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Debacle, Inc.
How Henry Kissinger Helped Create Our “Proliferated” World
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Henry Kissinger.  Credit: Huffington Post
Henry Kissinger. Credit: Huffington Post

The only person Henry Kissinger flattered more than President Richard Nixon was Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. In the early 1970s, the Shah, sitting atop an enormous reserve of increasingly expensive oil and a key figure in Nixon and Kissinger’s move into the Middle East, wanted to be dealt with as a serious person. He expected his country to be treated with the same respect Washington showed other key Cold War allies like West Germany and Great Britain. As Nixon’s national security adviser and, after 1973, secretary of state, Kissinger’s job was to pump up the Shah, to make him feel like he truly was the “king of kings.”

Reading the diplomatic record, it’s hard not to imagine his weariness as he prepared for his sessions with the Shah, considering just what gestures and words would be needed to make it clear that his majesty truly mattered to Washington, that he was valued beyond compare. “Let’s see,” an aide who was helping Kissinger get ready for one such meeting said, “the Shah will want to talk about Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, the Kurds, and Brezhnev.”

During another prep, Kissinger was told that “the Shah wants to ride in an F-14.” Silence ensued. Then Kissinger began to think aloud about how to flatter the monarch into abandoning the idea. “We can say,” he began, “that if he has his heart set on it, okay, but the President would feel easier if he didn’t have that one worry in 10,000 [that the plane might crash]. The Shah will be flattered.” Once, Nixon asked Kissinger to book the entertainer Danny Kaye for a private performance for the Shah and his wife.

The 92-year-old Kissinger has a long history of involvement in Iran and his recent opposition to Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, while relatively subdued by present Washington standards, matters. In it lies a certain irony, given his own largely unexamined record in the region. Kissinger’s criticism has focused mostly on warning that the deal might provoke a regional nuclear arms race as Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia line up against Shia Iran. “We will live in a proliferated world,” he said in testimony before the Senate. In a Wall Street Journal op-ed co-authored with another former secretary of state, George Shultz, Kissinger worried that, as the region “trends toward sectarian upheaval” and “state collapse,” the “disequilibrium of power” might likely tilt toward Tehran.

Of all people, Kissinger knows well how easily the best laid plans can go astray and careen toward disaster. The former diplomat is by no means solely responsible for the mess that is today’s Middle East. There is, of course, George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq (which Kissinger supported). But he does bear far more responsibility for our proliferated world’s disequilibrium of power than anyone usually recognizes.

Some of his Middle East policies are well known. In early 1974, for instance, his so-called shuttle diplomacy helped deescalate the tensions that had led to the previous year’s Arab-Israeli War. At the same time, however, it locked in Israel’s veto over U.S. foreign policy for decades to come. And in December 1975, wrongly believing that he had worked out a lasting pro-American balance of power between Iran and Iraq, Kissinger withdrew his previous support from the Kurds (whom he had been using as agents of destabilization against Baghdad’s Baathists). Iraq moved quickly to launch an assault on the Kurds that killed thousands and then implemented a program of ethnic cleansing, forcibly relocating Kurdish survivors and moving Arabs into their homes. “Even in the context of covert action ours was a cynical enterprise,”noted a Congressional investigation into his sacrifice of the Kurds.

Less well known is the way in which Kissinger’s policies toward Iran and Saudi Arabia accelerated the radicalization in the region, how step by catastrophic step he laid the groundwork for the region’s spiraling crises of the present moment.

Guardian of the Gulf

Most critical histories of U.S. involvement in Iran rightly began with the joint British-U.S. coup against democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, which installed Pahlavi on the Peacock Throne. But it was Kissinger who, in 1972, greatly deepened the relationship between Washington and Tehran. He was the one who began a policy of unconditional support for the Shah as a way to steady American power in the Persian Gulf while the U.S. extracted itself from Southeast Asia. As James Schlesinger, who served as Nixon’s CIA director and secretary of defense, noted, if “we were going to make the Shah the Guardian of the Gulf, we’ve got to give him what he needs.” Which, Schlesinger added, really meant “giving him what he wants.”

What the Shah wanted most of all were weapons of every variety — and American military trainers, and a navy, and an air force. It was Kissinger who overrode State Department and Pentagon objections and gave the Shah what no other country had: the ability to buy anything he wanted from U.S. weapons makers.

“We are looking for a navy,” the Shah told Kissinger in 1973, “we have a large shopping list.” And so Kissinger let him buy a navy.

By 1976, Kissinger’s last full year in office, Iran had become the largest purchaser of American weaponry and housed the largest contingent of U.S. military advisors anywhere on the planet. By 1977, the historian Ervand Abrahamian notes, “the shah had the largest navy in the Persian Gulf, the largest air force in Western Asia, and the fifth-largest army in the whole world.” That meant, just to begin a list, thousands of modern tanks, hundreds of helicopters, F-4 and F-5 fighter jets, dozens of hovercraft, long-range artillery pieces, and Maverick missiles. The next year, the Shah bought another $12 billion worth of equipment.

After Kissinger left office, the special relationship he had worked so hard to establish blew up with the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the flight of the Shah, the coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (and its occupants as hostages) by student protesters. Washington’s political class is still trying to dig itself out of the rubble. A number of high-ranking Middle East policymakers and experts held Kissinger directly responsible for the disaster, especially career diplomat George Ball, who called Kissinger’s Iran policy an “act of folly.”

Kissinger is deft at deflecting attention from this history. After a speech at Annapolis in 2007, a cadet wanted to know why he had sold weapons to the Shah of Iran when “he knew the nature of his regime?”

“Every American government from the 1950s on cooperated with the Shah of Iran,” Kissinger answered. He continued: “Iran is a crucial piece of strategic real estate, and the fact that it is now in adversarial hands shows why we cooperated with the Shah of Iran. Why did we sell weapons to him? Because he was willing to defend himself and because his defense was in our interest. And again, I simply don’t understand why we have to apologize for defending the American national interest, which was also in the national interest of that region.”

This account carefully omits his role in greatly escalating the support provided to the Shah, including to his infamous SAVAK torturers — the agents of his murderous, U.S.-trained secret police-cum-death-squad — who upheld his regime. Each maimed body or disappeared family member was one more klick on the road to revolution. As George Ball’s biographer, James Bill, writes: considering the “manifest failure” of Kissinger’s Iran policy, “it is worthy of note that in his two massive volumes of political memoirs totalling twenty-eight-hundred pages, Kissinger devoted less than twenty pages to the Iranian revolution and U.S.-Iran relations.”

