

tory of the race is thus vividly portrayed to its descendants. The piece presented last spring was written by Rubén Campos, and was given in the open air in the shadow of the Pyramids of the Sun and the Moon.

So Mexico — so all Latin America — is struggling upward. Our peoples say to Europe: 'America is not only res-

urrecting herself from the débris of her revolutions, but she is laboring, building schools, training better teachers to spread the gospel of peace, constructing out of her native materials a new educational curriculum. America is charting moral standards of her own to pilot her into an already dawning future. She may imitate Europe, but she is striving to avoid Europe's errors.'

POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE. II¹

BY CHARLES SEIGNOBOS

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It would be impossible to find anywhere in France a district where the whole population is of the same political opinion. Every precinct has members of several parties, and there is no department where a single ticket is presented at the polls. France has no political sectionalism such as exists in the United States. Party geography is therefore rather vague, and is determined by local majorities. Subject to that qualification, one may say in general that France is divided first into Conservative regions, — where the old ruling classes have preserved some of their ancient influence, — like Brittany, Anjou, Maine, and Poitou in the North-west. These are pastoral and moorland districts with a sparse population and without large cities or industrial centres. The peasants live on scattered holdings as small tenants, isolated from the world, ignorant, poor, and controlled by the landlords and the

priests. This district, except for the harbor towns of Nantes and Saint-Malo, has regularly sent Royalist deputies to the Chamber.

Normandy, with the exception of the industrial city of Rouen and the naval centre of Cherbourg, is also Conservative. The people are temperamentally much like the country folks of England. The Norman peasant does not trouble himself much about religion. He is well-to-do; he is not particularly interested in democracy; he cherishes a deep respect for the constituted authorities and for property; and he is instinctively afraid of change. As a result he generally votes solidly for Conservative candidates.

On the other hand, Southeastern and Eastern France are democratic and modern. It was here that the first Republican Party was organized in 1792. Roughly, this region embraces Provence, the Dauphiné, Burgundy and Léon with the neighboring districts, Franche-Comté, and La Bresse.

¹ From *Frankfurter Zeitung* (Liberal daily); June 20, 22, 24

Similar political tendencies prevail throughout Southern France from Languedoc to the Pyrenees. Its inhabitants live mostly in country towns, villages, and hamlets, and consist of small farmers, tradesmen, artisans, and a middle class of moderate means. Except for the inhabitants of a few of the remoter mountain valleys, they have long since thrown off all political allegiance to the Church; they recognize no distinctions of rank or wealth, and have completely forgotten the old régime; and they always send to Parliament strong majorities for the Parties of the Left. The Southerners of Provence and Languedoc, who pride themselves on their progressiveness, are inclined to favor the Socialists. 'In fact no practical difference between the Socialists and Radicals exists in the South, but now and then a district will elect a professed Socialist in preference to a Radical, with the help of the Conservative majority, which has often followed under the Third Republic 'the policy of the greater evil.'

Southwestern France, including the Mediterranean coast, Gascony, that portion of Languedoc tributary to Toulouse, Guienne, and Périgord, forms a distinct political region. Its people have the Gascon temperament so often portrayed in our literature. Except for those living in the high Pyrenees, they are suspicious and indifferent to politics and religion. A small portion of this district, including the fertile lowland and vineyard regions, is inhabited by a democracy of small farmers and artisans who always vote for the Left. But the political apathy of a majority of the population enables the Government to exercise an influence here which it rarely possesses in other parts of France; and the majority generally vote with the Party in power. Business considerations have relatively more influence in determin-

ing the action of the voters than anywhere else in the country. Toulouse and the smaller industrial centres, however, form islands of Radical or Socialist opinion. On the other hand, the only other large city in this region, Bordeaux, is not even dependably Republican. Its shopkeepers and the Protestants of Périgord are Republican, as they are everywhere in France, but without strong party feeling.

