


The old adventurousness has given way to conservatism. One needs allies who respect the true meaning of national independence and not the dangerous rhetoric of violent overturnings. A lonely Tito may find himself standing alone, as an ever combative Fidel Castro goes on battling bravely alongside Big Brother, knocking the bloc off anybody in their way. A terrible choice stands before the new nations of the Third World—to get lost in the mêlée of rival blocs or to lose themselves in the new giganticism of their very own third bloc whose Orwellian credo now reads: non-alignment means following the line.

François Bondy

## On Two Sides of the Rhine



Bonn

THE OCCASION was a special television programme out of the once-ruined now-restored Berlin *Reichstag*, and the question was put to *Bundeskanzler* Helmut Schmidt. It

came from Alain Clément, *Le Monde's* thoughtful and most experienced student of German affairs, and it sounded if it was in a spirit of Gallic self-questioning. "Why is it, I ask myself, that things are not going as well for France as for the Federal Republic of Germany? . . ." But in explaining the question, as is now the fashion among "talking heads" on our screens, he proceeded to give his own answer. "In radical defeat radical consequences are drawn. But when a defeat is camouflaged as a half- or quarter-victory, then it takes decades longer to recover. . . ."

Chancellor Schmidt, up to his quick-lipped reputation, saw the opportunity to play his role again as a generous European statesman and tried to defend the case for France for his hard-pressed Paris opposite number, Raymond Barre, who all in all was in firm control of the economic and financial situation, and he saw not crisis but promise in the air. It was a touching moment of Franco-German solidarity.

But, looking at the results of the recent *L'Express* opinion surveys, I wonder if anything would help. Neither his energies nor his rather *gemuetliche* appearance have prevented Raymond Barre from sinking, with almost Jimmy Carter-like precipitousness, to the bottom of the popularity lists: he emerges as the most unpopular Premier in

the 21 years of the Fifth Republic. And the detailed statistics must be inducing as much depression in the Matignon as the similar figures are in the White House.

Some 80% believe that the present French difficulties are "more serious" than all the previous ones and they see "no end" to the crisis. The Premier could draw some consolation from the fact that a Government of the Left would "not be better" (27%), would be in "the same" amount of trouble (39%), or would even be "worse" (19%). The man who had promised "a turning point within three years" was pronounced a failure by a 62% majority, especially on the issues of rising prices (82%) and unemployment (81%). In a similar survey conducted by the Left-wing *Nouvel Observateur*, some 63% felt that the government was at a total impasse. Even Raymond Aron, who for all his dour scepticism often gives the brilliant impression that there are somewhere clear solutions, has been disseminating pessimism. He feels that the American recession (if not the English one, alone) is in danger of spreading itself over the whole world-economy, and he almost seemed to be wringing his hands when he asked: "Is France in any better position (better, that is, than in the crisis of 1974) to weather the onsetting storm? . . ."

SO I WONDER WHETHER the soothing German words from the other side of the Rhine are considered to be just the right tone. Few compliments come these days from the crackling talk of the *Bundeskanzler*—no "nice and easy chap" in London, or Washington, or Jerusalem—but apparently he is persuaded that one has been underestimating the soundness and the extent of French prosperity. Yet of what help is the German Chancellor's admiration when Frenchmen today, after thirty years of European boom times, still talk of the "*deutsche Wunder*", the famed German miracle, with a mixture of shock and envy! As for the German attitudes, I do not think it can be doubted that we are quite sincere when we go on proclaiming our hope that France will flower and bloom. This may be ascribable to post-War Germany's well-known pro-European passions, and all the good-neighbourly pieties that go with them. More than that, the good will is followed up by much curiosity and steady attention. Paris is crowded with German journalists and permanently accredited bureau chiefs. In Bonn there are only a handful, and I was surprised the other day when a newly-arrived French correspondent told me that he had been given his choice to move either to the USA or to the *Bundesrepublik*, and he decided: "Bonn is more important for us than Washington. . . ."

That sense of new, or growing, importance is surely reflected in the recent speculation about

adventurous French-German cooperation—namely, the possibility of joint responsibility for the costly programmes of atomic armament, a bi-national “*Force de frappe*.” This, be it noted, came from solid Gaullist circles, and not from the “New Right” searching sentimentally among the old-fashioned scrapbooks of “the brotherhood of Frenchmen and Germans.” Some appeals for “solidarity” only awake dark spirits from a deep from which Western Europe has long escaped. We

may, as I have been suggesting, be talking past each other these days; but one thing is certain, that 40 years after the outbreak of World War II, there is simply nobody on either side of the Rhine who can conceive of Frenchmen and Germans shooting at each other again. Peace is here to stay, whether we can win the battle of prices and prosperity or not.

Werner Höfer

## The Case of Robert Havemann

By Günter Maschke



**T**HE MEASURES taken by the East German Communist leadership of the *DDR* against its critics, and the recent convictions of Stefan Heym and Robert Havemann for “currency offences”, suggest that thought is most dangerous when it is theoretical. The insistence of “the true and authentic socialism” that all intellectuals should be in complete

and wholesome agreement gives them the choice only of becoming abject apologists or uncompromising dissidents. There is no middle way, no third camp . . . but such hopes spring eternal, since they promise both that the spirit will become flesh and that the spirit will become free.

That a third way may just be possible is the useful unmilitant illusion of Robert Havemann which enabled him to preserve his integrity and finally to gain a famous victory over the Party régime on 8 May. For the first time in 18 months the 70-year-old scientist and author, weak and frail from his various ailments, was able to move freely again. Whole companies of *Volkspolizei* who had rotated taking up guard positions outside his front and rear doors will have to re-cycle their vigilance. For the moment he can come and go as he pleases, and those aware of the mania of Communist governments for marking historical dates must have noted the event with raised eyebrows. The Party thought it could afford to be magnanimous on the anniversary of “the glorious victory of the anti-Hitler coalition.” But 8 May 1945 was above all the day on which the Nazi hold on the last

inmates of prisons and camps ended. Uncertainty in the use of political symbols is evidence of a certain political insecurity.

Havemann’s victory is not diminished by the fact that formal proceedings are now being taken against him, and various other members of the dissident opposition are again being put under pressure. His survival is not to be explained only by Prime Minister Honecker’s sentimentality (they were fellow-prisoners under the Nazis in Brandenburg), nor by the world-wide protests of Western (and some Eastern) writers and intellectuals, nor by the Italian Party’s expression of Euro-Communist concern. He who persists in his solitary struggle may finally find allies rallying to his side. It was the quiet unswerving fanaticism of a moralist prepared to suffer for his heretical beliefs that forced a totalitarian state party to retreat. Whatever may happen now, it seems unthinkable that he will again be put under house-arrest or crudely deported, like so many of his friends, across the Wall to the West.

**Y**ET Professor Havemann’s political record is neither very remarkable nor distinguished, for he was neither an anti-Stalinist in the past nor over the long years of his intellectual life a very subtle or independent Marxist spirit. He was unperturbed when the Moscow “Show Trials” began in 1936: as he wrote, “Zinoviev, Kamenev, and all those comrades had at the time almost no political significance for me. I had hardly heard their names. . . .” But Zinoviev was the real founder of the German Communist Party (of which Havemann then was an underground member) and he had been the leader of the Communist Inter-