After the Shah fell, the ayatollahs were the beneficiaries of Kissinger’s arms largess, inheriting billions of dollars of warships, tanks, fighter jets, guns, and other materiel. It was also Kissinger who successfully urged the Carter administration to grant the Shah asylum in the United States, which hastened the deterioration of relations between Tehran and Washington, precipitating the embassy hostage crisis.

Then, in 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran, beginning a war that consumed hundreds of thousands of lives. The administration of Ronald Reagan “tilted” toward Baghdad, providing battlefield intelligence used to launch lethal sarin gas attacks on Iranian troops. At the same time, the White House illegally and infamously trafficked high-tech weaponry to revolutionary Iran as part of what became the Iran-Contra affair.

“It’s a pity they can’t both lose,” Kissinger is reported to have said of Iran and Iraq. Although that quotation is hard to confirm, Raymond Tanter, who served on the National Security Council, reports that, at a foreign-policy briefing for Republican presidential nominee Ronald Reagan in October 1980, Kissinger suggested “the continuation of fighting between Iran and Iraq was in the American interest.” Having bet (and lost) on the Shah, Kissinger now hoped to make the best of a bad war. The U.S., he counselled Reagan, “should capitalize on continuing hostilities.”

Saudi Arabia and the Petrodollar Fix

Kissinger’s other “guardian” of the Gulf, Sunni Saudi Arabia, however, didn’t fall and he did everything he could to turn that already close relationship into an ironclad alliance. In 1975, he signaled what was to come by working out an arms deal for the Saudi regime similar to the one he had green-lighted for Tehran, including a $750 million contract for the sale of 60 F-5E/F fighters to the sheiks. By this time, the U.S. already had more than a trillion dollars’ worth of military agreements with Riyadh. Only Iran had more.

Like Tehran, Riyadh paid for this flood of weaponry with the proceeds from rising oil prices. The word “petrodollar,” according to the Los Angeles Times, was coined in late 1973, and introduced into English by New York investment bankers who were courting the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. Soon enough, as that paper wrote, the petrodollar had become part of “the world’s macroeconomic interface” and crucial to Kissinger’s developing Middle Eastern policy.

By June 1974, Treasury Secretary George Shultz was already suggesting that rising oil prices could result in a “highly advantageous mutual bargain” between the U.S. and petroleum-producing countries in the Middle East. Such a “bargain,” as others then began to argue, might solve a number of problems, creating demand for the U.S. dollar, injecting needed money into a flagging defense industry hard hit by the Vietnam wind-down, and using petrodollars to cover mounting trade deficits.

As it happened, petrodollars would prove anything but a quick fix. High energy prices were a drag on the U.S. economy, with inflation and high interest rates remaining a problem for nearly a decade. Nor was petrodollar dependence part of any preconceived Kissingerian “plan.” As with far more of his moves than he or his admirers now care to admit, he more or less stumbled into it. This was why, in periodic frustration, he occasionally daydreamed about simply seizing the oil fields of the Arabian peninsula and doing away with all the developing economic troubles.

“Can’t we overthrow one of the sheikhs just to show that we can do it?” he wondered in November 1973, fantasizing about which gas-pump country he could knock off. “How about Abu Dhabi?” he later asked. (Imagine what the world would be like today had Kissinger, in the fall of 1973, moved to overthrow the Saudi regime rather than Chile’s democratically elected president, Salvador Allende.) “Let’s work out a plan for grabbing some Middle East oil if we want,” Kissinger said.

Such scimitar rattling was, however, pure posturing. Not only did Kissinger broker the various deals that got the U.S. hooked on recycled Saudi petrodollars, he also began to promote the idea of an “oil floor price” below which the cost per barrel wouldn’t fall. Among other things, this scheme was meant to protect the Saudis (and Iran, until 1979) from a sudden drop in demand and provide U.S. petroleum corporations with guaranteed profit margins.

Stephen Walt, a scholar of international relations, writes: “By the end of 1975, more than six thousand Americans were engaged in military-related activities in Saudi Arabia. Saudi arms purchased for the period 1974-1975 totaled over $3.8 billion, and a bewildering array of training missions and construction projects worth over $10 billion were now underway.”

Since the 1970s, one administration after another has found the iron-clad alliance Kissinger deepened between the House of Saud’s medieval “moderates” and Washington indispensable not only to keep the oil flowing but as a balance against Shia radicalism and secular nationalism of every sort. Recently, however, a series of world-historical events has shattered the context in which that alliance seemed to make sense. These include: the catastrophic war on and occupation of Iraq, the Arab Spring, the Syrian uprising and ensuing civil war, the rise of ISIS, Israel’s rightwing lurch, the conflict in Yemen, the falling price of petroleum, and, now, Obama’s Iran deal.

But the arms spigot that Kissinger turned on still remains wide open.According to the New York Times, “Saudi Arabia spent more than $80 billion on weaponry last year — the most ever, and more than either France or Britain — and has become the world’s fourth-largest defense market.” Just as they did after the Vietnam drawdown, U.S. weapons manufacturing are compensating for limits on the defense budget at home by selling arms to Gulf states. The “proxy wars in the Middle East could last for years,” write Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper of the New York Times, “which will make countries in the region even more eager for the F-35 fighter jet, considered to be the jewel of America’s future arsenal of weapons. The plane, the world’s most expensive weapons project, has stealth capabilities and has been marketed heavily to European and Asian allies. It has not yet been peddled to Arab allies because of concerns about preserving Israel’s military edge.”

If fortune is really shining on Lockheed and Boeing, Kissinger’s prediction that Obama’s de-escalation of tensions with Tehran will sooner or later prompt Saudi–Iranian hostilities will pan out. “With the balance of power in the Middle East in flux, several defense analysts said that could change. Russia is a major arms supplier to Iran, and a decision by President Vladimir Putin to sell an advanced air defense system to Iran could increase demand for the F-35, which is likely to have the ability to penetrate Russian-made defenses,” the Times reports.

“This could be the precipitating event: the emerging Sunni-Shia civil war coupled with the sale of advanced Russian air defense systems to Iran,” said one defense analyst. “If anything is going to result in F-35 clearance to the gulf states, this is the combination of events.’”

Into Afghanistan

If all Henry Kissinger contributed to the Middle East were a regional arms race, petrodollar addiction, Iranian radicalization, and the Tehran-Riyadh conflict, it would be bad enough. His legacy, however, is far worse than that: he has to answer for his role in the rise of political Islam.

In July 1973, after a coup in Afghanistan brought to power a moderate, secular, but Soviet-leaning republican government, the Shah, then approaching the height of his influence with Kissinger, pressed his advantage. He asked for even more military assistance. Now, he said, he “must cover the East with fighter aircraft.” Kissinger complied.

