

A NEW ERA OF GOOD FEELING

BY L. AMES BROWN

I

'ONE of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister Republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents.'

Thus wrote President Woodrow Wilson in an important statement which he issued from the White House eight days after he had taken his oath of office. That he was characteristically in earnest in the matter has been established by many other of his official utterances since that time, as well as by things he has done with the purpose of influencing these 'sister' republics toward a feeling of confidence and friendliness for the United States. How much room there was for attainment in this direction at the time of Mr. Wilson's assumption of office it would be hard to overestimate. Certainly the desired relationship which he described did not then exist, and as lately as the past summer there have been evidences of suspicion and distrust on the part of the Ibero-American peoples. A notable instance is found in the anti-American outbreak near the American legation at Montevideo a day or two after the seizure of Vera Cruz by our naval forces, — an outbreak which was inspired by the belief on the part of Uruguayan students that the United States had entered upon a war of conquest against the Mexican Republic. The President

was careful in this instance, as in every other where a similar attitude on the part of Latin Americans has been encountered, to do everything possible to ameliorate the difficulty. Secretary of State Bryan was immediately ordered to cable to the principal diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in South America copies of the President's address to Congress on April 20, disclaiming any thought of gaining an additional foot of territory in South America through intervention in Mexico. He was gratified to learn a few days later that the persons responsible for the threatened outbreak had expressed their regret at having misunderstood the motives of the United States; and he was assured that the publication of his address had rectified this misunderstanding.

It is my purpose in this paper to give an adequate report of the things Mr. Wilson has said and done in pursuance of this 'chief object' of his administration, and to show by somewhat critical comment the general results that may be expected from them.

II

In the past several months political students in this country and in South America have expressed themselves repeatedly on the subject of the Latin-American attitude toward this government. The article of Professor Hiram Bingham in the *Atlantic* of June, 1913, embodying a somewhat radical description of the unwholesome conditions

he had studied, had the very desirable effect of helping to awaken American statesmen and political thinkers to the necessity for constructive work in the field of Latin-American sentiment. Professor Bingham vigorously described the Monroe Doctrine as an 'Obsolete Shibboleth,' and supported the belief that abolition of this doctrine as enunciated in the past two decades is necessary to a happy adjustment of our international relations in this hemisphere.

Professor Bingham set forth in detail his reasons for the statement that 'from the Latin-American point of view, the continuance of the Monroe Doctrine is insulting, and is bound to involve us in serious difficulties with our neighbors.' He declared that it is necessary that we abandon 'our present policy, . . . to act as international policeman, or at least as an elder-brother-with-a-big-stick, whenever the little fellows get too fresh.'

A less temperate attack on the Monroe Doctrine was made by Dr. Roque Saenz Peña, President of the Argentine Republic, in a book that he published at Buenos Aires last summer. Dr. Peña concludes with the question, —

'What then is the actual, real, positive meaning to-day of the famous Monroe Doctrine? Simply this: North-American domination instead of European domination.'

The Argentine writer declares that the true inwardness of the 'unselfishness' of the United States has been its desire to keep the hands of Europe off the western continent solely that the United States might have no competitor in the mercantile and political field of the southern part of the western world.

I have been informed, however, that Dr. Peña's book created somewhat less of a sensation among thoughtful persons in the Argentine than in the United States. A compatriot of his

expressed the opinion some time after its publication, that it was regarded as a political utterance designed to strengthen the President with an element of his own electorate whose suffrage might best be won by inveighing against the United States.

Perhaps a more valuable recent discussion of our relations with the Latin-American republics and of their attitude toward us is to be found in the book of General Rafael Reyes, a former vice-president of Colombia, called 'The Two Americas'; it was written with the avowed purpose of promoting good feeling and closer union between the Northern and Southern continents. General Reyes's description of conditions existing until a year ago — when his book was published — is scarcely brighter than that by the President of Argentina; but the undoubted friendliness of the Colombian author and explorer toward the United States, as evidenced by the fact that his two sons are being educated in this country, gives the impartial student greater confidence in his frank statements than one may have in the politically colored attack of President Peña. In his introduction, he says: —

'There are many factors operating as a bar to friendly relations and mutual confidence between the Latin-American republics and the United States; but, while the fundamental cause of much of the unfriendly feeling now unfortunately existing in the greater part of Latin America may be traced back to the protracted disturbances in the political conditions of the smaller republics, the United States is very largely responsible for the uneasiness and apprehensions which appear to inspire the Latin countries in their dealings with the great Republic of the North.'

