

HOW TO ROUND UP CANNON-FODDER

BY BRUCE WINTON KNIGHT

AS LONG as peace rages with the vigor of the last few years in Europe and the Far East, the technique of assembling cannon-fodder is no mere academic question for Americans. Of course, the assassination of a king and a brace of prime ministers will not "cause" a war. Neither will a menacing trial-balloon speech from an officially unofficial source in the Orient. But these things are symptoms of the more fundamental fact that nationalism, imperialism, and balance-of-power diplomacy are still doing business at the 1914 stand.

And our foreign policy, especially in the Pacific, makes the chances of American participation in the next major war so great that we ought to face this fact frankly: conscription, as the preferred method of raising armies, has fastened itself on mankind with a grip which is not likely to be relaxed until war is either abolished or radically changed in character. In the event of war against a first-rate opponent, our geographical situation may make it possible for a large force of well-drilled troops to fend off the enemy until our war-time recruits are adequately trained. It may be possible to prepare a sufficient standing army by volunteer recruitment, and it may not. Assuming that this can be done, however, it will not be practicable to secure enough supplementary troops without conscription.

Even men in high places have not always understood why this is true. In a prepared-

ness speech at Chicago in January, 1916, President Wilson said:

I have been asked by questioning friends whether I thought a sufficient number of men would volunteer for training or not. Why, if they did not, it is not the America that you and I know; something has happened.

Incidentally, something had happened. The young men already slaughtered in Europe far outnumbered the entire population of New York City. But the main point is that in "the America that you and I know," if we do know it, volunteering never was a success, and for more than a century it had not been a success anywhere else. A little over a year after the aforementioned speech, Mr. Wilson had his Secretary of War and his Judge Advocate General at work on the blue-prints for compulsory enlistment. The corresponding plans for our next war are already prepared. The reasons lie in certain historical developments, not only in America, but in the world at large.

Universal service amounting to conscription dates back to ancient times. In early Egypt, only the varlets possessing less than six acres of land were denied the "privilege" of being soldiers. The first chapter of Numbers tells us how Moses, acting on instructions from Der Fuehrer of his day, recruited 603,550 soldiers by drafting everyone over twenty years old. Demosthenes assured his fellows that they must be soldiers to remain free. "There is one

source, O Athenians," he said, "of all your defeats. It is that your citizens have ceased to be soldiers." In Rome, Lombardy, Milan, Pisa, Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, and the Swiss Cantons, each in its time, universal service was the rule. If it was not conscription, it might as well have been: any real alternative to the service was what John R. Commons calls "an unavailable option."

In the latter part of the Seventeenth Century the complexity of economic and social life in Europe became such that unless the majority of men stuck to their knitting at home during war, organized existence would have collapsed. For this reason universal military service gave way to the system of a relatively small professional standing army, supplemented during war by volunteers. The new system itself, however, could not endure long. The expansion of the known world and of economic opportunities which attended the commercial and industrial "revolutions" made the professional army inadequate. At the same time that the job of conquest and defense grew, the attractions of civilian life increased and the emotional appeal of war was largely lost. Volunteers became more and more difficult and expensive to secure, until potentates who took the sword began to perish by the taxes.

In the French monarchy of the late Seventeenth Century, the reverberation of an empty treasury foretold conscription. In 1688, citizens were drawn by lot from non-exempt classes in the parishes. At first, the service was only temporary; and the conscripts, instead of being merged with the regular troops, were used only to guard interior posts and lines of communication and to help occupy conquered areas. But during the War of the Spanish Succession conscripts drafted by lot were employed with the professional armies; and this sys-

tem came to be used constantly during the chronic wars of the Eighteenth Century. It was far from being popular. We are told that the black ticket was drawn with "trembling hand and frozen heart"; and drafting was among the grievances helping to bring on the French Revolution.

Yet the new republic established by the Revolution found volunteering inadequate to prevent the restoration of the Bourbons. Various experiments with drafting led up to the law of 1793, which made liable to compulsory service all able-bodied men from eighteen to twenty-five years old. For two reasons the measure was fairly successful: civil life had become uncertain, and the men within the draft ages were too small in number to resist the will of the rest. The principle of conscription was embodied in the Constitution of 1798. Napoleon Bonaparte long used French regulars supplemented with conscripts, although toward the end of his career he was relying largely on foreign mercenaries. During the Restoration, regulars supplemented with conscripts predominated. Napoleon III overthrew the Second Republic with a small professional force, and was so fearful of arming the rabble that he adopted the standing army as a general principle. The Third Republic, however, returned once more to conscription, which has been well established in France ever since. At present, every French citizen, beginning with the age of twenty, is liable to compulsory service for twenty-eight years of his life.

