



Willy Brandt urged nations to cut their defense spending by 5 percent and use those funds for economic development.

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

Weapons issues stir debate

By Diana Johnstone

ALBUFEIRA, PORTUGAL

THE WORLD CERTAINLY does not look any brighter since our last congress in Madrid two and a half years ago,"

said Willy Brandt as he opened the 16th congress of the Socialist International here on April 7. When the congress ended three days later, the world looked darker still. Issan Sartawi, the leading Palestinian peacemaker, had just been murdered in the lobby.

That was the end of the SI's indecisive efforts to contribute to peace in the Middle East—and time was running out on a whole range of converging crises.

Mankind, Brandt warned in his opening speech, is "beginning to hurtle down a dangerous slope." In East-West relations, "there blows an icy wind such as we have not felt for a long time.

Nobody has a single obvious solution to the world economic crisis, he said, and the search for answers is hindered by revival of "a primitive early capitalist economic ideology" that only aggravates problems. The "explosive mix" of dangers includes "a formerly unknown kind of pauperization" through environmental destruction and "further impoverishment caused by the galloping arms race." Brandt warned that "we could arm ourselves to death without ever waging war, simply by strangling our economies and refusing to invest in the future."

Brandt then strongly urged governments to agree to "cut their military spending by 5 percent in a first instance and to earmark the funds released in this way for economic development."

Lionel Jospin of the French party called for "concerted action for worldwide economic recovery." The French were drumming up support for the economic recovery plan President Francois Mitterrand will present at the seven rich countries' summit in Williamsburg, Va., at the end of the month. Others were hoping the June UNCTAD meeting in Bel-

grade might somehow save Third World countries from looming bankruptcy. But nobody was very optimistic about these international solutions since they wholly depend on cooperation from the dominant economic power, the U.S., at a time when the country under Reagan is firmly committed to contrary policies.

The Albufeira Manifesto.

In lieu of any possible concrete action, the SI unanimously approved a 29-page statement of principles, dubbed "the Albufeira Manifesto," that developed what can be fairly called the Brandt line: democratic socialism as the peaceful political response to both North-South and East-West conflicts. The clarity and coherence of the document owes a lot to Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) leader Michael Harrington, who drafted the text in a committee headed by Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway.

A main theme is that "answers to both the arms race and the economic crisis can, and must, be linked together." The manifesto states that "disarmament could free resources for the development of Third World societies." It endorses a "negotiated, general, verifiable, mutual freeze on nuclear weapons" and the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones in various parts of the world.

A second main theme is democratic socialism, described as "a will and a way to deal with a military and economic revolution that is in progress," and as "a third force—an alternative to capitalism and one-party state communism.

"In these times of capitalist and Communist upheaval," the manifesto states, "the socialist ideology is the only one that can bring hope to the peoples of the Third World as well as to those of the industrialized nations." The key is democratic economic planning. In the capitalist world, "the question is not whether there will be planning, but who will plan and how. Even a militantly free enterprise government, like the Reagan administration, carefully designs tax and other policies to predetermine 'market' outcomes." Still, "the system continues to blunder into technological and economic

revolutions without considering the consequences or the alternatives." The manifesto then calls for economic democracy: "the economic crisis of the '80s cannot be resolved in elite boardrooms, but must be met by expanding the democratic principle to every level of society and to the world economy itself."

On the other hand, "the people of the Communist countries are paying a terrible price for the errors of undemocratic planning. Where the state directs the economy, the critical issue is: who owns the state? ... Democracy is...not a matter of 'superstructure' but the indispensable means of exercising the economic and social power of the people."

This political vision underlies and justifies detente, seeing both East and West in terms of problems that could be solved—not by the victory of one over the other, but by a process of peaceful convergence toward a similar system of democratic socialism. This vision appears to prevail in the northern European parties and was not directly challenged by anyone. It contrasts with the Cold War view of Communist societies as paralyzed in a "totalitarianism" that, having lost any inner dynamic, can be changed only from outside—by war, for instance.

There were hints of revival of the Cold War outlook in speeches from the emerging group of southern European NATO loyalists in Italy and Portugal. Portuguese host Mario Soares, known as a former German protegee who has been adopted by the Americans, castigated Cuba and the totalitarian perversion of East bloc socialism. But the northern view prevailed. As British Labor Party leader Michael Foot put it, "Our duty is to restore detente." Socialists reject Soviet methods but must not be sucked into another ideology put forth by the U.S. that would betray their ideals, he said.