General Reyes joins with Professor Bingham in regarding as one reason for the present situation 'the popular mis-

conception in the United States of the significance and objects of the Monroe Doctrine, which in many quarters is looked upon as a kind of international police regulation, to be administered for the better preservation of law and order in the somewhat extensive "municipal area" of Latin America'; but he does not declare the abolition of this policy necessary to the readjustment which he desires in order that 'all the countries of the western hemisphere may labor side by side, to their collective and individual advantage, for the glorification of America as a whole.'

Justice impelled the South American writer to say that 'credit for the greatest and most fruitful conquest of modern times is due to the United States of America — that is to say, the conquest of the tropical regions by the means of sanitation.' In speaking of the methods by which the Canal Zone was acquired, he at the outset of the Wilson Administration expressed the belief that 'Mr. Wilson's Administration, in the fulfillment of its undoubtedly sincere profession of those high principles which create respect for the countries which enforce them, will remove that blot from the national escutcheon.' He held out high hopes for the evolution of a new attitude on the part of his blood-kin as a result of the disclosure by the Wilson Administration of higher motives than those on which 'dollar diplomacy' was believed by the Latin Americans to be grounded.

III

That the Monroe Doctrine is at the heart of our relations with Latin America is evident from the fact that no writer on this subject can long restrain himself from discussing the opinions of our sister republics with respect to it, and from arguing in defense of the opinions which he himself has formed. It

is axiomatic therefore that the vital element in whatever general policy President Wilson may have formulated for our Latin-American relations should be his interpretation of this declaration of President James Monroe in 1823.

I have heard nearly all of the public speeches of President Wilson, and have been present at most of the semi-public occasions on which he discussed political affairs with newspaper correspondents, public men, and visitors; and I have heard him mention the Monroe Doctrine only once. That was in the early days of his administration, when a correspondent, at one of the regular White House newspaper interviews, asked, without great finesse, the question whether Mr. Wilson favored the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine? The President made it quite clear by his answer that he had never seriously thought of any such action.

It is not surprising, however, that Mr. Wilson has refrained from discussing this doctrine as such, when the excellent precedents for such restraint are recalled. It is noteworthy, as Professor Bingham has pointed out, that from the enunciation of what he terms 'this shibboleth,' until the second administration of Mr. Cleveland in 1895, — a space of sixty-two years, — direct mention of the Monroe Doctrine seldom found its way into a State paper.

It was to be expected of such a thoughtful student as Mr. Wilson that he would have exceedingly positive ideas on this subject, and that he would not be long in disclosing them after he became President. It was just eight days after he assumed the control of the executive affairs of the government that he issued a statement of the principles which would animate his administration's activities in Latin-American affairs. The chief news-value of the statement lay in its immediate application to the Mexican imbroglio. After

setting forth that one of his chief objects would be to promote 'the most cordial understanding and coöperation between the peoples and leaders of America,' the President proceeded to set himself irrevocably against revolutionary governments formed to serve the personal ambitions of political adventurers, such as he quite clearly considered that of Señor Victoriano Huerta at Mexico City. This statement, which forms the first chapter in the Wilson pronouncements upon the Monroe Doctrine, was in part as follows:—

'Coöperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect, and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves. We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigue, and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government, and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. We are the friends of peace, but we know that there can be no lasting or stable peace in such circumstances. As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights and respect the

restraints of constitutional provisions. Mutual respect seems to us the indispensable foundation of friendship between states, as between individuals.

'The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both, and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither.

'From these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this government as it is necessary now to forecast; and in the spirit of these principles I may, I hope, be permitted with as much confidence as earnestness to extend to the governments of all the republics of America the hand of genuine disinterested friendship, and to pledge my own honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peace and amity that a fortunate future may disclose.'

