

The second rock is the fact that the successes of past, present, and future medical research all tend to make medical care more expensive, and will probably continue to do so. The potential demand for care—including psychiatric care, the effort to develop the full potential of the severely retarded, and the effort to give geriatric patients the benefit of all possible help—can bankrupt any nation which attempts to provide it free of charge. Britain tried to circumvent this

difficulty by keeping a tight lid on NHS expenditures, especially for fixed capital. But now even this is inadequate and the Wilson Government proclaims openly that it will have to adopt an even more stringent system of priorities. This must come down to the decision that some shall be helped at the cost of others being permitted to die before they need to. The conflicts on this issue have only begun, but there can be no doubt that they will be fierce indeed when the Draconian na-

ture of the alternatives is fully realized. A rational solution would be to end the effort to realize a completely socialized and "free" medical service and to permit the introduction of a much larger private sector to help share the cost. Perhaps some future British Government will have the courage to turn to this solution. Until then, continued deterioration of morale among key NHS staff and worsening provision of physical facilities for treating the sick seem unavoidable. □

Robert F. Byrnes

Soviet-American Cultural Ties: Kto kogo?

Who benefits most from detente—the United States or the Soviet Union? American proponents suggest that the SALT and nuclear-arms negotiations, the arrangements on crisis management, and the Helsinki agreement are liberalizing the Soviet system, softening old hostilities, creating a new spirit and a new structure of peaceful relations. Critics assert that detente sanctifies the status quo in areas that Communists rule but gives them free rein elsewhere, as in Angola, that it gives the Soviets access to our superior science and technology but offers us few corresponding advantages. Cultural relations between these two powerful countries illustrate the issues and dilemmas both states face, and they may help to answer the critical question Lenin himself asked: *Kto kogo?* Who is overcoming whom?

The most visible manifestations of these cultural relations have been the exchanges of ballets, orchestras, and athletic teams, and, of course, the Apollo-Soyuz joint manned space laboratory. But the United States and the Soviet Union have also been engaging in cooperative research on environmental protection, medical care, agriculture, and transportation. And perhaps most significant, if least visible, the two countries have been continuously exchanging graduate students and scholars since 1958: these were the first exchange programs, and they have slowly increased in magnitude, so that by now somewhat more than a thousand scholars have studied in the other country for a semester or more.

It is important not to exaggerate the scope of these exchanges. Their total cost to America has been less than \$50 million, a fraction of the annual budget of a major state university. No more than ten Americans have taught in the Soviet Union in the last two decades, and only about three thousand Westerners have studied there since 1958, whereas 150,000 foreigners studied in the United States in 1974-75 alone.* Nor should one exaggerate the role cultural relations play in re-

laxing tensions. Thousands of foreigners traveled to and lived in Germany, Germans traveled abroad freely, trade flourished, and publications moved without interruption even after the Nazis had begun their barbarities and were preparing to attack their neighbors. Nevertheless, cultural relations do have some ideological significance, and, as the Soviet rulers constantly remind their subjects, the "ideological struggle" remains vital. One must remember that no Americans studied in Soviet universities between 1936 and 1958, and that the Soviet decision to send some of their young elite to their major rival and to accept Americans in their dormitories touches a critical Soviet nerve and serves as a symbol of post-Stalin policies.

The American athletes, historians, agricultural economists, and ballet dancers who perform, study, or do research in the Soviet Union benefit personally and professionally from their experience, just as Armand Hammer does from his business dealings there. But our national interest is also served by the increased knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union which these individuals bring back with them. This is particularly true because the largest single group of Americans who have spent more than a few months in the Soviet Union consists of specialists in Russian studies, generally in history, literature, and gov-

*It is equally important to keep East-West economic relations in perspective: in 1974 West Germany, the Soviet Union's most important Western trading partner, had more trade with tiny Luxembourg than with the Soviet Union, and its exports to Sweden equaled those to the entire Soviet bloc. Economic and military power, vitality and stability, and resolution and diplomatic skill are far more important in world politics than any mustard seed; and "the neglected aspect of foreign affairs," even when adroitly used, can only supplement.

ernment, in that order. By living and working in Moscow and Leningrad, they have been able to go beyond Soviet slogans and published literature, and their views of Soviet life and policy have become less abstract and doctrinaire, more humanistic and discriminating. Moreover, all of our scholars, even the most cloistered and politically naive scientists, have acquired substantial knowledge of the controls and iniquities which abound in the Soviet Union and of the difficulties our diplomats face in dealing with the Soviet government.

