

*The Winning of the West.* By THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Vol. IV., Louisiana and the Northwest, 1791-1807. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1896. Pp. vi, 363.)

MR. ROOSEVELT has done a real service to our history in his volumes on the West. He has rescued a whole movement in American development from the hands of unskilful annalists; he has made use of widely scattered original sources, not heretofore exploited; and with graphic vigor he has portrayed the advance of the pioneer into the wastes of the continent. He has considered his subject broadly, in its relations to world-history, not in the spirit of the local historian. This is an admirable thing to do; and Mr. Roosevelt's appreciative sympathy with the frontiersman, due in part to his own Western experiences, has enabled him to depict the movement as probably no other man of his time could have done. The difficult question of the relations between the Indian and the pioneer he has handled in a courageous and virile way that enables the reader to correct the well-intentioned, but not altogether well-founded, criticisms of the Indian relations of the nation by Eastern writers. He has brought into prominence an important, but much-neglected, subject by unfolding our relations with Spain and England respecting the frontier, and has given a valuable treatment of the tortuous intrigues of Western leaders with the Spaniards and the French. These are some of the strong features of Mr. Roosevelt's work. They indicate the value of his contribution to the work of constructing the truly national history of the United States,—a work that remains to be accomplished.

The author's conception of his subject is well indicated in its title: it is of the acquisition and early settlement of the West that he writes. He is not particularly concerned with the reactive influences of the West upon the East, nor with the development of institutions, nor with the later history of events, in the areas across which the waves of pioneer life passed. It is the dramatic and picturesque aspects of the period that most interest him,—the Indian fighting, the intrigues with Spain, and the exploration of the far West. He handles the subject with dash and lightness of touch; and sometimes this facility shows itself in a readiness to pass over institutional development with a comment of praise or blame, instead of information that the reader has a right to expect. He frequently fails to work his subject out into its less obvious relations; and the marks of actual haste are plain in careless proof-reading and citations. He does not hesitate to use his pages as a means of impressing his views of parties and party policies upon his readers, and he frequently enlivens his pages with a *hæc fabula docet*, for the benefit of the present generation.

The fourth volume adds evidence to the existence of these merits and defects. The opening chapters afford abundant proof of Mr. Roosevelt's skill in handling the picturesque. The campaigns of St. Clair and Wayne are not likely to be better presented than in the author's pages; and he has an excellent analysis of the confused conditions of treaties, of the diffi-

cult or impossible task of discriminating between friendly and unfriendly Indians, and of the forces of expansion that would have found occasion for the conquest of the wilderness, even if the savages had not given occasions. The reluctance of the government to undertake offensive operations against the Indians is forcibly illustrated by citations from Knox's and Pickering's papers. That the East finally backed the West, was due, the author thinks, to four main reasons: In some states, as in Virginia and Georgia, the frontiersmen were of such numerical importance as to affect the action of the state; the fathers or grandfathers of a large class of people had been frontiersmen, and frontier interests and traditions survived in older localities; in many communities were people whose kinsmen or friends had gone to the border; and the feeling of race and national kinship could be depended on to support the frontiersman when victory was doubtful. Mr. Roosevelt assents to Professor McLaughlin's view of British responsibility in these Indian wars, and criticises the British for treachery in abandoning their Indian allies.

Under the caption "Tennessee becomes a State," the author brings together an interesting mass of material on the difficult Indian questions that confronted Governor Blount; the economic and social conditions of the raw community; the land speculations; the treacherous intrigues of Carondelet with Wilkinson and other Western leaders, as well as with the savage enemies of these frontiersmen; the attempt of Elijah Clark, of Georgia, to set up an independent community in the lands claimed by Spain; and the new constitution of Tennessee.

One of Mr. Roosevelt's most interesting suggestions is with respect to the continuity between Western filibustering movements; they were parts in a current of tendency. Burr's conspiracy and the conquest of Texas were only later manifestations of attempts like those of Colonel Morgan at New Madrid, Elijah Clark, and George Rogers Clark. In further illustration of the continuity of this movement that culminated in the Mexican War, the author might have quoted Franklin's letter to his son in 1767, suggesting "that a settlement should be made in the Illinois country . . . raising a strength there which on occasions of a future war might easily be poured down the Mississippi upon the lower country, and into the Bay of Mexico, to be used against Cuba, the French islands, or Mexico itself." In this connection, Mr. Roosevelt's account of George Rogers Clark's relations to Genet in an effort to lead an expedition against the Spaniards at New Orleans, under the French flag, is of much value. This part of Clark's career has been ignored or glossed over by his admirers, but on the basis of the Draper Manuscripts, in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Mr. Roosevelt elucidates the interesting episode. Probably the most serious criticism to be made upon his account of the matter, is with respect to his bitter comments on Jefferson's relations to the movement. He declares that it is impossible that Jefferson should not have known the purposes of Michaux, the French botanist, who acted as one of Genet's agents in the West; and he thinks Jefferson was really engaged in a "characteristic