Tehran also began to meddle in Afghan politics, offering Kabul billions of dollars for development and security, in exchange for loosening “its ties with the Soviet Union.” This might have seemed a reasonably peaceful way to increase U.S. influence via Iran over Kabul. It was, however, paired with an explosive initiative: via SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), extremist Islamic insurgents were to be slipped into Afghanistan to destabilize Kabul’s republican government.

Kissinger, who knew his British and his Russian imperial history, had long considered Pakistan of strategic importance. “The defense of Afghanistan,” he wrote in 1955, “depends on the strength of Pakistan.” But before he could put Pakistan into play against the Soviets in Afghanistan, he had to perfume away the stink of genocide. In 1971, that country had launched a bloodbath in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), with Nixon and Kissinger standing “stoutly behind Pakistan’s generals, supporting the murderous regime at many of the most crucial moments,” as Gary Bass has detailed. The president and his national security adviser, Bass writes, “vigorously supported the killers and tormentors of a generation of Bangladeshis.”

Because of that genocidal campaign, the State Department, acting against Kissinger’s wishes, had cut off military aid to the country in 1971, though Nixon and Kissinger kept it flowing covertly via Iran. In 1975, Kissinger vigorously pushed for its full, formal restoration, even as he was offering his tacit approval to Maoist China to back Pakistan whose leaders had their own reasons for wanting to destabilize Afghanistan, having to do with border disputes and the ongoing rivalry with India.

Kissinger helped make that possible, in part by the key role he played in building up Pakistan as part of a regional strategy in which Iran and Saudi Arabia were similarly deputized to do his dirty work. When Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had backed the 1971 rampage in East Pakistan, visited Washington in 1975 to make the case for restoration of military aid, Kissinger assured President Gerald Ford that he “was great in ’71.” Ford agreed, and U.S. dollars soon started to flow directly to the Pakistani army and intelligence service.

As national security adviser and then secretary of state, Kissinger was directly involved in planning and executing covert actions in such diverse places as Cambodia, Angola, and Chile. No available information indicates that he ever directly encouraged Pakistan’s ISI or Iran’s SAVAK to destabilize Afghanistan. But we don’t need a smoking gun to appreciate the larger context and consequences of his many regional initiatives in what, in the twenty-first century, would come to be known in Washington as the “greater Middle East.” In their 1995 book, Out of Afghanistan, based on research in Soviet archives, foreign-policy analysts Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison provide a wide-ranging sense of just how so many of the policies Kissinger put in place — the empowerment of Iran, the restoration of military relations with Pakistan, high oil prices, an embrace of Saudi Wahhabism, and weapon sales — came together to spark jihadism:

”It was in the early 1970s, with oil prices rising, that Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran embarked on his ambitious effort to roll back Soviet influence in neighboring countries and create a modern version of the ancient Persian empire… Beginning in 1974, the Shah launched a determined effort to draw Kabul into a Western-tilted, Tehran-centered regional economic and security sphere embracing India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states… The United States actively encouraged this roll-back policy as part of its broad partnership with the Shah… SAVAK and the CIA worked hand in hand, sometimes in loose collaboration with underground Afghani Islamic fundamentalist groups that shared their anti-Soviet objectives but had their own agendas as well… As oil profits sky-rocketed, emissaries from these newly affluent Arab fundamentalist groups arrived on the Afghan scene with bulging bankrolls.”

Harrison also wrote that “SAVAK, the CIA, and Pakistani agents” were involved in failed “fundamentalist coup attempts” in Afghanistan in 1973 and 1974, along with an attempted Islamic insurrection in the Panjshir Valley in 1975, laying the groundwork for the jihad of the 1980s (and beyond).

Much has been made of Jimmy Carter’s decision, on the advice of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, to authorize “nonlethal” aid to the Afghan mujahedeen in July 1979, six months before Moscow sent troops to support the Afghan government in its fight against a spreading Islamic insurgency. But lethal aid had already long been flowing to those jihadists via Washington’s ally Pakistan (and Iran until its revolution in 1979). This provision of support to radical Islamists, initiated in Kissinger’s tenure and continuing through the years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, had a number of unfortunate consequences known all too well today but seldom linked to the good doctor. It put unsustainable pressure on Afghanistan’s fragile secular government. It laid the early infrastructure for today’s transnational radical Islam. And, of course, it destabilized Afghanistan and so helped provoke the Soviet invasion.

Some still celebrate the decisions of Carter and Reagan for their role in pulling Moscow into its own Vietnam-style quagmire and so hastening the demise of the Soviet Union. “What is most important to the history of the world?” Brzezinski infamously asked. “The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?” (The rivalry between the two Harvard immigrant diplomats, Kissinger and Brzezinski, is well known. But Brzezinski by 1979 was absolutely Kissingerian in his advice to Carter. In fact, a number of Kissinger’s allies who continued on in the Carter administration, including Walter Slocombe and David Newsom, influenced the decision to support the jihad.)

Moscow’s occupation of Afghanistan would prove a disaster — and not just for the Soviet Union. When Soviet troops pulled out in 1989, they left behind a shattered country and a shadowy network of insurgent fundamentalists who, for years, had worked hand-in-glove with the CIA in the Agency’s longest covert operation, as well as the Saudis and the Pakistani ISI. It was a distinctly Kissingerian line-up of forces.

Few serious scholars now believe that the Soviet Union would have proved any more durable had it not invaded Afghanistan. Nor did the allegiance of Afghanistan — whether it tilted toward Washington, Moscow, or Tehran — make any difference to the outcome of the Cold War, any more than did, say, that of Cuba, Iraq, Angola, or Vietnam.

For all of the celebration of him as a “grand strategist,” as someone who constantly advises presidents to think of the future, to base their actions today on where they want the country to be in five or 10 years’ time, Kissinger was absolutely blind to the fundamental feebleness and inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union. None of it was necessary; none of the lives Kissinger sacrificed in Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, East Timor, and Bangladesh made one bit of difference in the outcome of the Cold War.

Similarly, each of Kissinger’s Middle East initiatives has been disastrous in the long run. Just think about them from the vantage point of 2015: banking on despots, inflating the Shah, providing massive amounts of aid to security forces that tortured and terrorized democrats, pumping up the U.S. defense industry with recycled petrodollars and so spurring a Middle East arms race financed by high gas prices, emboldening Pakistan’s intelligence service, nurturing Islamic fundamentalism, playing Iran and the Kurds off against Iraq, and then Iraq and Iran off against the Kurds, and committing Washington to defending Israel’s occupation of Arab lands.

Combined, they’ve helped bind the modern Middle East into a knot that even Alexander’s sword couldn’t sever.

