

Quemoy-Matsu crises was crucial in precipitating the split between Moscow and Peking. Gaddis's conclusion is therefore as inescapable as it is surprising: Along with Mao Tse-tung, Joseph Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev, John Foster Dulles deserves to be recognized as one of the major architects of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

But if Gaddis's essay on American strategy toward the Communist world is an excellent example of how historical scholarship can renew our respect for Western statesmanship and enlarge our sense of diplomacy's possibilities, another essay in this collection can serve as a case study of virtually all of the myths and illusions that have prevented Americans from thinking sensibly about the Soviet Union. Entitled, like the book itself, "The Long Peace," it seeks to explain why Russia and America, despite all their disagreements, have never gone to war.

According to Gaddis, there are several factors, apart from the existence of nuclear weapons, that have served to moderate Soviet-American antagonisms. To begin with, since 1945 the United States and the Soviet Union have gradually evolved a series of "rules" to govern their rivalry. Admittedly, these rules are implicit rather than explicit, but thanks to the insights of modern game theory we are able to detect their presence. Thus, both the Soviet Union and the United States have implicitly agreed to respect each other's spheres of influence; both "prefer predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality" (whatever that means); and both have agreed not to undermine the other side's leadership. Without such rules, Gaddis informs us, "the correlation one would normally expect between hostility and instability would have become more exact than it has in fact been since 1945."

Another "behavioral mechanism that has sustained the post-World War II international system" is the decline of ideology in both the Soviet Union and the United States. Indeed, for Gaddis ideology is the great enemy of "stability": "Both the Soviet ideological aversion to capitalism and the American ideological aversion to totalitarianism could have produced policies—and indeed have produced policies in the past—aimed at the complete overthrow of their respective adversaries." Fortunately, Soviet-American relations today reflect "a new maturity . . . an increasing commitment on the part of both great nations involved to a 'game' played 'by the rules.'"

But "the preservation of stability" requires something more than the abandonment of ideological fervor; it

calls for "the realization that great nations have a stake, not just in the survival, but also the success and prosperity of their rivals." History teaches us that when great nations decline, their behavior "can become erratic, even desperate, well before physical strength itself has dissipated." The United States therefore has a stake in preventing the Soviet Union's decline as a world power, and the Soviet Union has a similar stake in preventing America's decline. For as Gaddis concludes, "International systems, like tangoes, require at least two reasonably active and healthy participants."

Now, in all fairness to Gaddis, one hastens to point out that he is not alone in holding these views. In fact, a decade ago they were accepted by much of the foreign policy establishment, and formed the intellectual rationale for the policy known as "détente." One would recall that the views he espouses today were subjected to a devastating critique by conservative and neoconservative intellectuals during the 1970s—a critique that succeeded in depriving "détente" of much of its intellectual respectability.

At the core of this critique was an emphasis on the singularity of the Soviet system, on the need to analyze it with much the same degree of care and sophistication that Gaddis brings to the study of American history. Indeed, the conservative/neoconservative critique was strikingly similar to Gaddis's own criticism of his fellow historians, in that it too rejected excessive emphasis on the techniques of political science in favor of greater attentiveness to the intellectual framework underlying Soviet foreign policy. This framework it located in Leninist doctrine, which is less an ideology than an "operational code" for seizing and maintaining power. Whatever the nature of their ideological convictions, critics of "détente" argued, the members of the Soviet ruling class have been trained to think in Leninist terms, and to discuss Soviet foreign policy without reference to Leninism (as theorists of "détente" did in the 1970s, and as Gaddis does today) is as futile an exercise as, let us say, describing American postwar diplomacy without mentioning containment.

Judging by his approach to American history, one would have expected Gaddis to be quite sympathetic to this line of argument. That he is in fact quite unsympathetic, that he has paid "curiously little attention" to what he himself has written in a different context, is a mystery surely greater than the question of why Americans and Russians have so far failed to blow each other up. □

REMAKING JAPAN: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AS NEW DEAL

Theodore Cohen, edited by Herbert Passin/The Free Press/\$27.50

Joshua Muravchik

The transformation of Japan into a thriving modern democracy was an extraordinary feat of social engineering. It was of course effected coercively, but the American occupation ended thirty-five years ago and the institutions it implanted have endured and grown stronger. This suggests that the occupation succeeded in changing not merely structures but hearts and minds as well, an accomplishment all the more impressive because the Japanese are an insular people with a distinctive and highly developed culture that had not previously sustained democracy.

