

day, when she and Kaiser Wilhelm were out walking along the Mulberry Avenue, near Potsdam, a Social Democrat, who saw them coming, took up a conspicuous position on the road, and, staring at the Emperor, stood with folded arms and covered head until the pair had passed. Wilhelm II, indignant at this deliberate insult, walked on until a dozen yards separated him from his ill-bred subject, and then, leaving the lady for a moment, he returned, walked up to the Socialist, saluted him in military fashion, and then said: 'The least one should do is to salute one's Empress!'

Even the tremendous test and challenge of the war brought nothing more out of the Empress than she had displayed before. It seems clear that with a foresight denied to her husband she feared and hated the war, and had it

lain in her power to prevent him, the Emperor would never have been allowed to force it upon the world. She accepted it, of course; she allowed her name to be freely used in the name of charity; she visited the hospitals, and increased her own homely output of plain necessities, but her name was scarcely mentioned. One thing may be said. The Kaiser duly dispatched a public telegram to his wife on every occasion on which, by any stretch of complacency, he could regard a movement or an engagement as successful. So habitual was this that the absence of such a telegram often gave welcome confirmation to the Allies of German difficulties in even their most extravagantly boasted days of victory.

And now the end has come to a life that must often have seemed to her simple nature but an empty show.

JAPAN'S TREND TO DEMOCRACY

BY S. YOSHINO

[This remarkable address upon the political evolution of Japan during the Meiji era, and present tendencies in that country, was recently delivered by Professor Sakuzo Yoshino of the Imperial University of Tokyo, before the students of the Japanese Language School in that city.]

From the *Japan Advertiser*, April 7
(*TOKYO AMERICAN DAILY*)

If you examine the newspapers from day to day you will find much written about the corruption of the government. There is also a great deal that is not printed. It is most embarrassing for a Japanese to discuss the corruption of his government, but facts are facts, and we may as well look them in the face. We cannot help feeling that what we see is very regrettable, but at

the same time, if we examine the political history of Japan, we must admit that the present state of affairs is largely unavoidable.

What are the reasons for this corruption in public life? One reason is that Japan has been for the last fifty years changing from an autocratic to a constitutional form of government. Although Japan has nominally had a con-

stitutional government for about thirty years, constitutional ideals have not been carried out in practise, and this has created many difficulties.

Japan has to learn from experience the lessons of constitutional government. England, Germany, and France, in their transition from autocratic to constitutional institutions, encountered the same difficulties that we encounter. They found that although the people were said to rule, authority really rested in the hands of certain leaders to whom they were obliged to yield obedience.

In Japan the real masters continue to be those who ruled under the daimios. Possibly the condition in the Roman Catholic Church to-day, governed by the Pope, is the most perfect example of this kind of governing.

One of the difficulties of applying constitutional ideas to the government of Japan is that those in authority do not and cannot give serious consideration to the opinions of the middle and lower classes. They accept the ideal of constitutional government in principle; but when it comes to actual ruling, they do it their own way. The daimios have gone, but their spirit still actuates the governing classes. As a matter of fact the official caste cannot bring itself to think that it is necessary in ruling the country to consult with *kurumaya*, merchants, and laborers; and when things are to be done they do them according to their own ideas. Our professional governors cannot rid themselves of the idea that they are designated by Fate to do the ruling without consulting anybody else. Here in Tokyo we have rulers who are the elected representatives of the people, such as the mayor and councilmen. They are in a position to run things, and do not like to be bothered with the advice and demands of the common people. Also in larger affairs we meet the same condition. The question is always arising,

'Who is to be consulted?' While we have a constitutional form of government, we find the authorities still dominated by the idea that, when it comes to actual ruling, they must do it their own way. History records similar conditions in England in the time of Cromwell and the Rump Parliament. The dismissal of the English Parliament showed where the real power lay. No doubt Japan, must still pass through many of the experiences of other nations in the past. Political leaders are always studying how to have their own way, and yet observe the forms of constitutional government.