Bloody Inventions

Over the last decade, an avalanche of documents — transcripts of conversations and phone calls, declassified memos, and embassy cables — have implicated Henry Kissinger in crimes in Bangladesh, Cambodia, southern Africa, Laos, the Middle East, and Latin America. He’s tried to defend himself by arguing for context. “Just to take a sentence out of a telephone conversation when you have 50 other conversations, it’s just not the way to analyze it,” Kissinger said recently, after yet another damning tranche of documents was declassified. “I’ve been telling people to read a month’s worth of conversations, so you know what else went on.”

But a month’s worth of conversations, or eight years for that matter, reads like one of Shakespeare’s bloodiest plays. Perhaps Macbeth, with its description of what we today call blowback: “That we but teach bloody instructions, which, being taught, return to plague the inventor.”

We are still reaping the bloody returns of Kissinger’s inventions.

Greg Grandin, a TomDispatch regular, teaches history at New York University. He is the author of Fordlandia , The Empire of Necessity, which won the Bancroft Prize in American history, and, most recently, Kissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman.

(Republished from TomDispatch by permission of author or representative)
• Category: Foreign Policy, History • Tags: Henry Kissinger, Iran, Middle East 
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  1. Chiron says:

    Kissinger real Hebrew name is Avraham ben Elazar, the real name of Kissinger was disclosed by the Supreme Rabbinic Court of America when he was excommunicated from Jewry on 20 June 1976. The real reason for the excommunication has not been disclosed.

  2. KA says:

    ““It’s a pity they can’t both lose,” Kissinger is reported to have said of Iran and Iraq. Although that quotation is hard to confirm, Raymond Tanter, who served on the National Security Council, reports that, at a foreign-policy briefing for Republican presidential nominee Ronald Reagan in October 1980, Kissinger suggested “the continuation of fighting between Iran and Iraq was in the American interest.” Having bet (and lost) on the Shah, Kissinger now hoped to make the best of a bad war. The U.S., he counselled Reagan, “should capitalize on continuing hostilities.”

    This paradigm is not old nor discarded. Zionist continues to employ this rule of engagement.
    Krauthammer or one of his ferocious depraved kinds famously said that it was better that they were killing themselves over and won’t have time to kill ” us” here .
    Israel was through obviously America , making sure that the rebels didn’t win enough and have a clear victory over Assad but just enough for a bleeding destructive prolonged NYT reported .

    Kissinger ,seeing the full positive potential of Jay Gardner ,decided to scuttle it . He got rid of him and put Paul Bremmer in charge of Iraq.

  3. KA says:

    “He’s tried to defend himself by arguing for context. “Just to take a sentence out of a telephone conversation when you have 50 other conversations, it’s just not the way to analyze it,” Kissinger said recently, after yet another damning tranche of documents was declassified. “I’ve been telling people to read a month’s worth of conversations, so you know what else went on.”

    May be ,he should change himself before changing other. He should pause and reject Zionist interpretation of the Iranianin statement on wiping off Israel
    He should read and analyze more the offer of 20 yrs truce offered by Hamas than focus on the forgotten and neglected decaying charter of Hamas. May be he should not take the Hamas firing off the rocket out f context nd may be he should include the constant persistent planned provocation by Zionist every step of the way before offerring his best opinion to the Fox or to the American policy makers .

    • Replies: @Art
  4. One of the very few foreign policy acts of Kissinger that was correct was the overthrow of Allende. Allende was well on his way to having “one man, one vote, one time.” When Pinochet overthrew Allende, the place was already crawling with Cuban agents, and Pinochet knew what was going to come next if the Army didn’t act.

    • Replies: @Bill Jones
  5. guest says:

    I grow tired of picking on and picking apart Kissinger, not because it’s not important nor because he deserves better. Rather, I find myself asking why Kissinger? Where did he come from, and why did he have so much power and influence? I have a hard time believing everything he did and all the advice he gave came directly from his head. We’re distracted, I think, by “gray eminences,” and forget that in addition to the power behind the power there’re also powers behind the powers behind the power. Kissinger is only part of the establishment.

    • Replies: @Wally
    , @Priss Factor
  6. Tom Welsh says:

    I’m strongly reminded of Sevareid’s Law: “The chief cause of problems is solutions”. Specifically clever, half-baked, short-term solutions. More specifically, immoral solutions whose inhumanity is somehow deemed acceptable because they are so very clever. As we have seen, the immorality lasts while the cleverness quickly begins to look more like smug shortsighted opportunism.

  7. Rehmat says:

    Christopher Hitchens called Henry Kissinger a ‘War Criminal’. He was involved in depopulation of Africa even before he became secretary of state.

    Reza Shah was a pro-Israel monarch who killed millions of Iranians who hated him for his pro-western policies and recognition of Israel in 1949.

    Henry Kissinger always felt ‘natural bond’ with Muslim puppet rulers.

  8. Anonymous • Disclaimer says:

    The following link gives you Mohammad Reza Shah’s Opinion on Jewish Lobby, and its destructive power on foreign policy, when people like Philip Giraldi were silent.

  9. We need a way to identify people like Kissinger (zero empathy) in the womb so that they will never see the light of day. Maybe the geneticists on this blog can help.

  10. Wally says:

    Spoken like a true hasbarist.

    Mass murderer Kissinger should be hung from the nearest tree. Then gather the rest.

    • Replies: @Priss Factor
  11. Priss Factor [AKA "The Priss Factory"] says: • Website

    It’s too easy to lay all the blame on the Kisser’s feet.
    Suppose the Kisser had never lived. Would the Middle East necessarily be better off?

    A kind of fallacy is at work here. We assume that because the Kisser did ‘that’ long ago, the ‘that’ that he did inevitably led to ‘this’ right now.
    But any action can have many different outcomes.
    US and USSR upon dividing Germany didn’t know that Germany would be united again in 1989. US and USSR upon dividing Korea didn’t know the Koreas today would be the way they are. Europeans who created Syria didn’t know that it would be in the state it is today. We can connect the dots, but we also miss many other dots.
    There was nothing inevitable about the things the Kisser did in the Middle East.

    When US lost in Vietnam, it was assumed that it was a huge victory for China and Russia. But it wasn’t long before Vietnam was at war with Cambodia and China. And for Russia, aid to the Vietnam was just one more drain on its economy. The more the world got communized and got aid from the USSR — where people stood in lines for bread — , the worse it was for international communism as directed by Moscow.