Numerous officials who served in the occupation, from General MacArthur and his deputy General Courtney Whitney on down, have written accounts of it, but none that I have seen is as good as Theodore Cohen's. Cohen, the son of Russian Jewish immigrants, stumbled into Japanese studies at City College in the 1930s. Like so many of his classmates of similar background (including his illustrious cousin, Daniel Bell), Cohen was a Marxist of sorts and therefore gravitated to labor studies. As a result, when the occupation came, Cohen, though not yet twenty-eight years old, found himself one of America's few authorities on Japanese labor and was named as chief of the occupation's Labor Division. He married a Japanese and settled in Tokyo after the occupation, making a career as a businessman. His book was published in Japanese in 1983, the year of his death, and only now comes to us in English.

Cohen aims to explain why the occupation succeeded so well, but the reader needn't accept all of Cohen's arguments to profit from the light he sheds on this most intriguing question. Just how intriguing is underscored by the reminders Cohen gives us of the skepticism expressed at the time by experts that the occupation could in fact succeed in democratizing Japan. Joseph Grew, the State Department's regnant authority on Japan, told President Truman that "from the long-range point of view, the best we can hope for

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is a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work." Moreover, the mystery only deepens when one considers the brevity of the occupation. It lasted less than seven years, and the period of political reform was even shorter. After only a year and a half, "MacArthur announced that the Occupation had no further major democratic reforms to propose." Nor was the occupation carried out flawlessly: Cohen argues that major mistakes were made, and he livens his account with anecdotes about minor foibles, such as the decision by some low-level official "to sponsor square dancing and billiards for the Japanese as obviously more democratic than geisha dances and *kendo* sword-fighting."

Though famously insular, the Japanese had twice before in their history given themselves to great spasms of cultural borrowing: from China in the seventh and eighth centuries and from Europe, notably Prussia, in the nineteenth. Thus when the occupation came, the Japanese had precedent for wholesale adoption of foreign ways. Drawing an analogy to the two earlier periods, Cohen calls the occupation, and the Japanese response to it, Japan's "third turn." Their shattering defeat left the Japanese especially receptive to change. They "were in a mood to question everything to which they had been loyal," says Cohen. And America offered a powerful alternative, enhanced by the fact that "it had proved more successful" in battle and by the beneficence of the occupiers which stunned the Japanese (who themselves had exhibited nothing of the sort in the lands they occupied and who expected the worst from their conquerors). Cohen says: "Personal fraternization, demonstrating a freer and kindlier way of life . . . was the secret weapon of the early Occupation."

The occupation had another main weapon, as well, although hardly a secret one: Douglas MacArthur. "MacArthur bestrode the land like a Colossus, and the Japanese called him 'father,'" says Cohen. He had an instinct for conducting himself in such a way that obedience was exacted from

the Japanese with minimum violence to their sense of right order. Cohen provides a nicely balanced portrait of MacArthur in Japan, a happy contrast to so much of the one-sided literature about the Supreme Commander, whether pro or con. Cohen criticizes MacArthur as self-promoting:

Important Headquarters measures were . . . taken in the name of the Supreme Commander, not the United States, and were accompanied by thunderous press statements emphasizing the revolutionary and epochal features of each successive action. In the heady days of the autumn of 1945, the word went around Headquarters, not entirely a joke, that the Supreme Commander had to be presented with one epochal achievement a week.

Yet Cohen also vividly illustrates how MacArthur's egotism sometimes worked to Japan's, and America's, interest. Because Japan was his turf, MacArthur protected it, such as against demands that Japan's industrial plant be offered up in reparations to the Allies. Cohen describes with patent admiration the stratagems by which MacArthur sabotaged the entire program. At the conclusion of MacArthur's deep stall, a share of Japan's machine tools had been disbursed to the allies. "The total value," says Cohen, "was put at some \$20 million, about 2 percent of what the Russians took out of Manchuria—in one-fifth the time."

