

cent tax would yield only \$20.2 billion — which is only \$6.4 billion more than they're paying now! We're still short \$165 billion.

How much more can we get from those earning from \$25,000 to \$50,000? This group can still take the same deductions, under McGovern's scheme, so we'll look at their *taxable* rather than gross, income. It turns out that all taxable income in the \$25,000 to \$50,000 bracket totals \$36.9 billion — of which \$10.2 billion is already being paid in income taxes. Other taxes take another 17.8 per cent from this bracket, or \$4.8 billion. That leaves about \$22.6 billion of currently untaxed income among a group of 1.4 million taxpayers. Let's be really "radical" (nasty) and leave each taxpayer in this bracket with only a "break-even" income of \$12,000. That would require \$16.8 billion (out of \$22.6 billion not now being taxed), leaving the government with only a \$5.8 billion gain — unless they all quit working. We're still short by \$159 billion.

It's now becoming clear who's going to get the bill for that \$159 billion, no matter how much we rob the "extremely rich." McGovern's remark that the \$12,000 to \$20,000 group would pay only \$21 more in taxes was an obvious white-wash, since there are only around 15 million taxpayers in that bracket (so that \$21 apiece would yield a mere \$315 million). There are 20.4 million taxpayers in the \$10,000 to \$25,000 bracket. Their

combined taxable income is \$192.8 billion (\$110 billion of which is from the \$10,000 to \$15,000 group). Federal income taxes now leave them with \$153.2 billion, and other taxes bring the total down to about \$123 billion. Even McGovern's magic can't squeeze the needed \$159 billion out of \$123 billion, so he'll end up having to levy lots more taxes on the poor in order to pay for their "benefits." This shouldn't be so surprising, since 89.3 per cent of all taxpayers have gross incomes under \$15,000. As the Brookings study put it: "Large numbers of families would receive allowances and at the same time have their taxes increased to pay for the allowances." In McGovern's case, the tax increase on those earning less than \$10,000 would greatly exceed their cash allowances.

"There were no poor people in the Land of Oz, because there was no such thing as money, and all property of every sort belonged to the Ruler." When L. Frank Baum thus described the Emerald City in 1910, little did his fertile imagination suppose that such arrangements would descend from the skies of fairyland, and would come to be regarded as radical new ideas for the 'seventies.

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Jacqueline R. Kasun

## A Rhineland Fantasy

As the United States slowly winds down its long adventure in Southeast Asia, it is tempting to speculate what might have happened had we done otherwise. This is, of course, something that cannot be known. Although war critics are certain that the alternatives to American involvement in Vietnam would have been infinitely preferable to our present state of affairs, and they may be right, in fact once an action has been taken, knowledge about the alternatives and their consequences is forever foreclosed to us.

Nevertheless, the temptation to make such speculations is well-nigh irresistible. There are many similarly fascinating possibilities for exercising our proclivities for "if only" fantasizing. Had one of the erstwhile Allies, for example, decided in 1936 to respond with limited force to Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland, this might have prevented World War II. But if this had been done, and if it had worked, no one would ever have known that a holocaust had been prevented.

It hardly needs to be said that American intervention in the Rhineland in 1936 was not merely impossible but unthinkable. The 1920s had been spent in second thoughts, mainly of revulsion and remorse, over the first World War. These national musings found expression in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 which pledged its signers never to resort to war as a means of settling international

disputes. The Pact had been promoted in the United States by the *New York Times*, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a number of university professors. As a result of vigorous American urging, most countries of the world finally signed it, including Germany, Japan and Italy.

But the peace forces had not let down their guard just because war had been outlawed. A couple of summers before Hitler's move to reoccupy the Rhineland, the Nye Committee of the U.S. Senate had in months of well-publicized hearings established to its own satisfaction, and that of most of the public, something that everyone already knew — that World War I had had as its chief purpose the enrichment of the bankers and the munitions manufacturers, better known as "Merchants of Death," about whom school children were reading in a best-seller of the same name. Savage aggression by Italy in Ethiopia and Japan in China had only re-enforced the American conviction that peace and love would find a way.

To ensure the continuation of platitudinous non-violence on the part of the United States, Congress was providing in a series of Neutrality Acts that this country would neither give nor sell arms to any party to any dispute anywhere in the world. As late as 1939, the Episcopal bishops intoned "...War as an instrument of national policy is a hideous denial of God and His condemnation rests upon

it. It is rationally unjustifiable, morally indefensible, and religiously irreconcilable with the love of God and our neighbor ... We believe that war will never achieve peace, but only sow the seeds of future wars ... We believe that the teachings of Jesus Christ — 'Love your enemies; do good to them which hate you; bless them that curse you; and pray for them that spitefully use you... are not mere counsels of perfection, but sound, sober, practical common sense.'" (Statement of the House of Bishops, 1939.) In short, we were a nation of pacifists.

