The Unz Review - Mobile
A Collection of Interesting, Important, and Controversial Perspectives Largely Excluded from the American Mainstream Media
Email This Page to Someone

 Remember My Information



=>
Publications Filter?
AKarlin.com Da Russophile
Nothing found
 TeasersRussian Reaction Blog
/
Russia

Bookmark Toggle AllToCAdd to LibraryRemove from Library • BShow CommentNext New CommentNext New Reply
🔊 Listen RSS

The Russian bureaucracy is, admittedly, a lot better than it used to be. In comparison to the state of affairs even just a decade ago, there are fewer papers to fill out, staff are more courteous, and many more tasks can be done online.

The contrast relative to the 1990s is even starker, when outright bribes were not infrequently required to carry out routine services. This is now most definitely a thing of the past.

A large number of “My Documents” centers have been built across the country under the philosopher of making a large variety of different services available under the same roof. They are located in large, modern buildings, tend to employ younger people, and advertise hotlines for reporting unprofessional or corrupt conduct.

These improvements are reflected in Russia moving from around 120th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings a decade ago, to 40th as of 2016.

Which still makes it a horrendous nightmare by American/British standards.

Say what you will about the Eternal Anglo, but they have really figured out this bureaucracy thing. Even the Germans that I have met in the UK consider their bureaucracy slow and capricious by comparison, to say nothing of Mediterraneans or East Europeans.

All bureaucracies make mistakes, lose papers, muck up appointment dates, etc. But this is where the similarities end. In Anglo world, staff apologize for any mishaps and devote extra attention to making things right, possibly because they actually feel guilty before the client (the very possibility of “bureaucrat guilt” is difficult to even process for those born behind the Hajnal Line). In Russia, they don’t give a fuck about your travails – at best. At worst, you will meet rudeness (hamstvo) the likes of which someone who has only dealt with Anglo bureaucracies can barely imagine, as the bureaucrats try to unload the blame on you for their own incompetence.

Personal anecdote from the past year. When I was returning to Russia in December 2016, I had a minor problem; my foreign passport (zagranpasport) had expired. No worries, in such cases you can get a Return Certificate (svidetelstvo na vozvrashenie) that confirms you as a Russian citizen; after that, you need to go back within a certain number of days, after which you will have another few days to apply for a new passport. I managed to do this through the Russian Consulate in London, though it took a few more days that it should have thanks to an appointment scheduling mess-up on their part, which they naturally blamed on me (I was somehow responsible for them associating a wrong day to a date).

This is where I encountered my first serious issue. I had already booked my flight back with a Spanish airline with a stop-over in Barcelona, but then the Russian Consulate in London informed me that it needed to be a direct flight. When I asked them why they hadn’t informed me of that earlier, before my booking, they falsely insisted that they had. After a lengthy argument, I got them to submit – I had no intentions of wasting ~$500 booking another flight – but they warned me that I would not be allowed to fly onto Russia in Spain and that all consequent problems would be my problem, and got me to sign a declaration to that effect (!).

As it happened, the Spaniards themselves were entirely cool with my Return Certificate, and gave it no more than a glance when I was boarding; this was evidently a routine process for them. More curiously, at the time I also discovered that this seemed to be a “hard rule” only at the Russian Consulate in London; the one in Marseilles listed a direct flight as only a recommedation. Clearly the guys in London were (rudely) incompetent at best, or perhaps had an “arrangement” with some booking agent or the airline itself. Who knows.

But my problems hadn’t ended there – now that I was back in Russia, I needed to get my domestic passport, also expired, replaced. And I needed to do it pretty fast, since the passport is central to Russian life – you can’t get a cell phone number or even visit some museums without one. (I suppose that the lower trust societies are, the more they make up for it with papers).

chinovnik-racial-phenotype So I went down to the local documents center. Since my case – both foreign and domestic passports expired – wasn’t the most routine one, I was called into the office of the head honcho there, a corpulent, middle-aged, heavy-browed man with that distinct chinovnik racial phenotype who proceeded to give me a crash course in Russian Bureaucracy 101.

Instead of getting to work on my problem, he decided to give me a lengthy interrogation.

Why didn’t you renew your passport?” he barked.

“You can only renew it in Russia, I wasn’t in Russia.”

Why didn’t you return to Russia?”

“Because I was busy. Could you please tell me how is this relevant?”

Why did you return to Russia?”

“Why not, LOL. Also, may I inquire what business is this of yours?”

The hell it’s my business! Why didn’t you renew your passport in time?

It went on around in circles like this for several minutes, but the best was yet to come.

If you didn’t renew your passport you obviously didn’t care about it, so why don’t you fuck off back to America?” (sic)

Sensing that things were rapidly heading to an ignominious conclusion, and by this point thoroughly pissed off, I grabbed my documents, told him he was a fat, useless cockroach who had wasted enough of my time, and wheeled out of the room before he could sputter out a reply.

The next place where I tried to get my passport issues sorted processed my problem quickly and professionally, which I suppose goes to show that the quality of bureaucratic service remains… quite uneven.

Rules of thumb for dealing with Russian bureaucrats:

1. Don’t. Do as many things online as possible.

2. Never take the information that they put on the Internet at face value. It varies department from department, Consulate from Consulate. They don’t always even get their opening times right.

3. The starting assumption should be that they have zero interest in helping your resolve your issue. Base your actions on this assumption.

 
• Category: Miscellaneous • Tags: Russia, The AK 
🔊 Listen RSS

moscow-2049

Eurasian Federation, 2049.

Half a year ago I wrote about the absurd legal case against Dmitry Bobrov, a Russian nationalist who was sentenced for using extremist terminology such as “the great Russian people.”

No, I am not even exaggerating, here is the formal conclusion of the court’s “linguistics expert,” Galina Melnik (who is also a professor at Saint Petersburg State University and a published author in American scientific journals):

Linguistic terms are used that constitute evidence of propaganda of the exclusivity of the white race and ethnic Russians. For instance, there are epithets that positively characterize ethnic Russians – “The great Russian people,” “Russians are the most prospective white people,” “planetary significance,” as well as phrases, that negatively characterize other races – “Non-white peoples,” “races of a second order”; various exaggerations; writing words with capital letters so as to give a specific meaning to concepts – White people, Russians, Russian Popular Socialists, Russian Socialism [AK: The names of ethnicities are uncapitalized according to standard Russian grammar]; phrases such as that some peoples “have a phase of obscuration, degradation, and disorientation,” while others are experiencing a “steady growth in the national consciousness.”

I assure you that this sounds as deranged in Russian as it does in English. Apparently, the phrase “great Russian people” is propaganda of exclusivity, the phrase “white people” demeans non-whites, and violating the standard grammatical rules of capitalization in the Russian languages constitutes the most outrageous sort of extremism. American SJWs are nervously smoking in the corner.

The only possibly questionable phrase in the quoted paragraph is “races of a second order.” However, in the article that got Dmitry Bobrov into trouble, “Racial Doctrine of the National Social Initiative” (which is blocked in Russia), it is explicitly stated that the phrase refers to subraces, as opposed to implying a racial hierarchy.

The combination of evolutionary and historical processes led to the fact that now a large White race consists of several subraces, or races of the second order.

Evidently, Galina Melnik did not feel the need to give this vital piece of context in her summary.

This Orwellianism echoes the arguments of another contributing “linguistics expert,” Rezeda Salahutdinova (who has a degree in the joke subject of “Scientific Communism” from Kazan University):

In particular, she declared that the phrase “white race” just by itself fans the flames of hatred, because “they don’t talk like that in modern science” and that the expression “non-white people” is extremist, since it attacks the national dignity of other peoples.

It is heard to describe this theater of the absurd under the guise of a law court. When she was asked, “What specific racial, national, ethnic, social, or other groups were insulted?”, she replied: “All those groups, that are not identified with whites.”

Even though Dmitry Bobrov, representing himself, absolutely destroyed the arguments of the prosecutors’ pocket linguistic experts – court transcripts show even the judge becoming annoyed with their incompetence – he still ended up getting sentenced to 2 years in a penal colony.

In the event, Bobrov went missing on the day the verdict was set to be announced and is now considered to be on the run. Hopefully he is safe in a foreign country.

And to top it all off, citizens of Country 282 have to listen to lectures from Hillary Clinton about how Putler heads the global white supremacist movement and read Washington Post op-eds by affirmative action Kremlinologists on how Russia “disparages black people” and “centers the Russian slav.”

Anyhow.

This Kafkaevschina finally motivated me to run a guide on avoiding Russia’s hate speech laws at my Russian language blog: Руководство по Избежанию 282

Here is a summary in English.

1. Strictly avoid any Nazi symbology.

That includes “ironic Nazism” of the sort that the Alt Right likes to play around with.

But all rules have exceptions.

If you are sufficiently close to the Kremlin you may well write articles along the lines of “Hitler did nothing wrong” (at least up until 1939). You can also organize conferences for foreign Neo-Nazis freaks, such as the International Russian Conservative Forum in 2015; some Galatic Brain in the Kremlin even came up with the idea of inviting German Neo-Nazi Udo Voigt, with his entirely non-ironic demands to return Kaliningrad to Germany.

2. Don’t insult Caucasians.

All countries have differential racial hierarchies for the permissibility of insulting different racial and ethnic groups.

handshakeworthy-russophobia

Handshakeworthy anti-Russian racism from /r/politics.

For instance, ex-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper thought nothing of saying that Russians are “almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever, which is a typical Russian technique” in a meeting with NBC journalists – one wonders how long somebody who said anything remotely similar about Jews would last in his job (actually we don’t have to wonder at all). Clearly, Jews, Blacks, the gay race, and the fat race are at the top, while white rednecks and Russians are at the bottom.

In Russia, there is a similar Great Chain of Racial Privilege.

One Russian nationalist, Konstantin Krylov, got convicted under Article 282 for his considered and entirely mild-mannered position on the issue of federal transfers to the Caucasus: “It it time to do away with this strange economic system.” In contrast, Holocaust denial only became illegal in 2014, and authors such as Israel Shamir with a reputation for anti-Semitism haven’t encountered significant problems (unlike his French language publisher, who was faced with a ban of the book he had translated and the prospect of three months in jail). On the other hand, you can’t relax too much: The Stalinist singer Alexander Kharchikov had one of his songs, consisting entirely of folk sayings about Jews, banned for extremism in 2012.

In fairness, Russia does also jail the most cartoonishly extreme Russophobes, such as Boris Stomakhin, who called for terrorist actions against Russian civilians to fight against “Chechen genocide.” In the West and amongst Russian liberals, Stomakhin is considered a prisoner of consciousness, because in their world, supporting terrorism against Russians is far more handshakeworthy than waxing lyrical about “the great Russian people.”

3. Don’t be an oppositionist.

This is so obvious that it hardly needs an explication – but that doesn’t make it into a rock-solid defense either.

For instance, just a few weeks ago, the police searched the offices of the Institute of Russian Civilization, a bookshop that focuses on republishing historical works – not Mein Kampf or Last Will of the Russian Fascist, but entirely mainstream texts in the Russian conservative and theological tradition, many of whom Putin has himself cited in his speeches (e.g. Berdyaev, Danilevsky, Ilyin, Karamzin, Pobedonostsev, Soloviev, Trubetzkoy, Khomyakov).

Apart from blocking the oppositionist Sputnik i Pogrom, Russian censorship authority also blocks the website of the Russian Imperial Movement, even though it is Orthodox-monarchic and entirely non-racialist in character, and even went to the trouble of advancing Russia’s geopolitical goals by sending a batallion to the Donbass in 2014.

4. You can’t be pro-Ukrainian.

You can if you’re a liberal – in that case, that’s actually expected of you – but you can’t if you’re a nationalist, especially with respect to the Crimea, for which there is a “separatism” clause on the lawbooks.

5. Don’t appear on law enforcement’s radar.

Possibly what really did Bobrov in is that he has a previous (and justified) conviction from back in the 2000s, when he headed the Schulz-88 Neo-Nazi gang that beat up immigrants. The current conviction is unjust, not only because this time round he literally did nothing wrong, but because the state is essentially sending violent Neo-Nazis a message: Regardless of whether your active is legal or illegal, violence or non-violent, we are still going to lock you up the same.

But let’s assume you’re not already “marked” by dint of previous legal troubles.

Here’s something you should bear in mind: The various Russian silovik agencies are not staffed by especially bright or conscientious people – in the case of Roskomnadzor or “Center E” (police anti-extremism division), their priorities are to fulfill their monthly quotas for finding “extremists” and get their bonuses for doing so. As such, they spend much of their time in the rich and easily accessible hunting grounds of VKontakte, which remains Russia’s most popular social network. As such, it would do well for “politicals” to limit their VKontakte posting to cat memes, while maintaining the bulk of their “meaningful” presence on Facebook and Twitter.

very-extremist-material

NSFR (Not Safe For Russia): What got Andrey Voronin in trouble just a few days ago.

Incidentally, this applies likewise for Westerners. Since nationalism is an almost purely “export” product so far as the Putlerreich is concerned, The Daily Stormer has been able to maintain an uninterrupted presence on VKontakte – even as Russians on the platform get in legal trouble for reposting historical illustrations that happen to feature a swastika.

6. Pay your mite to ZOG.

Liberals have an admirable tendency to stick up for each other, thanks to their higher IQs and levels of trust.

Nationalists are the opposite.

Whereas a liberal in Bobrov’s position would have gotten no end of attention from (predominantly liberal) human rights organizations, hardly any nationalist website anybody apart from Sputnik i Pogrom even bothered to highlight his case.

This problem is a very hard one and frankly the dearth of human capital is the single most crippling problem for conservatives and nationalists well nigh everywhere.

It is ironic that if anybody is going to seriously represent and advocate for you if you get in trouble, it will likely be a liberal with an idealistic commitment to free speech.

Therefore, the least that you can do is to pay at least symbolic fealty to ZOG – for instance, by affirming your commitment to free speech and human rights – so that when you do get sent off to the Gulag, the liberal sphere – which has at least ten times as much media influence as the nationalists – can’t just dismiss you by saying that this sort of world is what you were fighting for anyway.

7. Don’t listen to all this advice.

Doing so will just make you a mindless Kremlin propagandist. They’re a dime dozen anyway, and you probably won’t get rich even if you stand out, since all the most lucrative positions have long been carved up anyway.

Besides, as the host of our ROGPR podcast Kirill Nesterov acerbically noted, at the rate the wheels are coming off the Kremlin’s prosecution machine, it won’t be long before people start going to jail for justifying the return of the Crimea – and we’re not even entirely sure that this will happen after Putin loses power.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Freedom of Speech, Hate Speech, Law, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

lenta-russian-billionaires-2014

In 2014, Lenta.ru conducted a study into the ethnic composition of Russia’s billionaires. (Steve Sailer picked it up as well). The observation that Jews constituted 21% of the Russian Forbes 200 predictably drove handshakeworthy journalists, Jews, and especially Jewish journalists into a tizzy (as I recall, when I asked him when he was also going to condemn Forbes Israel, which also loves to count Jewish billionaires, that was when anti-Russian hack Ben Judah blocked me).

The hysteria concealed real failings in the article. There was no clear methodology. Furthermore, the numbers of Ukrainians in the ratings seemed vastly inflated. They supposedly constituted 12% of Russian billionaires, even though most of them were nothing of the sort; the analytical team seems to have just consigned everyone with a surname ending in “ko” to the Ukrainian race. This makes about as much sense as counting Donald Drumpf as a German oligarch in America.

Still, some general trends could be clearly discerned. Russians – that is, Russians and Russians misattributed as Ukrainians and Belorussians – consituted about 66% of the list’s members and almost exactly half of the combined capital of $481 billion. Jews and Mountain Jews constituted 24% of the list, and had 28% of the capital. All of the rest belonged to Caucasian and Muslim minorities. Notably, there were no traditionally Buddhist/animist Siberian minorities on the list.

top-10-russia-billionaires-2017

In recent days, the blogger Ivan Vladimirov, who produces excellent data-heavy material on Russian demographics, published a similar census based on the spring 2017 edition of the Forbes 200 for Russia for the nationalist journal Sputnik and Pogrom: Who Owns Russia?