As for MacArthur's political views, Cohen writes: "Far from being a convinced ideological rightist, the General was a political primitive with wide open spaces where his reactionary principles were supposed to be." MacArthur's politics were in fact shaped by an intense patriotism that entailed veneration of the revolutionary principles—liberty, democracy, equal rights—that constitute the American creed. With the self-confidence and command of a monarch, MacArthur proceeded to impose that revolution on Japan.

Yet he could not have succeeded, argues Cohen, had the occupation's democratic reforms not been reinforced by rapid economic recovery. Cohen identifies several sources of that recovery. First came emergency food aid from the United States that averted starvation while the economy was restarted. MacArthur secured aid in quantities that even exceeded Japan's needs, says Cohen, by warning Congress that anything less would require more troops to keep the peace. In the next few years, economic renewal was also fueled by war stockpiles that had been hidden by untold numbers of Japanese as defeat grew imminent to avoid confiscation by the victors. Gradually these stockpiles seeped into the postwar economy, an invisible but vital form of capital. Then in 1950 North Korea in-

vaded South Korea, and, as Cohen tells it: "In a matter of days the U.S. army was turning to Japan to provide large quantities of all kinds of military support supplies. . . . Suddenly Japanese makers were besieged with orders for rush shipment, price secondary. . . . Within only a month, the visible effect was startling."

But in Cohen's view, the key to the Japanese economic miracle and hence to the success of Japan's political transformation was a version of the New Deal that MacArthur imposed on Japan. It consisted of a land reform that made Japanese peasants the owners of their own plots and a labor reform that encouraged millions of workers to join unions. "The liberation of the peasantry and the freedom of labor unions to bargain collectively created for the first time in Japan's history a domestic mass-consumer market in depth," he says. This domestic market was essential to Japan's spectacular rise as an exporter, Cohen argues, by allowing Japanese manufacturers to develop and perfect their products before sending them abroad.

The occupation, however, was not entirely a success, in Cohen's view. A severe austerity program was forced on Japan over MacArthur's objections in 1949, designed to stem Japanese inflation and reduce the U.S. foreign aid burden. This step and a reckless purge of Communists, which Cohen says actually targeted fewer Communists than non-Communist radicals and labor militants, bought America considerable bad will among intellectuals, civil servants, and other sectors of Japanese society. Especially painful to Cohen, Japanese labor turned neutralist or anti-American. The result, he says, was "an incomplete alliance," for America a self-inflicted wound.

Given his pedigree as an anti-Stalinist radical at CCNY in the 1930s, I am willing to accept Cohen's word, as I would that of few others, that non-Communist radicals were mistaken for Communists in the later occupation purges, but I wonder if the causes and consequences of anti-Americanism among sectors of the Japanese populace aren't somewhat overdrawn in his account. Given that America smashed Japan in war, annihilating its cities and dropping two atomic bombs on it; that we then remade it to a great extent in our own image; that we then provided it with a great deal of aid (something that seems so often to breed resentment); and that to this day we provide for its defense, I suspect it was inevitable that anti-Americanism would be an active facet of Japanese life. Pride and the human psyche ordain it.

But the larger fact is that anti-Americanism does not dominate Japanese life; it remains a dissent, a countercurrent.

Our alliance with Japan may be in some ways "incomplete"—especially in Japan's failure to shoulder the burdens

of its own defense—but it remains strong. And Japan remains a democratic model to the rest of Asia and an economic powerhouse. These are the fruits of a brilliantly effective U.S. policy, and we are in Theodore Cohen's debt for this fine account of it. □

THE CHILD IN TIME
Ian McEwan/Houghton Mifflin/\$16.95

John Podhoretz

Ian McEwan's *The Child in Time* is an affecting, carefully observed, and beautifully written novel about the abduction of a small child and the catastrophic impact of that monstrous action on the child's parents. But telling this story simply and plainly wasn't enough for its author, who has bur-

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dened his slight tome with interesting but meandering disquisitions on the nature of time, an unwarranted intrusion of precious fantasy, and a vulgar bit of political satire.

McEwan clearly intends these apurtenances to distinguish his novel, and critics like the *Wall Street Journal's* Richard Locke have taken the bait. But in truth, McEwan's asides and subplots are awkward and inappropriate inter-

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