

## GREECE



# A Greek mystery: will U.S. pull out military by 1988?

By Diana Johnstone

ATHENS

**W**HEN GREEKS SPEAK OF the military threat from the East, they do not mean the Communist nations that lie to the North. They mean Turkey. And Greece's special situation is that it is bound into a military alliance, NATO, which not only includes but actually favors its main potential adversary, Turkey.

For all their other fierce political differences, Greeks agree on the dangers of conflict with Turkey in the Eastern Aegean sea. For most it is clear that the Turkish threat depends on tacit American backing, even instigation. Disagreements arise only over how to deal with this predicament.

Greeks saw further confirmation of the constant U.S. tilt toward Turkey in a November 14 statement made by Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle in Ankara. He said American aid to Turkey did not correspond to Turkey's importance in the region and would be increased next year. On a past visit to Greece, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained the American preference for Turkey by pointing to a map and saying: "It's simple: Turkey is here, and Greece is here." Turkey's strategic position is even more appreciated since the Iranian revolution.

Anti-American and anti-NATO feeling (the same thing, since NATO is the U.S. in Greece) was clinched by two related tragedies: the seven-year dictatorship of the colonels and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. "Our people consider the American establishment responsible for the colonels' junta," says professor Christos Marcopoulos, the nuclear scientist and former Europarliament member who heads the peace movement KEADEA, close to the government of Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Besides, he said, "we see every day that the Americans have no friends—only interests."

Thus in Cyprus, the Americans let Turkey grab 38 percent of an island with 80 percent Greek population not because they love Turks more than Greeks but because the rump "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus" has given the U.S. permission to establish a base there for the Rapid Deployment Force—something the non-aligned Cyprus of Makarios would not have allowed. The Americans have carried on the longstanding British policy of keeping Cyprus split from Greece in order to use it as a military base. Greeks see the establishment of a U.S. RDF in Turkish-occupied Cyprus as a grave development that makes a solution to the Cyprus problem impossible in the foreseeable future. Cyprus' position off the coast of Syria makes it an attractive base for intervention in the Mideast.

Closer to home, Greece is alarmed by Turkish claims to rights to the seabed and airspace surrounding Greek islands in the eastern Aegean. After seizing part of Cyprus in 1974, Turkey went on to claim rights in the Aegean on the grounds that it is on Turkey's continental shelf. Then in 1977, NATO Commander in Chief Bernard Rogers proposed an integrated regional air space, which would mean that in wartime Greece would lose control of her air space in the Aegean. Gen. Rogers has also declared that NATO has nothing to do with disputes between Greece and Turkey. Greek political observers consider all this part of the complicated bargaining, or "cat-and-mouse game," being played between Athens and Washington.

A major stake in this game is the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Greece—between 40 and 50, according to peace movement sources, depending on what is considered to constitute a base. The U.S. bases are felt by most Greeks as a limitation to their national sovereignty, a continuation of the foreign intervention they have been subjected to ever since the Turkish conquest.

"We consider that our struggle should start from the struggle of this people for independence," said Marcopoulos, explaining the meaning of his organiza-

tion's name, Movement for National Independence, World Peace and Disarmament (KEADEA). Ever since the beginning of the Greek independence struggle in 1821, "we have never been entirely independent," he said. "We always were under occupation or a heavy influence like occupation, from Russians, Austrians, British, French, Italians, then in the 20th century the Germans, then the Allies, and after World War II we were passed to the Americans who are now the country's protectors."

"We want to have Americans here as friends," Markopoulos said, "but they got the bases not by convincing the Greek people but behind their backs, in agreements between the U.S. and a minority and from the civil war."

### The base question.

Greek public opinion is strongly hostile to the bases, and one reason for the 1981 electoral victory of PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement) was its promise to throw out the bases and generally put Greek interests at the center of Greek policy, never mind what the Americans say. But given the relationship of forces between Greece and the U.S., this is no simple matter. Papandreou's great skill is to fill the gaps between what was promised and what he can deliver with exhilarating rhetoric.

Papandreou's supporters say the base question was "closed" by last year's agreement between Washington and Athens. The bases are "terminable" when the agreement runs out at the end of 1988 and will then be closed down within a short period of time, they say. But others, to the right and left of PASOK, doubt this will happen. The agreement's wording is ambiguous enough to allow conflicting interpretations.

