

cision to use the bomb was taken in good faith not to unleash a weapon in vengeance against a ruthless enemy, but primarily to bring a quick end to a barbaric war and secondarily to derive the benefits of a timely victory.

The book prepared by *The New York Times* is a compendium having to do with the effect on the affairs of human beings of the explosion over Hiroshima, from the precise moment of impact, which heralded the dawn of the Atomic Age, until today. Concerned that there should be any debate about the decision to drop the bomb, the editor, John W. Finney, is at pains to point out that with the passage of years true perspective has been lost, for twenty years ago such a debate would have found little audience. However, hindsight of history and the advancement of science now permit a fuller understanding of the cataclysmic event and of its moral and political implications.

The volume consists of some twelve brief essays contributed by members of *The Times* staff and some other writers. Reference to most of these contributors and their essays will suffice to give the flavor of the book. Hanson Baldwin produces a minute-by-minute account of the decision to drop the bomb. A. M. Rosenthal describes Hiroshima today. George R. Packard III, Special Assistant to our ambassador in Tokyo, reports on the generation of Japanese 20-year-olds. Senator Clinton P. Anderson, a member of President Truman's cabinet for three years beginning June 1945, discusses the peaceful use of atomic energy. Richard H. Rovere sketches the relation of the bomb to diplomacy and international politics since 1945, opening his essay, interestingly enough, with the conclusions reached by Alperovitz. William L. Laurence, Science Editor Emeritus of *The Times*, who was the only journalist permitted to witness the test of the first atomic bomb and the only newspaperman to fly with the atomic-bomb mission over Nagasaki, presents a series of interviews with top scientists, revealing their views twenty-years later. And W. H. Auden, the noted poet and essayist, discusses some aspects of the moral and emotional effects of the bomb on Man's consciousness. Concluding the volume are two appendices which contain copies of original documents deemed pertinent, such as Albert Einstein's letter to President Roosevelt and Laurence's eyewitness report on the test at Alamogordo.

The three volumes marked the 20th anniversary last year of the opening of the Atomic Age. But they do not still the debate; rather do they represent a fresh starting point for it.

Reviewed by HENRY M. ADAMS

## *The Giant Antagonists*

**Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict**, by Walter Laqueur, *Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1965. 369 pp. \$6.75.*

THIS INTERESTING book is a study in what the author calls "the metapolitics of Russian-German relations." He has deliberately avoided a conventional history of diplomatic relations on the ground that "what Germans and Russians thought about each other, their civilisations, ways of life, and political systems mattered much more in the long run than all the diplomatic reports." The result is a book of great interest to the general reader as well as to the professional historian. It combines readability with meticulous scholarship. The author has researched deeply in the German archives captured by the Allies in 1945, especially those of the Nazi Party, Propaganda Ministry, SS, and Foreign Office; he has examined innumerable obscure pamphlets written in Russian and German; and he has skillfully utilized the endless secondary literature in German, Russian, French, and English.

The central part of Laqueur's book is devoted to the relationship between the Nazi movement and Russia—both the Russia of communism and the Russia of reactionary counter-revolution. This discussion is preceded by a preliminary sketch of the rise of German Russophobia and Russian Germanophobia before 1917; it is succeeded by a concluding section devoted to Russian-German relations since 1945 and their projection into the future. The author's distribution of emphasis is designed to meet the wishes of readers interested in Naziism and communism—the two most fascinating political phenomena of the modern world—but little interested in such "dead," though historically important, aspects of German-Russian metapolitical relations as the German influence upon Russian Conservatism and Social Democracy before 1917. (Russian Conservatism owed much to German romanticism while Russian Social Democracy, in both its Bolshevik and Menshevik form, was shaped not only by the thought of Marx but by a mixed attitude of attraction and repulsion toward the formidable organizational structure of German Social Democracy).