Nevertheless, for a moment, imagine the unimaginable — that the United States had actually decided to counter Hitler's move into the Rhineland in 1936 with a limited resistance. What kind of a war might this have been and what might have been its results?

The British would of course have stood aloof from American interventionism. In an atmosphere in which Winston Churchill was barred from BBC as "too controversial," a British Rhineland action was unthinkable. For their part, the French would have responded with a series of emergency cabinet meetings followed by the resignation of the government and a succession of political crises, precluding any coherent foreign policy.

But the Americans might very well have been joined by some of Germany's other neighbors: Czechoslovakia, for example, might have had premonitions of what lay in store for her, and so might Austria. And there might have been small troop contingents and other assistance from the not-yet-utterly-Balkanized Balkans, and perhaps from others as well. These helpers would of course have required American aid to finance their operations. In consequence, worldwide Nazi propaganda would be able, with a fair approach to accuracy, to denounce the operation as American-inspired and American-manned, an operation of the Roosevelt imperialistic clique and its foreign clients. The *Nation* and the *New Republic* could characterize it as an American attempt to surround Germany with enemies and to reward countries for hostility toward Germany.

One necessarily enters a limited war before it's entirely clear that one should. By the time it is entirely clear that one has to fight, a limited war is no longer likely to be one of the options. A limited, "preventive" action in the Rhineland would have had to be fought while we were still in the dark about Hitler's real intentions, before he had had the chance to develop his capabilities for total war and to solidify his alliances with Italy and Japan. If we had succeeded in frustrating his expansion before he acquired the industrial strength of middle Europe, it would necessarily have appeared that Hitler was no threat to our security, or anyone else's either. In a word, in direct proportion to our success in pinning Hitler impotently down at an early point in his expansion, it would have appeared unnecessary to do so.

Doubtless this would have soon be-

come an extremely controversial operation. Awkward questions would have been raised about what we were doing on German soil. American newspaper correspondents would discover and report that the occupants of the area were predominantly German and were for the most part sympathetic to Hitler and wanted nothing so much as to be left alone by Americans. Senators and bishops would visit the front, a thing which is impossible in total war, and would of course discover that boys die in wars. (One of the greatest conveniences of a total war, in which the front is too dangerous for visiting luminaries, is that the fact that people are being killed is never discovered until it's all been done.) Many hawks would turn dove with dramatic announcements of the fact to the media, especially during pre-election maneuvers.

Casualties on all sides would be light, and controversial in inverse proportion to their numbers. (It would take more than a hundred years of Vietnam size casualties to equal the killings of World War II.) But the smaller casualties are, the more difficult it is to justify the fact that there are any. Casualties in a total war are above all vindicated by their staggering numbers; the fact that the carnage is so massive "proves" that it is necessary.

It is characteristic of a limited war, of course, that it's pretty much business-as-usual everywhere except in scattered pockets of action. The boys commute to the front and spend money like a swarm of tourists between assignments. Many of the Rhinelanders, like many of the Vietnamese now, would have never had it so good. The staging of a limited war is thus utterly different from the grim back-drop of a total war, with its leveled cities, the miles of smoldering rubble where factories and homes once stood, the cries of the buried-alive, the starving survivors amid the scorched farmlands and ruined villages.

In countries ravaged by World War II, all semblance of normal economic life disappeared not only during the war but for years afterwards. Population declined in East Europe and the Soviet Union. European industrial production fell to a fraction of pre-war levels and did not recover for years after the war. In 1947, European output of metals was only seventy-five per cent of the pre-war level; for food and feed crops the percentage was seventy. Two years after the war many Europeans were getting only 1900 calories of food per day, barely enough for survival and fully a third less than they'd had in the 1930s. (United Nations, *World Economic Report*, 1948.)

In contrast to the chaos wrought by World War II, it is difficult to find evidence of war in the economic data for Southeast Asia, except in export figures. U.N. data indicate that rice production, industrial output and electric energy production are vigorously increasing in South Vietnam. The population explosion is proceeding apace in both North and South. Death rates reported for Southeast Asia are lower than in many

other underdeveloped areas which are not at war.

This means, however, that the contrasts of a limited war are especially cruel; though casualties as a whole are light, some of the soldiers die and some are maimed for life. Visiting senators digest with difficulty the contrast between American boys dying in field hospitals and the local citizens (whom we're supposed to be saving from totalitarian aggression) off-handedly getting fat on the inflow of dollars. Amid the general civilian prosperity, the refugees and orphans and the wounded are a stark reminder of war's grim costs, which are total for the individuals concerned.

