

novelist Querido, the critic Van Campen, the poet Jacob Israel de Haan. The last of these is the inspired prophet of the Jewish revival, the singer of the new "Jewish Hymn" celebrating the mystic beauty of the old religious feasts and wording the longing of his race for the ultimate return to Palestine. Zionism is the gospel he preaches, and an unshakable faith in the invincibility of the Jewish race is his creed.

That magnificent Hebrew pride, so different from the fawning servility of the older generation, is the main power of this revival. Its weakness is in the lack of an international language and literature. For this Hebrew movement in Holland is only one phase in the general renaissance of the race all over the world. There must be prophets like De Haan in Russia and America, in all countries of neutral and warring Europe. But the Yiddish which is the common language of them all is not a fit instrument for the prophet's inspired song. In Holland, as in America, it is a mere jargon of everyday life, lacking the finer qualities which go to the making of poetic diction. Hence Zionism, in the field of letters, is doomed to remain a national and polyglot movement, enriching each separate literature rather than adding force to the international action. In Holland this gain from Hebrew fiction is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes from the Capital

W. J. BURNS.

William John Burns, whose recent activities in the Seymour case in New York have kept him "head-lined" in the newspapers there, is well known in Washington, where for several years he was a member of the Secret Service detailed for special work. It would be hard to find a man with less outward resemblance to the Old Sleuth of the detective stories. His face, though not so large and smiling as ex-President Taft's, suggests it strongly in the lines radiating in all directions from the nose. His frame is powerful, he has a double chin, and his girth is full without being excessive. His eyes are light, symmetrically set, steady of gaze, but not piercing; and temperamentally he strikes you as well poised, never giving way to undue enthusiasms, and equally avoiding aloofness.

There is no single key to the secret of Burns's success, which has as many phases as the wind. First, he makes it so rigid a rule to take nothing for granted that I venture to say, if the trail of a forgery, for instance, seemed to lead into the White House, not even the President could escape scrutiny. Again, he works up a case as a student commonly prepares a thesis, looking over his ground with the utmost thoroughness, settling upon a definite assumption of fact, and then marshalling every occurrence, tradition, argument, guess, or theory which can be made to pay tribute to it. Also, he is absolutely tireless in body and mind, contemptuous of anything which gets in his way, and especially of the conventional proprieties where they threaten to shield a suspect whom he is after. Finally, he does not attempt a capture till he feels sure that he has got his quarry past the possibility of escape. Of course, he is as liable to mistakes as other human beings; but the multitude and magnitude of his unequivocal successes have led

the public to presume the guilt of any one upon whom he pounces at the end of his painstaking pursuit.

Whoever believes that "crooks" are born, and not made, will quarrel with the notion cherished by Burns that the best of us will bear watching, and that no absolute assurance can be drawn from an apparently spotless past career. I have been present on more than one occasion when he has put a man of supposed virtuous character through the closest ordeal. This consists of being seated in a private room, face to face with Burns, alone or in the presence of perhaps one other person who is supposed to know the details of the case, and questioned. Burns, satisfied that he has caught his man, gives him a chance to confess. If he does not yield at once, Burns inquires why he does not, and perhaps proceeds to reason with him as to the practical wisdom of clearing his conscience without further delay. If that fails, Burns seems to be pointed towards his next move by the emotional symptoms of the suspect. Bravado he meets with a manner which shows very plainly that it is thrown away on him. Evasion draws from him volley after volley of stinging interrogatories: "Now tell me what first tempted you to do this." "Can you pretend that you did not know better than to do such a thing?" "Come—out with it!—you thought it wasn't *very* bad, didn't you?" "Have you ever done anything of this sort before?" And so on and on, till the squirming fellow inadvertently blurts out an answer which will bear only one construction, and is therefore equivalent to an admission of guilt. After that, the rest is comparatively easy.

Naturally, the greatest difficulty is experienced where the suspect shows neither effrontery nor weakness, but calmly answers the questions put to him and waits for more. Such instances are rare, and usually the man with the unshifting mien of innocence, if really guilty, will be betrayed by some glance, or intonation of voice, or request for repetition, which, however faint in itself, telegraphs its confirmatory message to the sensitive intelligence of the inquisitor. In short, it is his own wits, pitted against the nerves of his victims, in which Burns reposes his trust, rather than on physical force. He scorns the revolver habit, and goes boldly in among the criminals he is studying, with his brain always alert, but his pockets empty of weapons. The professional evil-doers know this; but his despatch of danger and the cocksure resolution with which he sets about his work constitute a safeguard as effective as a portable arsenal.

Burns, who is now about fifty-five years old, began life as an assistant in his father's tailor shop in Columbus, O. The father, active in the city's public affairs, happened to be made Police Commissioner. William, who had always taken a boy's interest in mystery stories, came thus into contact with the local detective force, and one day criticised its method of going at a particularly involved case. The elder Burns chuckled somewhat at these comments.