By the same token, cultural exchanges increase and improve the Soviet elite's knowledge of us, thus beginning to reduce some of the misapprehensions caused in part by Soviet propaganda, and in part by simple lack of information. In selecting their participants, the Soviet rulers have naturally emphasized the fields of research central to continued Soviet progress, and the scientists who have benefited from travel abroad, discussions and cooperation with foreign specialists, and increased access to professional literature, have been visibly influenced by their experiences. Scientists and other intellectuals in relatively influential positions are among those most critical of the Soviet system, particularly of the restraints it places upon travel and access to information. They therefore constitute a modest pressure for moderating and mellowing Soviet policies. They have also introduced revised information and attitudes directly into the research areas crucial to the Soviet government and into the higher reaches of the Soviet system. In this sense, Louis XIV's dictum that states touch only at the top remains true, and Western influence flows into the Soviet Union through the new elite.

However, we pay a price for these benefits. For those who go to the Soviet Union, the most annoying costs are the monumental inefficiencies of the Soviet system, which they cheerfully endure, and the indecencies and indignities to which many are subjected, and which

they bitterly resent. During the past five years some cosmetic changes and basic improvements have occurred, but Americans are still restricted largely to Moscow, Leningrad, and a few other cities, while Soviets travel freely throughout the United States; access to archives and laboratories is frequently denied in the Soviet Union, while Soviets have the same access to our scholarly resources as any American; and the KGB still harasses some Americans and especially their Soviet associates, while the FBI has never bothered a legitimate Soviet participant. Glaring inequities abound: Columbia University has assisted dozens of Soviet scholars and artists, but Vitali Rubin, a Soviet specialist in classical Chinese philosophy, cannot get a visa so that he can begin his appointment at Columbia.

Most cultural leaders are especially concerned because the exchanges occur under an official intergovernmental agreement and because, almost inevitably, the role of our government has grown constantly. Our scholars, cultural leaders, and government were all reluctant in 1958 to accept the exchanges agreement because we sought free trade in men and ideas, not a primitive barter, or even reciprocal trade, in which scientists and athletes are counted as carefully as bales of cotton. Given its obsession with bureaucratic and centralized arrangements, however, the Soviet government would open its frontiers, and some of its cities, universities, laboratories, libraries, and archives, only if the United States accepted an intergovernmental exchange agreement.

So far, Washington has exercised little control over the cultural relations process; quite the contrary, it has encouraged universities and private foundations to

assume many administrative responsibilities. Foundation support is declining, however, even as the costs of cultural exchange rise, and the government looms as the main, almost the lone, financial supporter. Federal control over Soviet studies and other disciplines is therefore increasing, and, through its control of purse strings, Washington threatens to become a kind of St. Petersburg-on-the-Potomac. The joint research programs negotiated since 1971 promise benefits to both countries, but they can only enlarge this federal influence. Indeed, as President Kingman Brewster of Yale University recently noted, our scholars and universities will have to devote increasing energies to defending their independence from their own benevolent government.

The greatest cost we pay in accepting controlled cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union is in granting respectability and dignity, parity and legitimacy to a government that denies the freedoms essential to civilized life. Sending novelists to a country, or accepting chemists from one in which historians are imprisoned for seeking to be objective and in which scientists of independent mind are hounded from their positions, is a high price, one that may lead to further moral demobilization and intellectual corruption.

Those who support cultural exchanges argue that we have no choice, that the Soviet Union exists in an ever-smaller universe, that the United States itself is a flawed society, that this is and will remain an imperfect world, and that we must use the instruments available to advance learning and at the same time to press for increased freedoms.

The writings of men such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn illustrate with blinding

clarity the dilemma that cultural relationships with the Soviet Union pose for us. They agree that the United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to reduce the likelihood of war, but they condemn us for weakness and irresolution and for failing to use our influence to advance the rights of the Soviet and East European peoples. They urge that we not grant legitimacy, and above all that we not provide scientific and technological assistance, to a government denying its citizens rights to which they are entitled under their own constitution.