. . . tortuous intrigue" against Washington, and was thwarting his wishes as far as he dared in regard to Genet. This is a serious charge, one of the most serious ones that have ever been brought against Mr. Jefferson. It is, in effect, that while holding his position as Secretary of State, and officially promoting a policy of neutrality, he was secretly assisting a movement which involved the expatriation of leaders in the Western country, the fitting out of a hostile expedition on American soil, against a friendly power, and the replacement of a weak and decadent nation at the mouth of the Mississippi by a powerful nation. The only evidence which Mr. Roosevelt offers for this view of Jefferson is the fact that Jefferson gave Michaux a letter of introduction to Governor Shelby of Kentucky. There is nothing in the letter to indicate a secret purpose, nor do Jefferson's published writings of this period indicate any desire to assist France in the conquest of Spanish lands; the only paper that looks even remotely in that direction bears the written approval of Washington. On the other hand, Jefferson had always taken comfort in the fact that, with a weak power at its mouth, the Mississippi would be ours when we needed it; and he declared only a few years later, when France did acquire Louisiana, that "there is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans." He was even ready to engage in alliance with England to prevent this French acquisition. Thus the antecedent probabilities are against Jefferson's willingness to yield New Orleans, even to a power he liked so well as France. But Mr. Roosevelt omits an important factor in the question, both in his treatment of Clark's expedition and in his account of the exploration of Lewis and Clark later. Jefferson had long been interested in the exploration of a transcontinental route by way of the Columbia and the Missouri. He had written letters to Washington and Madison, from France in 1786, asking information regarding portages between the Potomac and the Ohio, in order to foster the fur-trade between Virginia and the far West. Ledyard, a Connecticut Yankee, had even started with Jefferson's patronage to cross Russia to Kamtchatka, to sail to Nootka Sound and thence return to the United States by way of the Missouri. Ledyard did not succeed; but Jefferson kept the project in mind, and, in 1792, proposed to the American Philosophical Society to send an explorer up the Missouri to the Columbia. Michaux offered his services and they were accepted, and as the representative of this Society, Jefferson gave him a letter of introduction. His recall, as soon as Genet's plans became known, put a stop to his journey. There are several confidential letters of Michaux to George Rogers Clark, among the Draper Manuscripts, but none of them intimate any connection with Jefferson, though they do with Brown of Kentucky. If Mr. Roosevelt knows of this relation of Michaux to Jefferson's plans for exploration, it was certainly a grave mistake not to mention it, both because of the importance of it to a candid estimate of Jefferson's part in this French intrigue, and because of its interest as a stage in the evolution of the project of the Lewis and Clark expedition. Minor defects in the treatment of Clark's

attempt are the neglect to note the relation of Thomas Paine to the matter, and the suspicious correspondence between Wayne and O'Fallon. If Mr. Roosevelt had given more painstaking attention to this important part of Genet's activity, he might perhaps have secured important documents from the French archives upon the extent to which that government was involved in this effort to secure Louisiana in the period before Napoleon; there is no evidence that he attempted to do this. Mr. Roosevelt might also have given more generous recognition of the services of Gayarré in the years embraced in this volume.

The Yazoo Land Company, Carondelet's and Wilkinson's later relations, and Blount's English intrigue are briefly set forth in the work, while Jay's and Pinckney's treaties are considered chiefly on the basis of printed material, without an attempt to exploit Spanish, English, or French archives on these important diplomatic episodes in relation to the West.

The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 are disposed of by Mr. Roosevelt in a paragraph of a dozen lines, while he gives about two dozen pages to the picturesque narrative of St. Clair's disaster. That this mode of treatment is open to objection is clear when it is remembered that, in his previous volume, he had unfolded at some length the particularism of Kentucky with respect to the Mississippi. He makes no effort to relate the philosophy of Kentucky's Resolutions to this earlier experience, nor does he give his readers any insight into the sides taken by Kentucky leaders on the Resolutions. This way of looking at his subject finds illustration also in Mr. Roosevelt's treatment of Ohio in the same epoch. No considerable attempt is made to describe the development of political institutions, state and local, in the Northwest in this period, nor to account for the forces that brought about the division of the Northwest Territory. Such an account would be most helpful in the light it would cast upon the democratic influence of the back country on the New England Federalists who had migrated there, and upon the part played by the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Virginia settlers in the Northwest. It was because the expanding regions of the country embraced Democracy, while the Federalists remained stationary, that Jefferson's party came to control the government, and, therefore, a more detailed study of the incompatibility of temperament between Federalism and the West would be an important contribution. But Mr. Roosevelt does not like "the doctrinaire politicians of whom Jefferson was chief." He expresses his contempt in a somewhat characteristic paragraph, as follows:—

"The sin of burning a few public buildings [by the British, at the capture of Washington] is as nothing compared with the cowardly infamy [!] of which the politicians of the stripe of Jefferson and Madison, and the people whom they represented, were guilty in not making ready, by sea and land, to protect their capital, and in not exacting full revenge for its destruction. These facts may, with advantage, be pondered by those men of the present day who are either so ignorant or of such lukewarm patriotism that they do not wish to see the United States keep prepared for war and show herself willing and able to adopt a vigorous foreign policy whenever

there is need of furthering American interests or upholding the honor of the American flag."