Here are some of the more pertinent take-away points:

1. First, he notes that state ownership is now at 70% of the Russian economy, twice its share 10 years ago, so in actual fact, the real “owners” of Russia are now the curators and appointed directors of its state behemoths, such as Igor Sechin (Rosneft) and Alexey Miller (Gazprom).

2. Unlike Lenta.ru, he goes into some detail into his methodology:

  • No “svidomy zmagars” – all the billionaires with distant Ukrainian or Belorussian ancestors are assumed to be Russians by default.
  • Nationality is passed on down the paternal line, including with the Jews.
  • Unless they have openly declared they identify more with another aspect of their ancestry. For instance, Petr Aven (head of Alpha Bank), despite being a Latvian-Russian métis through his father, identifies more with his Jewish maternal grandmother and belongs to Jewish organizations, so he’s considered to be a Jew.
  • No presumption of Jewishness or non-Jewishness based on just the name since there are too many false positives.

russia-billionaires-2017-ethnicity

3. Now we come to the actual numbers – out of the Forbes 200 and their cumulative $459 billion in assets:

Russians constitute 127 (63.5%) of the people in the list, including 57.4% of the capital.

Jews have 41 (20.5%) people in the list, with 24.8% of the capital.

After those came Armenians (7), Tatars (6), Azeris, Chechens, and Ingush (3 each), and two Uzbeks, though one of the latter, Alisher Usmanov, is the fifth richest billionaire in Russia and has a relatively “interesting” public profile (a spat with Navalny; funding Western race realists).

4. Vladimirov also notes that the Russian billionaires tend to have a very low degree of national consciousness.

For instance, Evgeny Kaspersky’s comments when asked if he had any Jewish ancestry on a visit to Israel:

I searched and searched, alas, I did not find… I got the name from Polish peasants, who during the uprising in the 1860s emigrated somewhere under Nelidovo about 300km from Moscow. There they married into Russians (that is, Slavic, Tatar, Polovtsian and whatever else constitutes “Russian” blood from in me). By mother is from the Tambov peasants. But this is the most interesting thing. Tambov was inhabited by soldiers who served their lives in various places. And soldiers sometimes came with brides from the most different places. And according to indirect data – I have roots from Scandinavia and Persia. But from Israel – alas, no… Although who knows?

This is, of course, nonsense from a population genetics standpoint. But one of the tropes of Soviet/Russian multiculturalism is that Russians are mulattoes up and there is no such thing as a Russian anyway. And the Russian elites respect this legacy, after as they’ve long done away with the economic aspects of Soviet dogma.

In fairness, this multicultural spirit likewise applies to Russia’s Muslim elite. He cites the example of Mikhail Gutsuryev, who sits on the Board of Trustees of the Jewish Museum and Center of Tolerance, while at the same time funding the construction of synagogues, Orthodox churches, and mosques. Or Lukoil head Vagit Alekperov, an Azeri-Russian, who renovated the main Russian Orthodox church of Imperial-era Baku, and prefers to keep his silence on matters of religion: According to a NYT profile of him from 2004, he “prudently keeps leather-bound copies of both the Koran and the Bible at his office, to allay any concerns that he prefers one almighty to another.”

5. I also noticed that Russia’s statistics are rather similar to America’s.

In the US, North-West Europeans make up 51% of the members and own 56% of the cumulative assets in the Forbes 2010 list – this is almost identical to the figures for Russians in Russia, though on the other hand, this demographic group only makes up about 50% of the US population (non-Hispanic Whites minus Greeks, Italians, etc.), whereas Russians constitute 80% of Russia.

Jews own about a quarter of Russia but more than a third of the US – that said, they only make up 0.1% of the Russian population, versus 2% of the US population. That said, as Vladimirov points out, the more relevant indicator would be their 0.5% share of the Soviet population c.1989.

It is also interesting to note that “southern” diasporas, which in Russia’s case are Caucasians (Armenians, Azeris, Ingush, and for that matter, the Jews), are relatively more successful in commerce/becoming billionaires in Russia. This is also true for the US, where Italians, Middle Easterners, and Greeks are overrepresented as a share of the population. This is even though with the exception of the Jews, who are massively overrepresented, their IQs are no higher than those of WASPs or Russians, and possibly noticeably lower. I have speculated at times whether this “commercial trait” of people with Near Eastern/East Med ancestry could have developed as a consequence of their unrivalled length of experience with urban life and the associated haggling, bartering, etc. skills it selected for over the millennia.

 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Billionaires, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

While I was writing an article about Russian IQ for Sputnik and Pogrom the past few days, I noticed this amazing statistic from the 2010 Census.

Percentage of the population with a postgrad degree:

1. Ingushetia: 1.59%
2. Moscow: 1.12%

90. Chechnya: 0.32%

Ingushetia is Chechnya’s quieter, lower T, slyer brother. They are part of the same Ichkerian nation. But instead of going head on against a nation that outnumbered them a hundredfold in the 1990s, they manipulated the situation to extract very generous monetary concessions from the federal center while their kinfolk withered under Russian bombs.

Today, they are the region with Russia’s highest rate of unemployment, the lowest Internet penetration, the lowest patents per capita. They are 85% subsidized by other Russian regions, more so than any other region. Back during the Soviet period, there were only 90 scientists for every 100,000 Ingush, versus 573 for the Russians.

Even so, this region somehow manages to have the the highest rate of people with postgrad degrees in Russia.

Say what you will about ol’ Ramzan, but at least he keeps his peeps in check. Based Chechen men need no diploma mill degrees.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Academia, Chechnya, Corruption, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

According to the latest estimates, Russia might harvest as much as 133 million tons of grain this year.

russia-grain-production

This would make 2017 a record harvest not just by post-Soviet standards, which were pretty dismal until the past decade, but relative to the RSFSR’s peak of 127.4mn tons in 1978.

(This is the case even after adjusting for Crimea’s absence from the RSFSR after 1954, since the parched peninsula only produces about a million tons of grain per year).

The US Department of Agriculture predicts that Russia will overtake the US and the EU to become the world’s largest single wheat exporter in 2017, accounting for a sixth of the world’s total and recovering its old Tsarist status as one of the world’s great breadbaskets.

world-grain-exports

Incidentally, if it were to also recover its Tsarist era borders, especially the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, it would account for about a third of world wheat exports.

One of the big proximate reasons for this are recent economic developments. Few sectors of the Russian economy have gained as much from the ruble devaluation and the sanctions as agriculture.

However, there are strong secular trends that Russia’s new breadbasket status is here to stay.

The world population is growing, and the climate is warming. This will raise global demand for calories, channeling investment into Russian agriculture, even as crop yields go up thanks to longer growing seasons and more atmospheric CO2, and previously inhospitable lands are opened up for agricultural exploitation.

burke-temperature-economy Russia is predicted to economically benefit more than any other country from global warming, and relatively speaking, agriculture can be expected to benefit more than any other sector. Meanwhile, conviently, major competitors such as Australia and the US will be wracked by droughts.

Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, where grain imports were running at 30 million tons by the 1980s – that is, about as much as just Russia by itself now exports – and draining the country of foreign currency. There are now many agricultural conglomerates competing in a free global market, responsive to price signals and intolerant of waste (about a quarter of the Soviet potato harvest rotted away in transportation). This is an opportunity that Russia will continue to exploit.

Minister of Agriculture Alexander Tkachev has suggested that in the future, Russian export earnings from grain exports may come to equal or even eclipse those from hydrocarbons, in effect fully returning Russia to its foreign trade position during late Tsarism.

This is unlikely any time soon. Even as late as 2015, Russia exported a total of $7.4 billion of crops, which is not only an order of magnitude lower than its $189 billion worth of hydrocarbons and minerals exports, but is not even sufficient to cover its $9.3 billion worth of crop imports (primarily vegetables and tropical crops like coffee and citrus fruits).

Nonetheless, both the global prices for and Russian production of grains is likely to continue soaring in the decades ahead. Meanwhile, the outlook for oil is far less certain. While the supergiants continue depleting rapidly, new extraction technologies have postponed the oil peak for an indeterminate number of future decades, and electric cars will increasingly bite away on the demand side. So Tkachev’s vision is not altogether fantastical.

 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Agriculture, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

The other day the Chechen social media page vk.com/karfagen was banned.

This is not surprising, considering that it was genuinely extremist from head to toe, though it is perhaps telling of the Russian state’s priorities that it took longer for Roskomnadzor to catch onto them than it did for it to illegally block the moderate Russian nationalist website Sputnik i Pogrom.

The ban came a few hours after a Meduza article by Daniil Turovsky on the webside, which was translated into English by Kevin Rothrock. The website, allegedly run by a 19 year old Chechen student, was devoted to harassing young women who shared “immoral” photos on social media, including posting their addresses and relatives’ contact details. If that resulted in honor killings, that’s just too bad, one of the Carthage activists shouted in all caps: “IF I FIND OUT THAT SOME VAINAKH FAMILY HAS KILLED THEIR OWN DAUGHTER FOR SOME SERIOUS OFFENSE, THEN I WILL STAND UP AND APPLAUD, BECAUSE IT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO.” Women were forbidden from commenting.

Apart from doing their bit to make White Sharia real in Chechnya, the Carthage activists also embraced a sort of horseshoe theory Islamism (“You’re trying to distort our religion, publicly promoting the slogan ‘Islam is a religion of peace and good’”), as well as ultranationalist rhetoric. As with women, this extended to website administration; a tenth of the user base identified as Russians were kicked out in September. This is connected with Carthage billing itself as a “youth movement for the purification of the Vainakh people.” They did not mince words about their opinions of the Russian kuffar, who “pair off with anyone they want like animals” and “conceive children in the nightclub toilets.” Although they don’t promote Chechen independence, that is clearly driven by pragmatic reasons: “Chechnya is currently a subject of the Russian Federation, and it would be foolish of me to promote separatism among the masses.”

Now one might perhaps rejoinder that these are just some isolated nutjobs. One can mention the usual canard that there are Christian and non-Chechen extremists too.

But here’s the key difference: The 55,000 membership of Carthage on Vkontakte at the time of its closure represents 3.5% of all the Chechens in Russia.

For an online community where joining is entirely voluntary – i.e., the opposite of Kadyrov’s rallies – and not even entirely riskless, given the propensity of the most outspoken Islamists to be “disappeared” within Chechnya, these are astounding figures.

For comparison, the far right Ukrainian organization Right Sector on vk.com also has around 50,000 people while drawing from 30 times the population. Sputnik i Pogrom itself, perhaps the most popular Russian “extremist” resource, has around 110,000 supporters on that platform.

Even “normie” Ukrainian mass movements that dominated the headlines for months on end in 2013-2014 such as Euromaidan and Antimaidan still have 600,000 and 500,000 supporters, respectively, constituting about 1% of Ukraine’s population each, despite both movements also having a substantial international component.

Nor is this confined to Chechnya; earlier this year, Meduza had also reported on Chechen thot patrols harassing and threatening Chechen women who got too friendly with the kuffar, a story that got picked up in the Western alternate media. Carthage also had plans to expand to Ingushetia and Dagestan, at least before it was shut down. (There is also a Tatar “analogue” to Carthage called TTM, which remains accessible to date, though it only has 1,200 followers and my cursory examination of it suggests it’s more in the vein of /pol/-style trolling than hardcore Islamist nationalism).

All of this indicates that Carthage is the genuine voice of the Chechen people, as grassroots as the 1.8% interethnic marriage rates of Chechen women in Russia.

Once the Putin-Kadyrov “special relationship” breaks down due to political or actuarial factors, a new generation of skinny jeans wearing, organic food court-frequenting Russians will have to reenter political negotiations with a new generation of young, Internet-savvy Chechens who are more into stonings for adultery in the Caucasus Emirate.

 
🔊 Listen RSS

moscow-elections-2017

On September 10 there was a round of gubernatorial elections in Russia, as well as elections to local councils in Moscow.

There’s a lot of confusion on account of whether it was a victory for United Russia.

On the one hand, the low turnout – which traditionally favors more motivated liberals – allowed them to outright win most of the prestigious areas of Moscow.

moscow-elections-2017-and-bicycles

Amazing correlation between liberal victories (green) and bike sharing stations, that ultimate SWPL symbol.

On the other hand, United Russia did score 76% even in Moscow, gaining 1,150 deputies out 1,500. In contrast, liberal opposition, with 180 deputies, didn’t even manage to gather enough mandates to pass the municipal filter for participation in the Mayoral elections in September 2018. Since municipal councils in Moscow are toothless, having no access to the city budget and answering for little more than park benches, this would seem to be irrelevant.

That said, one thing that most people agree on is that this was a defeat for Navalny. He had distanced himself from the Moscow elections, not out of ideological reasons but personal ones; his deputy Leonid Volkov had fallen out with Maxim Kats, a liberal hipster figurehead who went on to unite with Dmitry Gudkov to form the United Democrats, the anti-Putin opposition bloc that went on to sweep SWPLy Moscow in close cooperation with Yavlinsky’s Yabloko. Incidentally, their positions are radically anti-Russian, more so even than Navalny’s; according to insider accounts, disavowal of Crimea – to say nothing of the Donbass – was a hard condition of entry into their coalition. Although this performance might not be that impressive in the large picture, it still probably counts for more than the number of Navalny’s YouTube views.

How important is this development? Probably, not very.

First, turnout was only 15%, and this naturally favored the liberals, who are more motivated than average.

Second, this pattern of voting is in any case a long-established pattern going back to the 1990s, in which the better educated, higher social status (higher IQ, in short) districts vote more strongly for liberal candidates. As I have long pointed out, the problem of very hostile elites is a problem common to both Russia and America.

See the data analysis by Emil Kirkegaard here:

moscow-elections-putin-phd

In the less prestigious, lower IQ, more prole areas, United Russia came out well ahead. My own district is pretty representative in this respect.

zhulebino-2017-elections

In terms of the average share of the vote of each political faction (you could vote for up to five people), United Russia got ~1,500, the liberals ~700, the commies ~700, and the nationalists ~300.

Personally I voted for two LDPR candidates, one from Rodina, and some green/ecological chick (she was not in United Russia, a commie, or a liberal traitor, so that was fine by me).

On the one hand, these results are still pretty encouraging; Moscow’s peripheries still reject the Westernist cargo cult, unlike the coddled hipsters of Central Moscow, who hate Russia despite everything that Mayor Sobyanin has done for them in transforming their living spaces into the gentrified SWPL urbanist paradise that they have always yearned for. But is United Russia actually a political force in its own right, or is it just a facade for normies who don’t want to “rock the boat,” and which will fold as quickly as did the Party of Regions in the Ukraine when the pedal is put to the metal? If it’s the latter, with liberals and commies running neck and neck, and nationalists basically out of the picture, the prospects for Russia will be grim in the event of a color revolution.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Moscow, Politics, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

The conventional view of nationalism is that it was a product of mass literacy and the modern state, underpinned by schoolbooks and Tombs of the Unknown Soldier. Recent years have seen challenges to this historiographic consensus at both a general level (e.g. Azar Gat’s Nations), and with respect to specific peoples (Robert Tomb’s recent The English and Their History comes to mind).

Our latest translation of Russian conservative intellectual Egor Kholmogorov is more than just a Russian contribution to this debate. It makes the much more radical argument that not only was Russia not a laggard in the process of nation-building, as European historiography has long claimed, but was at the very forefront of this process for longer than a millennium, from Novgorod’s implicit devotion to the Russian commonweal in the 13th century to Russia’s defense of a “Europe of Fatherlands” against the globalist tide of national annihilation today.


russian-mammoths

Mammoths and Patriots on the Russian Plain

A Brief History of Russian National Sentiment

by Egor Kholmogorov

Translated by Fluctuarius Argenteus

Original: https://um.plus/2016/04/09/rossiya-rodina-mamontov-i-patriotov/

Sometimes I hear that saying “patriotism as a national idea” is akin to saying that water is wet. However, this argument comes from people with a very superficial understanding of how difficult it is to be patriot given that, unlike a comfortable cosmopolitanism, patriotism is the path of struggle. Also, they fail to realize how important the contribution of Russia and Russian culture is to shaping the very phenomenon of a patriotic consciousness in the modern world. The Russians developed patriotism as a national idea far earlier than most European nations. And it is Russia that keeps its faith in a “Europe of Fatherlands” or a “World of Fatherlands” in today’s age of identity erasure.

