSR as the defender of its own Western frontier. Having lost their Eastern provinces to the USSR in 1945, the Poles are united in jealously guarding the so-called regained territories in the West. And as the party organ *Trybuna Ludu* has stated in words clearly intelligible to all Poles, Communist and non-Communists alike: "The frontiers of the Polish Republic are recognized by all our Communist neighbors as inviolable and are guaranteed by the USSR—the only great power to do so."[2] At a Moscow reception last April Khrushchev told Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz: "The Oder-Neisse frontier is a frontier of peace; it is both your frontier and ours. If

[1] *Trybuna Ludu,* Warsaw, May 16, 1957.

[2] April 20, 1957.

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anyone should cross your frontier, this would be a threat not only to you, but also to the security of the USSR." [3]

Irrespective of the official policy of the Bonn Government and the parrot-like protestations of Moscow's puppets in East Berlin, the Polish people are well aware that few Germans are prepared to regard the Oder-Neisse frontier as the permanent demarcation line between the two nations. Thus Poland's continuing adherence to the Warsaw Pact is more than just a formalization of her relations with the USSR. Sandwiched between their traditional enemies—the Germans and the Russians—the Poles, like the Czechs, will never be able to pursue a truly independent foreign policy. In maintaining the Polish-Soviet alliance Gomulka has chosen what most Poles regard as the lesser of two evils.

YUGOSLAVIA, by contrast, is situated on the periphery of the satellite bloc (barring tiny Albania). On ideological and psychological grounds Tito's defiance of Moscow and continued outspoken independence may have constituted a serious—and in retrospect even crucial—threat to Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe; but strategically, Moscow apparently did not consider Yugoslavia so vital a link in its empire as to warrant forcible intervention, considering the risks inherent in such a move. Thus Tito has survived for nine years, through varying degrees of Soviet hostility; in all likelihood he will keep on doing so, provided he continues to receive foreign aid.

After Stalin's death the collective leadership in Moscow made some efforts to improve party and state relations with Yugoslavia. A period of relative calm was initiated by Bulganin's and Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade and Tito's return journey to the USSR, and further enhanced by the CPSU's recognition in the Belgrade Declaration and at the Twentieth Party Congress of the principle of "separate roads to socialism." With the outbreak and brutal suppression of the Hungarian uprising, however, new acrimonious exchanges took place; Moscow, as we shall see, took offense at Tito's assessment of its actions and launched a series of attacks against Yugoslavia and its leadership.[4] Throughout this period of ups-and-downs, Tito has shown no inclination to compromise his own position seriously. Neither he nor his colleagues have missed a single opportunity to tell their Soviet comrades where they had gone wrong and what they should have done. Lately he has gone on record to say that a further deterioration in Yugoslav-Soviet relations would be "senseless" [5]; but it is safe to assume that he will remain staunch in maintaining his own independent position.

Unlike Poland, then, Yugoslavia has not been in serious fear of military intervention from the USSR. At the same time Germany does not loom as a permanent potential threat, and despite the Hitlerite occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II there is no long-standing enmity between the Germans and the Yugoslavs. As far as Tito is concerned he is almost in the enviable position dreamed up by the Polish student weekly *Po prostu,* when it plaintively speculated on what the Poles would do if they lived in Iceland.[6] This position has encouraged Tito to bold action in the game of international power politics. In a vigorous effort to establish himself as a leader in a loose alignment of neutralist countries, he has assumed an air of almost self-righteous Olympic detachment from what he calls the antagonism between the socialist camp and the Atlantic alliance, describing the Warsaw Pact and Nato nations as mutually exclusive military blocs which constitute the real threat to world peace. (*Pravda,* it might be said, has pointed out the discrepancy between this view and Yugoslavia's membership in the Balkan Pact.[7])

Conflicts and Contradictions

Very different factors, then, have played a part in determining Gomulka's and Tito's policies and tactics; the result has been a complex and often paradoxical evolvement of relations between Warsaw and Moscow, Belgrade and Moscow, and between these capitals and other countries of the Communist bloc.