The economic and demographic costs are clearly less for limited war. But these cannot be the only considerations. The very character of limited war — its light casualties, its way of dragging on and on without any definite conclusion, its marginal effects on most participants — exacerbates the question of why there should be a war at all. There is always the nagging possibility that the whole thing may be simply a dreadful mistake. And the more successful a limited war is in preventing a total war, the less likely it is that this fact will be evident, or even believable.

So, as limited wars have a way of doing, the Rhineland thing would drag on, and on. Hitler would be pinned down, but he would not be defeated or discredited. Indeed, the war would strengthen support for him in numerous quarters. Street demonstrations in many parts of the world would show widespread sympathy for Germany, seen to be struggling for her life and dignity against an imperialistic United States. World-wide fascist propaganda would continue to denounce the American "aggression" in the Rhineland. Peace vigils would be held to read the names of the war dead. Scholars would issue protests. Mothers, and others, would march for peace. Campus strikes would be organized. The Rhineland Veterans for Peace would sit in at the War Department. World leaders would urge the president to stop bombing and negotiate, even though Germany might have indicated no interest in negotiations.

At home there would have been none of the exhilaration of total war, with the girls learning to weld and the old men busy in civil defense and the ladies collecting blood. The daily war news would not have aroused patriotic commitment on the home front, as in a total war, but instead doubt, controversy and, most difficult of all to bear — guilt. Civilized men have agonized over the moral question of war for centuries. Moderns are more reluctant than their forbears to accept even self-defense as a vindication, on the grounds that modern weapons are so destructive that nothing can justify their use.

The paradoxical consequence is that it is easier for moderns to justify total war than limited war. The liberal American press of the 1940s, grieving over the "inescapable tragedy" of World War II, may not have been exactly justifying a certain kind of war in quite the analytical way of Thomas Aquinas, but a moral

question does not always require a direct answer. To be able to picture oneself as a tragic hero is often quite as satisfactory as being able to justify or rationalize one's actions. The massive destruction, the awesome costs, of total war permit us to see ourselves as tragic heroes, wading through the carnage of an inescapable tragedy, perhaps even settling some great issue in the process. But whether any great issue is settled or not, the sheer magnitude of the destruction enables us to dignify our role in the great drama.

A limited war, however, offers no such handy escapes from guilt. We could hardly have claimed to be defending our lives or our national existence in the Rhineland. There would not have been enough gore for it to appear that any great issue was being settled or to dramatize our involvement as an "inescapable tragedy." Whatever then could we have answered to the daily nagging guilt?

In progression, the American crusade to defend the world against fascism would have come to appear not merely over-reactive, but quixotic, counter-productive, imperialistic and, finally, positively criminal. These judgments would be re-enforced by concern for the plight of Rhineland refugees, indignation over corruption in the governments of our allies and anxiety over the fate of American prisoners of war in German hands. Some unfortunate incidents involving American troops and Rhineland civilians would exacerbate matters. One can imagine the headlines about the "Trier massacre." Agonizing reappraisals of the Rhineland debacle would conclude that the war was eroding the moral fiber of the nation.

In time, perhaps a very long time, the thing would have ended. Not with the bang of a Hiroshima but with the whimper of withdrawal from limited war. There would be no victory celebrations, no confetti in the streets, no tearful crowds thronging and embracing. Columnists and candidates would explore and explain our Rhineland "mistake;" senators would vow "no more Rhinelands." The president who presided over our final withdrawal would be re-elected, those who had first committed our troops having been assigned to ignominy.

If we had succeeded in avoiding World

## The Professor's Lament

I doubt that I shall ever see  
 A textbook flyer cliché-free.  
 Flotsam on each postal tide  
 Touts "approaches" which provide:  
 "Real involvement" for the class,  
 "Participation" *tout en masse*;  
 "Insights" (more than might be prudent)  
 "Meaningful" for every student;  
 "Relevance" to his "concerns" —  
 Who cares *what* the beggar *learns*;  
 Taking place within this fog  
 Is — "student-teacher dialogue!"  
 Fools like me can write bad verse,  
 But no Ed. D. could make *this* worse.

John Shelton Reed


War II, we would have had no way of knowing what we missed...

It's hard to imagine a twentieth century without the battles of North Africa and Sicily and Normandy Beach, without Stalingrad, without Dachau and Buchenwald and Landsberg. One can scarcely conceive of twentieth century history in which Roosevelt and Churchill were not heroes of one of the most destructive wars of all time, in which twenty-five million people were killed, but in which instead Roosevelt was a bungler who got us involved in a Rhineland mess which took several hundred thousand lives on all sides. (The smaller the casualties, the more likely it is that the leaders are villains; leaders are heroes in

proportion to the size of the casualties.)

A Rhineland intervention might indeed have averted World War II, but no lessons would have been learned from this. For even if some magic dispensation had allowed us to know that our policy had averted a global disaster, as Hegel has said, "... what experience and history teach is that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history ..."