    FDR and Truman didn’t know what their policies would lead to in the long run.
    Politics is about working with available cards in the present. When it comes to the future, it’s a murky game. And there are many possibilities.
    For example, we blame the Kisser for the Iran debacle. But suppose the Shah had been more of a warm guy who was close to his people instead of being such an aloof prick. Suppose he visited various regions in the nation and kissed babies in front of the camera. Maybe the Iranians would have loved him more. And then, he would have stayed in power, and maybe Iran would have been more modernized and been friendly with the US. The Kisser banked on this, and it’s not his fault that the Shah had no rapport with his own people. He lacked the touch.
    And even though SAVAK was brutal, the problem with the Shah was that he quite committed to modernization, indeed more than other Middle Eastern rulers. And that was the cause of the main contradiction in Iran. Saddam Hussein and the leaders of Saudi Arabia were more repressive and often more brutal than the Shah. But their consistency of toughness and paranoia kept political order as all dissenting voices were silenced. The Shah, in contrast, encouraged Iranians to become more western and modern, and that led to more dissent. To suppress dissent, he used his secret police. Now, had he been totally repressive like Hussein, he would have stayed in power. But he was, in many ways, a ‘nice guy’ and kept promoting modernization and westernization, and that led to more dissent. Of course, it didn’t help that France had given asylum to the Ayatollah.


    Shah was not a good guy but he was too much of a ‘nice guy’ for a dictator. He was, at once, too cruel for a modern leader and too soft for a dictator. Consider how Hussein was many times more cruel than the Shah, but he had no problem keeping the power. Hussein was like Stalin and never pretended to be an ‘enlightened monarch’ like the Shah did. In a way, the Shah was like Tsar Nicholas II. Nico was repressive but also supported modernization and tolerated liberalization. He was too nice to be tough, too hard to be enlightened. He was too pro-modernization but also too arch-reactionary. These contradictions made his rule unstable.
    Also, he lacked the Will to Power. The problem with monarch-types is that their power was handed to them on a silver platter. They never had to struggle for power, so they don’t understand the true nature of power. Men like Stalin and Hussein who had to struggle for power knew how hard it is to gain power and how easily it could be lost. So, they were ultra-ruthless and paranoid.
    In contrast, Nico and Shah just didn’t get it. They got their power all too easily. Nico just inherited it, and Shah was installed by the US that gave him protection.

    The toughest kind of Monarch has to fight for power or fight against it. Queen Elizabeth had to fight for her claim to the Throne. That made her tough. As for Frederick the Great, he didn’t want to be king. He wanted to write poetry and make music. But his pa killed his friend and whupped his ass real good. Even though Fred didn’t want the power, it was rammed so far up his ass in such a traumatic manner that he came to respect the fearsome force of power. At any rate, a kind of crisis of power marked those who came to power by struggle for it or against it.

    If Shah had been more ruthless, he would kept the power like Hussein and the Saudi royal family. The Royal family was also more clever in generously funding the Fundie Muslims so that they would serve the Family than turn against it. In contrast, the Shah neglected ties with the Muslim community in Iran. Also, the Saudi Royal family focused mostly on oil, so oil became just about the only economy of Saudi Arabia. Since the Family monopolized the oil fields, they controlled nearly all of the economy.
    In contrast, the Shah wasn’t content with Iran just being an oil-producing nation. He encouraged the development of other sectors, and this led to an expansion of an educated middle class, one that came to be filled with dissent.
    In time, the Shah was caught between a rock and a hard place. The modernized middle class blamed Shah for not modernizing fast enough. The Muslim traditionalists blamed Shah for modernizing too much and defiling the nation. The merchant class of the bazaars feared modernization as driving them out of business.
    Though the modernizers and Muslims stood for opposite values, they ended up as accidental allies in their mutual hatred of the Shah, albeit for different reasons. As a result, things got confused, which is why some European leftists supported the Muslim rebellion. They figured since it was anti-American and anti-Shah(ally of US), it must be sort-of-leftist. It’s amusing how the homo radical Foucault became one of the vocal supporters of the Revolution that would turn Iran into a puritanical place.

    Anyway, suppose Shah had managed to survive. Suppose he had the touch, kissed babies, and won the hearts/minds of his people. Then, the Kisser would have been praised for his successful policy.
    The point is it’s difficult to tell how things will work out in the long run. And sometimes, an action leads to something good in the short run, something bad in the long run, and something good in the longer run. Or an action leads to something bad in the short run, something good in the long run, and something bad in the longer run. And who knows beyond that? When US lost in Vietnam, it was seen as huge loss for the US. In the short run, it was indeed humiliating for the US. But as Vietnam imploded under communist economy and fought China, it was US that won the peace. When Reagan was building up arms in the Cold War, people said it could lead to WWIII. And maybe things could have gotten really bad if a hard liner than someone like Gorby had come to power. But Gorby came to power and decided to make peace with US. So, Reagan’s policy came to be seen as good.

    We can trace current realities in the Middle East to the Kisser. But it can also be traced to European imperialism, Arab dictators and their dumb policies, Saudi dirty tricks, etc. And even though the Kisser supported the Iraq War — too many people did — , he hasn’t been the architect of foreign policy for a long long time. And even though the Kisser did thread Jewish interests into his policies, he was nowhere as brazenly pro-Zionist as the later ones who came to control foreign policy. The Kisser’s worldview is more European than American. He’s always thought in terms of balance of powers. But then, foreign policy has always been a kind of gangsterism, essentially a heartless affair. What matters is that foreign policy should not be mindless even if it’s heartless. Bismarck understood this.
    Foreign policy is most dangerous when it is mindless and reckless, as when Germany invaded Russia and Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Or when a nut like Che Guevara urged the Soviets to provoke US into invading Cuba and then shoot off nukes at Miami. And there was Osama Bin Laden.
    And realists try to make ‘enemy monsters’ fight each other. When Iran went radical Muslim and when Iraq was led by monster Hussein, the Kisser saw it as good thing that they destroy one another. And just as USSR was happy to see US bleeding in Korea and Vietnam, the Kisser was happy to see USSR bleeding in Afghanistan. It was all tit-for-tat during the Cold War. Things seemed different back then.

    Btw, was the toppling of Allende a bad thing? The commie killed himself under siege, a few thousand Marxist scum were wiped out in Chile, and Pinochet restored order. Pinochet set the grounds for economic growth and even presided over the nation’s return to democracy. Why is Pinochet made out to be such a bad guy? Imagine if German generals had pulled off a coup, deposed Hitler, ruled with an iron fist to stabilize Germany, and then restored democracy. Okay, so several 1000s of Nazi loyalists and radicals were killed in the bargain. So what? (Democracy may be nice but if democracy paves the way for tyranny, under Allende or Hitler or whoever, isn’t temporary martial law preferable?) Similarly, so what if some commies got killed? When commies took power, they killed many more and created an even more repressive system. I would say the Kisser’s support of the coup in Chile was one of his great successes.
    All this anointing of Allende as some great saint kills me. Notice that ‘leftists’ and ‘progressives’ never much cared about Kennedy’s killing of Diem. And no one seems to care about the coup against Morsi(democratically elected in Egypt) and the massacre of 1000s by the Egyptian military.
    It’s all ‘who, whom’. Because the media and academia were made up of leftists, a Marxist like Allende and his supporters got much more support than right-wing leaders who were deposed or killed.

