

# *The West and the "New Asia"*

RICHARD L. WALKER

## *I. The Winds of Change*

IN THE mid-1950's, it was fashionable to refer to the "new Asia." The term was used to refer in general to nations with a strong anti-colonialist sentiment which were favorably disposed toward Communist China and the Soviet Union, were on the whole negative in their sentiments toward the West, and were expected to proceed toward modernization by generally socialist paths blazed by four-year, five-year or seven-year plans.

In the mid-1960's, the real revolution seems to have taken place elsewhere in Asia, and the "new Asia" which has emerged on a more or less pragmatic basis with relatively close ties with the West has for the most part excluded the influence of Marx and Lenin. The rapid movement into modernity on the part of Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and Malaysia seems to point toward these countries as the "new Asia" of the 1960's.

A fair number of beliefs, widely held in the 1950's, have been swept aside in the emergence of the new "new Asia." Then, for example, it seemed that stability could best be achieved within the framework of a discipline such as had been imposed by Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party in mainland China, and that perhaps the answers to questions posed by the "revolution of rising expectations" lay in the Chinese pattern. But by 1967, the power struggle in China—where a rule of law and a standard for orderly succession in government have not been achieved—has brought terror, armed clashes, economic disruption, executions, suicides, and the massive disorder of the "Red Guard" movement. In Indonesia Sukarno's attempt to create a synthetic adaptation of the Chinese approach has resulted in instability and runaway inflation, and, in the wake of an attempted coup by the Communists, bloodshed and suffering. By contrast, in the latter half of the 1960's, orderly economic development,

stable governmental processes, and overall social progress characterizes the countries which have not predicated their policies on emotional anti-Westernism as the path toward development, as have Communist China and Indonesia.

It was to this changed situation that Secretary of State Dean Rusk referred on July 12, 1966, when he reported to the American people on his eighth trip to the Western Pacific since he had assumed office. He noted, "From Australia in the south to Japan and Korea in the north, new winds are blowing." The American Secretary of State was not referring to the "East Wind" of Communist victory which, in 1957, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung had proclaimed was prevailing in the world. This fact of rapid change is of fundamental importance for the assessment of various forces and their direction of movement in international relations around the world, but in many respects it has hardly been grasped by many Western political and intellectual leaders. Perhaps they are still too committed to the slogans and analyses of the 1950's, or possibly they are clinging to a mythology of an unchanging East. Again, preoccupation with the central threat of Communist China may have diverted attention from the important developments which have taken place outside the areas of Communist control. In any event, in the mid-1960's the West is becoming involved with an entirely different Far East than it withdrew from in the first decade after World War II.

It is instructive to examine the contrasts between 1957, when de-Stalinization and revolts in Eastern Europe had first brought fissures in the Communist world, and 1967, when the monolithic nature of world communism—which had been assumed by West and East alike—was truly shattered. In that decade many of the

assumptions upon which foreign policies of the various powers had been based were either called into question or proven false.

In 1957, in the aftermath of the first Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, attention was directed toward the possibility that a presumed Afro-Asian unity constituted a major new force in the world. Leaders in the West were impressed by the rapidity of the retreat from colonialism following World War II and were sensitive to the statements of leaders of newly independent states who found common cause in the anti-colonial movement in which they had come to power. The defeat of the French in Vietnam seemed to symbolize a new power for an independent Asia. Indian Prime Minister Nehru spoke glowingly, and with a conviction shared by other national leaders, of a multilateral neutralist third force in the world. In the West, scholars and statesmen alike talked of this new force as something permanent on the world scene.

Only a decade later the situation has changed drastically and there is ample reason for reappraisal of former views. The "Bandung spirit" has proved ephemeral. Antagonisms and conflicts among those who spoke of unity and of the new spirit at Bandung in 1955 have prevented the convening of a second Afro-Asian conference. Many leaders, including Nehru, have passed from the scene, and the unity they found in deploring their former colonial status has been replaced by a preponderant concern for the problems of development and security—problems which sometimes lead more to disagreement than cooperation.