"So you think you could do the job better than my men?" he asked, with amusement.

"I know I could," was the lad's instant answer.

To prove his confidence, he went at the case himself, caught his man, and brought him in. From that hour his calling has been unquestioned.

TATTLER.

The Caliphate

By D. B. MACDONALD.

The Caliphate is the symbol of the traditionally and theoretically essential and necessary political unity of the Moslem world. The religious observances of Moslems—their daily worship, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage, etc.—may symbolize their religious unity; but the business of the Caliph is the administration of the affairs of their world in the widest sense, and the conception of his office looks back to a time in the remote past when these duties were really carried out and forward to a time in the millennial future when the carrying out of these duties will again be possible. At the present time, therefore, to call any one a Caliph means to assert his right to administer politically the affairs of the Moslem world. A Caliph, consequently, is to be sharply distinguished from a Pope, with whose office his is too often confused, in that he, first, is only an executive and has no right to develop or define what is of faith for Moslems—that is done by the Moslem people through their "agreement"—and, secondly, his executive functions cover all sides of life, political, legal, religious.* The interest, therefore, of the present situation lies in this question: Will the Caliph of the future continue to maintain this claim to the headship of a politically unified Islam, and will Islam continue to feel itself a political unity over against the non-Moslem world, or will the principle of nationality prevail among the Moslem peoples as it has elsewhere and their Caliphate become merely a symbol of religious unity? Caliph is the title used here as the one most commonly known with us; but Moslems use in its place, as often as not, *Amir al-mu'minin*, "Commander of the Faithful," and even *Imam*, "Leader," taking that word in its highest sense. These three are practically interchangeable.

The status, duties, and rights of a Caliph are made most intelligible by the early historical development. The theory of the Caliphate, too, is based upon the precedents then established and upon a few sayings which, though put into the mouth of Mohammed, were really forged to support one political party or another. Mohammed at Medina had administered directly all the affairs of his people; he had been, like Moses and the Hebrew Judges, their individual and absolute ruler and judge. As Prophet, he had also been a first-hand source of faith and law; dogmas and legal rulings he could produce at need. This position of his was strictly in accordance with Arab, and

*The theory of the Caliphate has been repeatedly treated by Moslem theologians and canonists. It is hardly in place here to give references to Arabic texts; but two such treatments exist in translation. One of these is Léon Ostrorog's "Traité de droit public musulman" (Paris, 1901), a translation of the "Ahkam as-sultaniya" of Mawardi, Vol. I, pp. 89-195, and the other is De Slane's translation of "Les Prolégomènes d'Ibn Khaldoun" (Paris, 1863), Vol. I, pp. 384-444. These supplement one another very happily.

indeed Semitic, ideas. To the authority, in a sense shading into *auctoritas*, of an Arab chief over his tribe he had added the infallibility of a prophet and the unifying and arousing force of a new idea—Islam. When he died, then, his position had to be filled, so far as that was possible. Of his four immediate "successors" (*Khalifa*, Caliph, means "successor")—the only ones recognized by all Islam—the first, the third, and the fourth were chosen by elective councils and in rapidly increasing political turmoil, and the second was nominated by the first.

It was thus fixed for the Moslem world, at least for that large portion of it which is called Sunnite, that its head should be freely elected by the people or nominated by his predecessor, and then accepted by the people. In theory, therefore, the power is of the people functioning as a free democracy, but the people chooses to be governed by a single individual who is then given absolute power and is to be obeyed implicitly as long as he breaks no essential law of Islam; if he does, he may be recalled by the people which appointed him. He appears, externally, to be an autocrat, but is not, and the people always retains the sacred right of insurrection. It is a disputed point whether tyranny and personal immorality are valid grounds for recall. One school of constitutional law so holds, but another teaches that so long as the Caliph is a Moslem and an effective ruler he must be obeyed. Into the further details as to whether tyranny or immorality deprives him of his office *ipso facto*, or whether he must be formally deposed, and again whether the people *must* depose him for these reasons, or only *may*, it is not necessary to enter.

Again, by the necessities of the case, the functions of this single ruler came in time to be discharged by a multitude of officials. The Caliphate was put into commission; but each official acted by delegated authority, and it is laid down as one of the responsibilities of the Caliph that he should personally satisfy himself that his deputies are doing their duty. Practically, the Caliph vanished behind a screen of administrative machinery and only at crises of the state did the people have any contact with him.