Constitutional government was nominally granted to Japan about 31 years ago. In the earlier elections the ruling classes resorted to force to carry out their will. It is not polite to use force in these days, so they now use money. A great deal of money is spent for bribing men in Parliament to put through certain measures. If you have read the papers recently you will have seen something about the South Manchurian Railway scandal. It seems there has been a great deal of corruption in the management of this railway. Those who are appointed to take charge of its development control large sums of money, and they use it to bribe people in this country to carry out their wishes. Of course, they claim this is in the interests of the nation, and necessary in order to carry out their plans for promoting the nation's welfare. But it causes a vicious circle. More money, more bribery, more power! More power, more bribery, more money!

This same thing has occurred previously in other countries. I might cite the elections in France in 1837 and 1848, and the French Revolution. Also the development of constitutional government by the Anglo-Saxon race. This thing that has happened in other lands is now happening in Japan, and we

must recognize it for what it really is, birth throes of real constitutional government, not to be pointed at with scorn, but taken as a necessary step in political progress, and accepted with an attitude of sympathy, rather than with contempt or unkind feeling. Many of the people who are using these large sums of money for bribing those in places of influence, do not think they are doing anything bad at all. They think they are doing an act of patriotism. Take the South Manchurian Railway case. Those who are doing questionable things think they are serving the state, and consider themselves real patriots.

There is one classic example which has happened in very recent years. At the time when Count Okuma was Prime Minister, and Viscount Oura was Home Minister, Viscount Oura believed that the military forces of the country should be strengthened. There ought to be two new army divisions. It did not seem at all likely that a bill providing for this could possibly be carried through the House, so he simply bought up twenty or thirty members to make sure that the bill would pass. He felt that it was necessary for the safety of the state that these two units be organized, and that 'the end justifies the means.' He did not stop to think of the consequences of this practise—that although he might gain something he considered very desirable at the time, he was doing something that in after years would lower our national ideals.

Now the majority in the House at present does not represent the public mind. It is a majority of older men who for many years have been the ruling force in the state, and feel it necessary to control the House in order to discharge their duty to the state. This is not a new attitude; the same idea has prevailed at times during the last thirty or forty years. The effort of Mr.

Ozaki to get support for his proposal to restrict armaments has come prominently before our notice recently. But the amount of support Mr. Ozaki is able to get is very small. No doubt some of our leading statesmen favor the plan but the majority of the House do not propose to listen to Mr. Ozaki for a single moment. Mr. Ozaki's proposition is the reduction of armaments all along the line. Reduce the army to only the forces that are really necessary, and do the same to the navy. Japan is over-armed to-day. This is especially true in regard to naval armament. It would be a good thing if some arrangement could be made between England, America, and Japan that would make possible a material decrease in naval expenditures. Japan might make some move in that direction, or if America were to propose such a reduction Japan should be ready to welcome it. In fact, Japan might do well to lead in such a matter and invite the coöperation of America.

When this question came up for vote in the House a short time ago, it was very emphatically snowed under. There were only 37 votes in favor of the proposition, out of a total number of 460, so that less than 10 per cent of the voting members in the House approved a reduction of armaments. Mr. Ozaki was not satisfied to have it snowed under in that way, so he resolved to appeal to public opinion. He has recently traveled through various parts of the country, and went to Kobe, Osaka, and other places, in order to present the question to the people directly, something in the style of a referendum. A few days after his first speech, Mr. Ozaki spoke to me about this, and I arranged to have the students of the Imperial University listen to a lecture from him on this subject. I was happy to find myself in accord with his views. There were 2000 students present at