II

Prussia was convinced by Napoleon I of the virtues of conscription. By the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, the professional army, once the glory of Frederick the Great, was

reduced to 42,000. But Baron von Stein and General von Scharnhorst soon accomplished wonders with the wreck. First they got rid of mercenaries and foreigners, abolished municipal and class exemptions, and apportioned military service by territories. Then, by a system of training 42,000 men in one year and sending them home, training another 42,000 the next year, and so on, they had better than a quarter of a million well-drilled troops ready to take the field by 1813. In the following year, conscription was incorporated permanently into law. The results were evident in the overthrow of Napoleon, and in the smashing victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1871. Following the Franco-Prussian War, England was the only great European power which had not adopted conscription, even in time of peace.

Meanwhile, what about Japan, our most probable opponent in another major war?

It may be remembered that, as late as eighty years ago, the civilization of Japan was unsatisfactory to the United States. Under a political system of feudalism and an economy of small-scale agriculture and household economy resembling medieval Europe, Japan had been virtually self-sufficient. Her foreign trade had been limited almost exclusively to an insignificant amount carried on with the Dutch. And so, in the spring of 1854, Commodore Perry, U. S. N., returned to Japan for an answer to the ominous question which he had put during his visit of the summer before: Wouldn't it be a good idea for the Japanese to extend trading rights and a few other privileges to Americans? The Japanese took another look at Perry's warships and decided that Western culture was irresistible. An agreement was made to open two ports to American ships; and in rapid succession similar agreements were entered into with other foreign powers.

But in the amazing development of civilization which followed, it was not merely Western economy which was adopted.

For the preceding three centuries, Japan had been at peace with the outside world. This is not to say that all had been quiet at home. The domestic racketeering bossed by various *shoguns* had produced enough fighting among the rival gangs of Samurai, the exclusive military caste, attached to these feudal barons, and the Emperor had been reduced to an impotent symbol. But the strife had been confined to Japan, and conducted by rules so antiquated that anybody who shot a man at a distance, instead of meeting him with cold steel, was considered a poor sport. For a century and a half, too, the population had remained stable at about thirty millions. But Western culture changed all this in short order. Population swelled with the growth of trade (it now expands at the world's record rate of a million a year), and Japan reached for outside markets and raw materials. Whatever might have been the best way to make her trade dependable, she imitated the West in this as in other things. She accepted imperialism, and the consequences of imperialism. The Meiji restoration of 1868 elevated the Emperor to dignity and power; the arrogant Samurai were ousted; and military service was opened to all classes. In 1873 Japan adopted her first conscription act, and turned over to a French military mission the instruction of her conscripts. From 1885 to 1894, the military mission and training were German. Since 1894, conscription for all classes, even in peace time, has been well established. At present, all males from seventeen to forty are liable to compulsory service.

So we see that at the opening of the World War only two great powers, Britain and the United States, had escaped conscription as a fixture of the peace that

ends in war. Insular position and genius for alliances in the case of England, and remoteness from powerful neighbors in the case of the United States, had been largely responsible for these islands of volunteering in a sea of conscription. Two main factors now forced these two powers into line with the rest. First, the Central Powers had huge armies of well-trained conscripts. Second, the changed character of warfare called for much larger numbers of victims. Frontal assaults on entrenchments stood no chance unless they were preceded by artillery barrages which so cut up the ground that advances over it were a slow process. Neither airplanes, nor high-explosives, nor poison-gas, nor even tanks, could break the deadlock, which was made only the more binding because private armament firms had done their best to supply both sides impartially with the best killing-tools and defenses. The result was a war of attrition, in which killing and the destruction of wealth continued until one side collapsed from exhaustion.