Nor do the politics of the frontiersmen please the author; for, in commenting on St. Clair's defeat in the presidency of Washington, he laments that "the foolish frontiersmen, instead of backing up the administration, railed at it and persistently supported the party which desired so to limit the powers and energies of the National Government as to produce mere paralysis. Under such conditions the national administration, instead of at once redoubling its efforts to ensure success by shock of arms, was driven to the ignoble necessity of yet again striving for a hopeless peace." The fact is that the frontiersmen were not likely to support and strengthen the power of the Federalist administration, unless they could see that its main policy did not rest on interests antagonistic to their own; and it would have been more useful for the author to have worked out in detail, by historical evidence, the reasons for this distrust, than to have thus expressed his opinion of Jefferson, Madison, and modern Americans. While one can appreciate the energetic Americanism of Mr. Roosevelt, one can also lament that he finds it necessary to use his history as the text for a sermon to a stiff-necked generation.

In further illustration of Mr. Roosevelt's way of looking at his subject, may be noted his neglect of the land companies and new state projects of western New York and the Susquehanna region, and of the Whiskey Insurrection.

The chapter entitled "Men of the Western Waters" gives a clear statement of the essential solidarity of the West,—its distinctive type that of the Southerner of the uplands, not of the coast regions. The Northeast did not have any considerable influence on the West in this formative period, and there was as yet "no hard and fast line drawn between North and South among the men of the Western waters." As yet the typical Westerner, north and south, was the small pioneer farmer working without slaves, with his home a log hut in the forest clearing. Between him and Federalist governors like St. Clair and Sargent, there were natural antagonisms. The author notes the contrast between the West of our own time and that of the older day as shown in the lack of urban life in the older West, while in the new West great cities like Tacoma and Seattle have sprung up with incomparable rapidity. During the first decade of its statehood, Colorado had a third of its population in its capital city, while Kentucky, which grew as fast as Colorado, did not have more than one per cent. in its capital city. This whole chapter is the best economic and social study which Mr. Roosevelt has yet made in his Western work.

Of the chapters on the Louisiana purchase, Burr's conspiracy, and the explorations of Lewis and Clark and Pike, less can be said. They are interestingly done; but they add nothing of importance to the work of Henry Adams, and the Coues editions of Lewis and Clark and Pike.

Taken as a whole, the volume will be to the general reader a revela-

tion in American history. But the special student must regret that Mr. Roosevelt does not find it possible to regard history as a more jealous mistress, and to give more time, greater thoroughness of investigation, particularly in foreign archives, and more sobriety of judgment to his work.

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*The Speaker of the House of Representatives.* By M. P. FOLLETT.  
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1896. Pp. xxvi, 378.)

MISS M. P. FOLLETT, in her book, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives*, has made a really notable contribution to the study of the growth of American governmental institutions; and she has, for the first time, put down on paper, for the benefit of the literary class, certain facts which are accepted as truisms by the men who actually shape the developments of our institutions, but to which the merely theoretical students of these institutions have been almost absolutely blind. The very reason why Miss Follett's work is so creditable is a rather severe commentary upon the mental attitude of many of these students. She has studied the subject at first hand; with the *Congressional Record*, *The Debates of Congress*, and the *House Journal*, as the highest authorities, but with frequent reference to the published statements of the chief actors in the various struggles, or of their really competent critics. Above all, she has faced facts as they are; and has not been blinded by seeming analogies between our own and the English system. Unfortunately, the average student of our methods of congressional government cannot rid his mind of the thought that it must be studied in the writings of those who know nothing of the practical work of Congress, and in consequence it is fairly astounding to see how little knowledge these writers usually have of the most important features of their subject, and how idle are their proposed remedies for any existing wrong. A really practical politician is continually irritated at the disregard which the men who merely call themselves practical politicians show for the work of the scholar and student; but this disregard is unfortunately entirely justifiable in many instances. A few years ago a number of very well-meaning students of congressional government conceived the idea that what we needed was parliamentary responsibility, in the English sense. One or two of the leaders of this cult, notably Mr. Woodrow Wilson, were men of marked ability, who have done admirable work in other lines, and who in this instance were misled solely because they did not know, and could not see, the real conditions under which our government worked; but their teachings on this point were as idle as if they had tried to model New York municipal government on Plato's *Republic*. Yet for some years their writings were not answered, because they were regarded with indifference by those who knew enough to answer them, and with reverential awe by those who did not. No man practically acquainted with our governmental methods considered them worth an answer, and the students whose knowl-