“Russia is the Motherland of elephants.” This zinger, coined as a mockery of Russian patriotism[1], is, however, entirely true, with a slight correction: Russia is the Motherland of mammoths. It is thanks to the hunt of those majestic beasts that the first humans on the Russian Plain, then half-concealed by the Great Glacier, created a culture highly developed for its time. Nowadays, archaeologists even speak of a “mammoth hunter civilization.”

Indeed, even nowadays the remains of long-term housing built out of mammoth ivory, exhibited at the museum of Kostenki village, Voronezh Oblast, are no less amazing than some stone ruins from Oriental or European antiquity. Overall, it seems that the mammoth joke is on the jokers.

With the same minor correction, one can claim that Russia is the Motherland of patriotism. Of course, patriotism is a word of Latin roots, also hearkening back to Greek. Of course, the cult of pride for one’s country, its history and its heroes, was developed in Greece and Rome, and new European nations learned this art from the ancients (for example, Old Rus’ via Byzantium).

But there are different kinds of patriotism. “The thrust of the Greek notion of freedom was directed at their closest neighbors: being free meant not being dependent on them”, as noted by Robert Wipper (1859 – 1954), one of our foremost Classical scholars. Only two or three times out of the entirety of Hellenic history the Greeks showed a capacity for working together and for a Pan-Hellenic patriotism, but even 300 Spartans, defending a bottleneck that led to the heart of Greece, believed they were fighting for “Laconic law.” The Greeks saw Hellas not as a common home country but as a common space for competing hometowns, peaceful if possible (at the Olympic Games).

Roman patriotism was more similar to ours. It was a not solely urban but also imperial patriotism, that of a city turned superpower. The history of a city that defended its freedom from foreign invaders and domestic tyrants, vanquished all of its neighbors, and transformed into a worldwide Empire formed the archetype of a patriotic myth for future generations.

The Russian Museum in Saint Petersburg houses a sculpture by Vasily Demut-Malinovsky (1776 – 1846) named The Russian Scaevola. A very Classical-looking Russian peasant with an axe is chopping off his arm bearing a brand of the letter N, meaning “Napoleon.” This patriotic legend was born as an imitation of a celebrated Roman historical myth. A young Roman patrician named Gaius Mucius, nicknamed Scaevola (“Left-Handed”), attempted to assassinate Porsenna, the Etruscan king. When he was caught and subjected to torture, he placed his right hand on a brazier and endured the pain until it became completely charred. Porcenna, terrified by the Roman’s defiant fortitude, sued for peace with his city.

However, it was the city that formed the nucleus of Roman patriotism. If Russia truly were “Muscovy”, if Moscow had been seen as a creator of a new world and not as a unifier of Russian lands, then we could have developed a Roman-styled urban patriotism.

But Russian patriotism existed long before the rise of Moscow, and had at its forefront not the City, but the Land. Russian patriotic consciousness is the oldest national consciousness among European peoples. There is no France yet, only a “Western Frankia.” There is no Germany yet, just the Holy Roman Empire, which would only have the “of the Germanic nation” appended to its name in 1512. England, only recently under the rule of Danish kings and separated into territories of Danelaw and Saxon Law, has fallen under the sway of new conquerors, the haughty Normans marked by both Frankish arrogance and Norse ruthlessness. Meanwhile, a Russian chronicler is already penning the title of his work containing the question: “From whence came the Russian Land?”[2]

150 years before that, Russian envoys already come to Constantinople bearing the words, “We are of Russian kindred”, and they come, as the chronicle puts it, “from the great Russian prince, and all other princes, and all people of the Russian land.” The oldest historical document mentioning the Russians, the Annales Bertiniani from the year 838, already contains this “Russian kindred” formula (id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant). The chronicler still remembers the differences between Polans, Drevlians, and Vyatichi[3], he knows that Russian princes united Varangians and Slavs, but the unity of this society named “Rus’” seems to him indisputable and beyond all doubt. The first Russian chronicler deliberately constructs the image of Russian history as that of a unified people creating a unified country and subject to a unified authority. The same is discussed by Hilarion of Kiev (11th century) in his Sermon on Law and Grace with regards to Prince Vladimir: “For he was the sole ruler of his land, bringing all neighboring countries under his sway, some of them by peace, and the unruly ones by the sword.

Those three elements – Land, People, Empire – are, in their unity, the true formula of Russian patriotism, inherited by Russia from the times when Western European peoples had no patriotic consciousness to speak of. Only in 1214, when French king Philip II Augustus crushed the joint forces of the Holy Roman Empire and England near Bouvines, can we discover a semblance of French national pride. Only three decades later, an anonymous Russian scribes writes the Lay of the Ruin of the Russian Land, a haunting patriotic manifesto lamenting the destruction of Rus’ in the flames of the Mongol invasion.

Due to the vagaries of history, the tale of the destruction per se is not extant[4], yet we can still read the preamble, a veritable hymn to old pre-Mongol Rus’ demonstrating the height of its patriotic sentiment. The Lay is a love-letter to the Russian Land, a paean to its beauty and wealth. In my opinion, the text should be learned by heart as a part of school curriculum.

“Oh Russian Land, bright with brightness and adorned with adornments! Many are thy beauties: thou art adorned by many lakes, rivers and wells famed in thy lands, mountains, steep hills, tall oak woods, clean fields, marvellous beasts, diverse birds, countless great cities, marvellous villages, vineries of monasteries, houses of the Lord and redoubtable princes, honest boyars, noblemen aplenty. The Russian Land is filled with everything, oh true Christian faith!”

But it is not just the beauty of nature of Rus’ that he relishes; it is also its might, its dominion over other nations and the prestige of its rulers:

“From here to Hungarians and Poles and Czechs, from Czechs to Yotvingians[5], from Yotvingians to Lithuanians to Germans, from Germans to Karelians, from Karelians to Ustyug[6], where live the pagan Toymichi[7], and beyond the Breathing Sea[8], from the sea to Bulgars, from Bulgars to Burtasians[9], from Burtasians to Cheremis[10], from Cheremis to Mordva[11] – everything did the Lord bring under the sway of Christian people. The pagan lands submitted to the Grand Prince Vsevolod[12], and his father Yuri, prince of Kiev[13], and his grandfather Vladimir Monomakh[14], with whose name the Polovtsy[15] scared their children in their cradles. And Lithuanians dared not crawl out of their swamps, and Hungarians fortified their stone cities with iron gates so that the great Vladimir would not strike at them, and the Germans rejoiced, living far away beyond the Blue Sea[16]”

This common national memory, the idea of the Russian Land as a unity was the force that kept Russia from disintegration and destruction during the years of the Mongol yoke. Serapion, Bishop of Vladimir (? – 1275), lamented that “our majesty is brought to the ground, our beauty is dead, our wealth profits others, our works inherited by pagans, our land is the legacy of outlanders.” This, by the way, is the best answer of a contemporary of the Mongol invasion to those that today would present this incursion from the East as a time of friendship and cooperation.

“We cannot relish our own bread.” This formula of Serapion’s is a precise description of centuries-long Russian woes that intensified in the years of the Horde: we cannot have the joy of relishing our bread, it is either won with blood and tears, or stolen by foreign invaders, or the harvest fails. A simple Russian dream: to relish our own bread.

Nevertheless, that dream required fighting for. The Russians afforded particular reverence to those that would fight for Rus’, like Saint Alexander Nevsky. For Novgorod, he was both protector and hangman when he forced a rich mercantile city untouched by the Mongol invasion to pay the tribute imposed by the Horde. This was done to relieve the burden of other Russian lands, pillaged and impoverished. He chopped heads off, drowned peolpe, gouged eyes out; he should have been remembered as a tyrant. Yet here are the words of a Novgorod chronicler in the First Novgorod Chronicle (oldest recension) regarding the prince’s passing: “Merciful Lord, reveal Thy Countenance to him in the ages to come, for he labored much for the sake of Novgorod and the whole of Russian Land.”

“For the whole of Russian Land”, words written in Novgorod, a city oftentimes presented today as something of an independent state forcefully subjugated by Muscovy. However, in spite of all trade ties to the West, Novgorodians gave priority to a Pan-Russian patriotic sentiment, even judging the prince that had harshly mistreated them from the viewpoint of an integral Russian cause, and not just that of their city.

That is the ideological foundation of the unified Russian state, the great Russia, which appeared not with a delay compared to Western Europe, but with a lead. Dmitry Likhachov (1906 – 1999) noted in his book Russian Culture of the Period of Russian Nation-State Formation (1946): “The origins of national elements of specific cultures are more or less simultaneous everywhere in Europe, but only in Russia do they receive support in the form of a proper Russian nation-state. That is why the national character of 14-15th century culture of Rus’ is more pronounced than in that of England, France, or Germany of the same period. The unity of the Russian language is much stronger than that of French, English, German, Italian national languages. Russian literature is much more subordinate to the theme of state-building than that of other nations…”

I cannot agree with Lev Gumilyov’s (1912 – 1992) statement claiming that “they came to the Kulikovo Field[17] as men of Moscow, Serpukhov, Rostov, Beloozero, Smolensk, Murom, etc., but returned as Russians.” The desire to frame the great battle as a turning point is understandable, but the warriors came to fight, came as Russians already, not only those from from the Vladimir Principality and its vassals, but also from Lithuanian-held Rus’. They realized quite well that the true Pan-Russian cause was that of Moscow and not Lithuania. Simeon the Proud, the uncle of Dmitry Donskoy, the victor of Kulikovo, already claimed the title “of all Russias”[18], and the Byzantine emperor referred to him in his epistles as riks pasis Rossias, “the king of all Russia.” Therefore, the warriors of Kulikovo were already fighting for Russia and just Moscow.

Thanks to Joan of Arc, the French got the idea that Englishmen have no right to claim La Belle France for themselves. The Hundred Years’ War in general played an enormous part in developing national awareness in European peoples. It would suffice to compare two versions of the same chronicle written by the famous Jean Froissart with a difference of several decades and describing the same events. The first version is steeped in chivalric ideas, the second one is inspired by the concept of nationality. Froissart interprets the same act first as conforming to the concept of honor, then as typical of English or French character.

In spite of this dichotomy, it is hard to imagine a 15th or early 16th-century French or English king justifying his claims to a certain territory with a national principle, not defending his own domain but demanding to cede a different one “because Frenchmen live there.” At the same time, barely freed from the yoke of the Horde, Russia begins an irredentist struggle for Russian lands. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Livonia are seen as thieves of “ancestral lands” inherited by Russian princes from their forefather, Prince Vladimir.

The Papal envoys, while attempting to cajole Vasily III into a war with distant Turkey, got the following reply from the boyars: “The Grand Prince wants his ancestral domain, the Russian Land” (at that particular moment this claim also included Kiev). Those demands were invariably followed by lengthy historical justifications of the rights Russian state that would shock European diplomats.“Russian diplomats skilfully used their historical learning and created a complex theory of Muscovite princely power that elevated the prestige of the Russian monarchy… It was a creative political ideology that directed the politics of the Russian state towards the defence of national interests and culture in the complex milieu of European civilisation”, writes Dmitry Likhachov in National Consciousness of Old Rus’.

At that time Europe was engulfed in wars of religion. The battle of Catholics and Protestants almost succeeded in stamping out the sprouts of nascent national consciousness. Only horror and revulsion at the atrocities inflicted by kin and kith speaking the same language keeps national consciousness alive in spite of religious boundaries. European nations mostly grew out of a rejection of religious schism, and this was a positive and unifying side of European nationalism. But it was also marred by a certain Hellenic particularism, all too often national bigotry was directed at closest neighbors and formed a nation based on this hostility. What are the French without hating Englishmen, Germans, or Spaniards?

Russian national awareness evolved in a different way. It was not directed against a neighbor. Even the attitude towards Poland-Lithuania, in spite of incessant hostilities, never developed into an ethnophobia. If Russophobia is an unfortunate fixture of Polish national awareness, the Russian side of the conflict limited itself to “I’ll have my revenge and then forget.” Russian self-awareness was based on a positive patriotism, on love for one’s own land, people, culture, and ruler. The rejection of others expressed itself not in hatred but in a good-natured gibe similar to the manner in which The Lay of the Ruin describes the neighbors of Rus’.

The “foreign” becomes a threat only if it is injurious and harmful to Russian identity. It is menacing not as an external but as an internal threat, as demonstrated by the Time of Troubles. Russia has no difficulty in repelling invaders but wasted much effort on surpassing internal conflict that almost wrecked the state itself. Ivan Timofeev (ca. 1555 – 1631), one of the most acute observers of the Time of Troubles, saw the root of all evil in an obsession with all things foreign that had engulfed Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov. He chastises the first Russian czar for straying from national identity:

“He slew many nobles of his czardom that were loyal to him, others he exiled into lands of heathen faiths, and instead of them he favored those who had come from foreign lands… That is why we are surprised: even people of moderate reason would have understood that one cannot trust one’s enemies forever. And he, a man of such great wisdom, was laid low by his own weak conscience, willingly putting his head into serpent’s jaws. All enemies that came from other lands would have never defeated him if he hadn’t surrendered himself into their hands. Alas! All of his secrets were in the hands of barbarians, and they did what they pleased with him. I will say nothing more – he was a traitor to himself.”

Timofeev reproaches the common folk as well. “Their tongues grew mute and their mouths were shut with bribery; all of our feelings were weakened by fear” is his description of Boris Godunov’s rise to power, the ascendancy of a man who was seen by many as a criminal and a child-murderer. The same complacence in the face of wickedness at the beginning of the Time of Trouble is lambasted by Avraamy Palitsyn (? – ca. 1625), who speaks of “a mad silence of the entire people.”

The restoration of the country begins with a loud patriotic proclamations: the epistles of Patriarch Hermogenes (ca. 1530 – 1612), calling Russia to resist brigands and invaders; the letters of the Nizhny Novgorod volunteer army[19] calling to “stand united against common enemies and Russian brigands that spill our own blood in the country.” Patriotic rhetoric and patriotic awareness were the remedy that nursed Russia back to health in the moment where its statehood was in tatters. The Chronograph (1617)[20] describes the Council of the Land that elected a new dynasty[21] by painting a picture of national unity: “From the borders to the hinterlands of the Russian land the Orthodox people, men both meek and powerful, rich and poor, old and young, were granted the generous gift of life-giving wisdom and illuminated with the light of virtuously minded concord. Even though they came from different lands, they spoke with one voice, even though they were dissimilar as they lived far apart, they were gathered in one council as equals.”

The Time of Troubles and the heroism of Minin and Pozharsky’s resistance army are a damning argument against the popular myth that denies the existence of the Russian nation in that period. On the contrary, Russia, in the depth of its national and patriotic consciousness, was a step or two ahead of even the most progressive of neighbouring countries, where even a century later collusion with foreigners against one’s own nation was not considered dishonorable and considered a legitimate political instrument.

In Russia this was already unthinkable. There, patriotic consciousness was a hallmark of identity, which enabled the reunification of Ukraine, the patriotic heroism of the Great Northern War that required a mighty collective effort of the entire nation to carve out a space among great European powers, the brilliant achievements of Catherine the Great, the majestic victory over Napoleon in 1812. The last war is particularly remarkable: not only ex post facto, but even during the campaign itself it was seen as, and called, a Patriotic War. All gestures and words of the actors in this patriotic drama were made for the cause of the Fatherland.