Laqueur documents far better than any previous author the "Russian influence upon National So-

cialism" in its formative period in the early 1920's (Chapters IV-VI). This influence was exercised primarily through two Baltic German refugees living in Munich who were on close terms with Hitler: Erwin von Scheubner-Richter (1884-1923), who was killed at Hitler's side during the ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch, and Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946), the "philosopher" of the Nazi movement who was hanged after the Nürnberg trials. Laqueur provides much interesting information on the morass of Russian right-wing exile politics, though not all of it is relevant for understanding the rise of Nazism. He shows in convincing detail that the famous protocols of the Elders of Zion, which "documented" the techniques of a Jewish world conspiracy, were introduced to Germany by Russian emigrés after they had already played a considerable role in the ideological outlook of the proto-fascist "Black Hundred" before the first World War. They helped provide Nazism with its favorite theory that Bolshevism was simply part of the Jewish war against civilization—a view which precluded any coherent understanding of communism and led Hitler into his fatal error of underestimating the power of the Russian state. (He was convinced in 1941 that it would quickly collapse under German assault.)

The next four chapters provide an account of German-Russian relations from 1919 to 1939. Since this topic has been exhaustively covered by earlier authors Laqueur confines himself to providing a summary of their conclusions. He is especially good in showing that Rapallo has far greater importance in myth than it ever had in historical reality; other sections document Hitler's consistent anti-Russian stand (even when Goebbels was flirting with the National Bolshevik heresy in 1926) and the remarkable "openmindedness" of much of Weimar public opinion toward all aspects of the "Russian experiment." German-Russian "official relations" were at first remarkably little affected by the Nazi accession to power in 1933, since both regimes maintained the useful fiction that the state was not responsible for the conduct of the governing party. The most original part of this section of Laqueur's book is the excellent monograph on the rather pathetic anti-Comintern organization launched by Eberhart Taubert, a high official of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. It had some success in mobilizing clerical and reactionary circles in the West for anti-Communist purposes, but was never taken very seriously by the top Nazi leadership. A notable lacuna of the book is the absence of any discussion of the "jungle war" between Nazi and Soviet intelligence services in the 1930's;

to give only one example, the "Tukhachevsky Affair," which led to the execution of the Russian marshal on the basis of information concocted by the Gestapo and allegedly delivered to Stalin through Czech channels, is not mentioned.

The Nazi adherence to crazy anti-Semitic notions precluded a correct understanding of communism; the Communists were, however, similarly handicapped in their understanding of Naziism by adherence to the incorrect (though not absolutely crazy) materialist interpretation of history. Laqueur shows in his excellent Chapter XI how Communist errors of analysis and Communist errors in tactics went hand in hand. The preoccupation with class forces led to the preposterous view that the Nazis were merely the lackeys of monopoly capital; the failure to understand the autonomy of political power led to an underestimate of the importance of the Nazi seizure of governmental power in 1933. The unintelligent classification of Social Democrats as "Social Fascists," and the refusal to differentiate between different types of so-called "Fascists"—the Centrist leader Brüning, the ultra-reactionary Papen, the "progressive" General Schleicher, and Hitler himself—led the Communists into ludicrous and suicidal conduct. Suffice it to say that the author provides a definitive case study of the limitations of Marxist social analysis and the fallibility of Moscow's direction of Communist parties in other lands. He provides, by way of contrast, a very balanced view of what Nazism really was, and of the significance of the financial support given by some industrialists to Hitler. The German dictator could with full truth have quoted Mirabeau: "I can be paid, but I cannot be bought." The contributions made to the party by industrialists after 1933 were often little more than protection money.