Since the initial stages of the Polish "revolution," cordiality apparently has been reestablished in official relations between Warsaw and Moscow, on both the state and party levels. Some ideological differences have been aired, but these have been confined to exchanges in the press. Gomulka seems to have convinced the Soviet leadership that he is the better judge of the situation in his country, and the Kremlin apparently has decided to accept his relatively independent status, at least for the time being. At the recent Ninth Plenum of the PZPR's Central Committee, Gomulka summed up his basic stand: on the one hand, he underscored his party's belief in the importance of the Soviet-Polish alliance and his own determination to keep Poland inside the camp of socialism; on the other hand, he reiterated his rejection of the idea that the Polish "road to socialism" must follow the Soviet pattern. "The road

[3] *Pravda,* Moscow, April 21, 1957.

[4] These extended to almost all aspects of the Yugoslav system, including criticisms of the Yugoslav economy and its management; see, *e.g., Kommunist,* Moscow, No. 3 of 1957.

[5] *Politika,* Belgrade, May 25, 1957.

[6] *Po prostu,* Warsaw, December 9, 1956.

[7] Issue of March 11, 1957.

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to socialism taken by the USSR," he stated, ". . . is neither fully necessary nor entirely suitable for other nations," and he added that this view would be valid even if the USSR had avoided "the disease of the personality cult." [8]

Reduced to bare essentials, the latter view more or less expresses what Tito has been saying for nine years. The difference, from Moscow's point of view, is that Gomulka has shown no signs of wanting to export his brand of socialism; he merely claims that he is applying the principles expounded at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in attempting to lead his country toward socialism through policies adapted to specific conditions in Poland. Tito, in Moscow's view, is trying to promote his own views of the proper approach to socialism in other countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet leadership profoundly resents what it regards as Tito's pretensions in putting himself forward as a rival Marxist oracle in Belgrade.

In particular, Moscow was infuriated by Tito's actions and statements in the course of the Hungarian uprising, however equivocal they may have seemed to the rest of the world. Premier Bulganin declared in a speech last March (on the occasion of Hungarian Premier Kadar's visit to Moscow):

> All know that Imre Nagy and his group received practical support from the Yugoslav leaders. This sustained and inspired Nagy, and it is not by accident that when the counterrevolution in Hungary was smashed he found asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy.[9]

It seems fairly obvious that the macabre posthumous rehabilitation of Rajk in Hungary, carried out at Tito's insistence, emboldened the anti-Stalinist faction and contributed to Hungarian unrest. But there is no evidence that Tito gave "practical support" to the Nagy government. Indeed, it is one of the paradoxes in the East European situation that while Yugoslavia's independence may have aggravated anti-Soviet resentment in Hungary, a truly independent and democratically elected Hungarian government—had the revolution succeeded—

[8] *Trybuna Ludu,* May 16, 1957.

[9] *Pravda,* March 28, 1957.

DIALECTICALLY SPEAKING

1952

Comrade Jopik: (at a party meeting) It has been charged here that Comrade Lipniak's mother-in-law is a class enemy and religious fanatic, that she keeps running to church every day and that she goes to communion every Sunday. And what reply has Comrade Lipniak offered? He has replied that his mother-in-law is already 62 years old and that you can't change her. This, Comrades, is opportunism! This is yielding to petit-bourgeois pressure!

It's never too late to educate a person, to transform a spiritual cripple into a valuable citizen. I don't wish to engage in empty talk. My wife has a grandma who boasts not 62 years, like Comrade Lipniak's mother-in-law, but exactly 90 years, comrades! She, too, has until recently been unenlightened, but I did not succumb to opportunism and began an uncompromising struggle. The struggle wasn't easy. The prejudices were deeply ingrained in my grandma, but what chance did they have against the fervent convictions of a Marxist? I began to reeducate my grandma—delicately but firmly. First I hid her prayer book, and in its place I offered her the *Agitator's Notebook.* Grandma—still, to be sure unenlightened—began to pray from the *Notebook.* When she confused Comrade Stalin with the Lord for good, I handed her, as a prize, the *Communist Manifesto,* and examined her on it every single Sunday. And thus, Comrades, we gradually reviewed all basic postulates of Marxism. Now my wife's grandma subscribes to the *Trade Union Review* and *Krokodil,* and thanks God every evening that she has finally become enlightened.