In 1957, India and Indonesia took the lead in urging accommodation and adjustment to the new power in mainland China, accepting at face value Peking's pledges to abide by the "five principles of

peaceful coexistence." A decade later the Chinese Communist regime has isolated itself from many of the Afro-Asian countries. Its border clashes with India, its complicity in the abortive coup in Indonesia, its strident assertion that "war is a great school," and its insistence that Afro-Asian unity could only be maintained on Chinese terms have raised serious doubts among Peking's former supporters about Communist China's ability to participate in constructive development and peaceful cooperation. Whereas in 1957 Peking could win accolades by an intense anti-imperialist line, ten years later the new nations of Asia are not as willing to cut all ties with the West. The Chinese Communists, instead of riding the forces of anti-imperialism, posed a new imperialist threat of their own. Moreover, they are themselves clearly out of touch with the great changes which are taking place in the many countries around their borders.

Although Khrushchev's destruction of the Stalin myth in early 1956 had caused real consternation in the Communist parties of Asia, there still seemed to be at that time a common cause and a general acceptance of the truth as expounded from the headquarters of world communism in the Kremlin. Even Mao Tse-tung had stated in Moscow at the time of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1957: "In the present-day world to reject the Soviet Union is tantamount to rejecting peace." By 1967, however, it is difficult to find much substance in the phrase "the world Communist movement," at least as far as Asia is concerned. The Sino-Soviet dispute has divided and weakened the Communist parties, and there is no longer a single line or strategy or leadership or organization. The intensity of the Sino-Soviet polemics and the cynicism of great power contention revealed in

the mutual denunciations has undercut much of the ideological fervor within the membership of the Communist parties in Asia.

Interestingly enough, the decade saw a movement toward re-establishment of interrelations and ties between Europe—both East and West—and Asia. It would have been difficult in the mid-1950's, when the French debacle at Dienbienphu symbolized—or at least so it seemed—the end of European involvement in Asia, to have visualized the extent to which both cultural and economic ties would be revived. Ironically, the awareness that events East and West would continue to affect each other in a world grown small came with Communist China's projection of its influence into the Eastern European scene in late 1956. The subsequent Sino-Soviet dispute accelerated the pace of polycentrism in Eastern Europe, and whereas initially, perhaps, leaders in Eastern Europe looked to Peking for support, a decade later they are turning their attention toward the possibilities that Western Europe might play a more constructive role in the loosening-up process. Eventually the leadership in the Soviet Union may be more amenable to and more aware of the changes taking place than their Stalinoid Chinese Communist comrades, who had first helped to set the process in motion.

But if the loosening up of what could once be accurately described as the "Communist bloc" brought an awareness that events in Asia could have influence in Europe and vice versa, it has been the changes outside the areas of Communist control which have been of overriding importance in bringing Asia and the West back to closer interrelations. While these developments in West and East have not been as newsworthy as the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the trends toward polycentrism, it is argued here that they may be of

longer range and more lasting significance. What has been involved is not alone the vitality and resurgence of the countries of Western Europe, but the fact that some of the countries in Asia have begun to find their own answers to the problems of development and adjustment to the world of the space age, and they have begun to understand that the answers involve cooperation with and re-establishment of ties with the West—in many cases with the former colonial rulers.

In the mid-1950's the world seemed more tuned to a discussion of the application of various ideological approaches to the problems of modernization. Scholars debated at length about which "model" was most applicable for this or that country. There was much talk of the Chinese-Indian rivalry in development and some observers even felt that the fate of Asia would depend upon whether China achieved more by totalitarian processes or India by democratic. A decade later, after the trauma of mainland China's "great leap forward" from 1958 to 1960 and the social-economic disruption it occasioned from 1960 to 1962, and after experiences with Communist Chinese fanaticism demonstrated in the "great proletarian cultural revolution" of 1966-7, there are few Asian leaders who would accept the thesis that the Chinese experience has relevance for them.

The Chinese Communists have clung tenaciously to the Leninist theory of imperialism in their approach to and interpretation of the outside world, and in this they seem as far divorced from the realities of modern life as in other aspects of their behavior. The vitality and economic progress in Western Europe and in Japan have just about laid the ghost of Lenin's theories about imperialism. The former imperial powers, shed of the colonies which proved to be more of a drain on

energy, manpower, and talent than an asset, have never been more prosperous and their people have never before had so much at their disposal in terms of social and economic conveniences.