On paper, Britain had in 1914 some 700,000 soldiers, composed of various Regulars, Army Reserves, Special Reserves, and Territorials. In practice, only the regulars were ready; and they were so scattered about the earth that the first expeditionary force to France, "the contemptible British army," numbered barely 60,000. In this predicament, volunteering was given every chance.

England declared war on August 4, 1914. "The first hundred thousand" volunteers were not secured until August 28. For a time after this, propaganda and the bombing of British cities brought recruits faster. By September 10 the number was a little over a half-million. But that was the high-tide, and thenceforward the rate declined progressively. Another two months brought only 200,000 more; and a six-weeks' drive beginning in mid-November netted only

120,000. By the New Year, the total was only a million. Only: for nearly four millions were considered necessary.

Yet volunteering was relied on for another year. Its subsequent stages need not be detailed. Three facts especially stand out. First, the "volunteering" became more and more coercive. Every device designed to produce mass hysteria was employed; and social ostracism was the lot of men without stars, certificates, and the like, to show that they were exempted for industrial reasons. Second, the data on manpower were defective. At first, men were classified according to age and whether they were married or single, although the presence or absence of special qualifications for industry was more important. When economic classification was adopted, failure to keep track and control of manpower still prevented an intelligent distribution of men between military and industrial needs, and among the various branches of each. Third, at the end of the year there were still a million and a half eligibles who had refused to volunteer. Conscription was adopted early the next year. When Russia collapsed, England extended the draft age to include every available man under fifty-one years old, and she implored America for speed.

III

Meanwhile, the United States had learned much from British experience with volunteering. She may have learned something also from her own. Though popular history creates the impression that our wars were triumphs of the volunteer system, the unvarnished facts about "the America that you and I know" are these: that it was very difficult to get volunteers to the front and keep them there, and that generally the volunteers were poor soldiers while

they were in action. There was nothing wrong with the volunteers as men. When decently equipped and trained, they proved themselves the equals of any soldiers. As a rule, however, they were only half-fed and clothed, and much less than half-trained. Because there were not enough seasoned troops to hold the line until recruits could be trained, the volunteers were pitched into battle untutored in the arts of slaughter, unsteed against its horrors, and even unsupplied with experienced leaders. The result was unreasonably to prolong our wars, and to increase their cost in lives and wealth correspondingly.

In the Revolutionary War, the first difficulty was to get volunteers and keep them in service. Washington complained that the men even refused to enlist until they knew their colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major and captain. On November 28, 1775, he wrote as follows to the President of the Continental Congress:

I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the egregious want of public spirit which reigns here. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted must have a furlough, which I have been obliged to grant to fifty at a time, from each regiment.

On the same day he wrote to Joseph Reed:

Such a dearth of public spirit and such want of virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great change of military arrangement I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that I may never be witness to again.

Certain Connecticut troops left camp wholesale as soon as their short-term enlistments were terminated, some of them taking their arms and ammunition along. The next year, following the British oc-

cupation of Long Island and New York, Washington wrote:

The same desire of retiring into a chimney corner seized the troops of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, so soon as their time expired, as had wrought upon those of Connecticut, notwithstanding many of them made a tender of their services to continue till the lines could be sufficiently strengthened.

As a story about World War deserters had it, the men in the Revolutionary War had been instructed to "strike for country and for home," so some of them let the others strike for country while they struck for home. Of this spirit General Schuyler wrote as follows:

Nothing can surpass the impatience of the troops from the New England colonies to get to their firesides. Near three hundred of them arrived a few days ago, unable to do any duty; but as soon as I administered that grand specific, a discharge, they instantly acquired health, and rather than be detained a few days to cross Lake George, they undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity.

Bounties for enlisting for the period of the war were of little avail. Chaos was guaranteed by the competition of State with Congressional bounties, and by the ambitions of military adventurers, foreign and domestic, who sought soft jobs at high pay.