The broad, hilly plateau that is drained by the Loire and its tributaries and extends from Western France to the Atlantic Ocean is a great battleground between Conservatism and Radicalism. It is here that the peasant freeholders, the tradesmen, and the orchardists of the Loire Valley and part of Berry meet the dairy farmers of Charente and Poitou, and the big landlords of Berry. The population is very dense throughout the districts where the vine, vegetables, and fruit are cultivated, and is very sparse in the sterile and swampy uplands. The iron and coal mines of Berry and Bourbonnais have attracted a growing number of industrial workers. Most of the people have little regard for the authority of the clergy or the social prestige of the rich. But even these democratic and anticlerical peasants, remembering their exceptional prosperity under the Empire, for many years voted for Bonapartist candidates. On the other hand, the working classes are Radical and Socialist. To-day the peasants and small shopkeepers are for the most part Radical Socialists or Conservative Republicans. North of the Loire the same general conditions prevail, although here the peasantry, after long hesitation, seems to have committed itself finally to the Left. Between the heights of the Loire and the narrow valley of the Rhone lies a zone of mountainous, sterile country where the population is relatively sparse and con-

centrated in isolated villages and hamlets without much intercourse with the outer world. These people hold fast to tradition and look upon the priests as their political leaders. Throughout this region the country voters, led by the clergy, divide majorities with the Republicans of the towns, except that in districts with a considerable Protestant population, like the Cévennes, the latter invariably vote for the Left and the Catholics for the Right. A similar situation exists in the Jura and Savoy.

Northwestern France — Brie, Champagne, Lorraine, the district of the Ardennes, and Alsace — is occupied by people of different races and lineage, who possess no political unity. Brie with its fertile farms, and Champagne with its great vineyards and ancient textile industry, are democratic and anticlerical. The people of the Ardennes, who bear a strong resemblance to their Walloon neighbors in Belgium, are democratic to the core. The working people in the small industrial towns along the Maas are convinced Socialists without being doctrinaires. In Alsace, which was a centre of Republican opposition to the Empire of the third Napoleon, the Catholic clergy, who became very strong during German rule, are fighting to preserve their power against the Republican middle classes and the Socialist workers. The people of Lorraine have a political temperament of their own. The middle classes are Conservative Republicans, and the clergy are still very influential. Little by little the majority has drifted toward the Right. The textile workers of Mülhausen and the miners of Brie still waver between the Conservative influence of their employers and the propaganda of the Socialists.

Northern France, with its great textile factories, mines, and metallurgical

works, and its intensive agriculture, is politically the least true to type of any part of the country. Until the seventeenth century the territory north of the Somme belonged to the Belgian Netherlands, and it still retains the political ways of that country. Its plodding, industrious, and peace-loving people take far more interest in local politics than they do in national affairs. As in Belgium, they are inclined to form three groups. The wealthy industrialists are strongly Catholic, and have retained great influence over the country people, who are to some extent their tenants, and over the small tradesmen who depend upon their patronage. A majority of the working population, however, no longer obeys the clergy, and has a powerful political organization of its own.

Paris and its suburbs is politically a world in itself. In fact the metropolis and the surrounding towns have their own political geography, determined by the social groupings of the population. That portion of the city on the right bank of the Seine, from Passy to the Market, where the luxury trades and the wealthy have their homes, and the quarter upon the left bank of the Seine from the Champs des Mars to the Church of St.-Sulpice, have remained Conservative with Catholic or Nationalist sympathies. The former suburbs, which now form the Labor districts of the East, embracing Saint-Antoine, Montmartre, La Villette, and Bercy, formerly a Radical stronghold, have become Socialist or Communist, except in a few localities where rebuilding has brought in a petit bourgeois element of Nationalist sympathies. The southern suburbs on the left bank of the Seine have a mixed population of Socialist working people and Nationalist members of the middle class. Catholics, Radicals, and Socialists also divide the field in the inner quarters of

the old city — the Temple, the Latin Quarter, and Marais. Farther north, in the industrial zones of Saint-Ouen, Saint-Denis, Aubervilliers, and Pantin, the extreme Left, with its Socialists and Communists, holds the fort. To the west, from Auteuil and Boulogne to Versailles, and south as far as Vincennes, are the villas and detached residences of the wealthy middle classes, and the homes of truck gardeners, retailers, and pensioners, most of whom are Conservative and Nationalist. During the last few years, however, the steady outflow of the population from the centre of the city to the suburbs has strengthened the parties of the Left in these districts.