Soviet advantages and disadvantages from cultural exchanges are in many ways the obverse of ours. Soviet scholars, artists, and athletes of course have many of the same interests as ours. In particular, they welcome opportunities to go "out," to perform and compete in other countries, to share information and insights with fellow specialists, and to obtain recognition from the international community.

For Soviet leaders, the main advantages are clear. They appreciate the respectability and prestige the exchanges bring and the impressions their artists, dancers, and eminent scientists create. They use travel abroad as a patronage instrument, denying those of independent, critical, or unorthodox mind the opportunity and awarding a bonus to those who faithfully endorse every government action. They exercise some influence over American scholarship by denying admission to qualified scholars with prickly subjects. Many discouraged from studying twentieth-century history, the Soviet economy, or foreign policy thus turn to subjects more comfortable for the Soviet leaders, or even abandon Soviet studies. Some timid intellectuals refrain from pro-

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tests against Soviet treatment of dissidents and from participating in conferences in which subjects distasteful to the Soviet government might be discussed. Many now accept controls that used to chafe.

Above all, the Soviet Union uses cultural exchanges to narrow the considerable gap between Soviet and Western science and technology by obtaining access to the equipment, techniques, and discoveries of our campuses and laboratories, just as it uses trade to obtain industrial information and to inject Western technology into critical parts of the Soviet economy. In the sciences, for example, the Soviet Union has acquired enormous benefits, from the Salk vaccine and new methods of heart surgery to the most sophisticated methods of exploring for oil and precious metals. The Soviets have even learned from us the best techniques of organizing and directing scientific research.

The costs to the Soviet Union constitute many of our benefits. "Cooperating with capitalism" exposes the Soviet government to criticism from the People's Republic of China and from fervent old-line Communists everywhere. Occasional defectors are an embarrassment. The restrictions the Soviet government imposes create resentment among many visitors and a sense of shame among informed Soviet citizens, as the policies of Nicholas I and Alexander III did in the nineteenth century. However, the main price is the infectious spread of Western ideas from the contacts the exchanges allow. Travel, art forms, hybrid corn and Holsteins, the presence of Soviets in American dormitories and of Americans in Soviet dormitories, exhibits of kitchen equipment, cooperation in cancer research, study of computer technology, and the adoption of our business management techniques all affect the Soviet intellectual elite, as Pepsi-Cola, jazz, miniskirts, and jeans affect other levels of Soviet society. Any Soviet citizens who remember Khrushchev's boasts in the early 1960s about surpassing the United States in important fields of production must wonder what has happened. Even the most obtuse Soviet citizen must suspect from the flow of Western science and technology that the West retains its cultural leadership. Imagine the effect here if we were drinking *kvass* and seeking Soviet equipment to exploit our oil and gas resources!

The Muscovite rulers appreciate the hazard they endure to obtain political and scientific-technical advantages. The more they borrow by sending Soviet artists and intellectuals abroad, by accepting Western scholars in Soviet institutions, and by increasing trade with other countries, the more they open the new Soviet elite to ideas they consider dangerous. They have learned that the Soviet Union cannot be open technologically and closed culturally, and that any relaxation, even to obtain great benefits, simultaneously raises great perils. The Soviet position at the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Geneva reflected this rein-

forced fear of "the free exchange of peoples and ideas." Soviet insistence that the Conference ensure "respect for the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention" and "strict observance of the laws, customs, and traditions of each other" represented a position already enshrined in the exchanges agreements and in the determined refusal to accept "ideological coexistence." The Soviet government therefore wishes to participate in cultural exchanges and to increase trade—but on the condition that it maintain censorship and other forms of control. It seeks "a fire that will not burn."

