

one will discover anywhere, and fortunately there are five good recordings of it currently available. The Deller Consort performance is excellent on Vanguard S-279, as is Barbirolli on Angel S-36359, and Colin Davis on Philips 5400131. Less well known but charming music is "The Fairie Queene" (London 1290, 2 records); and the "Ode for St. Cecilia's Day" (Argo ZRG-563) is dramatic, sumptuous, and resplendent music. But in my

opinion Purcell's greatest work is the magnificent "King Arthur." For an exquisite combination of majestic and lyric music, with deeply felt emotion as well as pomp and ceremony (nobody, except possibly Charpentier, does trumpet fanfares like Purcell) and tunes you want to whistle and stamp to, this work is unsurpassed. Try it on the two-record set, "Purcell: King Arthur." The orchestral suite taken from "King Arthur" is on RCA VICS-1432, but excellent as it is, you should be satisfied with nothing less than the entire work. (Next month: Oratorio and Opera from Handel to Wagner.)

PRINCIPLES OF EFFICIENT THINKING

By Barbara Branden

Gertrude Stein, one of the most remarkable intellectuals of this or any other era, is dying. At her bedside is Alice B. Toklas, friend, companion, lover. Stein opens her eyes briefly, looks intently at Toklas and asks, "What is the answer?" A moment passes—a moment of silence. Again, for the last time, Stein speaks. "In that case, what is the question?"

The story is often told, seldom analyzed. In fact, though it was mentioned in nearly all the major reviews of James R. Mellow's recent Stein biography, it was subjected to interpretive scrutiny in none of them. This does not mean that no one understands the story, or even that none of the reviewers of Mellow's book understood it. On the contrary, it is likely that the story is widely understood. But few people have much facility at translating an idea from presentational to discursive symbols (to borrow terms from Susanne Langer), which is why few people—book reviewers not excepted—are satisfactory literary critics, and also why few people who understand the story of Gertrude Stein's last words can say just what it is they understand.

Barbara Branden, whether or not she knows the story, can say and has said what is significant about it:

Thinking requires question-asking, a constant process of question-asking. One must ask oneself, "What questions must I answer in order to answer my primary question? What are the sub-questions that will lead me to the answer I seek?" It is the process of question-asking, the raising and answering of relevant questions, the assignment of sub-problems, that keep one's main purpose always functioning as a directing agent. Either the asking of the right questions will give you the answer, if you already possess the necessary knowledge, or the questions will tell you what it is that you have to find out.

Put even more simply, all conceptual knowledge is the result of asking and answering questions. It is the result of posing problems, cognitive problems, and solving them through a process called *thinking*.

If all this sounds dreadfully prosaic when compared to the genuinely poetic, if somewhat ambiguous, profundity of the original anecdote, it is not because Branden's reformulation is inadequate to the original; it is because too few people fully realize the implications of either the original or the reformulation. It is precisely the exploration of these implications, the detailed description of cases in point, which is the proper work of a course or textbook in thinking. But such courses and textbooks are few and far between. Though almost every contemporary college catalog declares its institution's intention to teach its students to think, one can look through those catalogs in vain for any listing of a course in thinking. And though books on thinking date back at least as far as Descartes's *Discourse on Method*, few of those currently available rise far above the level of the intellectually pretentious pep-talk offered by such writers as Norman Vincent Peale and Napoleon Hill. But thinking, the purposive use of the mind to gain conceptual information about reality, is a skill of a specific kind, and while it may be learned through exposure to the thoughts of other men, just as football may be learned by watching the games played by other men, the learner, in such instances, is educating himself. He is generalizing, from a number of individual acts of thought, or from a number of individual football games, and arriving at principles of thought or principles of football. It is an eloquent symptom of the state of human civilization that professional educators take the trouble to teach football but leave the learning of thinking up to the individual student. Of course, many people do learn to think quite well by teaching themselves. But the value of systematizing a branch of knowledge is that each generation of students is thereby able to build on the last, effecting an ever higher level of attainment in that field, and establishing an even higher standard of adequacy for attainment in that field. In this way, physical educators have made it possible for contemporary athletes to attain greater proficiency at their sports than was possible to the athletes of a century ago. But, because most educators believe that the way to learn thinking is to live, similar progress has been much slower among thinkers.

As is perhaps evident by now, I believe systematic instruction in thinking to be the antidote to this intellectual malaise—the malaise which enables people to correctly intuit the meaning of the Stein anecdote while not recognizing that meaning when it is reformulated in the more exact discursive symbols of theoretical psychology; the malaise which enables

people to believe that they can and should be taught to think about specific subjects, but that they cannot or should not be taught to think; the malaise which enables us to study football but does not enable us to study how we study football.