    Also, we have to keep in mind that the Kisser worked during the Cold War when the rules of the game were entirely different. No one back then foresaw the collapse of the USSR that happened in the early 90s. No one imagined that Reagan would become president… and make peace with a youngish and peacenik-ish leader of a USSR.
    No one in the 60s thought US would become the sole superpower.

    It’s hard to tell the future. Did anyone in the 70s see the state of China today? Who in the 60s and 70s would have thought that in a matter of few decades, China would have a much bigger economy that Russia(that will have lost its empire with the dissolution of the USSR). Who in the 70s or even 80s or even early 90s would have thought US would go nuts with ‘gay marriage’ and set about destroying the lives of those who oppose the homo agenda? It’s hard to tell the future. If someone in the present got inside a time machine and met me in the 80s and told me what the 2000s would be like, I would have laughed. White House lit up with ‘homo colors’?

    All we can do is examine the Kisser’s actions in his own time. And as often as not, they made sense within the context of what was happening then, what seemed urgent back then, and what seemed possible back then. It’s too easy to judge the past with the benefit of hindsight.

    What is truly disgusting about current US foreign policy is that it is no longer about national interest but Jewish Supremacist Interest. Though the Kisser had Jewish interests in mind, he was working in terms of broad US interests. That is no longer the case. Everything about US policy today is about Jews, Jews, Jews, Israel, Israel, Israel, and homos, homos, and homos(as homos are the main allies of the Jews).

    The Kisser kept his Jewish consciousness in check to fashion US foreign policy, but this isn’t the case with recent administrations who shape foreign policy only with the idea of pleasing Jews so that Jews will support them in the next election. GOP foreign policy today is about ‘what can we offer to Jews so that more of them will come over to our side?’ If Jews hate Russia, let’s hate Russia. If Jews hate Iran, let’s hate Iran. If Jews hate China, let’s hate China. That’s GOP foreign policy.
    The J-Street Democratic foreign policy is outwardly less one-dimensional, but it’s pretty much the same thing, with the likes of Obama and Hillary playing whore to Jews. Some people praise Obama for standing up to Neocons in his Iran Deal, but the deal was hatched by J-Street. It isn’t Obama the Stealth Muslim attacking the Jews but Obama taking orders from J-Street Jews while Neocon Jews huff-and-puff to fool the American dummy public that, oh my, Israel is facing an existential threat!!!!!!

    In truth, even Bibi knows that Iran poses no real threat to Israel. If Jews feel any kind of existential threat, it is from Russia and Putin. That is why Jews have decided to go after Russia and leave Iran alone for awhile. Why is Putin/Russia a bigger threat to Jews? Because despite the regional might of Israel, the real source of Jewish World Power is in the West. The core of Jewish power is as minority elites in US and EU. This ideal of gentile majorities being ruled by minority Jews(and their allies homos) has been challenged by Russia. Russia is nice to Jews but believes in national pride and unity. Russia tolerates homos but will not say homosexuality is just as good as real sexuality. It will not allow homo victory parades in the Red Square. Russia insists on majority normal values over minority hostile anti-values.
    Jews see this Russian model as a challenge to their power in the West. What Jews fear most is one European nation after nation seeking inspiration from Russia. After all, the National Front in France is sympathetic to Russia. Orban of Hungary has friendly ties with Russia. If the Russian model spreads in Europe, it might eventually awaken white consciousness in the US. White Americans might stop being cuckservatives who serve Jewish interests and instead insist on white interests. When that happens, whites will likely become anti-Jewish because any white gentile who gains white gentile consciousness will soon realize that the people who are most committed to anti-white policies are Jews.

    Only by suppressing white majority consciousness can Jews make white cuck for Jews and Israel. Since white consciousness is forbidden, white tribalism/nationalism finds its outlet in Jewish pride and Zionism. But once whites are made to feel proud of their own race/nation, they will care less about Jews and Israel.. and even more fearful to Jews, whites may come to realize that no people are as doggedly anti-white as Jews are. After all, Jews, even though the most privileged people on the planet, use the meme of ‘white privilege’ to dump all the blame on whites for all the problems of the world.

    When it comes to most whites, Jews guilt-bait them about either the Holocaust or black slavery. So, white Americans are still apologizing for slavery, and Europeans are forever atoning for the Holocaust(as main perpetrators or collaborators). But this is impossible to pull off against Russians. Russians never done enslaved Negroes, and Russians defeated the Germans and ended the Nazi project of mass killing. So, Jews have used the homocaust card. According to Jewish-controlled media, you’d think Russia is gassing the fruitkins.

  12. Priss Factor [AKA "The Priss Factory"] says: • Website

    “Mass murderer Kissinger should be hung from the nearest tree. Then gather the rest.”

    I don’t understand this animosity against the Kisser. Sure, his hands are dirty, but he worked in foreign policy, and foreign policy is gangster politics no matter which country practices it.

    Look at China’s support of Khmer Rouge. USSR supported lots of baddies around the world. Every nation plays dirty and loose when it comes to foreign policy.

    The real question is ‘was it necessary or unnecessary and was it for national interest or for cabal interest?’

    During the Cold War, the stakes were high. It was USSR vs US. And US had genuine fears that the Third World with all its natural resources and peoples would fall to communism or side with USSR. As it turned out, the spread of Soviet influence and power only bled the Soviet economy more. When communism spread, it destroyed third world economies that then came to depend on Soviets for aid.
    Communism just barely worked among civilized white folks in Europe. East Germans and Czechs and Poles and Hungarians and Russians were just able to make basic shoddy goods and harvest just enough potaters and tomaters.
    But when third world dummies took up communism, they made a total mess of things, and USSR had to bail them out. Just sustaining the Cuban economy was a huge drain on the USSR. North Korean economy, though not as piss poor as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola under communism, also had to be sustained with endless aid from Soviets.
    Whereas capitalism led to growing economies in Western Europe and East Asia, communist economies just led to poverty, and Soviets had to subsidize every commie state. So, the more the Soviets won around the world, the more they were burdened and began to weaken. (This was one reason USSR didn’t encourage third world peoples to emigrate to Russia. Russia could barely feed Russians.)