Eastern Europe is a part of the Soviet empire, but yet another world. The dilemma for the East European governments is even more acute than is that of the Soviet government, as is their need for access to Western science, technology, and intellectual sustenance. The West has long held a magnetic and contagious attraction for Eastern Europe, and this attraction, intensified by events since 1945, has been increased by the various exchanges, by greatly increased economic ties, and by the tantalizing opportunities to taste the adjacent forbidden fruits. These erode the economic, ideological, and political bases of the governments and weaken ties with Moscow in the same kind of "unbinding" that the Russian empire witnessed a century ago. They promote pragmatic and more traditional attitudes and tend to make the Communist leaders ever more nationalistic. They also bring closer together the peoples and their governments—the peoples eager to "rejoin Europe" and to enjoy the benefits of this century's advances, and the governments eager to acquire Western information to modernize their economies.

However, the East European governments cannot import knowledge from our universities, factories, and farms without importing the ideas and values at the heart of Western institutions, a continuing source of infection among a people already vulnerable. The erection of a Hilton Hotel on the hills of Buda, overshadowing adjacent St. Stephen's, and the establishment of an American Studies Program at the University of Warsaw symbolize the deterioration that has occurred.

Access to Eastern Europe is far easier than to the Soviet Union: one British observer noted that we approach the Soviet Union only across a moat and over a wall, while we reach Eastern Europe through a criss-cross of turnstiles—and Eastern Europe provides access to the Soviet Union. The Soviet rulers have long considered Eastern Europe a barrier against the West; it has instead become a carrier from the West, raising specters of 1956 and 1968 but under more subtle and dangerous circumstances.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will remain tense, even if detente continues. We shall no doubt remain locked together in a shrinking world, suspicious of each other, unable on the one hand to conquer by force but equally unable to disengage and find

some kind of armed security. We should promote cultural relations, and commercial relations as well, because freedom is our main strength and our best instrument. The Western world benefits from extraordinary intellectual and cultural vitality, in art and architecture, in music and literature, in philosophy (including Marxism), and in all the sciences, at a time when there is a silence in Russian culture. We should rejoice that the competition between the Soviet Union and the West has shifted to include a competition in ideas on a peaceful field, with intellectual weapons, one for which we are particularly well equipped and one from which all peoples, though not the Soviet system, will benefit.

We should grant the Soviets access to our high technology only as they begin to permit free movement and equal rights of penetration. The United States and its allies should continue to press for an agreement that incorporates clear acceptance of free movement throughout Europe. Jamming of radio broadcasts must end. Journalists must be guaranteed the right to function and report freely. We should not be satisfied with vague agreements about reuniting families but should insist upon the free flow of publications and the right of people to travel. In short, we should use the keen Soviet interest in obtaining our high technology in order to obtain the freedoms essential for the survival of a free Europe and a peaceful world.

The success with which the West has protected Soviet dissidents illustrates the Soviet dilemma and the significant way in which we can marshal our resources to advance human rights and international security. The presence of 240 foreign correspondents in Moscow and the skill with which Western news services retain contact with Soviet dissidents, have restricted Soviet action against them. Thus, the Soviet decision to expel Solzhenitsyn in February 1974, rather than to imprison him, reflects in part his courage and in part the pressure exerted by the information made available to the world, and then to the Soviet public, at a time when the Soviet government was desperate for Western scientific and technical aid.

Similarly, the warning the National Academy of Sciences issued in September 1973 served to safeguard Andrei Sakharov, to define the price of more open relationships with the West, and to demonstrate that we are determined that the Soviet Union modify its policies in order to obtain benefits. Sakharov was in serious danger until President Philip Handler of the National Academy informed the Soviet Academy that depriving Sakharov of his rights would end Soviet-American scientific cooperation. The Soviet government then chose to continue to tolerate Sakharov and his activities. On the other hand, the National Academy's silence last year when the Soviet government prevented Sakharov from going to receive the Nobel Prize proves, in reverse, the same point.

If we defend our principles shrewdly

and resolutely in this unending struggle, the Soviet government will twist in debate over a painful dilemma. It may one day be forced to choose between reducing sharply or even ending intellectual and economic relations, trying to combine more open relations with the West with ever tighter controls over its own peoples, and adopting a far more flexible and relaxed policy toward control over the Soviet population, one that would almost certainly undermine the system. Indeed, these relationships raise fundamental questions for any totalitarian government: can a society import a skill or a product from another culture without also

introducing other alien elements which produced that skill or product and which carry destructive potential? Because of the scientific and technical revolutions, particularly in transportation and communications, can any state isolate itself from the rest of the world? Would such a policy of isolation, if it could be implemented, condemn that state to ever more critical scientific-technical and economic-military backwardness? Does Communism bear within itself the seeds of its own decay, ripened into flower by necessary contact with the outside world?