It's never too late, Comrade Lipniak! . . .

1957

Comrade Jopik: (at home) What a scandal, what disgrace! My only son! He'd better not show his face here. . . . My name will be mud now! . . .

This scoundrel will discredit me! How will I dare to show myself to the [party] secretary? His Paul has an A in religion, and this ignoramus got an F. The son of Comrade Jopik! Wait till I get my hands on him! . . .

—From Szpilki *(Warsaw), March 17, 1957*

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would have proved an embarrassment to Tito's dictatorship, a consideration undoubtedly accounting for his equivocal attitude toward the uprising. As far as the Yugoslav regime is concerned, the real source of Soviet anger was Tito's famous speech at Pula on November 11, 1956, in which he distinguished between the first and second Soviet armed attacks on Budapest (of October 24 and November 4), condemning the first as unnecessary and implying that it made the second inevitable by provoking a counter-revolution.[10] This analysis is, of course, highly irritating to the Soviet leaders.

It is another paradox that Gomulka's most recently expressed view on Hungary is more lenient toward Moscow than Tito's, although at the time of the revolution probably no country felt the Hungarian tragedy as acutely as did Poland. Again at the Ninth Plenum of the CC, Gomulka stated:

> We may differ from other parties in our assessment of events in Hungary, but that does not change the common view that, for the sake of the maintenance of peace and the security of all socialist countries, the Soviet army's help in suppressing counterrevolution was a regrettable but inevitable necessity.[11]

This is indeed a far cry from Polish reaction last autumn. Pro-Gomulka elements in the population knew that their own "democratization" program had sparked the initial demonstrations in Budapest; and the methods used by the Soviets to suppress the Hungarians' fight for freedom must have incensed them deeply, in view of the historic revolutionary ties between the two countries and of Poland's own precarious position *vis-à-vis* Moscow at that time. A proclamation issued by the Central Committee of the PZPR on November 2, 1956, warned against reactionary trends in Hungary but at the same time indirectly protested the Soviet action by asserting that the Hungarian people could preserve their "socialist" achievements "through their own efforts and not by intervention from abroad." [12] Gomulka's difficulties in controlling public opinion even among his supporters was illustrated by the persistence of anti-Soviet comment in the Polish press and radio after his return from Moscow, where he had agreed to support the Kadar government. On November 23, 1956, *Zycie Warszawy* dismissed the Soviet allegation that the Hungarian revolt had been instigated by agents from abroad as "wholly primitive and over-simplified." On the next day Warsaw Radio broadcast a dispatch from its Budapest correspondent, Marian Bielicki, which declared:

> Hungary was a great national revolution. . . . The Hungarian population in its entirety took up arms in its just struggle. Its hands, and its hands alone, raised the banner of the Hungarian revolution on the barricades.

The fact that Gomulka was not publicly criticized by Moscow for allowing such outbursts as these is in part evidence that the Soviet leaders, having reluctantly accepted Gomulka's victory, were as anxious as Warsaw to avoid undue provocations. This contrasts significantly with their hyper-sensitivity toward comment from Yugoslav sources.

Cross-currents in the Communist Bloc

On the whole, relations between and among the East European countries have not been seriously affected by the turbulent events of last fall. As might be expected, Tito has come in for a considerable amount of concerted criticism from the satellite regimes, particularly the Albanian and Czechoslovak Communists. Yet the complete break of 1948 has not been repeated, and no East European Communist Party has slammed the door on the chance to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs. Tito himself has expressed his pleasure at the recent easing of East European attitudes toward Yugoslavia.[13]

In the first weeks after the Polish October, strong criticism of the Gomulka Communists was voiced by both the Czechoslovak and the East German regimes. For example, Novotny, First Secretary of the Czech CP's Central Committee, declared in early December that "hostile voices and demagogic attitudes were able to gain strength in Poland because the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party did not oppose them sufficiently." [14] By now, however, the Czech leaders seem satisfied that the Polish example will not inspire their own people to similar demands, at least for the time being. This, combined with the relative stabilization of the situation in Poland, has led to a marked improvement of relations and renewed economic contacts between Prague and Warsaw.[15]

As for relations between Poland and Eastern Germany, there is no doubt that the maintenance of bloc ties is purely a *mariage de convenance*. The emergence of a more independent Communist regime in Warsaw must be anathema to the East German Communist lead-

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[10] Broadcast over Radio Belgrade November 15, 1956.