    But during the Cold War, many Americans didn’t see it that way. They saw the danger of Soviet influence spreading all throughout Latin America. Americans were afeared of that so many Western European intellectuals were Marxist. Italy had a powerful commie party. France did too, and 1968 movement really shook Western leaders. Charles Degaulle nearly shat his pants. And all the youth and Negro riots in the US made Western leaders feel very uncertain.
    The defeat in Vietnam was especially stinging cuz so much of US prestige had been invested into it. Though it began as a Democratic war, it came to be seen as patriots, capitalists, pro-US ally, and silent majority versus USSR, Red China, leftists, radicals, Negroes, & European anti-American left. So, when US lost in Vietnam, it was seen not only as defeat to the Vietnamese commies but to the entire International Left.

    The Kisser worked in these times. Today, the idear of Latin America turning communist is laughable. But it was seen as a real possibility. Cuba totally kicked Batista ass and then foiled Bay of Pigs. Though US got the upperhand in Cuban Missile Crisis, it also accepted commie Cuba as fait accompli and pledged never to invade it. And though Che Guevara was defeated, he became more powerful dead than when he was alive. He was like a shining inspiration to young radicals all over. So, when Allende, an admirer of Castro, took power in Chile, it was seen as a big deal.

    In retrospect, I don’t much care if communism had spread throughout Latin America. Looking back, it appears communism was never a threat to the US itself. But back then, people thought different.
    People took the domino theory seriously. And there was also the fear that, even though the West was richer, it had grown too decadent to protect itself from disciplined communists. After all, US showered more aid to South Vietnam that had more people than North Vietnam, but SV was helpless before NV that had spartan-like discipline and unity and spirit.
    It’s like what Michael Corleone says in THE GODFATHER II:

    What’s funny is how leftists ridiculed the American Right(and anti-communist liberals) for paranoia and hysteria(about exaggerated communist threat) while, at the same time, firmly believing in the victory of World Revolution because the revolutionaries had ‘spiritual faith’ in their cause whereas capitalists had only materialism that made them soft and decadent(like the Batista supporters who partied and danced to the eve of communist takeover of Havana).

    The Kisser, Gromyko, Zhou En-Lai, and etc. were all playing a dirty game. They all understood the nature of the game. (Why is it that people who condemn the Kisser as a mass killer usually praise him for reaching out to Mao the Chinee butcher who was responsible for millions of deaths and total tyranny that makes Pinochet look like Mr. Rogers?) The thing is the Kisser was playing the big game for national interest(mostly). It was deemed necessary at the time. Yes, US bombing of Vietnam and Cambodia was horrible, but what options did US have in that war where it couldn’t just abandon an ally like a hot potater? And what was US supposed to do when Allende took power? Just let another Latin American nation fall to commies? Soviets made sure no part of Eastern Europe turned non-communist. It was that kind of game. An amoral game. The game was deemed necessary at the time and it was for huge stakes.

    Today, US foreign policy is really crazy because so many of US aggressions are unnecessary and involve nations that US can get along with nicely. Also, these aggressions aren’t for general national interest but petty Jewish supremacist(and mini-me homo) interest. However Jewish-conscious the Kisser was, I don’t think he would have approved of a foreign policy just to appease the likes of Sheldon Adelson. And he was truly a statesman when compared to nitwits like Victoria Nuland, a total pile of puss.

  13. Kissinger is the first name that comes to mind when reflecting on the fact that no matter how many egregious fuck ups they perpetrate and no matter how monstrous the consequences there are never any consequences for the anointed elites.

    Great piece by the way

  14. Priss Factor [AKA "The Priss Factory"] says: • Website

    “I grow tired of picking on and picking apart Kissinger, not because it’s not important nor because he deserves better. Rather, I find myself asking why Kissinger?”

    He served Nixon, and Jews and radical boomers hated, hated, and hated Nixon.

    Also, unlike most Sec of State, the Kisser loved being a celebrity of sorts. And he was also a scholar, which meant he wasn’t just a government official but grand strategist playing the world like a chess game. His accent made him stand out.
    The discrepancy between his European manners/Jewish intellect and his brutal foreign policy unnerved a lot of people. He seemed like Dr. Strangelove. He was embroiled in the Vietnam War, the defining event of the 60s for the left that came to dominate academia. And of course, Allende has been lionized cuz he was a Marxist. Had the Kisser worked with Nixon to take down some right-wing tyrant, I doubt if the academia and media would have been offended.

    Also, he had staying power. He didn’t just fade away. Even after he left government, he was sought for advice and opinion, and that kept him as the target of leftist ire forever and ever. Many people also hate him because he is still so revered in many quarters, even by Liberals. The left finds this very frustrating. If everyone hated the Kisser, they could just let it go, but leftists are still pissed that the Kisser is still welcomed as a sage and elder statesman all over the world.

    Though hated more by the left, there have also been those on the Right that never trusted him. They saw him a double-agent, a leaker, a Jew who was no conservative and whose only interest in serving Republic administration was his obsession with the heartless game of international politics.

    That said, he had a great style, and as in boxing, style often makes the fight in foreign affairs. Foreign policy is like making business deals. It’s about negotiations. So, even if you’re tough-as-nails inside or have strong passions, you must be willing to smile at times and shake hands and negotiate with the other side. AND YOU HAVE TO BE CONVINCING DOING IT. Style cannot be faked. Some people have a knack for this, others do not. And the Kisser had something of Tony Roma in GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS.

    Compared to the Kisser, idiots like Nuland and her ilk are amateurs pampered with Jewish privilege and drunk on American power. Or take someone like Rumsfeld and Cheney. In foreign policy, even a bully must play like a diplomat.
    Vito Corleone understood this in THE GODFATHER II. He knew how to make an offer the other side better not refuse. He didn’t act like Fanucci the fat pushy bastard. Hyman Roth had the right style for negotiations and intrigue too.
    The Kisser had the right style for foreign affairs. The later neocons with their Casino-Jack-style of personality did not. Elliot Abrahams, what a freaking jerk. A bunch of Moe Greenes.

  15. Odysseus says: • Website

    Twenty years ago I might have been moved by this piece. Now, when I compare Kissinger to the globalist scum that have sold our country out, Kissinger seems like a quaint patriot who was simply forced to play dirty in a dirty game. I’m not approving his actions but I think that we have bigger fish to fry these days. Focusing on Kissinger distracts us from retaliation against today’s elite, who have sold us out much more efficiently and effectively. We were still a nation in Kissinger’s day. Now we are atomized and dysfunctional.

  16. Clyde says:

    This all started when the alleged prophet Muhammad went on wars of conquest and conversion. Islam is a barracks religion so if you cannot figure out how the rest turns out you are a dullard.

    I blame Muslims a lot more than Henry Kissinger. Sunni-Shiite rivalry, wars and conflicts have been going on for centuries. Muslims are free agents. They are not 100% manipulated stooges of the West, Russia, China and Israel. Muslims will do what Muslims will do which is to get the best weapons they can and go to war with them sooner or later. Might be war against non-Muslims or war against other Muslims, just so long as they can get the rush from blood letting they crave. They crave the drama of war.