Herein for the first time appeared Mr. Wilson's pledge that the United States was not to seek further territory in this hemisphere. This pledge was repeated with much more definiteness several months later in Mr. Wilson's speech before the Southern Commercial Congress, at Mobile, October 27, 1913, when he said:—

'I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material duties made superior to human liberty and national opportunity. I say this, not

with a single thought that any one will gainsay it, but merely to fix in our consciousness what our real relationship with the rest of America is. It is the relationship of a family of mankind, devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty. We know that that is the soil out of which the best enterprise springs. We know that this is the cause which we have in common with our neighbors, because we have had to make it for ourselves.'

Thus far I have brought forward for emphasis utterances disclosing two of the essential principles of Mr. Wilson's Latin-American policy, namely, opposition to non-constitutional governments based on the personal strength of men like Huerta, Castro, and other soldier adventurers who have from time to time succeeded in overthrowing the governments of their respective countries; and the commitment of the United States not to seek territorial expansion in this hemisphere.

This Mobile speech disclosed the third essential principle of Mr. Wilson's policy. The history of Latin America is a history of exploitation of natural resources by foreign capital through concessions, almost as much as it is a history of revolutions. Especially is this true of Mexico, where the Cowdray and other British corporate interests have succeeded in seizing the control of great oil properties and of a large part of the railways. In his Mobile speech, Mr. Wilson set his face sternly against such exploitation and declared that the United States would rejoice to take part in emancipating the Latin-American states from it. He said: —

'There is one peculiarity about the history of the Latin-American states which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of "concessions" to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They

are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions, are in this condition: that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs; a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these states are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise, and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate.

'The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the self-respect of the Latin-American States, their achievements in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk — an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation. I think some of these gentlemen have already had occasion to bear witness that the Department of State in recent months has tried to serve them in that wise. In the future they will draw closer and closer to us because of circumstances of which I wish to speak with moderation and, I hope, without indiscretion.

'We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. You cannot be friends upon other terms than those of equality. You cannot be friends at all except upon the terms of honor. We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest, whether it squares with our own interest or not. It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It is not only unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions.

'Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship; and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world. Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity, as against material interests — that, ladies and gentlemen, is the issue which we now have to face. I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.'

Mr. Wilson's public speeches are fewer for the time he has been in office than those, perhaps, of any other President in the recent history of our country. He has found it advisable, however, on other occasions than the Mobile speech to reiterate the principles so definitely presented then. In his address to Congress on April 28, 1914, just after the landing of our forces at Vera Cruz, he said, —

'Our feeling for the people of Mexico is one of deep and genuine friendship, and everything that we have so far done or refrained from doing has proceeded from our desire to help them, not to hinder or embarrass them.

'There can in what we do be no thought of selfish aggrandizement. We

seek to maintain the dignity of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind.'

In a brief address to the newspaper correspondents at the White House, which preceded his departure for the Capitol to address Congress, the President said, —

'We are not at war with the people of Mexico. In no conceivable circumstances would we fight the people of Mexico. We are their friend, and we want to help them in every way that we can to recover their rights and their government and their laws.'

These last two quotations complete the list of the important public utterances of Mr. Wilson bearing on his Latin-American policy.

IV

Having set forth by quotation, as fully as is practicable in this paper, the policy that Mr. Wilson has evolved for our relations with Latin America, I shall now sketch the chief incidents between the Northern and the Southern republics, where an application of these principles was called for, and where the sentiment of these republics might be expected to be affected.

The timeliness of this article suggested itself several months ago, when the 'A B C' mediation of our troubles with Mexico had been initiated. That a large consideration in Mr. Wilson's mind in accepting the suggestions of mediation was the thought of its probable happy effect on our relations with the Southern republics was well known to persons close to his plans; but it was realized that the extent of this wholesome result depended in large measure on the manner in which the Niagara

Falls conference eventuated, and finally it was decided that the preparation of this article should be postponed until some conclusion had been reached in our relations with Mexico.

It cannot now be doubted that the success of the mediation and of President Wilson's Mexican policy in establishing peace with Mexico — and for a time, at least, within Mexico itself — marks a new era of good feeling between the two continents. For the mediation, though it was not entirely successful in establishing permanent peace in that Republic, certainly accomplished a great deal with respect to the constructive effect on the sentiment of Latin Americans generally.

