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Navalny claimed that the state-owned pollsters VCIOM were artificially inflating Putin’s figures, so his Anti-Corruption Fund will start releasing their own weekly polls, the first of which has just been released in Navalny’s latest video address.

Reminder that Putin got 66% in the last FOM poll, and 73% in the last VCIOM poll.

FBK poll:

poll-fbk-elections-2018

Oops, what a fail: Putin still gets 62%.

poll-fbk-elections-2018-prediction

And this is their prediction, which accounts for undecideds, in which Putin gets 78% – which is, incidentally, perfectly in line with my own old-standing prediction.

Meanwhile, as per my last post, this confirms that Grudinin seems to have stopped making gains relative to Zhirinovsky in the past week, having instead merely converged with him.

 
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In my previous post, I posted this map of how comfortable Europeans are regarding love relationships of their children in regards to race, and AP provided the original stats.

map-europe-poll-miscegeneration

I am always a bit saddened that Russia doesn’t participate in the Eurobarometer polls, but fortunately, I found that VCIOM asked rather similar questions in polls from 2002 and 2010.

The methodology is a bit different. Eurobarometer defined “being comfortable” if one of your children was in a love relationship with [member of ethnic group] and you rated your level of Comfort with that in the region of 7-10 (out of 10), or indifference. The Russian poll asks if you would approve, disapprove, or be indifferent towards one of your close relatives (son, daughter, grandkid) marrying [member of ethnic group].

I think the questions are close enough for direct comparisons to be meaningful by summing the percentage of Russians who either approve or are indifferent.

% Russians ok with kids marrying: 2002 2010
Russians 96% 96%
Ukrainians, Belorussians 83% 82%
Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians 61% 57%
Georgians, Armenians, Azeris 38% 37%
Central Asians 38% 33%
Jews 49% 47%
Chechens 28% 28%
Germans, Frenchs, English 66% 61%
Americans . 55%
Arabs . 29%

In terms of marriage preferences, Russians seem to be less philo-Semitic than Poles, about the same as Czechs, Lithuanians, and Romanians, and more philo-Semitic than Slovaks.

They are also fully within the bands of normality for Eastern Europe so far as marriages with Muslims go.

If Chechens could be considered proxies for Africans, Russians would be as “based” on that question as any in Eastern Europe (though far less so than 1950s Americans).

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Conservatism, Eastern Europe, Opinion Poll, Russia 
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goldberg-alt-left-american-gis

But just because American GIs fought Nazis didn’t necessarily make them Maoist thugs, as @tcjfs pointed out.

pnin-alt-right-american-gis

And another user, @pnin1957, brought up statistics suggesting that the American GIs who stormed the beaches of Normandy would have been veritable shitlords today.

These are the results of a 1942 survey of white enlisted personnel in the US military that were uncovered by Think Progress in 2010 (PDF).

This was reflected in American society at large:

Most civilians and military personnel opposed racial integration. One month before President Truman’s Executive Order, a Gallup poll showed that 63% of American adults endorsed the separation of Blacks and Whites in the military; only 26% supported integration. A 1949 survey of white Army personnel revealed that 32% completely opposed racial integration in any form, and 61% opposed integration if it meant that Whites and Blacks would share sleeping quarters and mess halls.

Just like Muhammad Ali in the 1970s, virtually no whites approved of marriages between whites and blacks in 1959.

poll-approval-marriage-blacks-whites

And even in 1965, when social mores began loosening up, a narrow majority still approved of actual state laws banning the practice.

poll-approval-laws-ban-marriage-blacks-whites

Some more polls from @tcjfs.

The people who fought the Nazis don’t appear to have been very Alt Left at all.

Very, very problematic.

And here’s the kicker: These Alt Right or even “Neo-Nazi” views percolated throughout the entire society.

For instance, take the British thinker Bertrand Russell. He wrote the world’s best known popular history of Western philosophy. He was dismissed and almost went to jail for pacifism during WW1. He stood as a suffragette candidate in 1907. He was one of the first to champion sex education and the end of Victorian sexual mores. For all intents and purposes, he was the Chomsky of his time.

And yet, here are his thoughts on… “The Case for White Australia” in 1950 (h/t @whyvert).

Even though Russell’s views on race were very progressive for the time, the ways in which he presented his arguments would have resulted in his immediate excommunication from today’s handshakeworthy society.

bertrand-russel-on-russia

How the worm has turned! (with caveats)

Except the anti-Russian sentiment, I suppose. That’s always a constant.