Four of the bases are major installations the Pentagon surely has no intention of easily relinquishing. The biggest is the Souda Bay complex on the island of Crete that provides facilities to the Sixth Fleet and is linked to a NATO missile firing range. Also in Crete, there is a big reconnaissance and air base at Iraklion. The other two major bases are near Athens, at Hellenikon and Neamakri.

Greeks have no way of knowing what goes on in these bases. The PASOK government was the first to reveal that the U.S. had nuclear weapons there. The U.S. brought nuclear weapons into Greece in 1959, but all previous Greek governments denied that there were any nuclear weapons on Greek soil. One of the first statements of the Papandreou government after it took office three years ago was to call for unilateral removal of nuclear weapons from Greece, but so far it is not clear how and when the

The Greek peace movements and government call for a "nuclear-free Balkans." In effect, that would mean removing nuclear weapons from Greece and European Turkey. Everyone agrees that the Communist countries of the Balkans are already nuclear-free. This is indeed the Americans' argument for not making a "unilateral" sacrifice.

Greece has three main peace movements. The oldest is the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace (EEDYE) founded in 1955 as part of the Soviet-backed peace campaign in the first Cold War. EEDYE remains close to the orthodox Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the World Peace Council.

Markopoulos explains that with the rise of new threats of war in the early '80s, some people saw the need to take the peace issue away from the Communists. Thus KEADEA was formed, close to PASOK and in support of the Papandreou government. KEADEA helped form the new network of the International Peace Communications Center (IPCC) outside the old World Peace Council.

At the same time, a third and smaller Independent Peace Movement (AKE) was formed with backing from the little "Greek Communist Party of the Interior," whose challenge to the pro-Soviet KKE has not had much success, especially since PASOK is there to take in disgruntled ex-Communists. AKE is close to British END and stresses the connection between peace and human rights.

Last week KEADEA hosted the 2nd Athens Conference for the Denuclearization of Europe attended by 120 representatives of peace movements from the Helsinki agreement signatory countries, aimed at furthering East-West dialog. The conference was carefully prepared by representatives of Eastern and Western peace movements and centered around three work groups on (1) the political situation in Europe in connection with the Euromissile deployments; (2) problems connected with creation of a nuclear-free Europe and (3) confidence and security building measures in Europe, such as no first use and the freeze.

Markopoulos stresses that Greece is obliged by its geographical position to seek world peace and friendship with everybody. "As neighbors we have three Communist countries and Turkey," he points out, implying that in case of war Greece would be isolated. And abandoned—if historic precedent teaches anything. "In World War II, we had the British here. When the Germans came, they abandoned us. They left in 18 days. They did nothing for us against the Germans."

Last month Papandreou visited Syria and Jordan and promised to unveil a new Mideast peace plan at the European Community leaders meeting in Ireland

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**The U.S. bases are felt by most Greeks as a limit on their national sovereignty and a continuation of the foreign intervention that plagues their history.**

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 this month. A few days later he played host in Crete to a surprise meeting between French President Francois Mitterrand and Libyan leader Kadhafi to try to work out the Chad conflict. These spectacular gestures of regional peace making enhance Papandreou's popularity to the extent that they convince Greeks that he is giving their country a new importance in world affairs. PASOK reminds people that before Papandreou, Greece was "the smallest country in the world" internationally.

**The U.S. attitude.**

Greeks complain that the U.S. refuses to recognize their concerns. Typically, in a November 20 speech to the elite Propeller Club in Athens, U.S. Ambassador Mont-eagle Stearns demanded admiration for the U.S., whose foreign policy—he said—inevitably reflected the democratic nature of the society that produced it. (Greeks who know their own history could counter that ancient Athens was democratic at home but expansionist and even tyrannical in its imperialist foreign policy.) Stearns mentioned Greece only once, to deplore that the demonstration three days earlier in Athens "showed how much misunderstanding of the U.S., willful or not, still exists in the rest of the world."

This was the annual march from the Polytechnic college to the U.S. embassy in commemoration of the Polytechnic students whose protest movement against

the colonels' dictatorship was brutally put down by the army on Nov. 17, 1973. The junta fell the next year after provoking the disastrous Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Polytechnic revolt is cherished as the last important popular movement in Greece and the most important act of resistance to the military dictatorship. The mass march through the streets of Athens ends before the U.S. embassy as a reminder of American responsibility for the junta. Prominent this year were banners calling for removal of U.S. bases, departure from NATO and an end to U.S. aggression in Nicaragua.