An interesting suggestion which has been made as to the inspiration of the offer of mediation by the diplomatic representatives of Brazil, Chile, and the Argentine, and which may not be fully proved or disproved at this time, is that it really grew out of the feeling of distrust on the part of the three governments which I have described by reference to the authorities previously quoted. In other words, the 'A B C' governments entertained the idea that the United States, if as a result of the seizure of Vera Cruz it really was forced to make war on Mexico, might enter upon a war of conquest extending beyond the Southern boundaries of that republic, — a war the end of which might not easily be foreseen; and they desired by the suggested mediation to cut off all avenues to such a result.

Whatever the atmosphere in which the idea of mediation was conceived, it was avowedly only 'with the purpose of subserving the interests of peace and civilization in our continent, and with the earnest desire to prevent any further bloodshed, to the prejudice of the cordiality and union which have always surrounded the relations of the governments and peoples of America,'

that the 'A B C' diplomats came forward on April 25 with their offer to mediate the issue between Mexico and the United States.

President Wilson's reply did perhaps as much as anything that has occurred for many decades in the history of the United States to convince the Latin Americans that the United States is not seeking their territory. It proved beyond a question, even in the suspicious minds of Latin Americans, that he desired peace with Mexico, and had not been waiting for a plausible opportunity to place a dominating grasp upon the land south of the Rio Grande. There was one possible bar to the acceptance of the mediation. The dignity of the United States might have been invoked as a bar to such a settlement of serious difficulties with a government which we had scorned to recognize from its very establishment. With a vision of the golden opportunity offered for winning the friendship and confidence of Latin America, the President thrust aside this bar, although he well knew that the country at that time, freshly remembering the deaths of the seventeen men who had fallen at Vera Cruz, was not enthusiastic over the plan suggested. In reality the Latin-American diplomats stood on strong ground in making their peace offer, for potent reasons on the part of the United States would have been necessary to a rejection, lest the sentiment of all South America be aggravated.

In replying to the note of the mediators, President Wilson said:—

'The Government of the United States is deeply sensible of the friendship, the good feeling, and generous concern for the peace and welfare of America manifested in the joint note received from your excellencies, tendering the good offices of your governments to effect, if possible, a settlement of the present difficulties between the

Government of the United States and those who claim to represent our sister Republic of Mexico. Conscious of the purpose with which the offer is made, this Government does not feel at liberty to decline it. Its own chief interest is in the peace of America, the cordial intercourse of her republics, and the happiness and prosperity which can spring only out of frank, mutual understanding and the friendship which is created by common purpose.'

He ended his reply with the hope that the peace interchanges might 'prove prophetic of a new day of mutual co-operation and confidence in America.'

There were, in the Niagara Falls interchanges, delicate issues involved for the mediating governments as well as for the United States and Mexico. It was absolutely necessary, for the sake of preserving and promoting the amity which had been given primary consideration by President Wilson in agreeing to the mediation, that no demands be insisted upon which might by inference have the effect of reflecting this Government's views on domestic conditions in any of the three intermediary countries. This consideration necessitated the relinquishment by the United States of its hope for a commitment of the Mexican representatives to a programme of land-reform legislation which had been in the President's mind as a necessity to the ultimate peace of Mexico. Realization that each of the three governments acting for peace had the same internal issue at home made it mandatory that, for the sake of the well-being of their own governmental administrations, they should not be called upon to take sides or encourage from either standpoint diplomatic argumentation respecting this issue.

There are other incidents of minor importance which group themselves about the Mexican problem, and which

as such should be mentioned in this paper. One of them is the selection of Brazil as the nation whose diplomatic and consular representatives should look after the interests of the United States in Mexico during the time when diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. The action of the United States in requesting this service from Brazil was a token of the confidence in the friendliness of that republic and a sort of recognition of her sisterhood, and it was accepted as such on the part of Brazil.