the meeting. That may not seem so very many, but there has never before been a meeting of that kind so largely attended in the Imperial University. Not only were there a great many students present, but a large majority of them were in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Ozaki. Of course, there were a few of a different opinion, but a very large majority were in accord with the suggestion for the reduction of armaments. It was decided that after Mr. Ozaki's lecture to the students, an opportunity should be given to vote in regard to this matter. As the meeting was not over until late, and no preparations had been made, no vote was taken until two or three days after that time, when an opportunity was given the young men to express their opinions. It was found that there were 270 votes cast. Of these 21 voted against, and 249 in favor of disarmament. Apart from the fact of the majority in favor, the fact that 270 students took the trouble to cast a vote is something to think about. Notice the proportions. In the Imperial House less than 10 per cent were in favor, while in the University less than 10 per cent were against the measure. Wherever Mr. Ozaki went he found the same thing. In Keio a large proportion were in favor, also in other schools, and in the Y.M.C.A. at Kanda. Everywhere the same condition exists. The politicians have their views, and the people outside have theirs. It is interesting to note that these views are diametrically opposite.

Perhaps you will raise the question why the majority in the House should be so large against these proposals. The majority in the House to-day is against these propositions because they are influenced, and practically owned, by the Genro. The latter are men of a preceding generation who are holders so far as political power is concerned.

You ask why should these men take the attitude they do — why they feel it necessary to pile up armaments in this way.

In order to understand this clearly, it is necessary for us to go back, to the Meiji era, the age of Feudalism, fifty or sixty years ago. Before this time the rulers of Japan were absolutely ignorant of outside affairs, of other countries or the government of other countries. They not only did not know, but they did not want to know. If you had suggested to them that the waters of the Sumidagawa and the Thames were much the same, you would no doubt have been arrested for high treason. In fact, something of the kind is recorded as having occurred at that period.

The quiet of the time was disturbed by the appearance of Russian ships in the north at Hokkaido, and American ships at Yokohama and Tokyo. The Japanese people at that time had never seen such big ships and such big guns, and they feared them very greatly. Some of that fear has come down to the present time. I come from the north eastern part of Japan — Morioka. When I was a boy I heard from my grandfather of the interest aroused by the news that the Americans were in Yokohama.

Everyone was very much concerned about what the American intended to do. No one had ever seen an American, but one man went down to Yokohama, and he saw them. He drew, or got from some source, a picture of one and brought it back to show the neighbors. The American was drawn with horns on his head, to show what kind of being he was. This is the way the people at that time had an opportunity of seeing what a real American was like.

Now the fear of the people toward foreigners was partly the result of uncertainty as to their intentions in coming to Japan. Formerly the Pope

of Rome had divided the world in halves, giving the West to Spain and the East to Portugal, and, of course, these nations started in to colonize. Whether the motives were religious or political was uncertain in the minds of many; and that increased the tendency to fear them. Of course, it is true that a large part of the fear was superstition, but there was always the suspicion that the purpose of the foreigners in coming to Japan was annexation, and who shall say that their fears were entirely unfounded? To-day we understand things better, and the Japanese people do not in general fear foreign countries. Even at that time, of course, there were some Japanese who understood the true situation, but the great majority of the people had a very real dread of foreigners.

Just about that time Ito and other young men were sent abroad to study conditions in foreign countries. Now if these men had found the foreign countries engaged in industrial and other peaceful pursuits, they would have received, and brought back to Japan, a good and beneficial impression; but they found Europe an armed camp. The Austrian and Prussian, and the Franco-Prussian wars were in preparation, and when they returned to Japan, almost before they got back, France and Germany were ready to begin fighting. The impression they brought back and gave to the country was that Japan's best preparation for living with her neighbors was to build big armaments.

Yamagata and the other men who went abroad fifty-two years ago, came back to Japan with the idea that the first thing to be done was to increase the military strength of the country. Other plans were being discussed at that time: questions of education, commerce, and industry; but these men came back with the militaristic idea, and said that the first and most urgent need

was to adopt conscription and to build up the army.

Internal conditions in Japan at that time encouraged the militaristic point of view. It was the period when the Tokugawa Government was being superseded by the Meiji régime. There was strife between the two parties, and in various places, such as Kagoshima, open revolts took place. So conditions at home and impressions from abroad worked together to foster the idea of military expansion as the first duty of the state.