As usual, since Mitterrand has had access to the doomsday buttons at the Elysee, the French Socialists were obsessively defensive about their *force de frappe*. Amid laments about the growth of "pacifism" and "neutrality," the French delegation fought hard in committee to water down passages dealing with nuclear

disarmament—sometimes backed by the Italians and Portuguese.

French delegate Jacques Huntzinger developed a global version of the "guns don't kill people, people kill people" line. The roots of our insecurity, he said, are in exploitation, blocs, not in armaments. He tried to outflank disarmament advocates of the Third World left. "What does disarmament mean to the people of Central America and Southern Africa?" he asked, adding that France was proud of having sold arms to Nicaragua and would do so again.

The Gallic line of reasoning clashed notably with what the French call the "Anglo-Saxons." Harrington, choosing to speak "not just as the leader of a small growing party but as part of a broad American movement," wanted to "say to our French friends that the freeze movement is not 'pacifist.' We are for a bilateral, verifiable freeze."

Attached to their own small nuclear deterrent force, French Socialists seem to be lagging behind in their realization that nuclear deterrence is not an eternal fixed protection against war, but that, as Kalevi Sorsa said, "the doctrines of deterrence only give legitimacy to the continuation of the arms race." Sorsa, chairman of the SI disarmament committee, pointed to "the shift in great power strategies from defensive to 'offensive deterrence.'"

President Reagan's March 23 "star wars" speech, suggesting an antiballistic missiles protective system for the U.S. that would in effect free the U.S. offensive strike forces from fear of retaliation, has begun to awaken the French to the instability of deterrence. Lionel Jospin spoke the "stupefying television appearance of President Reagan announcing his administration's intention to challenge the very foundations of deterrence."

The SPD's expert in this field, Egon Bahr, said Reagan was correct in saying that deterrence does not ensure peace because both sides try to go beyond deterrence. "Mutual assured deterrence is mutual vulnerability. The moment when one side would close the window of vulnerability is the moment of greatest danger. This is Reagan's aspiration."

He said he agreed with the French that this was dangerous. The SPD had always opposed efforts to gain superiority, he said, stressing that arms control agreements are the only way to obtain a relative security. This reflects the SPD concept of "security partnership" or, as the Palme report calls it, "common security."

The French vs. the Germans.

Bahr said he doubted that Huntzinger, despite his criticism of "blocs" and superpowers, was seriously trying to dissolve blocs quickly. A basic difference of approach between French and German socialists is that the Germans try to find common ground between the two blocs, to calm them down so to speak (except for Helmut Schmidt's now disputed complaints about the SS-20s that started the whole Euromissile controversy), whereas the French tend to view both with an alarm that may justify the alarm each feels about the other. The effect of French policy has been to reinforce blocs while complaining about them. French leaders seem to suffer from a Munich complex—a notion (shared by some Americans) that since the Munich agreement with Hitler caused World War II, any effort to make peace may cause war. But the Germans cannot see it that way.

In his opening speech, Brandt complained of the "catch phrases put into abundant circulation about a neutralist or pacifist danger.... I am not a neutralist but a conscious European, and perhaps a modest citizen of the world. Under the impact of the Nazi danger, I could not become a pacifist, but this I know: it was not peace policy but a loss of reality and the quest for superiority that led to war."

As to the Euromissiles, Kalevi Sorsa said "something must be done now, immediately, in order to prevent a ser-

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Thompson talks END

Last December, Yuri Zhukov, president of the official Soviet Peace Committee sent an open letter to some 1,500 leaders of the European peace movement in which he condemned the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) Liaison Committee's plan for a convention in Berlin, May 9 to 15. Complaining that official East European peace committees weren't asked to co-sponsor the convention, Zhukov accused END of "trying hard to neutralize the anti-war movement, disorient people in the movement and push them off the right way." Zhukov charged END leaders with attempting to "split the anti-war movement, which is global by its nature, and to infiltrate 'cold war' elements into it."

Responding for the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and END, Ken Coates pointed out that the Soviet and other official peace committees had been invited to attend the convention, but not to "co-organize" it, because the backers believe "non-alignment is the proper course for our peace movements." Coates made clear that END doesn't hold the two superpowers equally responsible for the arms race. "In fact," Coates wrote, "we disagree with this view." Nonetheless, he continued, "it is our opinion that blame of different kinds does historically attach to each bloc, and we do not wish simply to exchange blocs, but to make a genuine and reciprocal exit from the entire system of bloc divisions in our continent."