It was a happy coincidence that in the weeks that followed shortly after the Niagara Falls conference, the President should be called upon to sign the act of Congress raising the American legations in Chile and the Argentine to the rank of embassies. Mr. Wilson made a pleasant little ceremony of the signing of this bill. He invited Minister Naon of the Argentine, Minister Suarez of Chile, and Ambassador da Gama of Brazil to be present. In an informal speech which followed the affixing of his signature, the President said, —

'I want to look forward, if I may, to the closer relations with our sister Republics whom we so honor and are glad to be associated with; and in the present circumstances, when you have so thoughtfully and graciously offered to show our common interest in the peace and righteous government of America, it is especially fitting that the thing should occur.'

As ranking second on the list of those important constructive acts of the Wilson Administration which certainly will affect Latin-American sentiment toward this country favorably, should come the signing of the treaty with Colombia at Bogota on April 6. The administration has given every evidence of a resolve to push this treaty to confirmation by the Senate. It already

has been approved by the Colombian Senate. The treaty was referred to by the President, in transmitting it to the Senate, as one 'between the United States and the Republic of Colombia, for the settlement of their differences arising out of the political events which took place on the Isthmus of Panama in November, 1903.'

I shall not attempt here to defend the treaty from the political criticisms which have been directed against it by members of Congress, or to disprove Colonel Theodore Roosevelt's declaration that it is 'blackmail.' It will suffice to say that the establishment of the administration's determination to have the treaty made effective between the two countries will do much to smooth out an important obstacle in the way of a constructive Latin-American policy.

Whatever Mr. Roosevelt's views respecting the part played under his responsibility by the United States in the 'political events on the Isthmus of Panama in November, 1903,' which resulted in the acquirement of the Canal Zone by this government, there is no considerable division of opinion on this subject in Latin America. The people of Latin America generally accept the view that the revolutionary movement which established the Republic of Panama was deliberately fostered by American interests with the approval of the Roosevelt Administration.

General Reyes, from whose book I have quoted friendly comment upon the attitude of his blood-kin toward the United States, was in command of the military expedition which the Colombian government dispatched to reestablish order in the Isthmus at the outbreak of the Panamanian revolution. In his narrative of the happenings under which he says Colombia was deprived of her sovereignty, General

Reyes declares that the success of the revolution was made possible solely by the act of the American cruisers under Admiral Coghlan in preventing the Colombian force from landing. He points to the recognition of the new republic two days after it had declared its independence of Colombia, and to the agreement fourteen days thereafter upon a treaty guaranteeing the rights of the new republic and providing for the construction of the canal. In conclusion, he says, —

'The claims of Colombia in this matter do not merely embody monetary compensation for the material losses involved in the dismemberment of her territory. They include as a paramount consideration a recognition of the moral wrong inflicted upon her, and, by reflection, upon all the other Latin-American countries, by an attack upon her territorial integrity, solemnly guaranteed at an earlier period by binding treaty obligations of the United States.'

With this view permeating the Latin-American mind, the wisdom of eradicating it through the treaty signed at Bogota cannot seriously be questioned from the standpoint of the constructive purposes which the President of the United States has in mind. The treaty negotiated at Bogota meets all the requirements of Latin-American thought so far as it is practicable to do so. It furnishes financial reparation in the form of \$20,000,000 in gold, and of special privileges in the use of the canal and the Panama Railway; and in Article I it makes this more important concession: —

'The Government of the United States of America, wishing to put at rest all controversies and differences with the Republic of Colombia arising out of the events from which the present situation on the Isthmus of Panama resulted, expresses, on its own part

and in the name of the people of the United States, sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations.'

This sentiment is thus reciprocated by Colombia:—

'The Government of the Republic of Colombia, in its own name and in the name of the Colombian people, accepts this declaration in the full assurance that every obstacle to the restoration of complete harmony between the two countries will thus disappear.'

Another achievement of the Wilson Administration which will have a lasting effect in conserving the good results which by other means may be gained between the United States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere is the negotiation of the Bryan peace treaties with eleven of our sister republics. The republics which have signed these treaties with the United States since the inauguration of Mr. Wilson are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, Guatemala, and Salvador. The result of these treaties is practically to insure that there will be no war between the United States and countries in this hemisphere.

The treaties provide that in the event of international differences which under ordinary circumstances might necessitate a recourse to war, a year shall be allowed for an investigation of the issues by an international commission.