But if the process of getting and holding volunteers proved disheartening, the qualities displayed by volunteers in battle proved no less so. Volunteer officers in 1775 were ranked, not according to military ability, but by wire-pulling and the number of recruits they could bring in. Green volunteer troops performed not badly whenever they were commanded by seasoned officers and secured behind strong works. This was the case at Bunker Hill. Putnam pointed out that "the Americans are never afraid of their heads, they think only of

their legs, shelter them and they will fight forever." Otherwise, the results were doleful. It is true that in 1777 the Americans captured Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. But they outnumbered their foes three to one, and they failed to follow up their advantage by investing Howe at Philadelphia. The training received by some of our troops from Von Steuben was an exceptional case. At Camden, the volunteers who composed the bulk of our right flank exchanged a single fire with the enemy and then relied on footwork for safety. Tarleton, the victor at Camden, fared less handsomely at Cowpens the next year, and for this interesting reason: the seasoned Continentals were drawn up behind the raw volunteers, so that it was more dangerous for the latter to run than to fight. Stevens, whose command had deserted him at Camden, later employed the Cowpens device at Guilford Court-House.

The war was ended by the capture of Cornwallis at Yorktown by the combined forces of Washington, Lafayette, and a French fleet. How had the volunteer system worked? Although 395,000 men had been called out during the course of the war, 89,000 had been the most to take the field in any given year. The greatest force Washington had ever led in battle had been 17,000, and at Trenton and Princeton he had led less than 4,000. With a population of three millions, and with the assistance of France, it had taken us seven years to expel an enemy which never numbered over 42,000.

The experience with volunteering was substantially the same in the War of 1812. At the outbreak of this conflict our population was seven millions; and the entire British force in Canada was 4,500. Probably 15,000 well-trained American troops could have ended the war in a single campaign. Having no such force, we resorted

again to the volunteer system. And again troops proved hard to secure, harder to get into action, and grossly unprepared when they got there.

At the outset, the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to furnish their quotas of 100,000 authorized militia (State volunteers whose training has been notoriously inferior to that of the Federal "regulars"). Their argument was that individual States must decide for themselves when it was necessary, according to the Constitution, to put militia at the service of the Federal government in order to enforce the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion. While Congress was debating measures to fill the ranks, New England representatives, including Quincy and Daniel Webster, preached States' rights and nullification; and in 1814 some of the New England Federalists entered upon a definite movement for secession. Not to be outdone by statesmen in aptitude for Constitutional law, militiamen mustered into the Federal service more than once refused to cross over into Canada, because, they argued, the Constitution did not require them to serve outside the United States. Some of General Hull's force behaved in this fashion at Detroit in 1812. The remainder crossed over, and returned without inflicting any damage, after which the entire garrison surrendered Detroit without firing a shot. In the same year the heights at Queens-town had to be abandoned because the small band of regulars who had taken them was refused support by militia over on the American side.

Stung to the quick by such humiliations, one General Smyth issued "to the men of New York" a proclamation running like this:

In a few days the troops under my command will plant the American standard

in Canada . . . They will conquer or they will die. Will you stand with your arms folded and look on this interesting struggle? . . . Must I turn from you and ask the men of the Six Nations to support the government of the United States? . . . Shame, where is thy blush! No. Where I command, the vanquished and peaceful man, the child, and the matron shall be secure from wrong. If we conquer, we will "conquer but to save."

Men of New York, the present is the hour of renown . . .

And so on. Smyth raised about 4,500 men of New York. On November 28 they started to cross the Niagara River, but changed their minds and came back. On December 1, some 150 men refusing even to start, the first line of boats was recalled after going about a quarter of a mile, and the expedition was called off. At about the same time, Constitutional law was invoked by 3,000 militiamen near Lake Champlain to stay out of Canada. In 1813 and 1814, two separate Vermont Governors forbade the use of their militia in the Federal service, although in both cases the governors were disobeyed.

In battle, the behavior of the volunteers was typical of untrained men. In 1812, no less than 65,000 men drew pay from our government, and yet we lost the Northwest to less than 1,500 British regulars and such Indians as they could muster. The British and Americans both fled the "battlefield" at Frenchtown, Ohio, in 1813, the British because they were greatly outnumbered, and the Americans because they were panic-stricken. Our volunteers evacuated Fort George without a struggle; and the British destroyed Buffalo and Lewiston practically unopposed. Volunteers who had been intensively drilled proved themselves the equals of British regulars at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane in 1814. At Washington, however, a defending army of 5,400, mostly

volunteers, suffered casualties of only eight killed and eleven wounded before running for dear life from 1,500 British regulars. At New Orleans, in 1815, it was again demonstrated that volunteers under seasoned officers can stand their ground behind strong breastworks. For the madness of advancing across flat ground against works so strong that the Americans lost only seven killed and six wounded, Packenham paid with his life and the lives of 2,000 British regulars in less than half an hour. And yet, while this was happening, a division of our raw troops on the west bank of the Mississippi needed nothing but the sight of battle to send them running headlong into New Orleans.