When Japan came to consider constitutional government, the question arose, 'What form should the new constitution have?' There were various forms to choose from — French, English, American. Which of these forms was best suited to Japan's needs? After a great deal of discussion the choice seemed to rest between the French and the English system. These two forms were put before the minds of the leaders. There was a division of opinion. It was very plain that the Tokugawa group leaned entirely toward the French system, and it was also pretty clear that the Meiji leaders were in sympathy with the English system, and indeed had made studies of the British methods. English parliamentary institutions, however, were opposed by a large number of people outside the government, whose sympathies were with the French system, and who were supported by the Tokugawa leaders, though the English system had the favor of the government itself. At that time the only person who held any other view was Prince Ito. He was not sure that the French system was good for Japan, and he was not sure that the English system was good for Japan. He felt that neither one nor the other should be accepted in its totality, since it left no opportunity for developing purely Japanese ideas. He turned his eyes

toward Germany, not because he knew anything about the German system, but because Germany at that time was still in its formative political period, and Japan was also undergoing a similar process as regards her government, therefore Germany's ideas might be better suited to Japan at the time, Japan was not yet ready to take over such highly developed constitutional forms as those of England and France.

At that time Count Yamagata (afterward Prince) advocated the French method, and Count Okuma the English method; and there was a growing inclination to consider taking one or other of these forms pretty much as they were. Ito did not share that feeling. He thought the new constitution should be essentially Japanese, not essentially English or essentially French. His idea was to organize a constitutional government, that would preserve all that was best in Japanese history and thought. In getting these other plans scrapped, he aimed to secure for himself the task of framing the new constitution. His experience and knowledge were valuable to the political leaders, and he had little difficulty in presenting a plan drawn up in accordance with the ideas he thought best suited to Japan, and in getting matters into his own competent hands. Ito made a very careful study of English forms and also of American forms, as well as German. Indeed he looked everywhere for suggestions that would help him. He added to these ideas from abroad his own ideas of what was necessary for the country, and then made a draft of a Constitution for Japan. He took his draft to America and Europe and discussed it with the political leaders there. He found when he got to Germany that the plan he had drawn up was in most respects in accordance with German ideas and he received a great deal of praise and approval. These ideas

seemed to be working very well in Germany, so he thought they would work well in Japan. While in Germany he became acquainted with Dr. Stein, who gave him a great deal of help. Dr. Stein was invited to come to Japan and assist in developing the plan of the constitution, but his age did not permit him to do so. Ito did not go to Germany and copy the German system. Although there are many points about the constitution similar to the Prussian constitution, it is Japanese, not Prussian. However, since the ideas incorporated in Ito's constitution were much like those of the Prussian constitution, the Prussian spirit became increasingly influential in Japan. Again let me say, it was not the design of Japan, but the points of similarity in the constitution, that caused Prussian ideas to flow into Japan and to mold the political thought of the nation.

At that time, Ito had his views and supporters, and Yamagata had his. Yamagata's idea was to follow the constitutions of foreign countries rather slavishly. Ito was a very skilful man. He knew how far to go, and how far not to go. He would take the ideas of other people, but he applied them to suit his own views. Yamagata's tendency was to go very far toward the slavish copying of foreign constitutional methods, and on this account there arose a division between the two groups. Not that they disagreed on general principles. They still worked together in a general way, with the same object in view, but when it came to methods and the particulars of the plan, they were divided. Ito unfortunately died in the middle of his career. At least, it seemed as if his career was far from finished, although we have a record of many years of noble service. After his death, those who were in sympathy with Ito and his ideas rapidly lost their strength in

the Government, and Yamagata soon came into prominence. Yamagata's ideas meant autocracy and military expansion. For that reason the authority of the Genro was strengthened, and Japan's revenues were devoted to building up the army and navy for military expansion. This is the feeling that expresses itself in the refusal to listen to any proposal for reduction of armaments.

