Duty, Honor, Country
On the Importance of the Military Virtues in Preserving our Republican Institutions

Of course, to achieve this kind of cultural cross-fertilization between the civilian and military worlds, we need to think about more than just the role of West Point and the service academies. Not everyone is cut out to live the life of a combat officer. And this is especially true in the kind of commercial republic the Framers established. America is not Sparta or Rome. But it would be a good thing for both the military and the broader civilian society if more of our young people had at least some minimal experience of the rigors of military life, and some first-hand appreciation of its distinctive virtues.

One way to achieve this is to return ROTC to our elite campuses, from which it was ingloriously evicted during the Vietnam years. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, at the beginning of the 1990s, these institutions would not even permit military recruiters on campus, arguing that the military's policy of "don't ask, don't tell," violated their moral commitment not to discriminate on the basis of sexual preference. Instead, the elite universities imposed their own version of "don't ask, don't tell": interested students had to meet with recruiters at designated off-campus sites. Beginning in 1994, Congress began to retaliate, insisting that these institutions must either permit recruiters on campus or risk losing their federal funds. But they have come around only grudgingly, letting students know that acquiescence is by no means approval.

This is the climate in which the current debate over ROTC is taking place. At the moment, among the Ivies, only Cornell has ROTC units of all three service branches on campus. Princeton offers only army ROTC; Penn, navy ROTC; Harvard and Yale, along with Columbia and Brown, offer programs with exercises conducted at other institutions, imposing considerable burdens on the students enrolled in these programs. The so-called conservative Ivy, Dartmouth, offers no ROTC programs either on or off campus. If anything, the situation is even worse at the top liberal arts colleges, where there are not only no ROTC programs (with the conspicuous exception of Claremont McKenna College), but there are not even debates about whether to bring it back.

What the presence of ROTC programs on college campuses did was to help bridge the gap between the military and civilian worlds, much as Jefferson thought the militia might do. (In fact, here too, ROTC seems another reversal of what Jefferson intended. Rather than West Point graduates returning to lead their militia units, civilian-educated officers serve limited tours of duty in the active army.) Of course, there are the inevitable tensions between the graduates of the academies and the officers coming out of the ROTC programs, between the combat professionals and those fulfilling their short-term military obligations, but on the whole, this kind of levelling is good for the officer corps, and good for the country. This kind of cross-fertilization is still ongoing, but without the participation of our political and cultural elites.

Yet even if we could finally manage with the present war on terrorism to put an end to the debilitating "Vietnam syndrome" that has gripped our educated classes and opinion makers for the last thirty years, I do not mean to suggest that we could ever completely overcome the tension between the civilian and military cultures. And here again, our situation seems to be the reverse of the problem Jefferson faced. Jefferson worried about a mil-

SEE DUTY ON PAGE 8
DUTY
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7

civilian authority. But in another sense, it is
cal, not pluralistic and open-ended. In short,
embody them. Its end is victory, not liberty; its
principles and is inevitably shaped by the regime of

The military cannot and should not try to
mirror exactly the principles of democratic society. The military is not a “civic instrument”
that reflects social progress. Nor is it a social
welfare agency. The relationship between the
military and civilian spheres is more compli-
cated. Although the military defends the princi-
ples of democratic society, it cannot fully
embody them. Its end is victory, not liberty; its
virtues are courage, loyalty, and obedience, not
justice and tolerance; its structure is hierarchi-
cal, not pluralistic and open-ended. In short,
although the military defends democratic prin-
ciples and is inevitably shaped by the regime of

Let’s face it. The mainstream media in America has gotten a little wild and woolly when it comes to the truth. Hit and miss. Maybe even a little bit skewed one way or another. We think it’s high time to grab the truth by the horns and straighten things out. That’s why we’re inviting you to subscribe to The Washington Times National Weekly Edition, the only nationally cir-
culated newspaper in the country with the courage and conviction to cover the news hon-
estly. Every week, we’ll bring you a fresh, honest, unbiased look at the people and events
that shape the news in Washington D.C. and around the world. No liberal spin. No hidden
agenda. Just vigorous, unapologetic journalism and clean, crisp writing. We hope you’ll
join us. After all, haven’t you had enough bull?

(a $27.95 value). “At Any Cost” is a breathtaking examination of Vice President Al Gore’s audacious and unprecedented effort to overturn the presidential election. Alternately infuriating and hilarious, Bill Sammon offers a compelling, insider’s look at this historic standoff.

For lightening-fast delivery, call 1-800-363-9118

One Year (52 issues) $49.95 (2024) Two Years (104 issues) $79.95 (2026)
Friends & Enemies

BY MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS


LEADING A COALITION IN WAR IS A NOTORIOUSLY DIFFICULT Enterprise. As Winston Churchill wrote in The Hinge of Fate, "In war, it is not always possible to have everything go as one likes. In working with Allies, one finds that sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own." Napoleon Bonaparte expressed a preference for fighting alone against a coalition. "The allies we gain by victory will turn against us upon the bare whisper of our defeat."

