

NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

THE MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Frederic Louis Huidekoper. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

It is doubtless difficult for an advocate of military preparedness in these days to express his convictions with impeccable moderation. To be sure, if those who urge upon us the need of a larger and better equipped army and navy sometimes represent the American people as more profoundly immersed in a fatuous sense of security than is actually the case, they are not wholly to blame: the peace advocates "have gie'd them fair excuse." Nevertheless there is something repellent in any discourse that savors of *ex parte* pleadings. "As a child," writes Mr. Frederic Louis Huidekoper in his book, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*, "he [the American citizen] is taught from school books the authors of which have extolled to the skies the prowess of our 'citizen soldiery' and have painted in glowing colors the brilliancy of American military successes, while they have glossed over or suppressed with studied care the blunders and fearful cost in life and money which have characterized our past wars." This is hardly fair to the authors of modern text-books of history. In such books there is little "extolling" or "painting in glowing colors," and surely there is no deliberate suppression of truth. Not many voters, it may be presumed, have suffered in youth an impairment of judgment consequent upon a diet of history over-sugared with patriotism.

On the whole Mr. Huidekoper's treatise would be rather more persuasive if it did not now and then make the reader feel that he must be rather stupid to warrant his being belabored with arguments so weighty, so emphatic, and so often reiterated. It would be a pity, however, if Mr. Huidekoper's treatise should fail to secure wide popularity either because of its argumentative manner or on account of its somewhat formidable length and detail. The book contains much sound argument as well as many pertinent facts that are not elsewhere accessible to the majority of readers. No other work dealing with military preparedness in the United States is more informing in regard to the status and history of the army than this of Mr. Huidekoper's; no book designed for non-military

readers discusses the broad questions of military policy so comprehensively and intelligibly.

In two essential respects Mr. Huidekoper's point of view is entirely justified. The first of these is the less obvious and of the less immediate consequence. Nevertheless, it is a real and important consideration. There is undoubtedly room for a treatise, suitable for lay readers, dealing with the military history of the United States. Without such a treatise, a part—though not perhaps the most important part—of our national history—remains obscure to all but the expert. For it is scarcely feasible for the general historian to write adequately of our wars as military events, or to discuss at length the pros and cons of military policy. The historian, indeed, must presuppose in his readers an elementary knowledge of civil government, international law, and economics. These subjects are somewhat carefully taught, in connection with history or apart from it. In regard to military matters, however, the knowledge which most persons bring to the reading of history is not even elementary—it is made up largely of childish conceptions. Again, Mr. Huidekoper is certainly right in insisting upon the need at the present hour of a clearly defined plan of preparation. It is precisely because the need of such a plan is felt that his book will be widely read. The fact is not that Americans are now so apathetic upon the subject of national self-defense as to require rhetorical arousing, but rather that they are already aroused to the point of desiring extensive and sanely presented information on military questions.

In matter, if not always in manner, Mr. Huidekoper's book hits the mark. As a history, supplying an analytical view of every important military event from the colonial period to the close of the Philippine war, it possesses a value that will endure long after the issue of preparedness now before the country has been definitely and—it may be hoped, thoroughly—settled. The light which the author throws upon the conduct of our past wars will be appreciated by every reader of history who is not content with superficialities. Nor are Mr. Huidekoper's careful discussions of military matters too technical for readers gifted with intellectual curiosity and a moderate degree of patience. The whole subject of military policy and administration is easily understood in outline and in illustration; it resolves itself into questions of common sense and of arithmetic.