On the other hand, can our government retain the support of the American peo-

ple, the confidence of our allies, the faith of those who seek freedom, and the respect of the Soviet leaders if it grants free access to Soviet scholars, scientists, and business leaders but does not insist upon equal rights of penetration? Can we allow our government to assume control over our cultural and economic relationships with another part of the world without undermining our own freedom? Can an open, flexible society maintain close relationships with a closed and secret society without being infected by totalitarian practices? Indeed, has this already happened?

Kto kogo? □

The
Business of
America



by
Stephen A.
Snow

Businessmen and Economic Education

Every time a pollster tallies public attitudes about business, executives are confronted with frightening evidence of their growing unpopularity. This tide of anti-business sentiment gives rise to laws and regulations that increasingly circumscribe the businessman's decision-making freedom. While many businessmen lament this trend, only a few take action to combat it. Most executives, like ostriches, bury their heads and do nothing. This lack of self-defense is surprising, given both what businessmen have to lose and what resources they have available to influence public opinion.

Business employs sixty million people, contributes at least one billion dollars each year to philanthropic organizations, and shares the rewards of its success with over thirty million stockholders. With these resources, business could promote economic education programs aimed at dispelling common misconceptions about the market system. Studies have shown such efforts can improve people's attitudes toward business. There are several types of educational programs which could be readily implemented by companies. These are: (1.) Offering economic education courses for employees and printing articles on economic issues in corporate publications. (2.) Utilizing quarterly and annual reports to provide stockholders with opinions on economic issues and policies that affect company operations. (3.) Making financial contributions to universities and tax-exempt foundations which foster pro-free-enterprise economic education.

The statistics indicate that business has largely failed to pursue these rather obvi-

ous courses of action. A recent survey of 733 top corporations by the Joint Council for Economic Education showed that only 5% of them have formal economics courses open to all employees. Less than four out of ten have ever used corporate publications for economic education. A review of the funding of two of the largest free-enterprise-oriented economic education foundations shows they operate on rather small budgets that range from a quarter of a million to three-quarters of a million dollars. Corporations in the Fortune 500 contribute less than three percent of these funds. Very few corporations use portions of quarterly or annual reports to help refute common and potentially harmful delusions about our economic system.

The failure of businessmen to defend economic freedom may be attributed to several factors. First, many executives fail to perceive that gradual economic paralysis will inevitably result from negative public opinion toward private enterprise and the piecemeal controls that naturally follow. In the foreword to his most famous book, *The Road to Serfdom*, Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek said his purpose was to make Americans aware that economic intervention slowly nurtures a predisposition toward increased government regulation at the expense of freedom. This leads to economic stagnation and potential authoritarianism. Hayek's book was based on his observations of trends in Britain in 1944. His predictions about the dire economic effects of growing government interventionism appear to be frighteningly accurate given Britain's current economic

straits. Unfortunately, most businessmen have never read the works of Hayek or any other free-market philosopher. Like most Americans, businessmen tend to be pragmatic rather than philosophical. Their single-minded concentration on immediate business concerns often blinds them to the social and political trends which will eventually erode their economic freedom.

Second, many executives believe they must identify themselves with whatever is popular at the moment, even if it is inimical to the health of our economic system. At the present time, economic freedom and its moral foundations are unpopular. Corporate managers seem to fear that espousing a free enterprise position on a public issue may adversely affect consumer sales or hurt relations with labor, stockholders, and the government. In fact, some business leaders take special pains to find fault with our system and even endorse those who advocate increased government regulation. For instance, in early 1974, the president of one of the nation's largest department store chains criticized business for not supporting economic regulations which are popular with the public. He went on to suggest that businessmen embrace reforms proposed by consumerists. Another example was provided by the president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, in 1973, when he said that Ralph Nader's proposals were calculated to help business. Here we have a central figure in American business praising the man who, among other things, had proposed federal chartering of major corporations with the government empowered to