At the same time that the myth that European power and prosperity rested upon empire was being destroyed, the leaders in Asia were themselves realizing that solutions to their problems did not necessarily lie in ideological commitment, but rather in solid and practical measures frequently unrelated to ideology. With the passing of many of those who had found common cause in their anti-colonialism at Bandung in 1955, leaders in Asia have begun to realize that they must look to the patterns of development and relations which promise long-range stability and a constructive approach to modernization. It is within this framework that we have been witnessing a renewed and intense building of inter-relations between Asia and the West. It is within this framework that several of the states of Asia have been building new patterns of relations among themselves.

## II. *Persistent Factors*

BUT IF there have been winds of change in Eastern Asia in the past decade, many of the problems and forces of the mid-1950's have carried through into the present and have served as limiting factors. Foremost among these has been the revolutionary élan and drive for regional hegemony of the Chinese Communist regime. In its continuing commitment to violence and in its buildup of military power it has for more than a decade and a half constituted a towering threat which has occasioned the expenditure of vast quantities of manpower and resources for security in surrounding areas. As the early illusions about the Peking regime have

faded over the years, concern as to how best to bring mainland China into a pattern of responsible conduct and commitment to peace has intensified.

Although Communist China and its proxies in Eastern Asia have proved persistent in their attempts to apply Mao Tse-tung's formulas for seizure of power, this does not mean that the Soviet Union has abandoned efforts to create Communist regimes. In fact, the Peking-Moscow rivalry may have served to intensify efforts of each Communist power to create large Communist Party organizations amenable to its direction. Whether it be Soviet attempts to influence policies through aid and assistance to India or Communist China's efforts to bring the areas of Southeast Asia under its sway, subversion, pressures, blandishment, internal interference, and propaganda in the non-Communist areas of Asia have seemed to increase in proportion to the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The extent to which Communist activities have been and are likely to continue to be a source of continuing disruption in Asia was perhaps best dramatized by the attempt, on September 30-October 1, 1965, at seizure of power by the Indonesian Communist Party, which was clearly under the influence of Peking. Had this succeeded, it would have been a source of major embarrassment to the Soviet Union, for the Soviets had extended more military assistance to the government of President Sukarno than to any other country outside the Communist camp, and Soviet weapons would have come under control of a Communist Party committed to the Chinese strategy of "people's wars." Thus the continuing Communist commitment to "national liberation," which for both Moscow and Peking means the establishment of Communist regimes, remains a problem in Asia—a problem in all likelihood inten-

sified by the Moscow-Peking dispute.

Closely related to the continuing Communist threat has been the problem of divided countries in Eastern Asia—Korea, Vietnam, and China. In each case dissatisfaction with division on both sides of the continuing conflicts and plans and actions aimed at reunification have constituted a source for tension and for violence which can escalate, as the conflict in Vietnam has illustrated only too clearly. For the most part, initiative in terms of overt action, organizational operations, pressure, and propaganda has remained with the Communist parts of the divided countries.

Communist threats and violence have been in large measure responsible for a final persistent factor in the East Asian scene deserving brief mention: the presence of the United States. From the time of its response to overt Communist aggression in Korea on June 25, 1950, through the Taiwan Straits crises of 1955, 1958, and 1962, and up to its involvement in a major undeclared war against Communist aggression in South Vietnam in 1965-67, the power of the United States has been the major guarantee of the security of the non-Communist parts of divided countries in East Asia as well as the security of other countries threatened by pressures from Peking and Moscow. While Western Europe, behind the shield of NATO, was coping with problems of economic development and cooperation, and while Eastern Europe was groping toward modification of the institutions which had been imposed by Stalinism, the United States almost single-handedly provided resources for development and security in the non-Communist parts of the Far East. This involved significant commitments of economic and military assistance, manning of bases, deployment of naval force, treaty commitments, and the sta-

tioning of significant military forces in the area. In the cases of the divided countries military security required joint manpower commitments. In other cases, such as Japan, the major burden was carried by the United States.