Around Paris extends a wide zone of châteaux and country estates owned by members of the former nobility and by great industrialists and financiers who have intermarried with them. The bourgeois population is sparse and is dependent on these rich patrons; and it has adopted their political opinions. Only a few local industrial centres and the small peasants, who cherish a fierce hatred for the game wardens and bailies of the wealthy estate owners, vote for the Left. On the whole, however, Paris is not as Radical as the rest of France, although it tends to go to extremes — to be either Nationalist or Communist.

One can say in summary that the parties of the Left have the upper hand in the East, the Southeast, the South, the industrial districts of the North

and Northeast, and the industrial sections of Paris. They have conquered Western France except the mountainous district, where the Clericals are still in control. In the Southwest, where the parties of the Left have always had a majority in certain districts, their influence is extending, in spite of the political apathy of the population.

The parties of the Right control the aristocratic Northwestern section of the country, including Normandy, the Catholic North, a large part of Paris and its suburbs, and several outlying mountain districts. Old-type Republicans still hold their own in the Northeast and in a part of the Southwest; while the Nationalists recruit their followers almost exclusively in Paris and its neighborhood and in Lorraine.

This geographical distribution of political sentiment has persisted without great modification for a century or more. It changes only slightly with the advent of new generations of voters. A foreigner whose ideas are colored by memories of the Paris Revolution, and who is misled by the multiplicity of factions in the Chamber of Deputies, is apt to imagine that French voters change their opinions frequently and capriciously. That is quite contrary to the truth. As a great student of our political history says: 'The alleged changeable Frenchman is far more tenacious of his political opinions than an Englishman.'

SPAIN AND EUROPE¹

BY COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING

[SEVERAL paragraphs of this rather abstruse essay have been summarized.]

IN an absolute sense Spain belongs to Africa. A person who crosses the Pyrenees from France really passes from a land of gardens to a desert. Whatever in Spain is not desert is plateau or oasis. I use the emphatic word 'desert' to impress upon the reader at the outset an essential quality; but of course I do not mean it literally. What I wish to stress is a cosmic, stellar, all-dominating, planetary power over the individual's life — a life which, from the astronomical standpoint, is but an infinitely tiny tremor.

This overwhelming quality of the physical environment is characteristic of Africa and of her culture. From the earliest ages Spain has been a cultural appanage of Africa. Her culture is a particular expression of the same spirit of ancient ancestry plus primitive vigor that already exhibited itself in the pre-Egyptian civilized nations and that exists as truly in the Arab or the Berber as in the Spaniard. It is an ancient and aboriginal spirit. He who would study the culinary art of the Stone Age need only visit the shepherds of the Spanish Sierras. The very antiquity of typical Spanish traits makes the Basques, who stand for the oldest element in the nation, the most representative members of the race.

On the other hand, however, the Spaniard has also an ancient civiliza-

tion. Yet this likewise is not European, but African, and is easier for us to recognize when we see it in the Bedouin, who, having resided for milleniums in the desert, and having conquered his environment, has become of its own image. He is stern, serious, strong-willed, elemental. When aroused he is fanatical, like the wind of the desert. Has the Spaniard, considered historically, ever been different from this? The desert dweller invariably has a strong vein of romance in his make-up. Every man of the desert is at heart a Don Quijote. In other words, his life consists of mastering what is obstinately petty and conventional, and therefore ridiculous, compared with the orderly infinity of the cosmos. This rising superior to the commonplace merely makes him absurd in the eyes of the spectator, but for the Spaniard Don Quijote is never amusing. On the contrary, he is a supreme symbol, far more than is Goethe for the German.

In truth, is there not always a Quijote element in every great and typical action of the Spaniard, from the Cid down to Unamuno? Cortes burned his ships behind him; Pizarro set forth to conquer Peru with a corporal's guard; Loyola would make all mankind the disciplined soldiery of the Church; solitary Unamuno challenges the State to single combat. Every typical Spaniard stands alone and isolated like Don Quijote; that is the way man lives in the desert.

He maintains this mental and physical isolation even though, like every

¹From the *Revista de Occidente* (Madrid literary monthly), May