[11] *Trybuna Ludu*, May 16, 1957.

[12] *Ibid.*, November 3, 1956.

[13] *Politika*, May 25, 1957.

[14] *Rude Pravo*, Prague, December 8, 1956.

[15] Following Cyrankiewicz's visit to Prague in early May, agreements were signed to secure cooperation of the Czechoslovak and Polish engineering industries and to guarantee supplies of Polish sulphur for the Czechoslovak chemical industry.

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ers, who are among the most notorious exponents of Stalinism. But Ulbricht knows that the life of his regime depends on the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany, and that the security of their lines of communication depends in turn on the state of Polish-Soviet relations; thus he is apt to tread softly in dealings with Gomulka. Gomulka, on the other hand, has a vital stake in the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany, since—as has been noted—the Communists (on Moscow's instructions) are the only German political group prepared to endorse the Oder-Neisse frontier. Economic as well as political interests have compelled their fence-mending, as reflected in Gomulka's recent state visit to East Germany.

Tito's wholly different attitude toward the Ulbricht regime illustrates the point made earlier concerning his relative freedom of international maneuver *vis-à-vis* Gomulka's. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, there is no cause to take the East German regime seriously. Tito has diplomatic relations with Bonn but not with East Berlin, and official Yugoslav statements give support to the view that Germany should be reunited under conditions to be determined by the Germans themselves.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of evolving relations between the Communist countries has been the increased influence of Chinese communism on Eastern Europe. Since Stalin's death Mao Tse-tung's views have been accorded a growing respect by all Communist parties, including the CPSU. To the East European regimes, and particularly to the Polish regime, relations with Peiping have become second in importance only to relations with Moscow. Soon after Gomulka's ascension to power, the Polish Communists showed themselves anxious to establish a community of ideological views with the Chinese leaders. For example, on December 2, 1956, *Trybuna Ludu* paid tribute to "the wise and experienced Chinese Communist Party" and acclaimed Mao's current catch-phrase, "let all flowers blossom — let diverse thoughts contend," adding that there was pressing need for Poland to apply this slogan. In January Chou En-lai made an official visit to Warsaw, and in April Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz returned the compliment. At the Ninth Plenum of the CC in May Gomulka recommended Mao's thesis as a slogan for his party, calling it "a bold step, hitherto unknown in the practice of building socialism." While there is, of course, a genuine similarity of outlook in Gomulka's views and Mao's new line, it might well be that the Poles are also looking towards Peiping for potential support against Moscow should the need arise. Certainly there is significance in the fact that the Polish press was the first to publish extensive excerpts from Mao's new ideological pronouncements.

The cordiality which has marked recent Sino-Polish relations has not been evident in Peiping's attitude towards Tito. The Chinese Communists have been careful to do nothing which might impair the unity of the socialist camp and therefore have given no encouragement to Tito. On the contrary, an article in *Jen-min jih-pao,* the party-run People's Daily in Peiping, expressed its "astonishment" at "the sallies against all socialist countries and many Communist parties" contained in Tito's Pula speech, and warned "the Yugoslav comrades that they have gone rather too far." The article went on to castigate Tito's alleged attempt to enlist Gomulka as his ally.[16]

Tito seems not too much concerned by this official snub from Peiping. During his tour of the Far East, the Yugoslav leader did not visit China. The home press made much, however, of his visit to India, pointing to it as an indication of Belgrade's importance and standing among the neutralist powers.