### III. *Forces for Change*

IF BY 1967, there have been great changes in the Communist camp and in the approaches of many of the countries in Asia toward their former colonial masters in the West, there are forces and trends in East Asia which point toward the creation of the sort of regional cooperation which had developed in Europe a decade earlier. Behind the shield of U.S. military protection, the non-Communist countries have begun to show prospects for long-range stability and economic viability. At the same time their leaders are talking and planning in terms of interdependence rather than concentrating on independence. Their concepts of interdependence include long-range economic ties and exchange programs with Europe as well as with the United States.

A major emerging force in East Asia of the mid-1960's is Japan, whose miracle of economic development and progress cannot but carry political and power overtones. By 1966, Japan was the world's third largest steel producer, had captured the bulk of the world's shipbuilding market, had pointed the way for meeting food problems in Asia by intensified methods of agriculture under private ownership, and had become a major trading partner for many of the countries of Europe, both East and West. Japan's foreign trade—in excess of \$15 billion, four times as great as the trade of mainland China which has seven times Japan's population—makes it a major force in world trade. The “new Japan” has

been searching for its role in Eastern Asia with imagination as well as finesse. It has developed plans and programs for development assistance which will make it the second most important country in this field in the Far East after the United States. Also, like some of the European powers, Japan has been seeking to exert some moderating influence on Peking's antagonistic world pose by developing long-term economic arrangements for industrial construction as well as trade. In 1967, the men in Tokyo are approaching the question of trade with Communist China with great confidence, insisting that Peking is more dependent upon the trade than Tokyo. Japanese diplomacy is also moving cautiously toward the amelioration of strains with the Soviet Union.

If Japan has become once again a major force in the Far East, developments in Taiwan and South Korea have been almost as remarkable. Despite great burdens of military mobilization, these two countries now exhibit a rate of economic growth, political stability, fiscal responsibility, and a degree of involvement in world trade and world affairs which argue for their increasing long-range importance both regionally and internationally. The Republic of China, whose land reform and agricultural development have been acclaimed as an example of what can be done in the underdeveloped countries, has carried on a successful program of technical assistance in the agricultural field in a dozen countries in Africa. In similar manner, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia have moved into the mainstream of world trade and into active participation in regional affairs.

Two items can serve to symbolize the new patterns of relations which have been developing in East Asia in the wake of economic and political progress. The first was the formal founding, in Manila in

December 1965, by 22 signatory countries, of the Asian Development Bank with a capitalization of one billion dollars. A few facts are worth noting in connection with the Bank: Japan pledged a total of \$200 million, a contribution matched only by that of the United States; two-thirds of the initial subscriptions were provided by countries of Asia; and six West European countries joined in the venture.

The second item was the convening of the Asian and Pacific Ministerial Conference (ASPAC) in Seoul, Korea, June 14 to 16, 1966. The suggestion came from the Koreans, whose relations with Japan were normalized earlier in the year. Foreign ministers of nine countries joined in urging "more positive and effective cooperation among the participating nations for their common good in the economic, technical, cultural, and social fields as well as the information field." The ministers agreed to continue the meetings on a regular basis and laid plans for their second conference in Bangkok, the membership of which would likely be expanded by participation of other East Asian countries. Here too a few facts are worth noting: the initiative came from the Koreans, the United States was not involved; and, as in the case of the Asian Development Bank, Australia and New Zealand gave clear indications that they intend to make active participation in regional affairs a major feature of their foreign policies.

Such forces for change in free Asia, coming at a time when the Communist camp is in disarray, when Peking's truculence and the frenzy of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" have alienated many of its former friends, and when the countries of Europe are exploring new patterns of economic and political relations around the world, may well prove of greater long-range signifi-

cance than the initiatives coming from the Communist capitals. In the mid-1960's many countries in Asia, though still sensitive about their sovereignty and independence, are willing to look to extensive relations with the West in their plans for economic and political development in a way which would scarcely have been considered possible a decade before. Though Europe hardly figures in the military and strategic picture in the Far East, in political and economic terms the countries of Western Europe are showing initiatives which would have them increasingly involved in Asia's future. This fact was indicated, for example, by the commitment by the Federal Republic of Germany of more than 3.600 billion DM in economic assistance in Asia by the end of 1965, or again by the visit of French President de Gaulle to Cambodia in the late summer of 1966.