The least one can say is that Greek anti-Americanism was not invented by Andreas Papandreou. He exploits it skillfully, but some disgruntled critics, left and right, doubt that he is for real. Papandreou is a charismatic leader who inspires strong feelings—negative as well as positive.

The prime minister runs a one-man show. He came back from Syria with an agreement to establish a train ferry between the Syrian port of Latakia and the central Greek port of Volos that would allow traffic between Europe and the Mideast to bypass Turkey. Papandreou's supporters hailed this deal as an historic gain for Greece. His detractors doubt that it will ever materialize.

A knowledgeable conservative observer noted that for all his speeches against the Common Market, Papandreou's policies actually favor big business that alone can hope to benefit from Greece's membership in the European Economic Com-

munity. "He's right, in a way," the observer added. "You can't enter the EEC with nothing but small shops." Thus Papandreou is discreetly backed by sectors of big business as well as by the KKE.

Some of Papandreou's statements that cause greatest surprise in the West, such as his recent criticism of Polish Solidarity and praise of Gen. Jaruzelski, are interpreted as indirect moves to secure Communist support for his government even if its economic policies squeeze the working class. Moscow looks on Papandreou as the best thing possible in Greece, and thus the Moscow-aligned KKE has no choice but to support him.

All agree, grudgingly or not, that Papandreou will win another four-year mandate in elections next fall. But then what? The right is already complaining that since Papandreou will win, but without an absolute majority for PASOK, he will become a political prisoner of the KKE. This is a theme that can be used to raise the political temperature.

Toward the end of a second Papandreou term, the U.S. base agreement will come up for renegotiation. Probably the best Papandreou could hope for would be to swing a deal that would obtain enough benefits for Greece in return for an extension of base rights to enable him to claim a sort of victory.

The Marxist left current in PASOK has its own analysis. It foresees a split, with the party's right wing breaking off to join with New Democracy in a conservative coalition in time to take charge of negotiating the U.S. bases agreement.

# Hazards

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an accident, and the right to inspect factories to make sure that the community's health and safety is not being threatened.

**The right to know.**

The Bhopal disaster is a shocking example of why the community's right to know must be respected. While workers at the Union Carbide plant, according to newspaper reports, had been told what to do if there were a gas leak—check wind direction by looking at the windsocks above the plant, and run the other way—no one told the residents of the shantytown next to the factory what to do. Nor were there any windsocks in the community.

Citizens in 19 states and more than 40 communities have already enacted laws and ordinances for the "right to know" about toxic chemicals. At their best these right-to-know laws require companies to:

- label containers in the workplace with their chemical identities;
- educate and train employees to recognize and prevent hazards;
- make that same information available to local citizens.

After four years of opposition from the Reagan administration, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the law regulating the production and disposal of hazardous waste "from cradle to grave," was finally authorized—with stringent provisions covering underground storage tanks like the one that malfunctioned in Bhopal. Still languishing in Congress, though, are bills renewing Superfund, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, as well as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) that regulates pesticides.

After Bhopal, hopefully there should be no argument from David Stockman and the Office of Management and Budget about whether the important health and safety regulations in these laws are cost-effective.

It's not just a matter of enacting new laws but also of making sure that the existing laws are enforced. According to the public watchdog group, Environmental Safety, only 70 of the roughly 40,000 pesticides in the marketplace have been reviewed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as required by Congress. Many of these products were approved long before there were adequate testing procedures or health and safety standards. Now the agency is supposed to be determining if any of these products may pose a risk to public safety. Clearly, the potential looms for another EDB (ethylene dibromide).

As reports from India indicated that the chair of Union Carbide had been arrested (then later released) for criminal negligence, the strong words of Ira Reiner, the former Los Angeles City Attorney who headed a special task force to crack down on illegal toxic dumping, came to mind: "All that is needed is the will to enforce the law," he said. "Corporate executives [responsible for illegal dumping] need to hear the slam of the jail door behind them."

Richard Asinof is an editor of *Environmental Action* magazine based in Washington, D.C. Portions of this article were adapted from an op-ed in the *Los Angeles Times*.