Comrades in Contrast

There remains the task of assessing relations between Gomulka and Tito themselves, which raises the question of how their respective "paths to socialism" compare and wherein they differ. Tito, for his part, has hailed Poland's assertion of independence in internal affairs as a wholly welcome development, probably regarding it as a vindication in some sense of his own long fight with Moscow. Partly because of genuine differences in viewpoint and partly because of the delicate situation between Tito and the Kremlin, Gomulka has been less wholehearted in his attitude toward the Yugoslav Communists. The Polish Communists do not deny that the existence of an independent Yugoslavia has had a considerable influence on their thoughts and actions, and particularly that they have followed Tito's policy in introducing workers' councils in industrial enterprises. At the same time they are adamant in stressing that Gomulka's Poland is not a copy of Tito's Yugoslavia. "Not everything that is happening in Yugoslavia is liked in Poland, and *vice versa,*" wrote *Zycie Warszawy* last January, adding, however, that this in no way precluded friendly relations between the two countries.[17]

Many of the outspoken views voiced in Warsaw last autumn in the initial flush of enthusiasm over Gomulka's victory have now been toned down in accordance with the regime's avowed desire to remain inside Moscow's "commonwealth" of socialist countries. But back in November the Poles were freer in defining some of the

[16] *Jen-min jih-pao,* December 29, 1956.

[17] January 4, 1957.

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fundamental differences between their own reaction to Stalinism and the outlook and policies of the Yugoslav regime. *Zycie Warszawy* wrote at that time (November 29):

> **Although we, like Yugoslavia, have set out on the road of workers' councils and economic decentralization, we are determined to avoid various Yugoslav errors and distortions. . . . Despite the great popularity of Yugoslavia in our country, we do not approve of all their political conceptions without criticism. It appears that in regard to organizational matters, public expression of opinion, socialist parliamentarianism and the democratic division of power and authority, we have moved farther away from Stalinist practice than our Yugoslav friends.**

It would be difficult to find a truer or more succinct summing up of the differences between Yugoslavia and Poland on the level of internal policy. It is another of those paradoxes of present-day Eastern Europe that Poland, still experimenting on a "road" chosen only six months ago, should have rejected much more of Stalinism than has Yugoslavia in nine years of independence from Moscow—whereas in foreign policy Poland must toe the line with the USSR, while Tito is relatively free to engage in his shrewd game of power politics.

Gomulka's "road," as noted earlier, has been subject to complex pressures from both the left and the right, accounting in part for the difference in his policies *vis-à-vis* Tito's. The relaxation of Stalinist terror released a considerable force of pent-up public opinion throughout Eastern Europe, as well as in the USSR. Even before Gomulka's reappearance on the political scene, Polish writers and intellectuals played an important part in directing attention to the failings and broken promises of previous regimes, thereby helping to create the atmosphere which enabled Gomulka to take over. Yet many of these intellectuals, along with others in the population, represent what Gomulka himself has called a revisionist threat to his policies, striving to turn them away from socialism. That Gomulka is worried about pressure from the left is indicated, among other signs, by his remarks last April to a congress of the Union of Socialist Youth: he complained of "intensified reactionary activity on a large scale" in the country and warned against "removing the blots from socialism by revisionist brushes." [18] The Polish leadership has now clearly called a halt on some of the more extreme suggestions of reform put forth by liberal elements.

At the same time, Gomulka has stood firm against the Stalinist right within the party. His speech to the Ninth Plenum constituted a firm restatement of the policies he advanced last October, and despite criticisms from the Stalinist faction he again carried the day. The resolutions adopted by the Central Committee on this occasion clearly vindicated his view as *vs.* those of the rightists, and the expulsion from the party of the notorious Muscovites Berman and Radkiewicz confirmed the new leadership's determination to break with the past.

By contrast, the ferment of the post-Stalin era seems to have had relatively little effect on Yugoslavia, or at least on Tito's position of entrenched power. Tito faces neither a right nor a left; he may have to deal with an occasional recalcitrant individual such as Djilas, but there are no signs of any concerted opposition factions in the Yugoslav party. More than any other East European Communist leader, Tito resembles Stalin in his ability to base a personal dictatorship on an obedient party bureaucracy.