Although stress has been placed on developments in non-Communist Asia and the opportunities which have been offered for a revitalized Europe, it is important to note that Communist China has also been receptive to European initiatives in the economic sphere. The Sino-Soviet dispute brought a significant revolution in Peking's trading policies by the end of 1965. In the mid-1950's between 75 and 80 per cent of Communist China's trade was with the countries of the Communist bloc. In 1965 almost 70 per cent was with non-Communist countries, and mainland China's trade with the Soviet Union was almost matched by its trade with Japan and more than matched by trade with the countries of Western Europe. Peking's determination never again to be as dependent upon the Soviet Union as it was in 1960, when the Kremlin withdrew all its technical experts, and China's need to import grain combined to open the fabled "China market" to the West with unexpect-

ed rapidity. Perhaps of longer-range significance than the turn in the direction of mainland China's trade were the agreements for construction of large-scale plants which Peking concluded with Western European countries and Japan. Between 1963 and the end of 1965 the Chinese Communists concluded 28 such agreements involving close to \$200 million. Because such projects last for several years and because of financing arrangements, they have implications which range beyond strict economic limits as far as Peking is concerned, and they could eventually move a new leadership in mainland China toward a less doctrinaire approach to the outside world than the Mao-madness of 1967 seems to promise.

It is, of course, true that for the most part the trend for renewed involvement by Europeans in the affairs of Asia has been in terms of trade, economic assistance and economic development schemes. Yet, in an increasingly sophisticated and interrelated world, economic policies and trade patterns carry greater political ramifications than before. Although there has been no indication that Communist China's increased dependence upon trade with the non-Communist countries has exerted any significant influence on her political and military policies around the world, it is unlikely that the leadership in Peking can continue to remain isolated from the revolutionary changes in thinking which have been taking place in the non-Communist world with which it is increasingly involved and where its influence is clearly on the decline. It must be emphasized that in

terms of lifting the standard of living and economic security of the masses, the real Asian revolution is taking place in the non-Communist sector—in countries such as the Republic of China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and even South Vietnam, all of which have major programs of reform and modernization. This revolution, which is bringing the Asian peoples better housing, more food and clothing, and the educational opportunity appropriate to a technical world, is based on a liberalization and revitalization of free enterprise.

The stand-off between Communist China and the United States, which has caused agony in Vietnam and frequent criticism of the United States among its allies in Europe and Asia, has provided at least a framework within which the countries of Europe have been able to involve themselves once again in the future of Asia and within which many governments in the Far East have been able to search for and find ways to modernize, to move into the mainstream of world affairs, and to overcome some of their emotional fixations against the West. In the years ahead, this period when many Asian nations began to "find themselves" may be regarded as one in which President Kennedy's July 4, 1963, call for a new "Declaration of Interdependence" had been accepted. The cooperation of the Europeans, once again acting constructively in Asia, may well prove to have been a decisive factor. But they may also realize that the sacrifices of the Americans in providing the military security made their cooperation possible.

## *The Current West German Scene*

KLAUS EPSTEIN

TWO DEVELOPMENTS, both completely unexpected as recently as half a year ago, dominate the West German political situation in the winter of 1966-67: the electoral success of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) in provincial elections in Hessen and Bavaria, and the formation of a Great Coalition in Bonn between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The two developments, though separate in their origins, have inevitably become connected with one another and merged in the public mind. The rise of the NPD evokes bitter memories of the Nazi past, and arouses grave anxieties about West Germany's future; the formation of a Great Coalition evokes hopes that long-neglected problems can now be attacked in a spirit free of narrow partisan politics.

However, it also arouses concern because the NPD would become the major beneficiary of the Great Coalition's failure to solve Germany's outstanding problems.

In a country unburdened by Germany's past, the rise of the NPD would scarcely be alarming. It received 7.8 per cent of the vote in Hessen on November 6, 7.4 per cent of the vote in Bavaria on November 20, 1966. Foreign commentators have forgotten too easily that in both provinces more than 92 per cent of the voters supported democratic parties, and that a crackpot fringe of less than 8 per cent is by no means unusual in democratic communities. For example, the Poujadist movement in France in the 1950's—in many ways strikingly similar to the NPD—received more than twice as many votes, yet it disappeared after a few years without leaving