The Russian propaganda machine left Napoleon no chance to subjugate the Russian people or entrench his dominance. The narcissistic conqueror was opposed not only by soldiers but by artists of rhetoric, from patriotic admiral Alexander Shishkov (1754 – 1841) who wrote the czar’s manifestos to populist propaganda virtuoso Count Fyodor Rostopchin (1763 – 1826) and his broadsides[22]. Without understanding the cultural and symbolic background we can never understand the most important of historical events, from the Battle of Borodino, fought mainly for political reasons, where every Russian officer saw death or injury as the highest honor, to the epic and terrifying fire of Moscow. Russia opposed Napoleon not only with a superior fighting spirit but also with a superior, elaborate patriotic ideology.

Even in Europe, German nationalism was not a predecessor but perhaps a byproduct of Russian patriotic resistance to Napoleon. Russia created a vast network of resistance, inspiring many European minds. Alexander Svechin (1878 – 1938), a prominent military theorist, gives the following description of the German front of Russian propaganda wars:

Russia organized a German Committee under the de facto leadership of Baron Heinrich von und zu Stein, the political head of the German national movement, who consented to leading the Russian propaganda effort. With a brilliant cadre of German patriotic officers that had resigned Prussian service when Prussia had been strongarmed into an alliance with Napoleon, Stein decided to create a German Legion staffed with German deserters and prisoners of war from La Grande Armée. The Legion was intended as a revolutionary challenge to a Germany enslaved by the French and then the core of an armed insurrection within Germany itself.

A fine example of propaganda tracts published in Saint Petersburg in October 1812 at the printers of the Senate, financed by an absolute monarch, is the “Brief Catechism of the German Soldier” written by Ernst Moritz Arndt by special commission. It claimed that German soldiers used to have their own emperor, but then they made a pact with Satan and Hell in the guise of Napoleon. People who were once free became slaves and are being sent to far-flung countries to turn free and happy peoples into slaves just as themselves. A German emperor sends a German soldier to war; must he fight? No, says Arndt; the idea of monarchy is subordinate to that of the nation and Fatherland. If the sovereign forces his soldiers to oppress the innocent and violate their rights, if he conspires against the happiness and freedom of his own subjects, if he colludes with the enemies of his own nation, if he allows his population to be robbed, dishonored, and raped, then following the orders of such a sovereign would be an affront to divine law. German honor commands the German soldier to break the sword that German despots force him to raise for the cause of his nation’s enemies, the French. The soldier must remember that the Fatherland and nation are timeless and deathless, while monarchs and all kinds of superiors will stay in the past with their petty ambitions and disgraceful misdeeds…

The success of propaganda among German regiments that defended Napoleon’s operation lines in 1812 was largely instrumental for the Berezina battle plan, an encirclement of the La Grande Armée core that had delved too deep into Moscow.

This fact seems like a veritable mockery of the popular Western “time zones of nationalism” theory formulated by Ernest Gellner. Allegedly, national consciousness in Europe develops from West to East. The further to the West, the more developed the national sentiment, the stronger its civic nature. Conversely, the further you look to the East, the more tardy and ethnocentric the national sentiment there.

As we can see, this is patently untrue. Russian national sentiment is not younger but older than German, or even the French and English. It is the oldest among the modern peoples of Europe, based on an identity of the Russian Land already pronounced in 10-11th centuries. There is no reason for assigning the Russians a more recent birth date. At the same time, the Russian self-awareness is perhaps not the most but the least ethnocentric, sometimes overly so, causing certain inconveniences for the Russians themselves.

The object of this sentiment is not the place of a particular ethnic group among others but the Fatherland, the Russian Land, its beauty and grandeur among other lands.

The Russians were indeed late in realising the ethnic aspect of nationalism, not due to an alleged backwardness, but because they were late in encountering ethnic nationalism directed against them, mostly in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire. A certain part was played by the German nationalism in the Baltic region; having clashed with it, Yuri Samarin (1819 – 1876) formulated his idea of Russians as a nation that needs equal rights within its own empire in his Letters from Riga (1849)[23].

In spite of the “time zone” theory, German nationalism – in the form of a Pan-German, unifying, state-driven national sentiment – was not a predecessor but a product of Russian patriotism that manifested in the anti-Napoleonic struggle. Russia stimulated German nationalism as an opposition to a Pan-European empire, not imitated it. Russia became a protector of identity and national diversity in Europe in spite of all attempts to forge it into some faceless union.

Nowadays, Russian patriotism preserves the same importance. As justly reminded by Vladimir Putin: “For Russia, for a Russian person […] the patriotic sentiment is very important, the sense of national belonging that is now, to their chagrin, being eroded in certain European countries.” In today’s Europe, the eyes of those who seek to preserve their national identity, those who are patriots and nationalists in the best sense of the word, are fixed upon Moscow. Conversely, those who yell the loudest about a “Russian menace” and a “European unity in the face of Russian aggression” are mostly partisans of a complete erasure of European faces and borders, oriented towards the EU Quarter of Brussels and the White House.

As I have attempted to demonstrate, this is really old news. Russia is still the Motherland of patriotism in Europe, and now, in defiance of an artificial denationalisation imposed by Communism, we are returning to our old mission – keeping the flame of nationality in Europe, preserving it as a Europe of Fatherlands and not a public thoroughfare.


Notes

[1] The origins of this memetic phrase are in the so-called Anti-Cosmopolitan campaign enacted in the final years of Stalinism (1948-53); one of its prominent traits was the “discovery” Russian “firsts” in science, invention, the arts, etc.; many of such “discoveries” were based on dubious or outright falsified data. The “Motherland of elephants” joke was born as a parody of this propaganda blitz.

[2] An allusion to the Primary Chronicle, a.k.a. The Tale of Past Years (ca. 1110), Russia’s oldest surviving historical chronicle traditionally attributed to Nestor (ca. 1056 – 1114), a monk of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves. Its first words, often interpreted as the work’s title, are “These are the tales of past years, of where the Russian Land comes from, of who reigned the first in Kiev, and of how the Russian Land came to be.”

[3] Early East Slavic tribal groups.

[4] The anonymous 13th-century work only survives in fragments and quotations, most of them limited to its poetic preamble.

[5] Baltic tribal group.

[6] Modern-day Velikiy Ustyug, a city in the far Russian North.

[7] An obscure Finno-Ugric tribe.

[8] The White Sea or the Arctic Ocean.

[9] A defunct Volga ethnic group of unknown origin.

[10] An ancient name for the Mari ethnic group, in the modern-day Mariy El Republic of Russia.

[11] A Finno-Ugric ethnic group, in the modern-day Mordovia Republic of Russia.

[12] Vsevolod the Big Nest (1154 – 1212), Grand Prince of Vladimir.

[13] Yuri Dolgorukiy (ca. 1099 – 1157), Grand Prince of Suzdal and Kiev, founder of Moscow.

[14] Vladimir Monomakh (1053 – 1125), Grand Prince of Kiev. Famous, among other things, for organizing successful collective Russians expeditions against steppe nomads.

[15] Russian name for Cumans, nomads of Turkic origin.

[16] The Baltic.

[17] The battle of Kulikovo (1380) was fought by a Muscovy-led coalition of Russian principalities and was the first major Russian victory over Mongols in decades.

[18] This traditional English translation of title is something of a misnomer, a more precise one would be “of the whole of Rus’” or “of the united Rus’.”

[19] A popular resistance force organized in 1611 in the Volga city of Nizhny Novgorod by the merchant Kuzma Minin and the nobleman Dmitry Pozharsky with the goal of suppressing roving bands of brigands, expelling Polish invaders, and preventing the complete collapse of the Russian state. It was instrumental in defeating the Polish garrison in Moscow in 1612 and restoring an independent Russian monarchy in 1613.

[20] Compendium of Russian and world history from Biblical events to recent times, including the events of the Time of Troubles.

[21] An irregularly convened assembly of delegates from all estates of Russian feudal society (sometimes including peasantry) that discussed and voted on the affairs of the state, active ca. 1549 – ca. 1683. The Council of 1613 was particularly important for electing a new dynasty (the Romanovs) to take the vacant Russian throne.

[22] As governor of Moscow during the Napoleonic invasion, Rostopchin became famous for the mass printing and distribution of colorful broadsides with grotesque caricatures and easy-to-grasp text, written in a deliberately folksy style, that satirized the enemy and called for a mass popular resistance.

[23] In 1846, as a government inspector, Samarin travelled through what now is Latvia, documenting many facts of abusive and arrogant attitude towards Russia and the Russians by privileged Baltic German nobility amid the tacit or open support of Russian government officials. Drawing from those experiences, he published a pamphlet titled Letters from Riga (1849), considered one of the first Slavophile manifestos and a seminal document of modern Russian nationalism. The publication caused a scandal that led to Samarin’s brief imprisonment and exile for “fomenting anti-government dissent.”


Translator’s Notes

  1. Several abridgements were made in accordance with the author’s wishes.
  2. The translator took the liberty of making the text more accesible to readers not possessing an in-depth knowledge of Russian history. All names were rendered in their full form, and mentions of most Russian historical figures come with birth and death years for easier reference.
  3. Only names, events, etc. that cannot be identified with a quick Google or Wikipedia search were annotated. So were several allusions to historical events known to every educated Russian but obscure in the West.
 
🔊 Listen RSS

grozny-protest-myanmar

Anti-Myanmar protest in a nominally Russian region. Source: Елена Афонина / ТАСС / Scanpix / LETA

Photogenic female face of resistance to the junta and Nobel Peace Prize winner comes to power as de facto leader of Myanmar.

Some of Aung San Suu Kyi’s comments about a certain Muslim minority in her country up to that point had been disconcerting for NYT readers, but still, that wasn’t a big deal. It’s not like a Myanmar is a European country and the Rohingya are Chechens in the 1990s (though in that situation, it was the Chechens doing all the ethnic cleansing).

Anyhow, her government proceeds to step up statutory discrimination against said Muslim minority ramps up to what now appears to be large-scale ethnic cleansing.

Now China is friends with Myanmar, good location for a port and an outlet into the Indian Ocean not dependent on the Malacca Straits, and regularly vetoes all UN resolutions against Myanmar. Russia is friends with China, and supports it on these vetoes, just as China does likewise for Russia in Europe. Some bellicose Muslim minority isn’t going to bother them, especially considering that both of them have their own Rohingyas in the form of the Uyghurs and the Chechens.

There’s more WEIRD os who care about such sentimental stuff in the West, of course, but what with Trump’s latest adventures and Best Korea throwing about missiles every other day, there’s plenty of far more interesting stuff to occupy their attention. Besides, there’s no oil in Myanmar, and coming out too stridently against a female resistance leader they had patronized for decades would be a bit awkward.

Fortunately, there was someone to take up the slack, /ourguy/ Ramzan “White Sharia” Kadyrov.

He was very triggered and cried on Intagram all about it.

Soon after, a thousand strong crowd of Muslims gathered around the Myanmar Embassy in Moscow with their usual Allah Snackbars and the less usual “Buddhists are terrorists.” While someone more cynically disposed might sarcastically remark about how the mob must have collectively worked up a few hundreds years’ worth of jailtime under Article 282, Russia’s hate speech statue, we as civilized multicultural Europeans must take a more generous and enlightened view of our Muslim countrymen. Surely they were just discussing this 2013 TIME magazine cover.

time-buddhist-terror

Apart from inciting an unsanctioned extremist protest in the capital, Ramzan Kadyrov also herded in hundreds of thousands of Chechens to the center of Grozny in solidarity with the people of Rohingya. One idly wonders how many of them could point to Myanmar on a world map. A hundred? A dozen?

And here is based Chechen man Ramzan Kadyrov himself, governor of a region where more than 80% of the local budget is financed from Moscow:

Why is the Russian media silent? … You think, I am happy with this. Not at all!

And if even Russia was to support these shaitans, who are carrying out these crimes, I will oppose Russia’s position!

“Russia’s” position, along with China’s, is to block UN resolution after UN resolution against what it considers Myanmar’s Anti-Terrorist Operation.

I have my own vision, my own position.

The spread of Islamic identity politics beyond Kadyrov’s fiefdom to Russia at large and even the outside world, all courtesy of the Russian taxpayer.

And why shouldn’t Kadyrov play around? Judging by the muted reaction of the Kremlin, he has nothing to risk.

The cautious and elderly men who rule Russia are constitutionally incapable of fitting Muslims chanting “Buddhists are terrorists” into the Soviet-Putinist worldview of a “friendship of peoples” united against Wahhabis and fascists. The Moscow mayoralty saw nothing untowards in the unsanctioned protests against the Embassy of a sovereign power, there being no arrests, even though an analogous action by any other political group would have been unceremoniously dispersed by the OMON.

The reaction of the Russian MSM has been as schizophrenic as it has been demented, probably the result of no common position having come down from an equally confused Kremlin. Vladimir Solovyev, Russia’s most famous political talkshow host and fawning, has developed a rather strange interest in the welfare of the Rohingya in the past couple of days. State news agency RIA published “Muslim Non-Brothers” criticizing the Moscow protests, and was deleted almost immediately (cached version); on the other hand, the conservative-patriotic tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda article by Alexander Kots that was clearly substantially “inspired” by the former is still up: “Why, Ramzan, Mix Politics and Islam“? RT triangulated, making the case for why it was Soros’ fault.

Meanwhile, Putin has joined Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in condemning “all violence” in Myanmar.

The logical conclusion is that political Islam works in Russia. It gets results. Minority nationalist and sectarian activists have observed it to work, and will draw the required lessons.

The only silver lining is that is about Myanmar and as per above nobody really cares about Myanmar apart from Myanmar and Ramzan Kadyrov. And I suppose Bangladesh, who are having to take in the refugees. Poor Bangladesh, when not flooded by water, flooded by people, as if it still has any room to spare.

Still, there’s no reason this experiment couldn’t be repeated in the future. A whole vista of fascinating scenarios open up.

How wonderful would it be if “Putin’s political son” (according to The Saker) and “Putin’s soldier” (according to Kadyrov himself) were to one day discover the plight of the Uyghurs and force Putin to condemn violence on all sides there? Maybe even send some fighters to help out in the struggle against the Chicom shaitans. At least Kadyrov acknowledged that sending troops to Myanmar is “unrealistic” on account of “the geography,” though he added that if it was up to him, he’d “drop a nuclear bomb there to destroy those people killing women, children, and the elderly.” Happily, no such problems with Xinjiang, which borders Russia.

Or why even bother with Xinjiang. Lots of other potential Islamic states within Russia’s borders. Any one or all of them might conceivable come to be oppressed in Kadyrov’s “vision” and “position.”

Ridiculous to imagine today, of course. But stranger things have happened before. The one sure thing is that the West will still figure out how to blame Russians for everything.

 
• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Chechnya, Islamism, Myanmar, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

The magazine Profile.ru in 2015 compiled a list of Russia’s most subsidized regions.

It went exactly as you’d expect.

# Russian Region %dep. Majority Group
1 Ingushetia 85.0% Caucasian
2 Chechnya 81.4% Caucasian
3 Crimea 80.0% Russian
4 Tyva 77.1% Other Minority
5 Sevastopol 75.0% Russian
6 Altay 73.5% Russian
7 Dagestan 70.0% Caucasian
8 Karachaevo-Cherkessia 68.5% Caucasian
9 Kamchatka 64.7% Russian
10 Jewish Autonomous oblast 60.3% Russian
11 North Ossetia 56.3% Caucasian
12 Kabardino-Balkaria 56.2% Caucasian
13 Kalmykia 54.0% Other Minority
14 Amur 52.9% Russian
15 Buryatia 51.8% Russian

Of the top 15 regions, where federal subsidies make up more than 50% of the local budget, six were ethnic minority republics of the Caucasus. The top two were Ingushetia and Chechnya, which also have Russia’s highest unemployment rates by far.

Only seven of the most subsidized regions were majority Russian. However, Crimea and Sevastopol have a high level of subsidies for the very understandable reason that they are under Ukrainian blockade and international sanctions, and currently undergoing economic integration with Russia; while the Altay Republic and Buryatia both have sizable non-Russian minorities. Kamchatka krai, the Jewish Autonomous oblast, and Amur oblast are the only strong majority Russian regions that source a majority of their incomes from federal subsidies.

So statistically, Russian nationalists are not wrong when they say that Russians are “feeding the Caucasus.”