Barbara Branden's course of lectures on the *Principles of Efficient Thinking*, first offered during the 1960s under the auspices of the Nathaniel Branden Institute and now available on cassette tapes, is an excellent place to begin the systematic study of thought—if for no other reason than because it stresses the fundamental importance of two key psycho-epistemological concepts: purpose and context. Branden emphasizes and re-emphasizes the importance of these ideas and provides highly detailed and exhaustively analysed examples of their roles in actual cognitive situations. The first half of the course is largely theoretical, discussing the nature of thought, the philosophical presuppositions required for efficient thinking, the importance of purpose and context, and the nature of concept-formation. The second half is oriented toward the practical goal of improving one's own thinking processes, mostly by eliminating inefficient methods of thought. These five lectures consider the improper use of emotion, language, definitions, and logical structures (including a guest lecture by Nathaniel Branden on "The Fallacy of the Stolen Concept") as well as a discussion of the psychological cause of such inefficient methods.

Unfortunately, there are all sorts of things wrong with these lectures: they were originally written to complement the *Basic Principles of Objectivism* course; the philosophy of Ayn Rand; they offer a healthy (or should that be "unhealthy"?) dose of the polemic approach to philosophy which is typical of Rand and most of her apologists; they presuppose a certain familiarity with Rand's ideas, though they generally refer the unfamiliar listener to the primary sources (many of which, like the *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*, are certainly to be recommended); they even argue for the somewhat naive view of perception associated with Rand's epistemology, as much because of Rand's errors in thinking about the subject as because of her reluctance to learn from such more considered approaches as the one outlined in Moore's *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*; and, at times, they include curious failures to exemplify the principles they espouse, that is, to exemplify efficient thinking. At one point Branden tells us that the familiar scene of a woman ending an argument by rushing from a room in tears is an instance of allowing one's wishes to supersede one's rational faculty, an instance of declaring, in effect, "If the world persists in being so frustrating, I'll throw a temper fit." But could it not equally be a confession that the woman has become too emotional to argue cogently or even to admit as much calmly, so that she runs from the scene of the trauma to regain her self-control in private? Branden also remarks that this sort of scene occurs in movies and in bad novels, a remark I find simply incomprehensible, unless Branden really believes that a novel is to be judged on the efficient thinking of its characters, or, somewhat less fantastically, that the conventional wisdom about clichés in literature is true.

Later, her interpretation of a TV drama is simply unsupported by her synopsis of its events, though, of course, it may have been borne out by the actual events on the screen. Still, I confess that when Branden tells me, as she did recently in a published film review, that among the considerations in an artistic evaluation of a director are such grossly affective ones as "tempo" and "pace," I suspect I am in the presence of a critic who does not think efficiently about art.

Harsh as this criticism may seem (and I feel harshly about some of it and wish I had the space to make it more specific), the course is what I said it was a few hundred words ago: an excellent one, particularly for those who wish to begin a study of thinking. It makes the right general points and it makes them well. Once they have been learned, such more advanced works as those of William James, Charles Peirce, Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer, Alfred Korzybski, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the so-called logical positivists, Edward de Bono—the list is much, much longer—will prove of much greater benefit to the student who seeks a comprehensive, integrated understanding of the human thinking process. REVIEWED BY JEFF RIGGENBACH / **Cassette Tapes (15 hours) / LR Price \$67.50**

IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY

By Nikolai Bukharin

Libertarian students of imperialism should welcome the publication of this new paperback edition of Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy*. Bukharin is a fascinating figure. He was perhaps the greatest Bolshevik theoretician aside from Lenin, whom he influenced considerably. As leader of the Bolshevik "Left" because of his "semi-anarchist" views of 1917-18 and as leader of the "Right" because of his strong support for the NEP free market in the 1920s, he expounded views of some interest to libertarians. Bukharin was even sufficiently impressed with Austrian economics to attempt a refutation of Böhm-Bawerk.

Bukharin was fascinated by the phenomenon of world economy: the international division of labor and the unification of mankind brought about by the growth of trade. Like Marx, Bukharin regarded this process as qualitatively unique in world history, and like Marx, he produced a clear description of world economic relations. Unfortunately, his Marxist framework burdens the reader with numerous Hegelian metaphors (advanced as real entities), but deciphering them is well worth the effort.

Bukharin had a firm grip on the economic main drift, the "rise" of cartels and monopolies. Unhappily, he presented monopolization as an inevitable outcome of market relations. Although he thereby forced his analysis into an ideological strait jacket, his empirical description emphasized the crucial role of the state and banks in building the monopoly sectors of the world's industrial economies. Since the 1870s "high protectionism" had been the trend in all industrial countries, especially in the export industries where domestic monopoly prices and external "dumping" were now the rule. Monopoly prices in turn made necessary massive capital export. In the resulting clashes of interest between "national" groups of capitalists, military force was increasingly called in to protect and expand tariff areas and to secure raw materials and captive markets

for goods and investment. Conquest and war, in a word, imperialism, were the necessary outcome.

Thus Bukharin correctly saw that the chief "contradiction" of the age was that between world trade and the "'national' [i.e., state imposed] limits of productive organization." Economic internationalism was being opposed by "various groups of the bourgeoisie organized in the state." Thus "state capitalist trusts" competed in the world market, while the cartel magnates and their ideological hacks promoted intensified state intervention at home. Neo-mercantilism and empire were the order of the day, and the old bourgeois individualism was disappearing. The dominant big capitalists were strongly statist, even monarchist, in disposition, and it was a mistake to regard their attitudes as mere feudal remnants. Here Bukharin "corrected" Schumpeter's emphasis (in *Imperialism and Social Classes*) on feudal "atavisms" before Schumpeter advanced his theses.