In the area of political practice, perhaps the best contrast between Yugoslavia and the new Poland is afforded by the character of their respective legislatures. The Yugoslav Federal Assembly is as much a rubber stamp institution as any of the satellite "legislative" bodies. The Polish Sejm, although it does not compare with Western parliamentary institutions, does provide a limited forum for the expression of opinions which are at variance with the official view of the governing party. In allowing other political parties to have some voice in discussing the country's policies, Gomulka approaches the liberal views expressed a few years ago by the Yugoslav dissident Djilas—views which were rejected out of hand by Tito and which landed Djilas himself in jail.

IN THE ECONOMIC as in the political and foreign policy spheres, Gomulka's position is much more complicated than that of Tito. Tito left the Soviet bloc before Moscow's plans for its tight economic integration were put into action. While his experiments in industrial management have not been overly successful in improving economic conditions, he has received enough aid from abroad to prevent the Yugoslav living standard from falling below a "safety" level. Poland, on the other hand, has suffered deeply from the effects of economic integration with the USSR, which has meant in practice the subordination of Polish needs to the economic interests of Moscow. For years the Soviet milking of Polish resources has left the population to survive as best it could under conditions of desperate deprivation. Economic discontent, as symbolized by Poznan, was the driving force which carried the workers to the support of Gomulka and which gave substance to the shadow of intellectual polemics.

Poland's present economic situation remains grave. At

[18] *Trybuna Ludu,* April 26, 1957.

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the Ninth Plenum Gomulka revealed that wages had increased out of all proportion to production, and declared that this trend would have to be stopped. Barring substantial aid from other sources, Gomulka is dependent on Soviet benevolence and, above all, on his people's willingness to put up with their hardships for some years to come. Hunger is much more likely to bring Gomulka down than any ideological deviation or political pressure, either from the right or the left.

Mutual Protest and a Mutual Dilemma

As the basis of some summary remarks, it might be pointed out that in one area Gomulka and Tito speak as a single voice; that is in their mutual denial that they are "national Communists." While the Twentieth CPSU Congress proclaimed the right of every country to follow its own road to socialism, the Soviet leadership has been firm in insisting that this principle must not be confused with "national communism." The latter has been defined by party leader Ekaterina Furtseva as "nothing but an attempt to set the incorrectly understood national interest of one country against the common socialist interests of the working people of all countries." [19] Both the Yugoslav and the Polish Communists deny that their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism can be described as "national communism." In its defense against Soviet accusations, Belgrade alleges that this term was invented by the bourgeois press and has now been adopted by some Communist parties, but that it has never been used by the Yugoslav Communists themselves. The Communist organ *Borba* has asserted that the argument between the Yugoslav Communists and "conservative" elements in Communist parties elsewhere is in essence a question of socialist development; Yugoslavia's opponents are accused of "trying to conceal the true character of the quarrel by pretending that the bone of contention is nationalism and not the progress of socialism." [20] The Polish Communists, too, are very anxious to dissociate themselves from the taint of "national communism." At the Ninth Plenum, Gomulka declared: "We reject and will continue to reject all absurd attempts to look for national communism in our party."

Both Yugoslavia and Poland are pursuing policies which deviate considerably from those carried out in the USSR since 1917. Tito and Gomulka might resent any suggestions of "national communism," but they can scarcely deny that their specific roads are precisely that. They are both trying to make socialism, which is far from being universally popular in their countries, more palatable to masses. At the same time both are firm in stressing that the Leninist brand of socialism is their final goal. The process of combining the imposition of a disliked political system with the granting of limited freedom of expression is an extremely dangerous one. Sooner or later one of these trends must gain the upper hand and eliminate the other. This is true even of Tito's Yugoslavia, where the repressive trend has always been in the ascendant and where the momentum of nine years of inertia has helped to create a false sense of stability.

In Poland the ultimate clash between these two trends is likely to occur much sooner than in Yugoslavia: diverse thoughts are still contending and the many objective difficulties facing Gomulka cannot be solved by enthusiasm alone. On the contrary, an excess of enthusiasm might well wreck the Polish road to socialism.