The vital provision of each of these treaties, to quote from that with the Netherlands, which is regarded as representative of the entire group, is contained in Article I, which sets forth this agreement:—

'The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, to the settlement

of which previous arbitration treaties or agreements do not apply in their terms or are not applied in fact, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.'

Article III provides that the international commission shall complete its investigation and report within a year after the date on which it shall declare its investigation to have begun, unless the high contracting parties shall extend or limit this time by mutual agreement.

The *American Journal of International Law* is of the opinion that while war with many of the nations with which the United States has become signatory to the Bryan treaties is unthinkable, the very existence of such treaties with these nations 'is an invitation to other nations, with whom war is not unthinkable, to investigate before they fight, or rather to investigate instead of fighting.'

Secretary of State Bryan bases his confidence in the efficacy of the treaties in preserving peace upon the belief that the calm, dispassionate judgment of mankind is on the side of peace, and that the one year provided in which this judgment may assert itself will suffice in nearly every international dispute to avert war. 'We know well,' said he recently, 'the proneness of nations to act under excitement, and a period of investigation permits the restoration of deliberate reason.'

In some measure at least the trade between two countries reflects the sentiment between them. The same thing may be said with more confidence of the trade relations between two continents.

Let us see how this works out with regard to the United States and South America. According to a recent compilation of Director John Barrett of the Pan-American Union, the twenty Latin-American countries of Central and South America conducted in 1913 a foreign commerce valued at \$2,870,-188,575. Of this total, the imports were valued at \$1,304,261,763. The imports from the United States, despite the geographical propinquity of this country as compared with the position of Germany and Great Britain, the other great manufacturing countries from which the Latin Americans were making purchases, amounted to more than \$5,000,000 less than those from Great Britain and exceeded those of Germany by about \$100,000,000. These divergences were less impressive, however, than those of the previous year, and are accepted as indicating a development of American trade with South America.

It may be said without a violation of this government's neutrality in the European war, and without infringing on the diplomatic proprieties to such an extent as did A. Rustum Bey, Turkish Ambassador to the United States, by a similar utterance, that the war has furnished the United States its opportunity. The output from the European factories will necessarily be diminished for many years to come. The demand of the Latin-American markets, it follows, must depend more and more on the United States. It is a matter of gratification to realize that the American government, and American commercial interests as well, are fully alive to this opportunity, and are preparing with careful haste to reap the benefits which it is believed will be conferred mutually upon the two continents.

Most important probably of the steps which have been taken with the view of developing our trade with these

countries is the launching of President Wilson's plan for a government-owned merchant marine. The newspaper press assumed upon the announcement of this plan by the President that it was designed chiefly to furnish means of transporting American cereals and manufactures to the belligerent nations of Europe. Persons who have watched the minute developments with respect to this plan which have followed in the months since it was launched are convinced, however, that the larger purpose that the President has in mind to serve, after it has been ascertained that our European commerce will be cared for, is the promotion of our trade with South and Central America.

A short time after the administration Merchant-Marine bill had been introduced in the House, the President in a conversation at the White House expressed the belief that our commerce with Europe would be able to look after itself; and he spoke significantly of the possibility offered by the government-owned marine for developing 'new avenues of trade.'

It is fortunate that at this time there should become available a special appropriation of \$50,000 to be used by the Department of Commerce in promoting trade with South and Central America by extending commercial agencies such as had been initiated by the Taft Administration.

This opportunity offered by the war is not without its responsibilities for the United States, as has been pointed out by both Secretary of Commerce Redfield and Mr. Barrett, the Director of the Pan-American Union. These men have declared that first of all, in order that the United States may extend its trade with South America in these troublous times, there arises the necessity that American bankers extend a financial helping hand to these countries. The war has not impaired

their ultimate purchasing strength, Mr. Redfield points out, but their present buying strength and credit resources have been affected adversely, and he urges that the policy for which there is most immediate necessity is one of helping South America to regain her credit and thus laying the foundation of a permanent trade.

The action of the National City Bank of New York, however, in establishing important branches at Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo, gives evidence that the banks of the country are alive to this need.