Experts have said that a small but well-drilled army could have won the War of 1812 handily in a single season. Under the volunteer system, half a million American troops, all told, were called out; three years were required to conquer British regulars whose number never exceeded 16,500; and our losses in killed and wounded were greater than the total force of British in America at the beginning of the war.

The unbroken string of victories against superior numbers in the Mexican War seemed to prove the case for volunteering. In reality, it did not. Rather it showed that, against opposition of doubtful quality, regulars were able to bear the brunt until volunteer recruits had been thoroughly drilled.

IV

Volunteering was its old self again in the Civil War. Expecting a short conflict, President Lincoln in April, 1861, raised 75,000 volunteers for a period of three months. The North was so short of experienced officers that the recruits received little real training. But popular demand for action

before the expiration of their term pushed them into the Battle of Bull Run. It is history that they did the bulk of the running. While running anywhere from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear, they kept firing high in the air, thus obliging those still in front to retire also. A battalion of regulars which covered the retreat of the terrified rookies withdrew in perfect order. This rout, together with other Rebel victories of the same year, gave the Confederacy substantial advantages in initiative and morale.

By the end of March, 1862, the North had 600,000 three-year men; the South, only 200,000 one-year men. Had it employed conscription from the first, the North would have had at that time enough trained soldiers to bring the war rapidly to a close. Actually, the Confederacy was given time to adopt conscription and greatly strengthen its army. The North began to employ the draft the following year, but too late to prevent the war from dragging through four of the bloodiest years in history. It is not unlikely that the South would have won had its man-power and resources been anywhere near equal to those of the North. Against a really first-rate opponent who employs conscription, you must employ conscription even to hold your own.

The Spanish War proved little, save that a vastly superior navy and a mixture of volunteers and regulars could defeat a weak adversary. But even in this successful conflict the impulses of volunteers might have proved detrimental had they not been overbalanced by professional judgment. For example, a Regular Army sergeant told the writer of having seen Theodore Roosevelt expose himself in foolhardy fashion.

In the World War, the United States largely escaped not only the blunder of volunteering but also the main mistakes which

attended drafting during the Civil War. The war was well sold to the people. Allied propaganda and channels of transmission far excelled anything the Germans could offer. Wealthy persons were not allowed to escape merely by purchasing discharges or hiring substitutes, although, as Grover Cleveland Bergdoll illustrated, money was sometimes useful in dodging the draft. Local feelings were not ruffled, as in the Civil War, by having officials in Federal uniforms invade homes to enroll and draft men. Instead, the draft was executed through the customary political divisions and subdivisions. "As if they were going to vote," men were registered in their own voting precincts, usually by personal acquaintances.

The announcement of Lincoln's draft had too far preceded the actual drafting. People had had time to look at it more and more, and to like it less and less. Four months had not sufficed to complete the registration, but it had proved enough for the killing or wounding of about a hundred Federal registrars. In the rioting which had attended the drafting itself, 300 persons had been killed and over two million dollars' worth of property destroyed in New York City alone. To say that the World War draft was all arranged before the public heard about it is stating the facts mildly. The main outlines were determined upon before Congress began to debate the measure, and local precincts and officials were supplied with blank forms far in advance. Only about three weeks intervened between the enactment of the measure and the date set for registration; and, before this period began, the trick plays designed to score on the people were well rehearsed. In the debate at Washington, of course, the legendary virtues of volunteering were dusted off, and conscription was viewed with alarm. General Crowder was warned

that if he accepted the job of chief provost marshal his name would be the most odious in America. Senator Champ Clark declared, in round numbers, that conscript and convict were all the same to Missourians; and Senator Reed of Missouri guaranteed rivulets of blood in our streets.