But though the successor of the Prophet, it is plain that the Caliph can only partially take the place of the Prophet. He cannot promulgate or define doctrines or laws; he can only defend and apply those already given forth and defined; in a word, he can only administer what is accepted as being of Islam. But that does not mean that the system of Islam is unchangeably fixed; it is quite the contrary. There are far greater possibilities of addition, development, and change inherent in the Moslem people than, for example, in the Pope, even when speaking *ex cathedra*. If that people agrees that any doctrine or law is of Islam, it is of Islam. This is the principle of the Agreement, and is crystallized in a saying put into the mouth of the Prophet: "My People will never agree in an error." Further, this Agreement is not reached by any specific

decisions of councils. The Moslem people, rather, develops it, as it were, unconsciously through a process of gradual crystallizing of opinion. Individuals who by study and attainments have a right to have an opinion of their own on the point in question come to have the same opinion, and the thing is accomplished. This, of course, takes place everywhere in the formation of common opinion; but in Islam it has been observed, analyzed, and established as a definitive source—and the final one—of theology and law.

So much it is necessary to state to clear away the prevalent view that the Caliph is a Pope. He is an executive and his business is to administer all the affairs of Islam, religious and secular, and to watch over the purity of its doctrine and usage. But it may well be asked how this theory can be brought into agreement with the historical facts, and, especially, with the existence of hereditary dynasties of Caliphs, such as the Abbasids. The basis for these lies in the admitted right of the Caliph to nominate his successor; so Abu Bakr nominated Umar, and the nomination was accepted. On the detailed theoretical limitations with which the canonists have surrounded this right of nomination they themselves are in dispute, and a consideration of them would lead us too far; in practice they have been ignored. Apart from the hereditary dynasties, the most conspicuous case of nomination is that which passed on the Caliphate to the Ottoman House. In 1538 the last representative of the Abbasids died in Egypt as a purely titular Caliph, and he nominated as his successor Suleiman the Great, the Sultan of the Ottoman Turks. Since then that sultan has received, at his accession, a double investiture. He is girded with the sword of Othman as the Sultan of the Ottomans, and he is chosen by the Sheikh al-Islam, the official head of all the canonist-theologians of Turkey since that office was created in 1453, as the Caliph of the Prophet, the head of the Moslem world, and symbolic representative of its theoretical unity. This action of the Sheikh al-Islam is regarded as being that of the Moslem people; he, as it were, casts a ballot for them, a far more regular and legal proceeding than the violent scenes which so often took place in the stormy times of the later Abbasids, when the mob of the capital, or even the palace guard, assumed the same function.

But it becomes plain how theoretical is that unity when we consider that it existed only for 138 years, and that since A. D. 755 the Moslem world has never acknowledged allegiance to a single ruler. Somewhat later, in the tenth century, as Stanley Lane-Poole has picturesquely put it, "the Mediterranean washed the territories of three rival Caliphs." Indeed, if we take account of more fugitive and less important secessions, we might push the period of unity back to within thirty years of the death of the Prophet. So many Moslems have felt, and their position has been put in the form of

a statement from Mohammed, "My Successorship will last thirty years; thereafter will come kings and princes."

This was one—a violent—method of evading the difficulty. Another was to develop the doctrine that when there were lands of Islam so far removed from the country of the Caliph that his influence and authority could not reach to them, it was allowable for the people of those lands to choose a Caliph of their own. This was upheld by canonists of the first rank in both east and west, and especially, apparently, in the west. Spain was too far from Bagdad for the Abbasid Caliph to be there more than a name. So, in 929, Abd ar-Rahman III, the Umayyad of Cordova, took the title of Caliph with the approval of the canonists of his court who urged this theory.

It would be vain in the space possible here to work through the history of the Caliphate; but the resultant present situation can be put quite shortly. Moslems today look to, roughly, six different supreme rulers. By far the largest number render an allegiance, often dubious, to the Ottoman Sultan. On a basis of strict canon law his claim to that allegiance is shaky; for almost all Islam accepts as valid a statement put into the mouth of Mohammed that the Caliph must be of the tribe of Quraish, that of the Prophet himself. Abd al-Hamid, the late deposed Sultan, felt the force of this so strongly that the tradition in question had to be omitted in collections of traditions printed at Constantinople. The true basis of the Ottoman claim is really pragmatic. That Sultan is undoubtedly the greatest independent ruler in the Moslem world, and to him, therefore, the headship belongs by right. This basis would, of course, vanish with the vanishing or considerable curtailment of Turkey.

Afghanistan is probably the next greatest independent Moslem country. But its origin is comparatively modern, dating from about the middle of the eighteenth century, and its Amir, although in treaties he is now a "majesty," is debarred by treaty from external political relationships, and has never been associated with aspiration to the Caliphate.

The second of the six is the Invisible Imam of the Twelver sect of Shi'ites. All Shi'ites believe that Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth Caliph of the Sunnites, was his divinely appointed immediate successor and was wrongfully kept from his rights by his three predecessors; further, that his children had an equally divine right to succession after him. This is one of the legitimist parties in Islam, as opposed to the Sunnite or democratic party, and Shi'ism has sometimes run perilously close to deifying the line of Ali. All Persia believes that the twelfth in descent from Ali was removed by Allah from the sight of men and is now being preserved alive in retirement until his time to reappear shall come. This withdrawal happened about A. D. 874, and still, for Persians, after more than a thousand years, he is al-