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By Chris Norton

SAN SALVADOR

**T**HE FIRST PEACE TALK, HELD on October 15, between the Salvadoran government and the opposition was hopeful. But the second, held on November 30, was disappointing. Both sides emerged from the Catholic religious retreat in Ayagualo with little to show for their 12 hours of debate. At that time they could not even agree on such a minimal accord as a Christmas truce.

Few observers here ever believed that the peace talks would lead to any quick solutions to the war. Yet many now doubt President Jose Napoleon Duarte's commitment to the entire dialog process.

Duarte took a much harder line in Ayagualo than he had during the first talk in La Palma. Observers say that the right has consistently pressured him to back down from any substantial progress toward peace. Immediately after the second talk, Duarte, flanked by the government negotiating team, went on government TV to denounce the rebels for trying to destroy the dialog through their "intransigent" position—or, in other words, their unwillingness to accept his by-now familiar proposal to surrender.

Although Duarte undoubtedly would like to be remembered as the man who brought peace to El Salvador, his more immediate goal is less grandiose: he desperately wants to win control of the Legislative Assembly from the right in the upcoming March elections. So he will likely continue to wear two hats at once, trying to refrain from further alienating the right while at the same time giving those in the center and on the left the appearance of progress toward peace—at least until March.

Despite the remote possibility of any real negotiated solution with the FDR-FMLN opposition forces, the right has reacted to the dialog with alarm. Even though it's probably just part of Duarte's election strategy, short-term success in the peace talks could cost the right control of the Assembly—control that they've maintained since it was formed in 1982. Dialog brings other risks to the right—legitimacy for the rebels and their demands, which strike directly at the power of the oligarchy and the military.

"The guerrillas are gaining political ground. Their recognition is greater than ever as a result of La Palma," rightist leader Roberto D'Aubuisson said just before the second talk. "Duarte's image may be temporarily elevated, but when the people see nothing is coming of it his power will be flayed."

While the tremendous public support for dialog makes it difficult for official organs of the right, like the private sector umbrella group the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), to publicly oppose peace talks, they warned that negotiations were just a political tactic of the guerrillas and firmly opposed any ceasefire, which they said would only give the guerrillas "breathing space."

Less official right groups took even stronger action. Rightists were rumored to be contacting military officers to get them to oppose the talks and, according to one observer, to stage a coup.

Although most of the high command—including Defense Minister Vides Casanova, Deputy Defense Minister for Public Security Lopez Nuila (who is on the government's negotiating team) and Chief of Staff Adolfo Blandon support Duarte and the dialog process, many middle-level field commanders are less firmly behind him. Rightists, many of them from the same graduating class as ex-Major D'Aubuisson, reportedly control six of the country's important barracks, including three of the U.S.-trained elite battalions. Before the second peace talk, D'Aubuisson made the rounds of the barracks, supposedly in preparation for the March election. But these "courtesy calls" undoubtedly touched on the peace talks, and a few observers told *In These Times* that D'Aubuisson has been one of the right's intermediaries with the military to limit and oppose dialog.

Although the right must be pleased

## EL SALVADOR

## President Duarte's new balancing act



Duarte is currently under attack from both the right and the left.

with Duarte's hard line on the talks, one observer said that the private sector knows that it can buy the army if it needs to. He said that some rightists have boasted that with \$5 million they can pull off a coup; \$250,000 would merely be put in the bank accounts of key officers.

According to several observers, the peace talks and the recent death of Col. Domingo Monterrosa (which many officers believe was caused by a bomb placed in his helicopter in late October) have upset the precarious political balance in the armed forces. Monterrosa, considered the army's best field commander and chosen to run the war in the conflicted eastern half of the country, was influential among the colonels and supported Duarte.

Previously the army had been content to "lay low in the background. It was content to be the ultimate power," said one observer. Its domain was clearly defined and "giving El Salvador the appearance of a working democracy was seen to be in the best interests of the institution."

Now things are much more volatile, and rightist sectors of the military who have never particularly liked Duarte or wanted peace talks are warily watching his moves with new distrust.

Just as the peace talks highlighted blatant contradictions between Duarte and the armed forces, they have also spurred divisions in the private sector.

A new rightist group has emerged that calls itself the Domingo Monterrosa Patriotic Front. It surfaced with a communique denouncing the rightist business group ANEP for initially collaborating with Duarte's peace commission.