 
• Category: History • Tags: Alt Right, Opinion Poll, United States 
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At the tail end of the Cold War, there was an incredible atmosphere of Americanophilia throughout the USSR, including amongst Russians.

poll-levada-russia-usa-approval

Blue – approve of USA; orange – disapprove.

Around 75%-80% of Russians approved of the United States around 1990, versus <10% disapproval.

By modern standards, this would have put Russia into the top leagues of America fans, such as Poland, Israel, and the United Kingdom. It was also around 10%-15% points higher than contemporary US approval of Russia.

The blogger genby dug up a VCIOM poll from 1990 asking Russians – that is, Russians within the RSFSR, i.e. the territory of the modern day Russian Federation – what they thought about Americans.

The poll was redone in 2015, keeping the same questions, which allows a direct comparison between the two dates.

What in your opinion characterizes the United States? 1990 2015
High criminality and moral degradation 1 15
No warmth in people’s relations 1 15
High living standards 35 12
Large gap between rich and poor 5 11
Racial discrimination 1 9
Highly developed science and technology 15 7
Success depends on personal effort 20 7
Free society 13 5
Other . 6
Can’t say for sure 10 12

I would wager Russian opinions on America were more positive c.1990 than the opinions of the average American on his own country today!

Is US government friendly or hostile to Russia? 1990 2015
Friendly 35 3
Not very friendly 40 32
Hostile 2 59
Can’t say 23 6

These results speak for themselves and hardly need more commentary.

Nowadays, of course, things are rather different. Suffice to say the numbers of America fans have plummeted, while the percentage of Russians with actively negative views emerged essentially out of nowhere to constitute majority opinion. According to other polls, Russian approval of the US rarely breaks above 30%, and the sentiments are quite mutual. Just 1% (that’s one percent) of Russians approved of US leadership by 2016. Although there were hopes that this trend would turn around after Trump, which seemed plausible in early 2017 and indeed seemed to be happening, this was in the end not to be.

What I think is more significant is that nobody likes to talk about it now, because it reflects badly on pretty much everyone.

Russians would have to acknowledge that they were naive idiots who threw away an empire centuries in the making to end up within the borders of old Muscovy in exchange for… jeans and “common human values.” These figures testify to the complete and utter failure of Soviet propaganda, which spent decades spinning tales about American criminality, unemployment, and lynched Negroes only to end up with a society with some of the most Americanophile sentiments in the entire world. It also makes it much harder to scapegoat Gorbachev, or the mythical saboteurs and CIA agents in power that feature prominently in sovok conspiracy theories, for unraveling the Soviet Union, when ordinary Soviets themselves considered America the next best thing since Lenin and the US government to be their friend.

For their part, Americans would have to acknowledge that Russians do not have a kneejerk hatred of America, and that the “loss of Russia” was largely of their own doing. The arrogant refusal to take into account Russian interests after the Cold War, instead bombing their allies, expanding NATO to Russian borders in contravention of verbal commitments made to the USSR, and for all intents and purposes treating it as a defeated Power, may have made sense when it seemed that the US would be the world’s dominant hyperpower for the foreseeable future and Russia was doomed to die anyway – as was conventional wisdom by the late 1990s. And from a purely Realpolitik perspective, the results have hardly been catastrophic; the US gained a geopolitical foothold in Eastern Europe, tied up further European integration into an Atlantic framework, and closed off the possibility of the “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” envisaged by Charles de Gaulle. On the other hand, in a world where China is fast becoming a peer competitor – with the implicit backing of a resentful Russia – this may, in retrospect, not have been the best long-term play.

 
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When finishing up yesterday’s post I realized that Transparency International has finished releasing its final version of the Global Corruption Barometer.

By far the most interesting indicator is the percentageof people who report paying a bribe in the past 12 months (more precisely, the percentage of households who paid a bribe when accessing basic services). It is as close to objective measurement as you can get in a sphere of life as indefinite and necessarily opaque as “corruption.”

You can take a look at a global interactive map here: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/global_corruption_barometer_citizens_voices_from_around_the_world

Access to the global data here in Excel format: Global_Corruption_Barometer_2017_Global_Results

More regional maps (where available), with a few comments comparing results to the GCB 2013.

gcb-2017-bribery-europe

Europe – Romania, Hungary, and Lithuania are the most notably corrupt EU countries; Greece, in fairness, has improved substantilaly since the last assessment in 2013, when 22% of Greeks paid bribes.

Ukraine didn’t budge relative to 2013; was 37%, now 38%. Both the Ukraine and Russia are much worse than Belarus. This confirms stereotypes, BTW.

gcb-2017-bribery-asia-pacific

East Asia – India has actually deteriorated further, from 54% in 2013. Taiwan’s figure is much more plausible than the anomalous seeming 36% in the last survey.

gcb-2017-bribery-latin-america

Latin America – What is going on in Mexico? It was 33% last time.