Given the unequal strength of the great powers, an international equilibrium could not be reached, and imperialism and war were necessary to resolve their political-economic rivalries. The World War expressed and strengthened state-capitalist trends. Every belligerent state was busily affording new subsidies, bounties, and benefits to its monopoly sector at the expense of all other classes. Bukharin noted with unease the rise of the United States as the major new state-capitalist and imperialist superpower. Despite his denial that a free market could resolve the contradictions of the era, Bukharin was truly an accurate prophet. High tariffs, monopolies, and the new wartime monopolies would mean that "an ever greater part of the national product will be retained by the bourgeoisie and its state." He need only have said "the state and its bourgeoisie" to have arrived at a libertarian analysis. REVIEWED BY JOSEPH R. STROMBERG / **Economics—Political Philosophy** (173 pages) / LR Price \$2.95

HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RESEARCH TRADITION

By Irvin L. Child

Most who are familiar with contemporary psychology are aware of the well-drawn battle lines between experimental and humanistic psychology. In academia the hostilities probably reached their height with the famous Skinner-Rogers crossfire at a Rice University symposium in the late '60s. Even before then, and at the same gathering, the more diplomatic were suggesting the compatibility of the two approaches and thus the possibility of negotiating a truce. This has by now become a common neutral stance, at least among those in the "softer" tradition, for they have everything to gain academically from surrender and alliance.

In his refreshing examination of the two traditions, Irvin L. Child, professor of psychology at Yale and well-seasoned veteran of the field, does more than reiterate the "couldn't we get together" tack. His object is "to show that each extreme is by itself defective and that a fusion of virtues is needed," and he goes on to carefully map out the meeting grounds between them.

In the first three chapters he identifies the characteristics of the two traditions and examines them in the spirit of his opening quotation from Shakespeare: "...for several virtues/ Have I liked several women; never any / With so full soul, but some defect in her / Did quarrel with the noblest grace she owned / And put it to the foil." Backed by his perceptiveness of the weaknesses and strengths of both, Child is able to distill the essentials and lay aside the self-proclaimed image and posturings of each side.

What is significant here is his identification of humanistic psychology as that tradition within which the model of man is man "as he knows himself," that is, as a conscious agent. He thus manages to bring out the *fundamental* direction of what is often called humanistic in a pejorative sense. And as he proceeds it becomes clear that he is eschewing what humanistic psychology and its hangers-on have often claimed as distinctive, if not inevitable: subjectivism, relativism, the supposed impossibility of objectivity when studying man. On the other hand the "orthodox core of the experimentalist tradition," with its undue emphasis on methodology *a la* physics, has led the bulk of American psychology to stand by a hamperingly narrow conception of the subject matter of psychology and its mode of explanation. Child's rejection of these adopted features as insensational and mistaken is the crux of his case that the historically opposed traditions are capable of peaceful coexistence and more: mutual progress.

With these considerations as the backdrop, Child goes on in the rest of

the book to tell the encouraging tale of recent developments in psychology. He devotes a chapter each, in nontechnical language to psychology's study of moral development, art, hypnosis, attitudes and motives, ESP, schizophrenia, and psychotherapy. He shows issues of special interest to the humanistic tradition receiving careful research treatment, and very narrowly defined behavioral work coming to be viewed in essentially humanistic terms. The latter in particular makes for a fascinating story in Child's hands.

For those constrained by time, I especially recommend the chapters on moral development, social psychology, and art. In these areas in particular there is impressive research which lends credence to some of the conclusions dismissed so vehemently by B. F. Skinner and his ilk, more subtly by most social scientists and contemporary philosophers, and popularly by Johnny Carson. It is notable that these conclusions have been arrived at *within* the research tradition because original behavioral-relativistic explanations *failed to fit the facts*. This, of course, is what will ultimately win the hard-core experimentalist over to the humanists' side, while the latter must admit the importance of carefully mapping out the evidence.

Child is the first to admit that, in spite of the signs of change, each tradition tends to cling to its image, resulting in incongruities. Of two contemporaneous best-sellers, Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* was purportedly squarely within the experimental tradition, Rollo May's *Love and Will* in the humanistic. Yet the former is more "an expression of the author's personal values and beliefs, stated with papal confidence...making almost no contact with the great body of psychological research on man, which might be drawn on to present a very different picture from that drawn by Skinner." May's book, on the other hand, grew out of his own and others' long clinical experience with patients.

Unlike many critics of one or the other faction, Child maintains evident respect for the best of both traditions. This enlightens his recounting of recent trends and justifies his recommendations. And underlying this respect is his fascination with psychology's venture—understanding man—and his awareness of the magnitude, but not the impossibility, of that enterprise. So he finishes as he began, with Shakespeare: "...but you, O you, / So perfect and so peerless, are created / Of every creature's best." REVIEWED BY MARTY ZUPAN / **Psychology** (213 pages) / LR Price \$8.95