By now it is highly unlikely that the Soviet leaders would adopt forcible methods to solve any potential controversy with Yugoslavia. While Tito's example may have generally influenced the trend of Communist countries toward greater independence from Moscow, his particular brand of socialism is not so attractive as to threaten direct contagion. Apart from prestige the Soviets have lost little by Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist bloc. By contrast the loss of Poland, a vital link in their strategic system, would be disastrous for them. As long as Gomulka's present policies are applied, the Soviet leaders will allow the Polish experiment to continue. However, it is hard to conceive that they would ever permit Poland to leave the so-called camp of socialism. The question remains whether the people of Poland will accept the *status quo* indefinitely.

[19] Speech at the Lenin commemoration rally n Moscow, published in *Pravda,* April 23, 1957.

[20] February 14, 1957.

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Workers' Councils in Poland

By Kazimierz Grzybowski

IN CONTRAST TO YUGOSLAVIA where they were planned from above, the workers' councils functioning today in Poland were the result of a spontaneous movement among the factory crews of Polish industrial enterprises. They are the Polish workingman's bid to control his own economic destiny and to create a genuinely representative institution in a land of fictitious "people's democracy." Already, during the Poznan uprising, factory crews pushed forward their demands and organized their action through *ad hoc* elected committees. Later, during the critical days of October-November 1956, all factories in the Warsaw area and some scattered at various places in the provinces were taken over by workers' councils. In Warsaw and elsewhere the councils either replaced the regular factory managements or gained control over their decisions.

The Statute on Workers' Councils adopted on November 19, 1956, was therefore a concession by the government to a popular *fait accompli.* It constitutes a link between the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka and the achievements of the revolutionary period, and it provides the legal basis for the operation of a new institution and the exercise of newly-won freedoms.[1]

The workers' councils created by this law are the primary units of the economic administration, subordinate in the last instance to the various economic ministries of the government. They provide the basic instrumentality for ironing out conflicts of interest between labor and management and assuring their cooperation in running economic enterprises. The composition of the councils represents a compromise between two opposed principles: The first aims at unitary factory management and is reflected in the provision giving the factory director *ex officio* membership on the council of his plant. The second recognizes, on the other hand, that there is a conflict of interest between labor and management; it is reflected in the prohibition of the factory director, or his deputy, from holding the position of council chairman. In addition, the law stipulates that not more than one-third of the members of a council shall be persons holding administrative or managerial jobs.

The factory director, as *ex-officio* council member, occupies a very special position. On the one hand, he is obligated to keep the council fully informed of what he is doing and how he is executing its resolutions. On the other, as the council's executive officer, he may act without its prior consent in exceptional circumstances, provided that he later notifies the council and obtains its approval. At the same time the director is bound by the directives of the higher authorities of the state economic administration and must give them precedence over the resolutions of the council. Where a conflict occurs, it is his duty to enforce the will of the authorities. He may also refuse in the first instance to execute a council order if—and only if—he deems it contrary to government laws or the state economic plan. In that case the matter goes to a higher authority, which decides either for the director or for the council.

Factory or enterprise directors continue to be government appointees, but their appointments now require the prior consent of the workers' councils. The councils also have the right to recommend their own choice for the posts of director or deputy-director in their respective plants, as well as the right to demand the dismissal and replacement of government appointees already occupying these positions.

THE BASIC LAW contains several provisions intended to ensure the ability of the councils to resist pressures from the factory managements and effectively protect the interests of the workers. For one thing, it stipulates that the councils' statutes shall be formulated by general meetings of the factory crews, to which the councils are solely responsible. Further, no provision is made for the dissolution of the councils by higher authorities, nor does the law make any reference to "democratic centralism" as a basis for subordinating them to the ad-

[1] For text of Statute on Workers' Councils, see Dziennik Ustaw, 51/238/1956.

Mr. Grzybowski is Assistant Editor of the Mid-European Law Project of the U.S. Library of Congress and author of numerous studies on Soviet and Satellite legislation. He edited *Economic Treaties and Agreements of the Soviet bloc in Europe, 1945-1951* (New York, 1952).

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