It appears that North America will not be covered in this round of the GCB. For comparison with its southern neighbors and Europe, the reported bribery rate in the US was 7% in 2013 (up from 5% in the survey before that, and 2-3% in the oldest surveys).

The bribery rate in Canada in the last GCB was 3%.

gcb-2017-bribery-middle-east

Middle East – This is pretty interesting – Tunisia is basically a European Mediterannean countries in this respect (Greece: 10%; Italy: 7%).

Algeria not bad either at 14%. Perhaps explains why there hasn’t been an Arab/Islamist “spring” there against its ageing rulers.

gcb-2017-bribery-africa

Africa – This concisely explains why Botswanans manage to maintain a pretty nice state despite very low average IQs (they have natural resouce rents from diamonds, ofc, but so does Equatorial Guinea – and far more of them – but that doesn’t translate into normal living standards for its 99%).

 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Corruption, Opinion Poll 
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I meant to write about this PEW poll when it came out this May. Better late than never, I guess.

They highlight what they consider “9 key findings” here.

Here is what I found to be the most interesting, significant, and/or surprising:

poll-east-europe-religious-demographics

This doubles as a rough demographic tally. Russia is around 10% Muslim – around the same as Georgia, and lower than Bulgaria (you rarely tend to hear about their Muslim minorities).

poll-east-europe-democracy-free-markets

View on democracy and free markets: Amusingly, the Ukraine is least pro-market, Lenin statue topplings regardless.

poll-east-europe-russia-counters-usa

Majorities in all the Orthodox countries, even including rather not exactly Russophile Georgia and Romania, look to Russia to balance the influence of the West.

Ukraine is the sole glaring but understandable exception.

Even more curiously, 50% of Croatians (Salo is doing yeoman’s work) and even 34% of Poles support this.

In contrast, Bulgaria is rather more Russia skeptical than its stereotype as a supposedly Russophile country would imply.

poll-east-europe-russia-protection

poll-russia-protec-russians

There is strong support in both Russia and amongst Russians in the Near Abroad for protecting coethnics outside its borders.

Surprisingly, there is also near universal majority support for Russia protecting Orthodox Christians and ethnic Russians outside its borders – a majority agrees even in Georgia and Romania.

There is a pronounced split between west and east Ukraine on this question. Overall support is at 38% there. (Crimea, Lugansk, and Donetsk were not polled).

poll-east-europe-whos-to-blame

Who’s to blame for the conflict in the Donbass?

poll-east-europe-superior-culture

More Orthodox believe their culture to be superior than Catholic or especially Protestant ones. Poland here is perhaps especially surprising.

poll-east-europe-atheism

Russia is considerably more atheist than Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. (I suspect almost entirely on account of the more atheist, Finno-admixed north).

Women are also universally more religious than men.

poll-east-europe-science-evolution

Acceptance of evolution. However, most curiously, the most evolution-skeptical, Armenians, also believe the most strongly that “science will eventually explain everything.”

poll-east-europe-homosexualityCaucasus almost monolithically “based” on God and homosexuals. Poland is actually pretty progressive these days.

map-east-europe-support-for-gay-marriage

Support for gay marriage based on the poll results.

I have sometimes joked that Belorussia can into Hajnal Line.

poll-east-europe-social-attitudes

That said, in geneal, opinions on social attitudes are pretty similar across Russia/Ukraine/Belarus.

poll-east-europe-diversity

That said, there doesn’t seem to be any strong correlation between “based” attitudes on God and social policy, and on the desirability of diversity.

The most pro-homogeneity peoples are the very religious Armenians and the very atheist Czechs.

poll-east-europe-fertility

This is pretty interesting – and surprising. Did Hungary produce Orban, or did Orban do this to Hungary?

poll-east-europe-stalin

Stalin remains very popular in Georgia as well as in Russia, just like 4 years ago.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Eastern Europe, Opinion Poll, Religion 
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Gallup: New Index Shows Least-, Most-Accepting Countries for Migrants

The least acceptive countries are in Eastern Europe, constituting nine of the top ten – the sole exception is Israel.

The most positive country is Iceland, with Sweden in 7th place.

Japan isn’t really the center of “basedness” that that dissident right paints it as; it is still in the immigration-welcoming First World cluster, though towards the more skeptical end of the spectrum.

The full list is attached below.