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## November and Beyond

(WASHINGTON)—The bumbling anti-professionalism of George McGovern's campaign organization since the Democratic convention makes the re-election of Richard Nixon a virtual certainty. The Senator and his people have made just about every imaginable mistake and are going to have to pay the price in November.

Therefore, perhaps we can afford to take a few minutes to look beyond November: to ask ourselves what effect the developments of 1972 will have on the American political landscape in the years ahead.

George Meany and his friends appear to believe that when it's all over the Democratic party will be returned to them intact, that the nightmare will be over and they will be able to pick up where they left off. Thus, they are sitting this one out in the expectation that a defeated George McGovern will disappear into the Senate o'er the hills of South Dakota.

They may be right about McGovern, but if they really think they're going to be back in the saddle themselves by 1976 they are only deluding themselves. Their party has been seized by ideological hardliners who are not about to surrender it without a fight. The McGovernites—with or without George McGovern—are likely to be with us for some time.

Mr. Meany should consider what happened to the Republican party in 1964. In the process of nominating Senator Goldwater, Republican conservatives that year also managed to gain control of their party's machinery and refused to give it up even in the face of a massive electoral defeat. They still control it today and insist on their due. They handed the nomination to Richard Nixon in 1968 and will swallow his programmatic

liberalism so long as he clothes it in the rhetoric of the right, but in their heart they are as conservative as ever—a fact made "perfectly clear" to all attending this year's GOP convention.

The Republican moderates made the same mistake in 1964 that the Democratic "traditionalists" are making today. They assumed that their party would "come to its senses" after a major defeat and admit that they, rather than the ideologues, should be in control. They were wrong, of course, for true believers are not prone to give up after one defeat.

So Meany and his friends are not going to be welcomed back as prophets who turned out to be right. If they are represented at the next Democrat convention it will be on their opponent's terms—not theirs. One McGovernite congressman has gone so far as to suggest that a quota be set up that will give "traditional" Democrats some representation in 1976, a suggestion that puts Meany in essentially the same box with racial and sexual special interests groups entitled to proportional, but essentially token representation.

At any rate, it can be safely predicted that the McGovernites will remain in control. They may be more sophisticated by 1976, but they will be as radical as ever. They may come up with a candidate more cosmetically attractive next time, but if necessary they can be expected to be as brutally successful in their next convention as they were this time.

The future of the Republican party is less clear for several reasons. The party is united now behind Richard Nixon, but one has to wonder what will happen as party workers begin looking toward 1976.

Today there are liberal republicans and conservative republicans but most of

these and many others must first be described as "Nixon" Republicans. The futility of the McCloskey and Ashbrook attacks on his policies are evidence of the success of the President's domestic political strategy. He has combined liberalism and conservatism in a unique synthesis that has won the support of the Javitses of his party without losing the Goldwaters or party workers at the local level.

This unity will necessarily disappear after this election or at least prior to the end of the President's second term. It will disappear because only he could have imposed it on ordinarily divided and unreconcilable factions within the GOP.

He did it by giving the conservatives the rhetoric while moving programmatically to the left. His substantive program won him the support—or at least the toleration—of the liberals within the party while his rhetoric made it difficult for conservatives to oppose him. That he got away with it is amazing enough in itself and attests to his political ability.

But this election will signal at least the beginning of the end of the Nixon era—an era that has spanned more than twenty years. Republicans have convened in convention six times since Richard Nixon emerged as a national figure and at five of these conventions they have nominated him for one or the other of the nation's two highest offices. They are comfortable with him—they trust him.

Thus, many of them will allow Nixon as president to do things no one else could have gotten away with. The trouble will begin when someone else steps forward to say, "Let me do these things." Richard Nixon may be able to sell them FAP, SALT and deficit financing, but that does not mean anyone else will be able to. In this sense, he is unique and essentially irreplaceable.

The struggle in 1976 will be between those Republicans who admire Nixon for what he says and those who admire him for what he has done. It will be a liberal-conservative struggle for the soul of what, by then, may be the majority party in this country.

It is impossible to say at this point which side the President himself might favor in such a struggle. There is some evidence to suggest that he may be moving to the right in preparation for his second term, but the evidence cannot be considered conclusive in light of his penchant for surprise and breaks with tradition.

Neither liberals nor conservatives seem to be waiting for word from the White House, however, as both sides appear to be preparing for the struggle they know must precede the next convention.

Liberals, for example, have already surfaced a potential candidate in Illinois Senator Charles Percy who, along with Senators Packwood and Mathias, went to Miami this summer to help the Ripon Society "reform" the old GOP.

The reforms they propose were consciously or unconsciously designed to weaken the power of party professions at the next convention and to shift power away from traditionally Republican areas