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Caucasus, Finance, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

Russia has half the world’s Neo-Nazis

This claim appears to date to a 2007 ABC News report about far right violence in Russia:

In a country that lost more people defeating the Nazis than any other country, there are now an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 neo-Nazis, half of the world’s total. They even have supporters in parliament.

We know that because we have Neo-Nazi censuses.

Oh wait, we don’t.

No original sources are cited, there are no hints as to who qualifies to be a Neo-Nazi, and ABC News had a pronounced anti-Russian agenda even by Western media standards (they were banned from continuing to work in Russia after having an interview with the Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev in 2005).

Russia does of course have quite a few Neo-Nazis, but they only constitute a small percentage of nationalists in general. This might be a hard concept for two-bit journalists who are convinced that all the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” protesters, or even Donald Trump voters, are Nazis, but in the real world definitions are important and Russian Neo-Nazism always has been, and remains, a numerically marginal movement.

Russians/(Poles, Slavs, etc.) have to be are stupid/insane/historically illiterate to be Nazis, don’t they realize the Nazis killed 27 million of them?

I never really understood how this is even an argument.

Presumably, to the extent they harbor any genocidal fantasies, Russian (Polish, etc.) Neo-Nazis would much sooner want to kill 27 million foreigners, not 27 million of their own. (They aren’t Communists, after all, whose democidal ambitions are primarily aimed at their own people).

The Holocaust regardless, the Jews constructed the most unapologetically ethnonationalist state in the First World; that very event is not infrequently cited as one of the reasons that the Jews need a Jewish state.

So clearly the mere fact of having suffered from German Nazis constitutes no logical impediment to adopting elements of Nazi policy for what they consider to be in service of their own people. Nazism is national socialism, after all; it’s not the NSDAP (which specifies German workers) that they subscribe to.

On this note, here is one additional argument that I encountered on the (now defunct) blog of a Russian Neo-Nazi. I don’t endorse it, but it’s interesting and relevant.

To loosely paraphrase yarowrath: Both Western leaders and the highly Jewish Kiev regime today are perfectly fine using openly Neo-Nazi batallions to prevent Russians from seceding from the Ukraine (a state that only exists thanks to the Bolsheviks). However, they label you a Russian troll just for noticing the symbology on Azov’s flag.

Now considering that Russians:

  • Don’t have any “white guilt” from colonialism, having done more than anyone to end it (to the extent that the Kalashnikov graces the flags of Mozambique and Hezbollah);
  • Suffered more than anyone except the Jews from Hitler;
  • Did not themselves participate in the Holocaust, but did more than anyone else to stop it;
  • The Jews themselves haven’t shown much hesitancy about borrowing from Nazism in service of their interests;

One can argue that Russians have more of a moral right to dispassionately assess Hitler, without shame or condemnation, and adopt those of his ideas that are good and useful than well nigh any other people.

Russian Neo-Nazis all (1) support Ukraine against Kremlin mongolo-katsaps OR (2) hate Ukraine and fight for Putler.

This is a rather strange myth since it takes the form of a binary. But both versions are equally wrong.

In reality, the War in the Donbass has split the Neo-Nazis.

The more explicitly Nordicist elements of the Russian Neo-Nazis supported Ukraine, and a number of them went off to fight with Azov.

The rest of the Neo-Nazis supported the insurrection in the Donbass, and even formed their own batallion, Rusich.

By far the most famous Nazi figure in Russia is Tesak (Maxim Martsinkevich), a skinhead of Polish-Russian ancestry who is perhaps most notable for having invented the concept of Nazi ironic trolling a decade ahead of /pol/ and The Daily Stormer. His fans, the most numerous of any Russian Neo-Nazi, specialized in street actions that ranged from funny slapstick affairs to highly violent, illegal, and disgusting. Following the crackdown on his group in July 2014 (which saw Tesak jailed for 10 years this year), this cluster has turned strongly anti-Kremlin and many of their members have jaunted off to the Ukraine.

However, if support for the Ukraine vs. Novorossiya was perhaps 70-30% amongst Russian Neo-Nazis in 2014, by now those ratios have reversed.

Reading their forums as early as 2015, the general sentiment amongst them was that they had been betrayed and used by ZOG.

Poroshenko and his clique obviously and understandably cared much more for the opinions of besuited businessmen and bureacrats than tatted up stormers, and many of the Russian Neo-Nazis who had gone into exile in Ukraine for the cause of the white race were even failing to get residency permits, let alone Ukrainian citizenship, putting them at risk of deportation back to a Russian jail.

That said, regardless of their current opinions on Novorossiya and Ukraine, which are indeed mixed, Russian Neo-Nazis do more or less uniformly detest Putin, as they always have.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Nazism, Russia 
A Russian Conservative on James Damore
🔊 Listen RSS

Prosvirnin is the most talented writer. Limonov has by far the most colorful personality. Dugin has been the most effective at promoting himself in the West. Prokhanov probably has the most name recognition in Russia. Galkovsky created the most powerful memes. Krylov provided the esoteric flavoring.

And yet out of all of Russia’s right-wing intellectuals, there is perhaps none so unique as Egor Kholmogorov.

egor-kholmogorovThis is ironic, because out of all of the above, he is the closest to the “golden mean” of the Russian nationalist memeplex.

He is a realist on Soviet achievements, crimes, and lost opportunities, foregoing both the Soviet nostalgia of Prokhanov, the kneejerk Sovietophobia of Prosvirnin, and the unhinged conspiracy theories of Galkovsky. He is a normal, traditional Orthodox Christian, in contrast to the “atheism plus” of Prosvirnin, the mystical obscurantism of Duginism, and the esoteric experiments of Krylov. He has time neither for the college libertarianism of Sputnik i Pogrom hipster nationalism, nor the angry “confiscate and divide” rhetoric of the National Bolsheviks.

Instead of wasting his time on ideological rhetoric, he reads Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century and writes reviews about it on his website. And about 224 other books.

And this brings us to what makes Kholmogorov so unique: He is an extremely well-read autodidact.

This allows him to write informed and engaging articles on a very wide variety of different topics and breaking news.

In my opinion, Kholmogorov is simply the best modern Russian right-wing intellectual, period.

Unfortunately, he is almost entirely unknown in the English-speaking world; he does not angle for interviews with Western media outlets like Prosvirnin, nor does he energetically pursue foreign contacts like Dugin. Over the years I have done my very small part to remedy this situation, translating two of Kholmogorov’s articles (Europe’s Week of Human Sacrifice; A Cruel French Lesson). Still, there’s only so much one blogger with many other things to write about can do.

Happily, a multilingual Russian fan of Kholmogorov has stepped up to the plate: Fluctuarius Argenteus. Incidentally, he is a fascinating fellow in his own right – he is a well recognized expert in Spanish history and culture – though his insistence on anonymity constrains what I can reveal, at least beyond his wish to be the “Silver Surfer” to Kholmogorov’s Galactus.

We hope to make translations of Kholmogorov’s output consistently available on The Unz Review in the months to come.

In the meantime, I am privileged to present the first Fluctuarius-translated Kholmogorov article for your delectation.

***

A New Martin Luther?: James Damore’s Case from a Russian Conservative Perspective

google-image

Original: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/triumf-gendernyh-sharikovyh_79187

Translated by Fluctuarius Argenteus:

Google fires employee James Damore for “perpetuating gender stereotypes.

– You persecute your employees for having opinions and violate the rights of White men, Centrists, and Conservatives.

– No, we don’t. You’re fired.

A conversation just like or similar to this one recently took place in the office of one of modern information market monsters, the Google Corporation.

Illustration to the Google scandal. James Damore fired for “perpetuating gender stereotypes”. Source: Screenshot of Instragram user bluehelix.

Google knows almost everything about us, including the contents of our emails, our addresses, our voice samples (OK Google), our favorite stuff, and, sometimes, our sexual preferences. Google used to be on the verge of literally looking at the world with our own eyes through Google Glass, but this prospect appears to have been postponed, probably temporarily. However, the threat of manipulating public opinion through search engine algorithms has been discussed in the West for a long while, even to the point of becoming a central House of Cards plotline.

Conversely, we know next to nothing about Google. Now, thanks to an ideological scandal that shook the company, we suddenly got a glimpse of corporate values and convictions that the company uses a roadmap to influencing us in a major way, and American worldview even more so. Suddenly, Google was revealed to be a system permeated by ideology, suffused with Leftist and aggressively feminist values.

The story goes this way. In early August, an anonymous manifesto titled Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber was circulated through the local network of Google. The author lambasted the company’s ideological climate, especially its policy of so-called diversity. This policy has been adopted by almost all of US companies, and Google has gone as far as to appoint a “chief diversity officer”. The goal of the polity is to reduce the number of white cisgendered male employees, to employ as many minorities and women as possible and to give them fast-track promotions – which, in reality, gives them an unfair, non-market based advantage.

The author argues that Leftism and “diversity” policies lead to creating an “echo chamber” within the company, where a person only talks to those who share their opinions, and, through this conversation, is reinforced in the opinion that their beliefs are the only ones that matter. This “echo chamber” narrows one’s intellectual horizon and undermines work efficiency, with following “the party line” taking precedence over real productivity.

In contrast to Google’s buzzwords of “vision” and “innovation”, the author claims that the company has lost its sight behind its self-imposed ideological blindfold and is stuck in a morass.

As Google employs intellectuals, argues the critic, and most modern Western intellectuals are from the Left, this leads to creating a closed Leftist clique within the company. If the Right rejects everything contrary to the God>human>nature hierarchy, the Left declares all natural differences between humans to be nonexistent or created by social constructs.

The central Leftist idea is the class struggle, and, given that the proletariat vs. bourgeoisie struggle is now irrelevant, the atmosphere of struggle has been transposed onto gender and race relations. Oppressed Blacks are fighting against White oppressors, oppressed women challenge oppressive males. And the corporate management (and, until recently, the US presidency) is charged with bringing the “dictatorship of the proletariat” to life by imposing the “diversity” policy.

The critic argues that the witch-hunt of Centrists and Conservatives, who are forced to conceal their political alignment or resign from the job, is not the only effect of this Leftist tyranny. Leftism also leads to inefficiency, as the coveted job goes not to the best there is but to the “best woman of color”. There are multiple educational or motivation programs open only to women or minorities. This leads to plummeting efficiencies, disincentivizes White men from putting effort into work, and creates a climate of nervousness, if not sabotage. Instead of churning out new ground-breaking products, opines the critic, Google wastes too much effort on fanning the flames of class struggle.

What is the proposed solution?

Stop diving people into “oppressors” and “the oppressed” and forcefully oppressing the alleged oppressors. Stop branding every dissident as an immoral scoundrel, a racist, etc.

The diversity of opinion must apply to everyone. The company must stop alienating Conservatives, who are, to call a spade a spade, a minority that needs their rights to be protected. In addition, conservatively-inclined people have their own advantages, such as a focused and methodical approach to work.

Fight all kinds of prejudice, not only those deemed worthy by the politically correct America.

End diversity programs discriminatory towards White men and replace them with non-discriminatory ones.

Have an unbiased assessment of the costs and efficiency of diversity programs, which are not only expensive but also pit one part of the company’s employees against the other.

Instead of gender and race differences, focus on psychological safety within the company. Instead of calling to “feel the others’ pain”, discuss facts. Instead of cultivating sensitivity and soft skins, analyze real issues.

Admit that not all racial or gender differences are social constructs or products of oppression. Be open towards the study of human nature.

The last point proved to be the most vulnerable, as the author of the manifesto went on to formulate his ideas on male vs. female differences that should be accepted as fact if Google is to improve its performance.

The differences argued by the author are as follows:

Women are more interested in people, men are more interested in objects.

Women are prone to cooperation, men to competition. All too often, women can’t take the methods of competition considered natural among men.

Women are looking for a balance between work and private life, men are obsessed with status and

Feminism played a major part in emancipating women from their gender roles, but men are still strongly tied to theirs. If the society seeks to “feminize” men, this will only lead to them leaving STEM for “girly” occupations (which will weaken society in the long run).

It was the think piece on the natural differences of men and women that provoked the greatest ire. The author was immediately charged with propagating outdated sexist stereotypes, and the Google management commenced a search for the dissent, with a clear purpose of giving him the sack. On 8th August, the heretic was revealed to be James Damore, a programmer. He was fired with immediate effect because, as claimed by Google CEO Sundar Pichai, “portions of the memo violate our Code of Conduct and cross the line by advancing harmful gender stereotypes in our workplace”. Damore announced that he was considering a lawsuit.

We live in a post-Trump day and age, that is why the Western press is far from having a unanimous verdict on the Damore affair. Some call him “a typical sexist”, for others he is a “free speech martyr”. By dismissing Damore from his job, Google implicitly confirmed that all claims of an “echo chamber” and aggressive Leftist intolerance were precisely on point. Julian Assange has already tweeted: “Censorship is for losers, WikiLeaks is offering a job to fired Google engineer James Damore”.

It is highly plausible that the Damore Memo may play the same breakthrough part in discussing the politically correct insanity as WikiLeaks and Snowden files did in discussing the dirty laundry of governments and secret services. If it comes to pass, Damore will make history as a new Martin Luther challenging the Liberal “Popery”.

However, his intellectual audacity notwithstanding, it should be noted that Damore’s own views are vulnerable to Conservative criticism. Unfortunately, like the bulk of Western thought, they fall into the trap of Leftist “cultural constructivism” and Conservative naturalism.

Allegedly, there are only two possible viewpoints. Either gender and race differences are biologically preordained and therefore unremovable and therefore should always be taken into account, or those differences are no more than social constructs and should be destroyed for being arbitrary and unfair.

The ideological groundwork of the opposing viewpoints is immediately apparent. Both equate “biological” with “natural” and therefore “true”, and “social” with “artificial” and therefore “arbitrary” and “false”. Both sides reject “prejudice” in favor of “vision”, but politically correct Leftists reject only a fraction of prejudices while the critic calls for throwing all of them away indiscriminately.

As a response, Damore gets slapped with an accusation of drawing upon misogynist prejudice for his own ideas. Likewise, his view of Conservatives is quite superficial. The main Conservative trait is not putting effort into routine work but drawing upon tradition for creative inspiration. The Conservative principle is “innovation through tradition”.

The key common mistake of both Google Leftists and their critic is their vision of stereotypes as a negative distortion of some natural truth. If both sides went for an in-depth reading of Edmund Burke, the “father of Conservatism”, they would learn that the prejudice is a colossal historical experience pressurized into a pre-logical form, a collective consciousness that acts when individual reason fails or a scrupulous analysis is impossible. In such circumstances, following the prejudice is a more sound strategy than contradicting it. Prejudice is shorthand for common sense. Sometimes it oversimplifies things, but still works most of the time. And, most importantly, all attempts to act “in spite of the prejudice” almost invariably end in disaster.

google-fox

Illustration to the Google scandal. A fox sits gazing at the Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber exposing the ideas of the fired engineer James Damore. Source: Screenshot of Instragram user bluehelix.

However, the modern era allows us to diagnose our own prejudice and rationalize them so we could control them better, as opposed to blind obedience or rejection. Moreover, if the issue of “psychological training” ever becomes relevant in a country as conservative as Russia is, that is the problem we should concentrate on: analyzing the roots of our prejudices and their efficient use.

The same could be argued for gender relations. Damore opposes the Leftist “class struggle of the genders” with a technocratic model of maximizing the profit from each gender’s pros and cons. This functionalism appears to be logical in its own way, but is indeed based on too broad assumptions, claiming that all women are unfit for competition, that all of them like relationships and housekeeping while all men are driven by objects and career. And, as Damore claims biological grounds for his assumptions, all our options boil down to mostly agreeing with him or branding him as a horrible sexist and male chauvinist.

However, the fact that gender roles historically developed based on biology but are, as a whole, a construct of society and culture does not give an excuse to changing or tearing them down, as clamored by Leftists. Quite the contrary: the social, cultural, and historical determinism of these roles gives us a reason to keep them in generally the same form without any coups or revolutions.