It would be very unfair to say that the Japanese people are either one or the other of these two extremes. We cannot say that they are by nature either autocratic or militaristic. There is an historic reason for things being as they are to-day. But the rising generation of young men are taking a new view of affairs, what we may call the 'world' view — a very different view from that of these older men, who obtained their ideas a generation ago, ideas that now seem exceedingly narrow. I cannot undertake to-day to tell you fully what are the ideas of the young men of the coming generation. I have only time to point out to you the ideas that govern the older leaders, these men who have come down from the preceding generation, but who still hold the reins of power very firmly indeed. I have pointed out to you the attitude of the politicians on the one hand and on the other, have tried to point out, to a certain extent, the attitude of the people, and especially of the younger people, which is very different indeed.

With this historic background, we can understand something of the problem involved in the constitutional government of Japan. Between the politicians of the preceding generation, the politicians in power to-day, and the people, — especially these young people, — there is a great gulf.

The coming generation, made up of these young people of new and broad ideas, has no power to-day except the power of thought. Most of them are still students. The power that comes from office and positions of influence will be theirs as these young men come into their own. As they advance in years and in influence, a great conflict is coming in this nation. A great change is coming. It may be in five years; it may not be for ten years; but it is very plain that in five or ten years it will be here. How will it come? Who can tell? Who can divine the future? But it will come. Japan will have a new day.

I want to say, in closing, just one word in regard to these new ideas. They are Christian ideas. Not that they bear that name, or are called such, or are even recognized as such, perhaps, by those who are developing them; but the fundamental forces that are pushing these young men forward have their origin in the strength that comes from Christian ideals; a vigorous, powerful, Divine force is pushing them forward into a new day. That is the power that is behind the movement. That is the leaven that is leavening the whole.

TATALIER'S TOOTHACHE

BY JEAN GAUMENT AND CAMILLE CE

From *L'Echo de Paris*, April 10
(CLERICAL DAILY)

ONCE upon a time there was a poor man whose name was Tatalier and who had toothache. During the forty-four years he had been in the world he had had pain in the ivories in his square jaws, just like the fingers of an insane artist on the yellow keys of a piano out of tune. His canines sounded little sharp notes like the points of needles; his molars poured out great wails whose circumference was everywhere and whose centre was nowhere. His wisdom teeth played the bass, and his incisors, long since departed, mingled their absent voices in the hymn of torment.

The teeth of Tatalier occupied his life. They filled all his hours with sufferings, dull or lively shooting pains, and pains all round, the blow of a hammer, the stab of a knife, the rasp of a saw, the twist of a screw. While he was busy about his work picking apples, cutting wood, or burning heaps of dead leaves, his pain, hypocritical or cruel, cut off short the song which he had begun. Then he would take the pipe out of the corner of his mouth, spit on the earth, and pointing his finger in his open mouth, he would exclaim: 'It's the big one at the back — or the little one in the middle.' Then he resigned himself and the dance began.

He had tried everything. He had put pinches of pepper in each cavity, a plug of cloves, a little piece of tobacco. He had bathed his gums with marshmallow water. He had stuffed into his ears wads of paper moistened in warm water.

Often he had tried to pull the tooth; he cut at it with his knife. He shook it in vain between his fingers. He had followed everybody's advice; had tried all remedies, had tried everything that anyone could do — except going to a dentist. For a dentist is rather expensive, and Tatalier was poor.

Now there was at this time a dentist at Bourg-Achard. He was a timid little chap, who had nothing on the little door of his little house but a little plate of steel, such as there is on the tombstone of a miser. The little dentist had a little office, with a chair. He had his pincers and he had his drill; he had cement and he had drugs. He had his little boxes with his name printed on them, in which people carried off as souvenirs the tooth embedded on gory cotton wool. He had a professional manner; he had science. He even had honesty — but he had no patients.

There came sometimes on market days a fellow in the clutches of pain, haggling ferociously over the price of having an 'extraction.' In vain the little dentist used to hint that the tooth was still good.

'I can save it for you.'

'Not on your life.'

'Some gas, at least, to save you pain.'

'A cup of coffee an hour later will be better for my business.'

Five minutes after the rescued man spat his blood into the basin and his forty sous into the hand of the dentist.

'That's easy money!'