Not least among the efforts of government officials to develop friendly intercourse between the United States and Latin-American countries is the recent undertaking to establish a flat two-cent rate for letter postage throughout the Western Hemisphere, and to conclude money-order conventions which will stimulate trade with Latin America. The Postmaster General has indicated a willingness on the part of the government to sacrifice the revenue that would be lost through a reduction of the postal charges from the United States to those countries, out of consideration for the impetus that would be given toward the building up of direct and frequent mail interchanges.

The United States does not now do any money-order business with Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia and a number of the less important Latin-American republics. Negotiations have been undertaken for concluding conventions with the postal authorities of these countries by which direct money-order interchanges can be made to the advantage of all concerned. These efforts of the Post Office Department, while not in themselves likely to bring any immediate important result, are a part of the movement being made for bringing the countries of this hemi-

sphere into closer touch and sympathy, and they cannot in the long run fail to aid this general purpose.

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Certainly it is too early now to attempt to form an estimate of the results of the efforts of the Wilson Administration toward establishing a 'new era of good feeling' between the two Americas. These efforts have laid the foundation for large results in the future, and their accomplishments cannot now be foreseen. It can be said, however, and with proper regard for the principles of conservative judgment, that the unity of high purpose running through all these recorded happenings, unless obstructed by events which are not now anticipated, will do much to overcome the racial and sentimental antipathies which have held back the development of the relations that should exist between the greatest democracy and those other governments which are founded on the same principles as our own.

The policy which Mr. Wilson has laid down is destined to be regarded as remarkable in the history of international politics. It is based on a new precept — that it is possible for great neighboring powers to continue prosperous and great without attempting to overlord one another. He has advanced the idea that the United States, in order to carry to the fullest consummation its destiny of political and commercial prosperity, need not become the suzerain nation of the Western Hemisphere. His is a precept that has been entirely absent from the diplomatic history of the United States as well as from that of Europe. Doubtless it will take a considerable time for it to permeate the minds of those controlling the destinies and friendships of the Latin-American republics.

AFTER THE WAR

BY G. LOWES DICKINSON

At a time when the issue of the war is still doubtful, it is impossible to speak with any confidence of its probable effects upon Europe and the world; for the kind of settlement that is possible will depend upon where victory falls. The Germans, so far as one can understand from the utterances of their representative men, are fighting for a German hegemony of Europe, in order that they may pursue the task — whose hopelessness all history demonstrates — of destroying by force the 'culture' of the non-Germanic nations and imposing upon them their own. Such an attempt would mean perpetual war, and would end by reducing Europe to the level of the Balkan States. On the other hand the Allies profess to be fighting, not for territory or for hegemony, but to 'crush German militarism.' No object could be more desirable, but the important question is, how to do it. There is talk, irresponsible of course, of 'crushing Germany' in order to crush German militarism, and even of imposing upon her by force a new form of government, expelling the Hohenzollerns and democratizing Prussia. But it is clear that no nation will patiently take its form of government from foreigners and enemies; and that such a solution, too, would only perpetuate war. If militarism is to be crushed it must be crushed in all countries, the victorious as well as the vanquished. Will it be, and can it be? Let us try to estimate the forces and the possibilities.

First, what do we mean by militar-

ism? Conscript armies, in the first place, and huge navies. But that is only the outward sign. The inner spirit is the will to dominate by force, evoking everywhere the fear of domination.

These two things go together. Every country, of course, claims to be always on the defensive. But every country, or every group of allies, believes the others to be aggressive, or there would be no need of defense. The truth indeed is that, in all countries, there are militarists and anti-militarists; the militarists believing in force, desiring to extend the power and territory, or perhaps the 'culture,' of their country by force, and believing that every other state has the same purpose and attitude; the anti-militarists believing that no country has any interests that are worth pursuing by war; that all real interests are common to all peoples; and that all disputes between states can be and should be settled by judicial process. In the conflict between these principles the militarists have always won. They win partly because they are so strongly entrenched in the governments of the continental states; partly because, having made war, which they can always do before the people know they are making it, they can count upon an immediate outburst of passion, sedulously nourished by the press, to carry them through to the issue.

The question, then, that we have to ask is, whether this war, like all previous ones, is to end in a mere truce leading up to a new war, or whether we