First, that tradition is an ever-growing accumulation of experience. Rejecting tradition is tantamount to social default and requires very good reasons to justify. Second, no change of tradition occurs as a result of a “gender revolution”, only its parodic inversion. Putting men into high heels, miniskirts, and bras, fighting against urinals in public WCs only reverses the polarity without creating true equality. The public consciousness still sees the “male” as “superior”, and demoting “masculinity” to “femininity” as a deliberate degradation of the “superior”. No good can come of it, just as no good came out of humiliating wealth and nobility during the Communist revolution in Russia. What’s happening now is not equal rights for women but the triumph of gender Bolshevism.

Damore’s error, therefore, consists in abandoning the domain of the social and the historical to the enemy while limiting the Conservative sphere of influence to the natural, biological domain. However, the single most valuable trait in conservative worldview is defending the achievements of history and not just biological determinism.

The final goal of a Conservative solution to the gender problem should not be limited to a rationalist functionalization of society. It should lead to discovering a social cohesion where adhering to traditional male and female ways and stereotypes (let’s not call them roles – the world is not a stage, and men and women not merely players) would not keep males and females from expressing themselves in other domains, provided they have a genuine calling and talent.

The art of war is not typical of a woman; however, women warriors such as Joan of Arc leave a much greater impact in historical memory. The art of government is seen as mostly male, yet it makes great female rulers, marked not by functional usefulness but true charisma, all the more memorable. The family is the stereotypical domain of the woman, which leads to greater reverence towards fathers that put their heart and soul into their families.

Social cohesion, an integral part of it being the harmony of men and women in the temple of the family, is the ideal to be pursued by our Russian, Orthodox, Conservative society. It is the collapse of the family that made gender relations into such an enormous issue in the West: men and women are no longer joined in a nucleus of solidarity but pitted against one another as members of antagonistic classes. And this struggle, as the Damore Memo has demonstrated, is already stymieing the business of Western corporations. Well, given our current hostile relations, it’s probably for the better.

 
🔊 Listen RSS

navalny-vs-strelkov

H/t Eduard-456.

Navalny has accepted Strelkov’s call for a debate from June 15. Get hype? At any rate, this is probably the closest things to politics that has happened in Russia this year.

There are going to be the main topics of discussion in the debate next week, which may be hosted by Echo of Moscow:

  • How can Navalny beat corruption, if he’s President?
  • His position on Russia’s Western partners?
  • What is he going to do about Crimea and the Donbass?

This has been met with general surprise from all quarters.

The former commander of the LDNR militias is as much an object of hatred for Russian liberals – Navalny’s core constituency – as he is an idol for Russian nationalists.

sip-game-of-russian-=spring

Famous Sputnik i Pogrom designed banner from 2014 that still adorns many pro-Novorossiya sites.

As such, many Russian liberals and Ukrainian nationalists (but I repeat myself) are already squealing and kvetching about Navalny agreeing to appear with the “war criminal” Girkin.

One need only read some of the top responses to Navalny’s Facebook post announcing the debate to get a flavor of their fury:

  • Pavel Khmelnytskyi: You guys are so cool in Russia… a debate between a Presidential candidate and an international terrorist. On the right path!
  • Denis Zatsepin: Alexey, I’m a strong supporter of yours, but in this case I consider it a mistake to appear in the same frame as a bandit and killer. Debates with him are only possible in the form of interrogations about his war mongering, murders, illegal arms transfers, mercenary work.
  • Alexey Karpov: A great opportunity to publicly disavow your phrase that “Crimea is not a sandwich” [i.e., as an object to be haggled over]. And if you fail to do this, I will consider the ensuing crash of your political career to be perfectly justified.

That said, there is a logic to Navalny appearing with Strelkov.

The only half-way conceivable way in which the Putin government could be overthrown would be through an overarching alliance between liberals and nationalists, as in the Ukraine itself in 2014, or in Serbia in 2000.

Navalny could either comfortably occupy the “liberal niche” that constitutes no more than 10% of the Russian electorate – the one that Prokhorov filled in 2012 – or he could try to convince the patriotic-nationalist crowd to sign up with him, which would cut into Putin’s own support base.

The price of his gamble is the risk of alienating his diehard liberal supporters, and consequently fading away into the limelight. Then again, as pro-Donbass blogger El Murid points out, there is, in any case, only so much fuel left in Navalny’s anti-corruption engine; the engine on which he rose to prominence. After the film about Medvedev, one can hardly generate any political excitement over exposing the corrupt machinations of one more CEO of a state firm or regional governor; everybody is waiting for the “Big Film” starring “The Main Hero.” Anything else would be a let-down. After the failure of the June 12 protests, one can make a good case that Navalny needs to do something bold and unexpected to turn around a negative trend in publicity and get people talking about him again – and going head to head against Strelkov is perhaps not the worst idea.

However, this is going to be an opportunity for the patriotic/nationalist crowd to make their mark as well.

Navalny, at least, enjoys access to Gazprom-funded Echo of Moscow and TV Rain. Since returning from the Donbass, Strelkov has been blacklisted from appearing on federal MSM – a not atypical fate for repatriated war heroes with harsh words for the leaders who “abandoned” their cause. Shorn of media resources – no radio or TV mass media to speak of, their main website blocked, and reliant on blogs and social networks to spread their messages – this will be a good opportunity for nationalists to remind Russians that there are choices beyond Putin and Navalny.

The main danger for them is that Strelkov performs poorly. Although he has a poor grasp of issues beyond his pet theme of corruption, as demonstrated in his recent interview with Sobchak, Navalny more than makes up for it as a demagogue. And whereas Strelkov might be an inspirational battlefield commander, his sartorial style and rhetorical skills… leave much to be desired.

strelkov-not-inspiring

 

Another interesting question is to what extent this debate has been cleared with the Kremlin.

The ideal outcome for Kremlin Inc. would be for Navalny to destroy Strelkov, a minor nuisance for them, while affirming his pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian positions on Crimea and the Donbass (that is, a second referendum in the former, and withdrawal of support from the latter). This would also close off any lingering prospects for a liberal-nationalist alliance against Putin.

In this scenario, it is even feasible that Navalny would be allowed to run in the Presidential elections. Without any significant support from the patriotic-nationalist camp, Navalny would be more or less safely bounded at a maximum of 10-15% of the vote, while the fact of his participation in the electoral process – as the most prominent figure in the non-systemic opposition – would serve to “legitimize” Putin’s inevitable victory in the West.

Best of all, there is probably nothing quite as good for burnishing one’s questionable credentials as a Russian nationalist or even patriot for the domestic audience as running against an outright Ukrainian nationalist and Western representative.

 
🔊 Listen RSS

Ilya Glazunov, one of Russia’s great painters is dead at the age of 87.

The “official” art of the modern age is an aesthetic desert; a postmodernist joke that celebrates fraudsters and degenerates, and benefits art dealers and billionaires. Yet there are still men of idealism, far from the cameras and the accolades of handshakeworthy critics, who labor on, creating Great Art for this lost age, and ages yet to come.

Ilya Glazunov was undoubtedly such a man, capturing the “spirit” of Russia’s 20th century on canvass with a flair that no-one else has matched. A nationalist of monarchic and Orthodox inclination who was alternatively persecuted by and accomodated for by the Soviet regime, the unloosening of social and political strictures following its collapse – especially in tandem with the dark backdrop of the despair and moral anomie of the 1990s – offerd Glazunov the scope to realize his full potential.

It is unclear who will carry on his legacy. Pavel Ryzhenko, a pupil of his, was the prime candidate, until his untimely death in 2014 from a heart attack at the age of 44 (his life’s work is now tirelessly propounded by his widow, whom I met at an exhibition a few months ago). That said, he headed an academy that churned out dozens of graduates trained in his style of realistic painting every year, so there is a good chance that some of them will rise to deserved prominence.

His website where you can view many of his works: http://glazunov.ru/en

A longer, more comprehensive article about him by Russia Insider’s Ricky Twisdale.

***

glazunov-tsarevitch-dmitry

Tsarevich Dmitry, 1967

glazunov-mystery-of-the-20th-century

Mystery of the 20th Century, 1976. (I ts display in 1988 was one of the first steps towards Solzhenitsyn’s rehabilitation).

glazunov-roads-of-war

The Roads of War, 1985.

glazunov-the-legend-of-kitezh

The Legend of the City of Kitezh, 1986.

glazunov-eternal-russia

Eternal Russia, 1988.

glazunov-in-memory-of-wife

In Memory of Wife, 1994. (His wife committed suicide, a trauma he only managed to artistically address eight years after the event).

glazunov-market-of-democracy

The Market of Our Democracy, 1999.

glazunov-dekulakization

Dekulakization, 2010.

 
• Category: History • Tags: Art, Obituary, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

I have already written about the Russian government’s blocking of Sputnik i Pogrom, Russia’s foremost nationalist resource.

Two politicians have taken a clear stance on this. Zhirinovsky was one. I have been weighing whether to vote for him or Putin (if only to “reward” him for Crimea) in March 2018. Well, the decision is vastly easier now.

Another supporter is Sergey Shargulin, a Communist deputy, who has sent a letter to the General Prosecutor requesting they provision the materials on the basis of which they were blocked. This is probably connected to Shargulin having been an active supporter of the Donbass resistance, so to hear inanities such as SiP’s support for Ukrainian nationalists must have been especially jarring for him.

The liberals have generally approved of this, since Russian liberalism has little to do with liberal values as such (e.g. freedom of speech) and is more often a respectable fig-leaf for Russophobia and Western cargo cultism. (Alexey Kovalev is a consistently honorable exception).

Perhaps surprising to some – though it shouldn’t be – was the joyous reaction of Stalinists and Eurasianists, such as Israel Shamir. He has not only celebrated the “closure” of that “Vlasovite site,” but believes the authorities haven’t gone far enough; nothing less than a prison term under Article 282 would suffice!

One might think that cheering political prosecution is a rather incongruent position for someone labeled as a Holocaust denier by the Western media, but apparently SiP sinned by not being hard enough on the Jews. Not making this up! “A desperate attempt to set Russians against everyone: Against Armenians, against the Kyrgyz, against Ukrainians. But not against the Jews! They obviously get their money from the CIA, and they wouldn’t give them a penny if they criticized the Jews.

It’s hard to see where to even begin to comment.

I mean, kudos to Shamir for thinking up one of the more… idiosyncratic rationalizations for having a legal system in which obese 90 IQ bureaucrats decide what Russians are allowed to read on Russian taxpayer money (or try to, anyway; Russians are aware of VPN). Hopefully he takes this as a compliment.

So instead I will make just two points. First, this is a good illustration of why Stalinists and Eurasianists are not Russian nationalists (as the Western media almost always clumps them), and why the two factions don’t usually want to have anything to do with each other.

Second, I do want to take the opportunity to specifically address the “Vlasovite” smear that is repeatedly lobbed at Russian nationalists, including SiP, by Stalinists, Eurasianists, and assorted Soviet people.

Vlasov was an exemplary Soviet officer. He did not disappear in the 1937 military purges. Instead, he “faithfully followed the party line” as a member of military tribunals, and enjoyed steady career progression. He so impressed his superiors that he was awarded with a golden watch in 1940. But after going over to the Germans, he suddenly became a resolute enemy of Bolshevik tyranny. The Prague Manifesto, compiled in 1944 under Nazi tutelage, praised the ideals of the February revolution, supported the self-determination of the nations within the USSR (that is, an independent Ukraine, Belarus, etc), and promised to fight against “reactionary forces.”

All of that is in direct opposition to what Russian nationalism stands for. But it is also very congruent with the ideals of the rootless liberal elites who ruled Russia in the 1990s, and continue to exercise significant cultural and economic power today. Who are themselves in large part just the mutant offspring of the late Soviet nomenklatura. (The case of Nobel Peace Prize winner Svetlana Alexievich is particularly instructive: A woman who transitioned seamlessly from writing cringeworthy odes to the ethnic Polish founder of the Soviet secret police Dzerzhinsky to penning Russophobic screeds, she is perhaps the quintessential representative of this “Soviet-liberal” class).

Now here’s the thing. To my knowledge, SiP has never expressed any support or sympathy for Vlasov. (I’ve read a good percentage of everything they’ve written since about 2014, so I am reasonably qualified to make this judgment).

They have, however, pointed out inconvenient facts – including the critical observation that Vlasov was a successful product of the Soviet system and a quintesential Soviet person (as judged by that system itself until 1942).

But for devotees of a tyrant who literally erased people who fell afoul of him from historical record, this might well be more infuriating than if SiP actually were the swastika-toting Vlasovites of their imagination.

 
🔊 Listen RSS

Sputnik i Pogrom (SiP), the premier online resource of the Russian nationalists has just been blocked by Roskomnadzor.

It was done on the request of the General Prosecutor, along with five other nationalist sites. They claim to have found evidence of them “justifying” Right Sector, the Islamic State, Al-Nusra, and other terrorist groups, fighting in Syria. Formulaic reminder about how the Islamic State is banned on the territory of the Russian Federation, in case anyone forgot. The resources in question “propagandize the ideas of national and religious discord, which constitute a threat to social peace and incite extremism.”

Apart from the inherent absurdity of implying Russian nationalists have sympathies for Islamists – an absurdity that any honest person can recognize regardless of ideological orientation – the more telling characteristic is no particular offending material was identified. This means “correcting” a sentence or even removing an article or two doesn’t appear to be an option. SiP’s editors seem to have recognized this, and are mulling switching domain names and directing readers to guides on how to install VPN. (Though the Russian government is working on banning VPN too).

sip-blocked-news As a reminder, SiP isn’t some fringe Neo-Nazi blog bedecked in swastikas and dug up from the bowels of the Internet. It is a glossy magazine with long, high-quality articles about Russian history that now garners 1.5 million monthly visits, despite many of its articles being paywalled. It has been remarkably successful at penetrating its way into the Russian elites: Alexander Voloshin, Igor Strelkov, and Ksenia Sobchak (!) are known to be readers. Combining the visitor numbers of the top Alt Right websites with the intellectual sophistication and elite influence of the upper-tier neoreactionary blogs, SiP’s success as a media phenomenon cannot be denied. As the ultimate “compliment,” many of the large federal MSM organizations have already written about the pogrom of Sputnik i Pogrom.

It is highly critical of the Putin regime for what they see as its corruption, privileging of ethnic minorities, open borders with Central Asia, laxness in Ukraine, and the stiffling climate of political authoritarianism and social conservatism. One can agree or disagree with these assertions to varying extents, but one cannot credibly accuse it of being an agent for Western (or Islamist) interests; in 2014, they actively supported Crimea’s incorporation into Russia and the Donbass resistance, contributing 60 million rubles for humanitarian needs, sending volunteers, and crowdfunding an APC for the people’s militias.

Nor could SiP have been banned for its relative social and political liberalism, such as their criticism of organized religion and homophobia. The website of the Russian Imperial Movement, which whom I became acquainted in Saint-Petersburg, has also been blocked, even though they are hardline social conservatives and require applications for membership to be Orthodox Christians.

In totality, all this points to one conclusion: The Russian government has increasingly had it with Russian nationalism.

To be sure, the General Prosecutor balked at stating that directly, but the very lameness and lack of specifics of its accusations indicates that this is indeed the case. (More than half of Russians agree with the implicitly ethnonationalist slogan “Russia for Russians,” so perhaps that was a wise decision on their part).

What are the consequences and implications?

From a political perspective, the Russian elections are coming up in March 2018, and the authorities might have decided that oppositionist nationalism is not a media factor they want in play. This might imply that Navalny will be allowed to run after all (even though SiP has in truth been opposed to Navalny as much as Putin).

Another predictable theory that rears its head at times like these is that a “Putinsliv” (betrayal) is being planned for the LDNR, so the screws are being tightened in preparation for that – needless to say, a capitulation there will infuriate oppositionist nationalists more than any other group. This is very highly unlikely. Russia is coming out out of recession, so concerns about the economic impact of Western sanctions should be at a relative minimum. Besides, this is not the first time that SiP has been subjected to state harassment; its chief editor Egor Prosvirnin had his apartment searched and electronic devices confiscated back in September 2015.

Finally, it would be amiss to end this without a brief discussion of this event in the current political and sociological context.