Waging Modern War, by retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, is a fascinating account of coalition warfare: NATO's 1999 war against Yugoslavia in Kosovo. In this, NATO's first war, Clark ostensibly controlled vast assets. In reality, so many conflicting forces - political, diplomatic, military, and legal - compromised his command that it's remarkable NATO was able to achieve anything resembling victory. This effort was against a militarily weak foe, leading one observer to question whether NATO would be able to maintain solidarity and combat effectiveness against a more equal opponent.

Clark, who was commander both of NATO and of U.S. forces in Europe, faced unprecedented problems in executing this war. The first and most important was that the members of NATO were unable to agree on the goals of the war, the strategy, and the extent of force that could be brought to bear against Slobodan Milosevic. NATO civilian leaders entered into the war expecting that it would end quickly - that Milosevic would be cowed by a few days of air strikes.

Second, the civilian leaders undercut the coercive potential of the military campaign by declaring at the outset how limited it would be. For instance, President Bill Clinton announced that NATO would not use ground forces, and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana stated that the air campaign would last only "days, not months."

Third, the influence of lawyers on the conduct of the war in Kosovo was unprecedented. Not only did Clark have to contend with the sort of civilian interference in military operations that characterized the Vietnam War, but his subordinates had to have every target vetted by the lawyers. In this war, lawyers became facto tactical commanders.

Finally, Clark had to deal with an administration that, for whatever reason, did not fully trust him and a military establishment that did not support him - indeed, arguably did what it could to undercut him. Clark was never invited to a strategy discussion with either the secretary of defense or the president. So bad was the relationship between Clark and his Washington counterparts that Defense Secretary William Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman Hugh Shelton conspired to keep Clark away from the NATO summit meeting in Washington during the war. He attended anyway, but was ostracized by the president, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Cohen and Shelton. As he approached their receiving line at a reception, several glanced at him. "Stay away was the clear message from the body language," he writes. "It was jarring."

But there was more humiliation to come. After having presided over a victory of sorts in Kosovo, Clark was unceremoniously ousted from his command in order to make way for Air Force General Joseph Ralston.

Waging Modern War also reveals that, despite claims to the contrary, the Vietnam War continued to shape the way policy makers, both civilian and military, thought about foreign affairs during the 1990s.

To begin with, President Clinton was not interested in foreign affairs, preferring to focus on domestic politics. Unfortunately for Clinton and his legacy, events in the international arena did not cooperate. Almost from the start, Clinton found he could run but couldn't hide from events overseas. This forced him to focus on that part of his job in which he had the least interest and the least competence.

Clinton's foreign policy team was not the strongest in the history of the Republic - some have described it as the Carter administration's third string. Most of the civilian policy makers in the Clinton administration had cut their teeth in the anti-war movement of the 1960s. Yet over time, many became advocates of military intervention and the use of force to prevent human rights abuses.

For obvious reasons, the officer corps did not trust the Clinton foreign policy team. Even those too young to remember Vietnam thought that these "hawkish" civilians who were so eager to involve them in conflicts abroad would abandon the military if the going got tough, leaving the soldiers to twist slowly in the wind.

THERE WAS ALSO A CULTURAL ASPECT to this distrust. The officer corps as a whole tended to oppose the sort of "constabulary" operations that became so prevalent during the Clinton administration. The military in general and the Army in particular became casualty-averse during the 1990s, not wanting to lose soldiers in operations that they did not believe were in our vital national interest. As a result, the Army often dragged its feet in these kinds of operations. This foot dragging comes through loud and clear in Waging Modern War.

Indeed, all the contradictions of post-Cold War foreign and defense policy - pro-intervention activists among the civilians; reluctance on the part of the military, with the exception of the Air Force, which would be the featured actor in this operation - emerged during the war in Kosovo. On the one hand, the civilians wanted war on the cheap. Many civilians, both American and European, were reluctant to even call it a war.

On the other hand, the military was heavily influenced by the argument made by H.R. McMaster in his remarkable book on the origins of the Vietnam War, Dereliction of Duty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, McMaster writes, acquiesced in the irresponsible decisions of the Johnson administration that led ultimately to defeat in Vietnam. As a result, the military was as culpable as Robert MacNamara's "Whiz Kids" in supporting a limited intervention in Vietnam that was bound to fail. Trying not to repeat that mistake, the military dragged it's feet in Kosovo and elsewhere, which made it impossible for the administration to follow a strategy based on the correct lessons of Vietnam, had it been so inclined.

As a result, the war in Kosovo was waged as if Vietnam had never taken place. Serbia could have been brought to its knees had the West been willing to employ decisive force at the outset. This lesson of Vietnam was driven home nearly two decades ago by the foremost American expert on Vietnamese communism, Douglas Pike. In the book Viet Cong and PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, are classics. In a paper delivered in 1983 at a Wilson Center symposium on Vietnam, Pike wrote that "the initial reaction of Hanoi's leaders to the strategic bombings and air strikes that began in February 1965 - documented later by defectors and other witnesses - was one of dismay and apprehension. They feared the North was to be visited by intolerable destruction which it simply could not endure."

Based on interviews and extensive archival research, Pike concluded that...

PHOTOGRAPH © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS

CLAIREMONT REVIEW — FALL 2001 — 9