The lessons which Mr. Huidekoper draws from the experience of the United States in former wars are mainly those which have been more or less expatiated upon of late, with varying degrees of insistence upon particular points, by writers who treat of preparedness from the expert point of view. The Regular Army, it seems evident, has invariably been too small to assure success in any considerable military operations. Never once has the Army been prop-

erly organized, or so constituted that when war approached it would be automatically expanded to the requisite strength. No proper reserves have ever existed, and in consequence the Army has almost invariably been compelled to accept such recruits as offered themselves. Moreover, in no case have measures been taken to increase the Regular Army until the eve, and frequently after the beginning, of hostilities. As a natural consequence, far too much dependence has always been placed upon raw troops, and until the Philippine war no proper standard was set either for militia or for volunteers. Mistakes even more deeply rooted in ignorance, or in unwillingness to face facts, are, in the author's opinion, the persistent failure of Congress to realize that where a choice is offered men invariably prefer to enlist in that organization in which discipline is most lax; and the "total inability of Congress and the American people" to perceive that the Army of the United States must be placed unreservedly under the control of the Federal Government. To these fundamental errors must be added the uniform neglect to provide *beforehand* for the requisite equipment of the number of troops likely to be called into service during the war. Finally, the lesson of the past, the one which the author reiterates and most heavily emphasizes, is the fact that "the policy of the length of enlistments has uniformly been the very incarnation of folly." More than once, as a result of the failure to prescribe that all enlistments shall be *for the war*, dependable forces have had to be discharged; generals in the field have been forced to act in opposition to military judgment; and the safety of the country has been jeopardized by the depletion of armies at just the time when troops were imperatively needed. These contentions are backed by a presentation of historic facts that seems not only conclusive but fairly exhaustive.

But in addition to the lessons of history, there are the lessons of common sense. The Act of May 27, 1908, specifically prescribed that "the Organized Militia shall be called into the service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise." This is the rock of offense that seems to loom largest in the eyes of most military experts. Mr. Huidekoper denounces it as "one of the most flagrant pieces of folly ever injected into the military legislation of our country," and adds that "so long as it remains on the statute books there need be no hope of our possessing a sound military organization suitable to the stress of war." Reason requires, thinks Mr. Huidekoper, that the militia should either be nationalized or, if it is to remain under State control, that it should be "appraised at its true value" and relegated to the last line of defense.

In Mr. Huidekoper's opinion, however, it is not enough to correct legislative mistakes of this nature or to make wise supplementary laws for the administration of the army. The author is

a thorough-going advocate of preparedness. The plan which he proposes calls for four lines of defense, consisting of an enlarged Regular Army, a body of reserves, a body of United States volunteers, and the Organized Militia or National Guard. In this way, it is thought, a force of at least 1,200,000 men, of whom 670,000 would have had training in the Regular Army, would be provided. This plan, it is true, involves a relatively short term of active service with the colors for each member of the Regular Army and a relatively long term of service in the reserves—a feature sometimes objected to by military writers on the ground that it tends to impair the efficiency of the Army by making it a school for recruits. This, however, is a point for discussion among experts. For the general reader the interest of the discussion will lie in the apparent feasibility of Mr. Huidekoper's plan in its broad outline, and in the author's conservative estimate of the number of troops necessary to defend the country.

Mr. Huidekoper's volume is a cyclopaedia and source book for the advocate of preparedness; but it is far more than this. It is, as has been said, a valuable military history—a record and critique, moreover, of military legislation in the United States from the War of the Revolution to the present day. As an exposition of military needs it probably expresses better than any other single work the consensus of opinion among military men regarding the land-forces of the United States.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: AN INTERPRETATION. By Albert Bushnell Hart. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1916.

No political idea is more deeply impressed upon the minds of most Americans than that which is represented by the words "Monroe Doctrine," and yet this familiar idea, when an attempt is made to analyze it, usually turns out to be what the psychologist Weininger called a "henid," or pseudo-idea. The truth, as expressed by Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, is simply that "the Monroe Doctrine is not an utterance or a series of utterances, but a frame of mind, the nature of which is from time to time described in the generalizations of those who are in a position to know the facts and also to gauge the temper of the country. . . . The number of Doctrines since 1849 is about the same as the number of Secretaries of State."

Professor Hart's treatise upon the Monroe Doctrine is a clarifying discourse; it will reveal to many readers their own actual belief, transforming what has been a mere "henid" into a true conception. The book shows, indeed, what the country as a whole has always believed, separating the essential from the accidental. In effect, then, Professor Hart does two things: he traces the trans-