The following interview with British historian Edward P. Thompson, a founder and leader of END, takes up this question.

By Alan Wolfe

Is it fair to say that the first period of attack on the European nuclear disarmament movement came from the West, but that now it's increasingly coming from the East, specifically from the Soviet peace committee?

Yes, Soviet ideologists are extraordinarily isolated. They have a siege mentality. When the West European peace movement emerged as a noticeable force in 1980 they welcomed it as potentially pro-Soviet and tended to dismiss our non-aligned position as irrelevant, as being confusion. But it's become apparent to them, particularly in the last 12 months, that this is a clearly held political position, and that elements in the West European and American movements have been trying simultaneously to contest Western weaponry and to open communication between like-minded people in movements in the East.

This is not a hidden policy. The European nuclear disarmament appeal of April 1980, which is one of our charter documents, clearly stated that the movement must not be to the advantage of the West or the East, and that peace workers must act as citizens of Europe, not of either bloc.

But this provokes high sensitivity in the ideological security system of the other side. And now we're engaged in quite a

sharp confrontation. We were originally offered partnership with official Eastern European peace committees. These are quasi-governmental organizations and have functions, just as do similar organizations in the West. For certain kinds of official relations they are convenient, and we don't refuse discourse with them. We have never refused interchange with them. But we do refuse to conduct the discourse of peace on their terms, in their way.

This became heightened by two episodes: One, the problem of unofficial peace movements in the East and the sensitivity of ideological security services over there toward our contacts—such as the contact between the Dutch and West German Lutheran churches, and the East German Swords into Ploughshares and other peace movements in East Germany, our relations in END (European Nuclear Disarmament) with Hungarian peace groups and then the exceptionally complicated and tense situation of those very small independent groups in the Soviet Union, notably the Moscow group for establishing trust between the USSR and the U.S., which is being fought out at this moment.

The other issue was the promotion of all European, or more than all European, conventions or conferences. The West European political forces of various kinds working for peace convened the conference in Brussels last July, which was very successful. But the official peace committees in the East were very resentful that they weren't invited as equal partners. The explanation that the West gave was that attendance with full rights was supposed to be for signatories of our END appeal, which is even-handed in

The search for peace

Beyond the Cold War: A New Approach to the Arms Race and Nuclear Annihilation

By E.P. Thompson
Pantheon, 1982

By Barbara Epstein

In *Beyond the Cold War: A New Approach to the Arms Race and Nuclear Annihilation*, E.P. Thompson brings together his "recent interventions for the peace movement." The collection includes short topical pieces on issues such as the Falklands crisis and President Reagan's zero option proposal, as well as sev-

er criticism of both blocs, and which they refused to endorse. Moving on to the projected convention in Berlin in the middle of May, they became increasingly restive and said they thought Berlin was a provocative place to chose.

I think actually they have a bit of a case there, because there's no way that the German question, a very sensitive question, won't have a high profile, or should be repressed, in West Berlin. But they resented this and wanted equal participation rights.

Now this is complicated because on paper the Warsaw powers would like NA-

TO and the Warsaw pact to be disbanded, and they have some more short-range proposals which, on paper, are O.K. We would support some of them. We would support a nuclear free Europe, and a mutual security pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty organizations, which is rather much of a paper treaty that one wouldn't sweat a lot to create.

But at the same time the real concessions that we are asking for are more political and ideological than terms of treaties. They cannot adjust to situations in which autonomous movements, with all their untidiness and all their plurality,

World War II, the U.S. claimed the cause of freedom, the USSR that of peace, and European nations and movements were forced to choose sides. Thompson points out that there is a large element of hypocrisy in these claims: the U.S. does not hesitate to support oppressive regimes when it sees that to be in its interest, and the USSR has not held back from participation in the arms race. Nevertheless, he writes, dissent has a better chance in the U.S. than in the USSR while the U.S. has consistently taken the lead in the arms race.

The grain of truth in the superpowers' claims make it difficult to rejoin movements for peace and for democracy, Thompson writes. Dissenting movements in the East are suspected of sympathy for the U.S., while Western peace movements are charged with allegiance to, or domination by, the Soviet Union.

Thompson argues that the two halves of Europe, and the causes of peace and

THE WAR



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