None the less, the draft worked pretty well. It rounded up nearly four-fifths of the men it went after, which probably compares well with the Canadian Mounted. To be sure, it missed some 337,000 balkers. These consisted of "dodgers" and "conscientious objectors"; and the objectors, in turn, of those who objected, respectively, with and without benefit of clergy. It was the objectors who based their case on reason instead of emotion who caught particular hell. Their most merciless opponents were the especially pious elements of America, who would not raise a hand to defend them from excessive prison sentences. A good example of the rational objector was Carl Haessler, Rhodes scholar and teacher of philosophy. He did not believe that the war was being fought to save democracy, or even to end war. And so he was led off in handcuffs to improve his education at prison labor. Despite such inconveniences, however, our draft was successful in getting 100,000 young Americans killed. Conscription throughout the civilized world at this time was a major triumph; it assembled enough men to kill 13,000,000 directly and extinguish another 25,000,000 or so as an indirect result.

Conscription, especially when extended to peace time, seems to have some objectionable features. It takes men from productive occupations, brings hardship to

their families, and gives them training which is no offset for the civilian training they might have got in the same length of time. It develops urban at the expense of rural life. Towns grow up, or expand, to serve garrisons and to manufacture war materials; and drafted country boys acquire a taste for the bright lights. The shortage of young women near the troops, and of young men in civilian life, stimulates prostitution in the former sector and vicious competition among young women in the latter. Nationalist and militarist sentiment is aggravated. When it comes to war, the conscripts are so young that they do not relish the prospect of being or making corpses or invalids.

And yet conscription is not especially to blame. If war is accepted, any other system of recruiting would be yet more prodigal of life and wealth. As long as imperialism necessitates saving the institutions under which it flourishes, conscription is incomparably superior to the volunteer system. As long as armament manufacture is a private enterprise disturbing peace and protracting war, conscription is a fixture. As long as armament firms sell the latest and best to friend and foe alike, thus creating an even balance between attack and defense, minimizing surprise and finesse, and turning the once mobile art of war into a clinch in which the winner is the people which can starve and freeze and die the longer, it will be impracticable to round up enough cannon-fodder without conscription. Modern conscription is so inseparable from modern war that if you approve the latter you are unreasonable to condemn the former.

ILLEGAL PERIODICALS IN GERMANY¹

BY WALTER SCHOENSTEDT

THIS winter many new illegal papers have appeared in Germany. It is no longer uncommon to run across anti-Nazi leaflets and newspapers without even looking for them, for the illegal editors have greatly improved their methods of production and distribution. Moreover, the tale-bearers are not so active as they used to be, and the police must perform its task single-handed.

A few months ago the milk or potato dealer who helped Hitler to power ran eagerly to the police if he had the slightest information about underground activities. Today he remains quietly behind his counter. Another portion of the middle class now actively helps the revolutionary editors by furnishing rooms and money. This transformation in the middle class is easily explained: Hitler has not kept his promise to abolish the department stores and hand over their plants to the small retailer. In 1934 Woolworth was permitted to open a series of new stores. The small retailer no longer cares whether the department store owner is Aryan or non-Aryan. His enemy is the department store itself, and he is more and more openly accusing National Socialism of having deceived him. Taxes are going up, there is no purchasing power, rents are rising, there are evictions throughout the country.

Thus the middle class, which furnishes Hitler's chief support, is rapidly being ruined, and its conscious members are

joining the revolutionaries. The others are despairing. In 1934 there were about 20,000 suicides. Most of these must be laid to economic causes.

Under these circumstances German revolutionary literature is becoming more and more widespread. The illegal cadres have grown enormously in numbers. Despite mass arrests, despite the increased vigilance of the police, the underground editorial boards have redoubled their output. Particularly the larger cities and industrial centres are flooded with anti-Hitler propaganda.

Even within the SA illegal papers are appearing. These are edited by discontented storm-troopers, consisting for the most part of the so-called old guard. The foremost among these journals is the *Red Standard*. It contains excellent drawings and resembles in tone the Nazi papers before Hitler's rise to power. It quotes from old speeches, calls attention to points in the old Nazi program, and recalls to the storm-troopers the Socialist ideal which they once dreamed of in their bivouacs. Every storm-trooper knows the *Red Standard*. It lies in the cupboards or even on the tables in the barracks. As a letter, it finds its way into their homes. Its most recurrent refrain is the call to a second revolution which will bring the real Socialism for which many storm-troopers risked their necks.

The existence of these illegal papers shows the degree of disintegration within

¹ Translated from the German by Ralph Manheim.