The remainder of the book is a rather sketchy survey of Russian-German relations from 1939 to 1963. The author is deliberately brief on topics which have elsewhere received definitive treatment, such as Nazi-Soviet relations 1939-41 (by Gerhard Weinberg, 1954) and the German occupation of Russia (by Alexander Dallin, 1957). Notable points of the narrative are Laqueur's very fair-minded statement of Stalin's case for making the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939; his belief that the Nazi attack upon Russia in 1941 was inevitable only because of Hitler's personal views, not any "objective necessity"; his too dogmatic assertion that German defeat on the eastern front was "inevitable" in view of the facts of geography, demography, and economics; and the view that the Russian-American rivalry over Germany after 1945 was not the

result of any avoidable misunderstanding but rather of a *true* (if for Americans belated) understanding of each others' incompatible objectives. It is regrettable, in the opinion of this reviewer, that Laqueur has omitted discussion of two fascinating phenomena which fall into the area of his book: the German-sponsored movement of anti-Stalinist Russians under General Vlasov, and the Russian-sponsored movement of anti-Hitler Germans organized in the Moscow-based National Committee in the years 1943-45. The concluding part of the book is enlivened by a challenging comparison between Hitler and Stalin which forms part of a rather belittling assessment of Stalin as a historical figure.

Laqueur's study is the best we have of an extremely important segment of contemporary history. While uneven in its treatment and by no means a full coverage of the subject, it possesses the great merits of readability, a thorough command of the sources in many languages, and fair-mindedness in dealing with still explosive topics. It succeeds admirably in its aim of conveying to readers in happier lands the tragedy, ferocity, and importance of ideology in the relationship of two great peoples whose incompatible objectives, and reciprocal misunderstandings, have caused untold sufferings to each other and the unhappy peoples—especially the Poles—so unfortunate as to be located between the struggling giants.

Reviewed by KLAUS EPSTEIN

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### *A German Survey*

#### **Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow,**

by Peter H. Merkl, *New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 366 pp. \$7.50.*

THIS REMARKABLE BOOK, written by a professor of political science at the University of California (Santa Barbara), provides an excellent introduction to the contemporary German scene. The author, a post-war German immigrant to America who received his academic training here, combines scholarly detachment with passionate absorption in his subject matter; he wrote the book not only to promote American understanding of German affairs, but also to clarify his own attitude toward the intractable "German problem." Though only a child under the Nazis, he feels that he shares some part of Germany's "collective guilt" and views the understanding of the roots of this guilt as a kind of personal catharsis.

The passionate concern of the German "insider" is balanced, however, by the perspective of the American "outsider" who rejects the outlook, common and flattering to most German defenders and critics, that the "German problem" is somehow unique in its complexity and tragedy. The temporary "solution" to the problem offered by the Nazis between 1933 and 1945 was indeed unique in its barbarism; the terms of the problem requiring solution—the passage from the stable *ancien régime* to dynamic modernity, as defined below—were, however, common to many European and, more recently, non-European countries.

Two introductory chapters seek answers to two frequently asked, closely related questions: Why have the Germans been the problem children of modern Europe? and how was it possible for Hitler to win power in a supposedly civilized country? The answers are provided in the flexible form of several skillfully constructed imaginary discussions held in a Munich tavern between a middle-aged American civic leader of Liberal sympathies, an elderly British professor of German literature with Conservative sympathies, and two young Germans—one a journalist of the Christian Democratic persuasion, the other a Socialist who works as a university assistant in psychology. Since the purpose of the discussions is pedagogic the participants are inevitably spokesmen for particular points of view rather than convincing flesh and blood characters; but it should be said that the intrinsically very difficult genre of the dialogue is used with remarkable success.

Why have the Germans been so troublesome during the last century? The answer lies partly in the historical circumstances which made for a weak bourgeoisie, unable to wrest power from a reactionary Junker landlord class, partly in a strong authoritarian tradition which militated against the development of democratic civic-mindedness. Merkl's major explanation is, however, that the Germans have experienced during the last hundred years an unusually severe crisis of "modernization"—the high-universal process in the contemporary world of the transformation of a rural, hierarchical, religious, and above all *static* into an urban, egalitarian, secular, and above all *dynamic* society. The pace of modernization has been unusually brisk in Germany, the obstacles—in the form of a distinguished and proud "pre-modern" culture and the extraordinary tenacity of well-entrenched "pre-modern" social groups—unusually powerful. The clashes of German history suggest the image of an irresistible force hitting an immovable obstacle.

Why did Hitler get into power? Merkl provides,