First, there is a rich irony in that just a few weeks ago, Egor Prosvirnin was disinvited from the Saint-Petersburg “Geek Picnic” tech conference thanks to the no-platforming efforts of SJWs of “multinational nationality” such as Mikhail Gelfand, Boris Stern, David Homak, and Asya Kazantseva. Their logic being that Prosvirnin is a Kremlin attack dog and an imperialist Russian chauvinist (all these terms are interchangeable to them). The rather more banal reality is that Russian nationalists are squeezed between globalist “ZOG” and the “Putletreich” that loathes them in almost equal measure.

Second, it is just beautiful that SiP is now banned not just in “brotherly” Belarus, but in Russia as well, but not yet in “Banderite” Ukraine. Needless to say, this has nothing to do with any particularly Ukrainian respect for free speech. It is just that Ukraine is the least competent of these three Russophobic states. It’s still funny, though.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Censorship, Nationalism, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

musinov-moscow

Credit: Ivan Musinov.

There is this strange dichotomy with respect to Russia.

The Western elites like Hillary Clinton and many Russophile right-wingers believe that it is a paragon of fascist/conservative and white supremacist/traditionalist values, respectively. (The main difference being that the former think that this is Bad, while the latter think it’s Good).

On the other side, the more fervently anti-Putin Russian nationalists and /pol/ shitposters are in agreement that the Kremlin are just pursuing a Russian version of multiculturalism and open borders.

The Myth of Mosque-O

The central exhibit in this has become the Cathedral Mosque, and photos of the 100,000-200,000 strong crowds congregating around it on Islamic holidays.

Even Steve Sailer has written about it. Our Ukrainian friend AP never tires of reminding us about it in the comments.

pol-moscow-mosque

Here is a slightly more relevant statistic: There are a grand total of four mosques in Moscow, and this is one of them.

Moreover, it was originally built in 1904, then controversially demolished, and rebuilt in a project largely financed by a private Dagestani tycoon, Suleiman Kerimov.

The other Moscow mosques include the historical Old Mosque (constructed in 1823), the Moscow Memorial Mosque (more of a war monument than a place of worship), and one that is part of a complex of religious buildings that also includes a Buddhist stuppa. The latter two were both constructed in the 1990s.

This is in comparison to Moscow’s 1110 churches, a number which is increasing by about 5% yearly.

Two of them are Catholic churches. What is the ratio between the Muslim and Catholic population in Moscow? 20:1? 100:1?

To add an international perspective, the “UK Mosque Searcher” lists 427 mosques in London (many of which are funded by Saudis).

It should therefore be immediately obvious as to why the streets around the Cathedral Mosque are jam-packed with worshippers. Unlike in London, or Paris, or Berlin… they pretty much have nowhere else to go!

It is also probably – hopefully – as good a proof as any that Russia’s elites are not focused on a population replacement agenda, as is evidently the case in Western Europe. If mosques aren’t being constructed, then presumably, there aren’t any intentions to keep many Muslims around in the long-term.

What I am saying is that there is rhetoric and there are facts and statistics, and the former is no substitute for the latter if you want to be taken seriously outside your own narrow ideological circles.

The Myth of Moskvabad

Here is another, in many ways stunning, statistic: Moscow is the last and only megacity in the world where Europeans remain a solid majority.

According to the 2010 Census, 92% of Muscovites are Russians, rising to 94% amongst infants. For all intents and purposes these figures go up to more than 95% if you only count Slavs and other non-Central Asian and non-Caucasian minorities. Now yes, to be sure, if you go outside, then 85%-90% of the faces you encounter will have a Slavic appearance. In 2014, the Federal Migration Service estimated there were 1.4 million foreign workers in the city, of whom 400,000 were there illegally. Bearing in mind that the city’s official 12 million strong population is overwhelmingly Russian,

Rounding that up to two million – while bearing in mind that a significant percentage of those are Ukrainians and Moldovans – and adding them to the city’s official population of 12 million, which is overwhelmingly Russian, and you get a figure of about 14 million people. That is, about 85% European.

In comparison, London is 60% white according to the latest UK census. The French (in)famously don’t collect such data, but Paris is probably similar. Non-Hispanic whites constitute 45% of New Yorkers and 29% of Los Angelinos.

Most importantly with respect to the post-1960s European experience, fertility amongst these Gastarbeiters appears to be very low. There’s a simple explanation why this must be the case: There are 8x as many Uzbek and Tajik male citizens in Russia as women in the 17-25 year age group, and 4-5x as many in the 25-45 year age group. Men cannot bear children, as it generally acknowledged outside the SJWsphere.

gastarbeiters-age-sex-stats

There’s another scrap of circumstantial but pretty strong evidence to support this. In Europe, we are constantly inundated with news of how Mohammed has become the most popular’s baby boys’ names in the latest European city of church spires and historical taverns. Yet according to Moscow official statistics, it was the 80th most popular name in the city in January 2015, with only ten Mohammeds being born (actually some “ethnic” names were more popular: There were 26 Amirs in 51st position, and 16 Umars in 66th position). The most popular “ethnic” girl’s name was in 36th position, with 34 Aminas being born.

This is not to say things are ideal, and I don’t think I ever have. London, Paris, and Berlin did not become the way they are now over a few years, but over several decades. Not even the Social Democrats of Germany ever planned for Gastarbeiters to stay permanently. There is no guarantee that the same will not happen in Russia.

Yet even so, it’s important to keep things in perspective.

na-korable-polden

The Last White Megacity

Here’s a stunning implication: Moscow is now the last and only megacity in the world where Europeans remain a solid majority.

In contrast, Japan has three 99% Japanese conurbations, out of 127 million people. China has more than a dozen. Korea has one.

This is a very sad state of affairs for the European world in general, but it might well be a relative boon for Russia itself. Economists have long identified increasing returns to city size for economic wealth and technological productivity, and psychometricians have long noticed that big cities tend to attract the cognitive elites, which further turbocharges economic dynamism. Russia is the only country within “Greater Europe” to retain a megacity with a solidly predominant white population and its associated benefits of a high average IQ.

To be sure, there are plenty of megacities in the world. Most are now in the lower IQ Third World, and thus inconsequential from a “smart fractions”-central perspective, but a good twenty or so are in high-IQ East Asia, a civilization that has thus far managed to escape the “baizuo” disease of mass immigration and cultural decomposition.

However, considering East Asians’ relative lack of curiosity, it is not completely beyond the realm of the possible that Moscow might become a genuinely one of a kind cultural and scientific hub as the 21st century goes on.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Demographics, Eurabia, Moscow, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

Non-West European nationalists don’t tend to like Charles Murray’s Human Accomplishment (HA) database.

For instance, as relates to Russia: Why is Marconi propped over Popov? Where is Lodygin? Where is Bulgakov!?

Let’s answer that very last question.

It would certainly be very useful to see Murray’s assessments of the most eminent Russians correlates with Russian assessments. If the correlations are low, then perhaps the critics are correct about his alleged Western Eurocentrism. If, however, the correlations are high, though, then he should probably be taken seriously. Especially if these correlations are attained in more “subjective” fields such as literature, which are separated by a language barrier (e.g. Pushkin is far harder to translate well into English than Dostoevsky) and 70 years of fraught international relations.

Fortunately, I came across a list of the most influential Russian writers as tallied by the Russian Book Chamber (RBC), the national bibliographic agency.

This allows us to compare Murray’s list to one compiled by a major institutional authority.

A few years ago, the RBC tallied the relative shares of publications accruing to literary authors from 1917-2012. Here is the correlation with the HA:

murray-rbc-eminence-russian-writers

And yet despite all these problems, there is a remarkable r=0.79 agreement between the two lists. Including on Bulgakov’s absence from both!

Yes, there are many things that I myself find strange about both lists. The absence of Kuprin and Esenin from HA is somewhat unexpected. The absence of figures such as Nabokov, Sholokhov, Babel, Ehrenberg, and Zamyatin from the RBC list is even weirder, as is, for that matter, Nabokov’s very low rating on HA. (The absence of Derzhavin and Lomonosov from the RBC list would be strange, but RBC does state that it only only covers 19th-early 20th century writers). And the absence of Bulgakov from both lists is genuinely absurd.

Even so, the numbers are what they are, and so far as I’m concerned, it confirms the legitimacy of Murray’s assessments with respect to Russian accomplishment.

***

HA & RBC Lists Compared

Author RBC HA
A.S. Pushkin 10.29% 30.05
L.N. Tolstoy 7.93% 40.53
M. Gorky 7.05% 18.82
A.P. Chekhov 5.48% 24.01
A.N. Tolstoy 4.15% 7.30
N.V. Gogol 4.08% 26.03
I.S. Turgenev 4.00% 24.30
M.Y. Lermontov 3.58% 12.48
F.M. Dostoevsky 3.10% 40.20
N.A. Nekrasov 2.34% 5.84
I.A. Bunin 2.29% 5.01
V.V. Mayakovsky 2.23% 16.29
V.G. Korolenko 1.64% 3.15
A.A. Blok 1.57% 11.31
N.S. Leskov 1.49% 7.30
A.N. Ostrovsky 1.42% 5.34
V.Y. Bryusov 1.40% 4.93
B.L. Pasternak 1.39% 11.76
K.D. Balmont 1.18% 2.48
F.I. Tyutchev 1.15% 3.38
A.A. Fet 1.11% 2.71
I.A. Goncharov 1.11% 7.95
A.A. Akhmatova 1.07% 4.73
A. Bely (Bugayev) 1.00% 7.70
L.N. Andreev 0.86% 5.42
F.K. Sologub 0.86% 3.15
V.M. Garshin 0.83% 2.01
A.K. Tolstoy 0.83% 2.38
A.S. Griboedov 0.80% 4.82
E.A. Baratynskyi 0.66% 1.93
O.E. Mandelstam 0.65% 2.29
A.I. Herzen 0.65% 5.46
N.G. Chernyshevsky 0.58% 4.43
M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin 0.44% 6.12
D.S. Merezhkovsky 0.43% 6.15
A.V. Koltsov 0.41% 2.49
A.F. Pisemsky 0.13% 2.28

Appear Only in HA

Author HA
Karamzin, Nikolai 6.52
Ehrenberg, Ilya 5.00
Babel, Isaak 4.33
Derzhavin, Gavril 4.25
Lomonosov, Mikhail 4.19
Zoshchenko, Mikhail 4.11
Lenz, Jakob 4.07
Sholokhov, Mikhail 4.04
Krylov, Ivan 3.94
Fedin, Konstantine 3.77
Zamyatin, Yevgeny 3.51
Fonvizin, Denis 3.09
Aksakov, Sergey 2.91
Nabokov, Vladimir 2.68
Radishchev, Alexander 2.42
Katayev, Valentin 2.31
Olesha, Yuri 1.52

Appear Only in RBC

Author RBC
A.I. Kuprin 2.42%
D.N. Mamin-Sibiryak 2.01%
S.A. Esenin 1.24%
V.A. Zhukovsky 1.00%
I.F. Annensky 0.88%
N.S. Gumilev 0.88%
P.P. Ershov 0.87%
M.I. Tsvetaeva 0.81%
V.F. Odoevsky 0.79%
I.S. Shmelev 0.71%
Z.N. Gippius 0.66%
V.I. Ivanov 0.64%
D.I. Harms 0.62%
M.A. Kuzmin 0.60%
M.A. Voloshin 0.52%
A.A. Pogorelsky 0.47%
N.G. Garin-Mikhailovsky 0.44%
V.F. Khodasevich 0.38%
A.M. Remizov 0.35%
G.I. Uspensky 0.35%
D.V. Grigorovich 0.35%
P.A. Vyazemsky 0.28%
K.N. Batiushkov 0.28%
A.I. Vvedensky 0.28%
G.V. Ivanov 0.27%
I. Severyanin 0.27%
O.N. Klyuyev 0.24%
B.K. Zaitsev 0.20%
V. Khlebnikov 0.20%
A.V. Druzhinin 0.17%
A.B. Mariengof 0.14%
R. Ivnev 0.13%
N.G. Pomyalovsky 0.12%

.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Human Achievement, Literature, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

Another Uraza Bayram.

Countless photos showing zillions of Muslims filling up Moskvabad’s streets. More gleeful shitposts from /pol/ to svidomy forums about imminent Russabia.

moscow-uraza-bayram-2017

But you don’t have to be a particularly big fan of open borders with Central Asia to be able to look at statistics.

In a series of recent posts, Russian blogger Ivan Vladimirov tallied the percentage of newborn ethnic Russians relative to the percentage of Russians as a whole per region.

This is a solid approach, because while counting immigrants is hard – estimates of illegal migrants in Russia vary all over the place – doing so for newborns is far easier. Ultimately the vast majority of births happen in hospitals, and it is difficult to imagine a vast Uzbek/Tajik underground baby boom taking place, not least because of the banal fact that the vast majority of Gastarbeiters are males.

Anyhow, bearing in mind that newborns today reflect society in 30-50 years’ time, the figures are actually quite encouraging (from an assimilationist perspective).

acer120-map-russia-minorities-change

The percentage of ethnic Russians is increasing across almost the entirety of core Russia.

Here is another set of maps from blogger n_avdeev.

The first one shows the percentage of ethnic Russians by region:

avdeev-map-russia-minorities

The second shows the percentage of ethnic Russians younger than 5 years by region (note that green numbers represent an increase, and red numbers a decrease, relative to the total percentage of ethnic Russians):

avdeev-map-russia-young-minorities

You can actually see the majority Russian areas getting even more Russian. This even includes Moscow and Saint-Petersburg, despite them being Gastarbeiter magnets.

The Chuvash, Udmurts, Karels, Komi, Mari, and Mordva are steadily becoming Russians. The Republic of Karelia, once a separate Soviet Socialist republic from 1940-1956, has gone from being 57% Russian in 1926 to 82% by 2010 (and 94% amongst infants), while the comically named Jewish autonomous oblast has seen its Jews decline from 16% of the population in 1939 to 1% by 2010, and becoming 93% Russian overall (98% amongst infants).

Unsurprisingly, the Ukrainians and Belorussians are becoming Russians at an even faster pace, as are as the few remaining Jews and Germans.

Only the Tatars and Bashkirs are holding their own in their ethnic republics, though outside them, they too are dissolving into Russiandom.

However, in regions already mostly populated by highly fertile, underdeveloped, and lower IQ ethnic minorities, such as the North Caucasus (esp. “DICh”, i.e. Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya) and some Siberian regions such as Tyva and the Sakha Republic, the share of ethnic Russians is falling, often at a precipitous rate.

If Russia has an equivalent to US states like Arizona and Texas, where the original White American stock is steadily being outpaced by demographic expansionism from more virile southern ethnicities, it is Stavropol krai (81% total vs. 77% infants), Astrakhan oblast (67% vs. 64%), and the Altai republic (57% vs. 51%).

yuray-map-european-census However, these are literally the only major exceptions to a pattern where ethnic Russians are stable or increasing in the parts of the country where they already constitute a solid majority. In this sense, Russia is far better off not just relative to the US, where non-Hispanic Whites now total 62% of the population and account for less than 50% of new births since 2011, but also many West European countries that have gone from being ~99% to 85%-90% White in the space of just a couple of generations (see Mark Yuray’s map to the right).

Since ethnic Russians don’t have particularly high fertility rates (though they are not significantly lower than those of non-DICh and Mongoloid Siberian minorities), the primary vehicle through which Russianizationization occurs must happen on account of differential rates of intermarriage with Russians (in such marriages, children typically adopt the dominant Russian culture).

Another blogger, Oleg Lisovsky, has compiled figures on intermarriage for both men and women.

Around 70% of Ukrainians and Belorussians marry Russians, so assimilation there is particularly fast, considering also the barely indistinguishable nature of those cultures.

These figures are considerably lower amongst the Christian Caucasian (Armenians, Georgians) and Finno-Ugric (20%-50%) nationalities, and extremely low amongst the Tyvans and DICh peoples (<5%).