  17. @Quartermaster

    And why is the situation in Chile any business of murderous Zionist Jews who are citizens of convenience in the US?

    It’s for the Chileans to handle.

  18. Art says:

    “”It’s a pity they can’t both lose,” Kissinger is reported to have said of Iran and Iraq. “

    That statement shows the total lack of a human soul in the Jew mindset – call them whatever they want you to call them – Zionist, Talmudist, tribe, religion – they all come with the same mindset – non-Jew life is cheep.

    Just think of all the evil, all the war, all the death that bastard of a man has advocated. Like most all Jews he has a mindset buried in past millennia – religious or not – he is a power hungry tribal killer – end of story.

    • Replies: @Priss Factor
  19. Hrw-500 says:

    Speaking of debacle, inc.; there might be more to come from what I saw on this blog post.

  20. Priss Factor [AKA "The Priss Factory"] says: • Website

    “That statement shows the total lack of a human soul in the Jew mindset – call them whatever they want you to call them – Zionist, Talmudist, tribe, religion – they all come with the same mindset – non-Jew life is cheep.”

    It can be Jewish nastiness, and some Jews are indeed like that.

    But it’s a trait to be found all over. Romans and Chinese have long practiced the strategy of making barbarians fight barbarians. An amoral opportunistic game. And Roosevelt had no problem with Soviets and Nazis killing one another and waited until 1944 to invade France.

    Also, we have to see this in the context of the 80s. Iran has long since stabilized. It still has some nutty rulers, but it’s now more or less a normal nation. So, much of the current hysteria about Iran is truly out of order.
    But in the 80s, Iran was like Soviet Union in the 1920s. It was in its fever stage and very aggressive in trying to export its brand of Islamism all over. Iran back then was alarming to both US and USSR. And Hussein was no saint, so it made sense to pit Iraq vs Iran. Since then, the new younger generation of Iranians have grown tired of the revolutionary rhetoric. But in the 80s, it was the younger generation that was calling for world Islamic revolution and acting like Mao’s red guards.

    Now, you’re right that a lot of people got killed as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, but then, foreign policy has always been gangster politics. EVERY nation plays it this way.
    And even though US played dirty in goading Iraq to trigger a war with Iran, Hussein wasn’t forced into it. He did it cuz he wanted to. (Idiots can’t be helped, or they can be helped to do something idiotic.) And of course, Iran supports its own proxies in other parts of the Middle East.

    I would say things that are happening or being allowed to happen today are much worse than in the 80s cuz they are so unnecessary and petty. And why are they happening? All because Israelists rule Washington. Jewish issues used to be an important factor in US foreign policy, but now, they are the ONLY concern, and that is very dangerous. All the problems in the Middle East, with Russia, and even with China can be traced to Jewish neurosis about the world. When the entire spins around the Jewish Axis because US is the sole superpower and EU is a whore of the US, we don’t know where this may lead, especially when Jews are adamant about antagonizing Russia and now even China.

    It could be that Jews tend to be somewhat more devious than non-Jews cuz of the nature of their history, which, in turn, may have favored certain genetic traits(as those Jews with those traits were likely to succeed more and have more kids).
    Gentiles were makers whereas Jews worked as traders. Making is a more straightforward activity whereas trading or middlemanning or merchandising is a trickier endeavor that requires manipulation.(Gambling is Jewish-dominated, and it’s more about rakers than makers. Raking it all in from everyone.)

    Consider the movie LOST IN AMERICA by Albert Brooks. There is the reference to FORD and MERCEDES BENZ. Ford made cars, and Germans have long been famous as makers. Henry Ford was anti-Jewish and Hitler’s car was a Mercedes.
    It’s as if Jews feel that the industry of making has been dominated by gentiles, so Jews must find their niche in marketing. So, the Jewish guy in LOST IN AMERICA works in advertising. Gentiles make, but Jews manipulate. Gentiles build the product, but Jews shape the public opinion of the product. In the end, control of the mind could be more powerful than construction of products.

    Kissinger could be aggressive, but he still understood the art of salesmanship. But the new neocons are like crazies who bang on your door unless you relent and buy whatever it is they are peddling. And then they demand you buy more and more and more.

    It’s like Ziontology. Neocons are Ziontologist bullies.

  21. Priss Factor [AKA "The Priss Factory"] says: • Website

    The Kisser was sort of like Ben Franklin, and not just in their boing factor with the ladies.

    Both understood the strategy of foreign policy.

    Americans like to remember their origins in terms of principles, freedom, values, and valor in battle.
    While it is true that the American Founding Fathers comprised prolly the most intelligent and able assembly of founders of a political order, none of that would have mattered if not for their foreign policy. In other words, whether the Founders had good ideas or bad ideas or justifications or not to secede, the only reason their movement came to be realized was due to foreign policy.
    It was France that won the war for the American rebels. After all, only 1/3 of colonials were pro-independence. Another 1/3 was indifferent and another 1/3 was loyal to the crown. So, without French intervention, the rebels would have lost for sure. Come to think of it, even if 100% of colonials had been for independence, the Brits still might have won cuz they had all the industry and arms on their side.

    So, the only way the revolutionaries could win was by playing the game of foreign policy.
    They understood that UK and France were the two great powers, and it was in the rebels’ advantage to make Brits fight the French. And Ben Franklin was masterly in his foreign policy. In that sense, whoever worked on foreign policy and convinced the French to give full support to the revolutionaries was most responsible for the creation of the New Order. And this wasn’t entirely easy to do since it would cost the French dearly and the French Monarch would be helping democratic revolutionaries to defeat another Monarch. Using one monarch against another.
    Later, the Kisser figured it made sense to use one commie giant against another commie giant.

    Anyway, at the time of the founding, American colonies were vulnerable and weak. Much later in the 1960s, US was the superpower of the world.
    But then, colonial America had no role to play in the world whereas the post-WWII America was expected to police the ‘free world’. America of the 1960s was infinitely more powerful than in the beginning of the republic, but it was also many times more beset with troubles cuz it had taken on so many obligations all around the world.
    So, in both cases, the art of foreign policy was very important.

    Both Ben Franklin and the Kisser were amoral in their foreign policy. Franklin was willing to rub shoulders with French reactionaries to win their support for American revolutionaries against British empire. He played very loose with principles.
    French involvement led to a prolonged war that killed many people, and eventually, it laid the grounds for the French revolution as the involvement in the Revolutionary War had bankrupted France.

    But then, foreign policy was always gangster politics.

  22. […] Debacle Inc.: How Henry Kissinger Helped Create Our “Proliferated” World by Greg Grandin, author of Kissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman. […]

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