The Front, which some describe as a new death squad, called the meeting that Duarte held with ANEP on October 19 just after the first peace talk, "a shameful day in the history of Salvadoran free enterprise." They denounced the ANEP for not challenging Duarte when he said, ac-

ording to the communique, that he would rewrite the constitution and change the reforms if he won control of the Assembly. Although this statement is more likely a reflection of ultra-rightist paranoia than Duarte's true intentions, it is a strong indication of what the right fears most. Soon after the communique was circulated, ANEP members withdrew from the government's peace commission.

**Left alienation.**

While winning plaudits from the right, Duarte's hard-line position has angered the left wing of his support base. Just before the talks, the centrist umbrella union and peasants' coalition that supported Duarte in the election served notice once again that they were unhappy with the pace of the talks and felt that the government wasn't approaching the dialog in a serious manner.

The Democratic Popular Unity (UPD), which provided important campaign assistance to Duarte's successful bid for president last March, warned that they might withdraw their support for the next elections if Duarte does not make significant progress toward peace. Yet they really have no alternative but to fundamentally support his efforts on behalf of the Christian Democratic Party since the other parties are even farther to the right.

Still, peace remains the crucial issue to most Salvadorans. Duarte will need to raise popular expectations for peace before the elections without alarming the right so much that they might try to launch a coup. But Duarte and the other Christian Democratic leadership are practiced populists and can likely wend their way through the obstacles.

One possible scenario is to have another planning meeting or two in January and early February. At that time the two sides could schedule a more dramatic, high-level meeting that both Duarte and Ungo and top guerrilla commanders could

possibly attend just before the elections. If Duarte plays his cards right, he could then possibly be in the position to advance a temporary cease-fire that would extend to the elections and help Duarte win control of the Assembly.

Whether that occurs depends to some degree on the FDR-FMLN and their analysis of whether a Christian Democratic Assembly would give Duarte more support to negotiate a political settlement. Some sections of the left had hoped for an ARENA victory during last March's elections, believing Duarte was a populist front man for the same economic interests who continue to rule the country. Now, the opposition might similarly see that they could gain ground if the government is divided between Duarte's control of the executive branch and the Assembly controlled by the right. The crucial question for the left is whether Duarte is actually negotiating in good faith.

For the left to agree to cooperate in Duarte's electoral strategy they would probably demand certain concessions and assurances—perhaps even as much as a role in the government. There would be nothing unconstitutional, for example, about Duarte appointing an opposition member to a cabinet post. The rebels are also eager to stop the regular army attacks against their civilian supporters in the zones they now control. Because Duarte continues to deny that this is happening, he is either ignorant of the situation or complicit. Either way, the opposition may not believe that Duarte has the power to either negotiate or stop the army from its aerial bombardments and scorched-earth sweeps.

Duarte claims that the country has fundamentally changed since the 1979 young officers' coup. He says major social reforms are in place and that the army now represents popular interests. Duarte asserts that the oligarchy has been forced out of power and that El Salvador is living under a democratic system based on election.

But the FDR-FMLN doesn't agree. "The government makes arguments that the conditions of poverty and of misery and of repression that existed in 1979 don't exist now in 1984. This isn't true," said guerrilla commander Facundo Guardado (of the Chaletenango-based Popular Liberation Forces, FPL) after the November 30 talk. "What family lives better than it did in 1979? What peasant, what worker, what market vendor lives better? The objective conditions haven't changed."

**Rebel proposal.**

During the second talk the rebels presented a proposal that was fundamentally similar to one that was circulated last January, centering on a coalition government of broad participation that would purify the army, make reforms and prepare for general elections. The new proposal, however, went further than the previous one, separating the demands into three phases. In the first phase a national forum would be created, encompassing different political and social groups excluding the ultra-right. In this phase, the rebels also propose an end to the state of siege, an end to human rights abuses and a judgment of those responsible for the war as well as an end to U.S. military intervention.

The second phase involves forming a government of "common accord" that would continue all the previous measures as well as set up an electoral calendar, arrange a verifiable cease-fire and start to resettle the displaced population.

During the third stage a formalized government would draw up the constitutional reforms necessary to implement the social and political reforms. It would then submit those reforms to a national referendum and also form one army out of the two opposing forces. Finally, it would conduct general elections.

Duarte dismissed the rebels' proposal as "anti-constitutional and anti-historical." "This proposal reflects a lack of comprehension of the changes that are occurring in this country," he said.

He ridiculed the idea of integrating the two armies, adding that it showed that

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