On the basis of this data, Vladimirov also compiled a map of the intermarriage coefficient for Russia’s regions. Unfortunately, the scale is not specified, but one can make out the general pattern:

  • High levels of intermarriage in the regions where there are substantial ethnic minorities amongst large Russian majorities;
  • Moderate levels of intermarriage in regions with near homogenous Russian populations and predominant ethnic minorities;
  • Extremely low levels of intermarriage in DICh (who barely even intermarry amongst themselves).

acer120-map-russia-intermarriage-coefficient

One notes that this applies even to small population groups within DICh, such as the Laks, of whom there are 161,000 in Dagestan and 179,000 in Russia according to the 2010 census. Male Laks marry female Laks 85% of the time and ethnic Russians 5% of the time (my grandfather is a very rare case); female Laks marry male Laks 88% of the time and ethnic Russians a mere 1.2% of the time.

Three are three main lessons to take away from this:

(1) Russia is simply not undergoing population replacement/displacement on the American or West European model. There is, to be sure, considerable… métissage, but it is primarily happening between genetically and psychometrically similar peoples – and in many cases, this is something that has been happening for centuries anyway (e.g. north Russians are basically admixed Slavs and Finno-Ugrics anyway).

(2) The DICh regions are a lost cause in terms of assimilation, but in all fairness, they probably always were. They are very distinct from the rest of Russia, and understandably so, since like Central Asia, they were only annexed in the middle of the 19th century. They are also absurdly ethnocentric in terms of marriage and reproduction.

During the course of the next century, it seems inevitable that Russians will fade away from the other ethnic minority Caucasian republics, such as Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia, as well as Kalmykia and Tyva.

The only places in the North Caucasus where a demographic “struggle” of sorts is occuring with respect to traditional Russian majority regions are Stavropol krai and Astrakhan oblast, but even there, the scale of the problem is decidedly smaller than in America’s borderlands with Mexico’s or Western Europe’s inner cities.

(3) The system of ethno-republics, apart from feeding corrupt regional oligarchies, also seems to act as a break on assimilation. The prime historical example is of course the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which foistered a Ukrainian identity upon Malorussians within its territories – including Novorossiya, where they were essentially just settlers – whereas the Malorussians of the Russian Kuban have almost all became Russians since the 1920s by dint of being in the RSFSR. However, as the demographic statistics above make it clear, the same trends are playing out, to some extent, even within the Russian Federation proper.

This is why most Russian nationalists have tended to dislike federalism and ethnic minority republics, and urge a return to the imperial system of guberniyas.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Demographics, Minorities, Russia 
🔊 Listen RSS

Who is really the greatest Russian?

Okay, formally, the Levada survey that put Stalin in the lead asked about the “of all times and places.” However, in practice – and this isn’t just limited to Russia – most people interpret it as “who is your greatest countryman.”

In my opinion, to be considered “great,” you must be both eminent (i.e. frequently mentioned in encyclopedias and reference works) and to have positively impacted the world, or at least your own country. Few would call Hitler great, though he was almost surely the most influential/eminent Austrian (and one of the most influential Germans).

So perhaps the least controversial approach is to just tally the Great People (scientists, artists, inventors, etc).

Charles Murray’s Human Accomplishment database is not the worst place to start.

To qualify, the persons below either had to have been born in Russia, and at least either worked in Russia, or had Slavic ethnicity. (Otherwise the most influential Russian would have been Georg Cantor, whose connections to Russia were fleeting at best; his Jewish parents left Saint-Petersburg with him for Germany when he was 11 years old).

It’s morbidly funny to note that Lenin and Stalin, respectively ranked #4 and #1 by Russians, were instrumental in getting a noticeable percentage of the people on this list – e.g. Zworykin, Sikorsky, Gamow – to permanently leave Russia, and convincing Dobzhansky to stay there (a good thing for him considering the Lysenkoism of the 1930s).

# Name Index Inventory Birth Death Birth Work Ethnos
1 Stravinsky, Igor 45.42 Music.West 1882 1971 Russia Russia Slavic
2 Tolstoy, Leo 40.53 Lit.West 1828 1910 Russia Russia Slavic
3 Dostoevsky, Fyodor 40.20 Lit.West 1821 1881 Russia Russia Slavic
4 Kandinsky, Vasily 30.62 Art.West 1866 1944 Russia Germany Slavic
5 Pushkin, Alexander 30.05 Lit.West 1799 1837 Russia Russia Slavic
6 Gogol, Nikolay 26.03 Lit.West 1809 1852 Russia Russia Slavic
7 Mendeleyev, Dmitry 25.03 Chem 1834 1907 Russia Russia Slavic
8 Turgenev, Ivan 24.30 Lit.West 1818 1853 Russia Russia Slavic
9 Chekhov, Anton 24.01 Lit.West 1860 1904 Russia Russia Slavic
10 Zworykin, Vladimir 21.79 Tech 1889 1982 Russia USA Slavic
11 Tchaikovsky, Piotr 20.48 Music.West 1840 1893 Russia Russia Slavic
12 Lobachevsky, Nikolay 19.41 Math 1792 1856 Russia Russia Slavic
13 Popov, Aleksandr 18.86 Tech 1859 1906 Russia Russia Slavic
14 Gorky, Maxim 18.82 Lit.West 1868 1936 Russia Russia Slavic
15 Ostwald, Wilhelm 18.31 Chem 1853 1932 Russia Germany Slavic
16 Sikorsky, Igor 16.89 Tech 1889 1972 Russia USA Slavic
17 Mayakovsky, Vladimir 16.29 Lit.West 1894 1930 Russia Russia Slavic
18 Mussorgsky , Modest 15.61 Music.West 1839 1881 Russia Russia Slavic
19 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolay 15.33 Music.West 1844 1908 Russia Russia Slavic
20 Malevich, Kasimir 14.63 Art.West 1878 1935 Russia Russia Slavic
21 Lenz, Emil 14.39 Eart 1804 1865 Russia Russia Slavic
22 Tsvet, Mikhail 14.27 Biol 1872 1919 Russia Russia Slavic
23 Dobzhansky, Theodosius 13.99 Biol 1900 1975 Russia USA Slavic
24 Lomonosov, Mikhail 12.82 Astr 1711 1765 Russia Russia Slavic
25 Lermontov, Mikhail 12.48 Lit.West 1814 1841 Russia Russia Scots
26 Tatlin, Vladimir 11.94 Art.West 1885 1953 Russia Russia Slavic
27 Ivanovsky, Dmitri 11.80 Biol 1864 1920 Russia Russia Slavic
28 Pasternak, Boris 11.76 Lit.West 1890 1960 Russia Russia Jewish
29 Shostakovich, Dmitri 11.55 Music.West 1906 1975 Russia Russia Slavic
30 Prokofiev, Sergei 11.52 Music.West 1891 1953 Russia Russia Slavic
31 Blok, Aleksandr 11.31 Lit.West 1880 1921 Russia Russia Slavic
32 Korolev, Sergei 10.54 Tech 1907 1966 Russia Russia Slavic
33 Claus, Carl 10.06 Medi 1796 1864 Russia Russia Germanic
34 Tamm, Igor 9.44 Phys 1895 1971 Russia Russia Jewish
35 Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin 8.51 Tech 1857 1935 Russia Russia Slavic
36 Kovalevskaya, Sonya 8.34 Math 1850 1891 Russia Sweden Slavic
37 Borodin, Alexander 8.18 Music.West 1833 1887 Russia Russia Slavic
38 Scriabin, Alexander 8.15 Music.West 1872 1915 Russia Russia Slavic
39 Oparin, Alexander 8.05 Biol 1894 1980 Russia Russia Slavic
40 Veksler, Vladimir 7.99 Phys 1907 1966 Russia Russia Slavic
41 Glinka, Mikhail 7.96 Music.West 1804 1857 Russia Russia Slavic
42 Goncharov, Ivan 7.95 Lit.West 1812 1891 Russia Russia Slavic
43 Bely, Andrei (Bugayev) 7.70 Lit.West 1880 1934 Russia Russia Slavic
44 Frank, Ilya 7.60 Phys 1908 1990 Russia Russia Jewish
45 Friedmann, Alexander 7.54 Phys 1888 1925 Russia Russia Slavic
46 Markov, Andrei 7.33 Math 1856 1922 Russia Russia Slavic
47 Tolstoy, Alexey N. 7.30 Lit.West 1882 1945 Russia Russia Slavic
48 Leskov, Nikolay 7.30 Lit.West 1831 1895 Russia Russia Slavic
49 Cherenkov, Pavel 7.27 Phys 1904 1990 Russia Russia Slavic
50 Rachmaninov, Sergei 7.13 Music.West 1873 1943 Russia Russia Slavic
51 Gelfond, Aleksander 6.82 Math 1906 1968 Russia Russia Jewish
52 Lebedev, Pyotr 6.62 Phys 1866 1912 Russia Russia Slavic
53 Karamzin, Nikolai 6.52 Lit.West 1766 1826 Russia Russia Slavic
54 Merezhkovski, Dmitri 6.15 Lit.West 1865 1941 Russia Russia Slavic
55 Saltykov, Mikhail (N. Shchedrin) 6.12 Lit.West 1826 1892 Russia Russia Slavic
56 Nekrasov, Nikolay 5.84 Lit.West 1821 1877 Russia Russia Slavic
57 Balakirev, Mily 5.80 Music.West 1837 1910 Russia Russia Slavic
58 Herzen, Aleksandr 5.46 Lit.West 1812 1870 Russia Russia Slavic
59 Andreyev, Leonid 5.42 Lit.West 1871 1919 Russia Russia Slavic
60 Ostrovsky, Aleksandr 5.34 Lit.West 1823 1885 Russia Russia Slavic
61 Ambartsumian, Viktor 5.34 Astr 1908 1996 Russia Russia Slavic
62 Bunin, Ivan 5.01 Lit.West 1870 1953 Russia Russia Slavic
63 Ehrenberg, Ilya 5.00 Lit.West 1891 1967 Russia Russia Jewish
64 Gamow, George 4.96 Phys 1904 1968 Russia USA Slavic
65 Bryussov, Valery 4.93 Lit.West 1873 1924 Russia Russia Slavic
66 Rodchenko, Alexander 4.87 Art.West 1891 1956 Russia Russia Slavic
67 Gabo, Naum 4.82 Art.West 1890 1977 Russia Russia Slavic
68 Griboyedov, Alexander 4.82 Lit.West 1795 1829 Russia Russia Slavic
69 Kapitsa, Pyotr 4.77 Phys 1894 1984 Russia Russia Jewish
70 Akhmatova, Anna 4.73 Lit.West 1889 1966 Russia Russia Slavic
71 Goncharova, Natalia 4.72 Art.West 1881 1962 Russia Russia Slavic
72 Lenin, Vladimir 4.65 Phil.West 1870 1924 Russia Russia Slavic
73 Chernyshevsky, Nikolay 4.43 Lit.West 1828 1889 Russia Russia Slavic
74 Babel, Isaak 4.33 Lit.West 1894 1941 Russia Russia Jewish
75 Derzhavin, Gavril 4.25 Lit.West 1743 1816 Russia Russia Slavic
76 Lomonosov, Mikhail 4.19 Lit.West 1711 1765 Russia Russia Slavic
77 Szymanowski, Karol 4.14 Music.West 1882 1937 Russia Poland Slavic
78 Archipenko, Alexander 4.14 Art.West 1887 1964 Russia France Slavic
79 Zoshchenko, Mikhail 4.11 Lit.West 1895 1958 Russia Russia Slavic
80 Kolmogorov, Andrey 4.09 Math 1903 1987 Russia Russia Slavic
81 Lenz, Jakob 4.07 Lit.West 1751 1792 Russia Germany Slavic
82 Sholokhov, Mikhail 4.04 Lit.West 1905 1984 Russia Russia Slavic
83 Tchebycheff, Pafnuty 3.94 Math 1821 1894 Russia Russia Slavic
84 Krylov, Ivan 3.94 Lit.West 1768 1844 Russia Russia Slavic
85 Fedin, Konstantine 3.77 Lit.West 1892 1977 Russia Russia Slavic
86 Pfitzner, Hans 3.70 Music.West 1869 1949 Russia Germany Slavic
87 Zamyatin, Yevgeny 3.51 Lit.West 1884 1937 Russia Russia Slavic
88 Glazunov, Alexander 3.51 Music.West 1865 1936 Russia Russia Slavic
89 Larionoff, Mikhail 3.39 Art.West 1881 1964 Russia Russia Slavic
90 Tyutchev, Fedor 3.38 Lit.West 1803 1873 Russia Russia Slavic
91 Dargomïzhsky, Alexander 3.31 Music.West 1813 1869 Russia Russia Slavic
92 Markovnikov, Vladimir 3.20 Chem 1838 1904 Russia Russia Slavic
93 Sologub, Fedor 3.15 Lit.West 1863 1927 Russia Russia Slavic
94 Korolenko, Vladimir 3.15 Lit.West 1853 1921 Russia Russia Slavic
95 Fonvizin, Denis 3.09 Lit.West 1745 1792 Russia Russia Slavic
96 Butlerov, Aleksandr 3.07 Chem 1828 1886 Russia Russia Slavic
97 Cui, César 2.94 Music.West 1835 1918 Russia Russia Slavic
98 Aksakov, Sergey 2.91 Lit.West 1791 1859 Russia Russia Slavic
99 Repin, Ilya 2.88 Art.West 1844 1930 Russia Russia Slavic
100 Fet, Afanasy 2.71 Lit.West 1820 1892 Russia Russia Slavic
101 Nabokov, Vladimir 2.68 Lit.West 1899 1977 Russia USA Slavic
102 Koltsov, Alexey 2.49 Lit.West 1809 1842 Russia Russia Slavic
103 Balmont, Konstantin 2.48 Lit.West 1867 1943 Russia Russia Slavic
104 Radishchev, Alexander 2.42 Lit.West 1749 1802 Russia Russia Slavic
105 Tolstoy, Alexey K. 2.38 Lit.West 1817 1875 Russia Russia Slavic
106 Katayev, Valentin 2.31 Lit.West 1897 1986 Russia Russia Slavic
107 Mandelstam, Osip 2.29 Lit.West 1892 1938 Russia Russia Jewish
108 Pisemsky, Alexey 2.28 Lit.West 1820 1881 Russia Russia Slavic
109 Kabalevsky, Dmitry 2.27 Music.West 1904 1987 Russia Russia Slavic
110 Garshin, Vsevolod 2.01 Lit.West 1855 1888 Russia Russia Slavic
111 Baratynsky, Evgeny 1.93 Lit.West 1800 1844 Russia Russia Slavic
112 Myaskovsky, Nikolay 1.68 Music.West 1881 1950 Russia Russia Slavic
113 Olesha, Yuri 1.52 Lit.West 1899 1960 Russia Russia Slavic
114 Vogel, Wladimir 1.24 Music.West 1896 1984 Russia Germany Slavic
115 Taneyev, Sergei 1.16 Music.West 1856 1915 Russia Russia Slavic
116 Glier, Reinhold 1.06 Music.West 1875 1956 Russia Russia Jewish
117 Arensky, Anton 1.00 Music.West 1861 1906 Russia Russia Slavic
118 Bortniansky, Dmitry 1.00 Music.West 1751 1825 Russia Russia Slavic

.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Human Achievement, Russia 
No Items Found
Anatoly Karlin
About Anatoly Karlin

I am a blogger, thinker, and businessman in the SF Bay Area. I’m originally from Russia, spent many years in Britain, and studied at U.C. Berkeley.

One of my tenets is that ideologies tend to suck. As such, I hesitate about attaching labels to myself. That said, if it’s really necessary, I suppose “liberal-conservative neoreactionary” would be close enough.

Though I consider myself part of the Orthodox Church, my philosophy and spiritual views are more influenced by digital physics, Gnosticism, and Russian cosmism than anything specifically Judeo-Christian.


PastClassics
The “war hero” candidate buried information about POWs left behind in Vietnam.
What Was John McCain's True Wartime Record in Vietnam?
The evidence is clear — but often ignored
Are elite university admissions based on meritocracy and diversity as claimed?
A simple remedy for income stagnation