It is based on positive/negative responses to the following three questions:

  1. Immigrants living in this country
  2. An immigrant becoming your neighbor
  3. An immigrant marrying one of your close relatives

Immigration acceptance is positive correlated with education, youth, and higher incomes.

Curiously, the Russian sphere is the major exception that:

The CIS region is a notable exception to each of these global patterns — acceptance is low regardless of education, generation, income level, or whether residents live in urban or rural areas. However, in the CIS, those with less education tend to be slightly more accepting.

Also:

But in some places, who these migrants are may factor more heavily into whether they are accepted. For example, in Russia, where the index score is among the lowest in the world, more than 40% of residents say “it depends” to each of the questions.

This makes a lot of sense. It is strange that West European countries make fewer such distinctions.

***

Migrant Acceptance Index
Iceland 8.26
New Zealand 8.25
Rwanda 8.16
Sierra Leone 8.05
Mali 8.03
Australia 7.98
Sweden 7.92
Nigeria 7.76
Burkina Faso 7.74
Ireland 7.74
Norway 7.73
Ivory Coast 7.71
Benin 7.67
Luxembourg 7.54
Netherlands 7.46
Bangladesh 7.45
Spain 7.44
United States 7.27
Chad 7.26
Albania 7.22
Switzerland 7.21
Senegal 7.17
Germany 7.09
Denmark 7.09
Congo (Kinshasa) 7.05
Guinea 7.01
Togo 6.96
Ghana 6.91
Venezuela 6.82
Congo (Brazzaville) 6.81
Taiwan 6.8
Philippines 6.77
Uruguay 6.77
Zimbabwe 6.7
Lesotho 6.65
Portugal 6.65
Niger 6.64
United Kingdom 6.61
Finland 6.58
Kenya 6.51
Argentina 6.51
Paraguay 6.5
Italy 6.49
South Korea 6.49
Tunisia 6.47
France 6.46
Japan 6.42
Morocco 6.39
Saudi Arabia 6.39
Brazil 6.38
Cameroon 6.36
Central African Republic 6.36
Peru 6.33
Nepal 6.28
Belgium 6.16
Liberia 6.14
Colombia 6.13
Ecuador 6.13
Gabon 6.12
Malawi 6.1
Vietnam 6.08
Austria 6.06
Dominican Republic 6.03
Nicaragua 6
Hong Kong 5.89
Libya 5.79
United Arab Emirates 5.79
Armenia 5.78
El Salvador 5.73
South Sudan 5.63
Mauritius 5.58
Uganda 5.45
Costa Rica 5.44
Bolivia 5.42
Cyprus 5.41
Turkmenistan 5.36
Haiti 5.31
Mauritania 5.29
Madagascar 5.24
Singapore 5.21
Ethiopia 5.19
Chile 5.17
Zambia 5.15
Honduras 5.15
China 5.11
Botswana 5.1
Somalia 4.99
South Africa 4.98
Malta 4.95
India 4.9
Uzbekistan 4.9
Kuwait 4.85
Tanzania 4.82
Mexico 4.75
Northern Cyprus 4.66
Kyrgyzstan 4.59
Guatemala 4.59
Slovenia 4.42
Tajikistan 4.39
Panama 4.36
Azerbaijan 4.34
Kazakhstan 4.28
Kosovo 4.17
Iran 3.95
Indonesia 3.93
Yemen 3.93
Palestinian Territories 3.9
Lebanon 3.89
Moldova 3.8
Cambodia 3.65
Egypt 3.5
Iraq 3.42
Belarus 3.38
Greece 3.34
Poland 3.31
Turkey 3.27
Ukraine 3.15
Georgia 3.05
Jordan 2.99
Mongolia 2.99
Myanmar 2.96
Romania 2.93
Lithuania 2.72
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.71
Thailand 2.69
Russia 2.6
Afghanistan 2.51
Pakistan 2.47
Bulgaria 2.42
Croatia 2.39
Estonia 2.37
Czech Republic 2.26
Latvia 2.04
Israel 1.87
Slovakia 1.83
Serbia 1.8
Hungary 1.69
Montenegro 1.63
Macedonia 1.47

.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Immigration, Opinion Poll 
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Results of the new PEW poll on international relations.

ROG-ZOG alliance on Trump.

pew-trump-support-2017

Russia is also the major country where approval of the US went up since Trump’s election.

pew-usa-approval

These figures are however a bit outdated (they were gathered this spring).

Levada, which keeps track of Russian opinion of foreign countries, showed US approval falling from 37% in March 2017 back to 24% in May 2017 – not far from the nadir under Obama – in what must have been a response to the US strikes on Syria.

levada-russia-usa-approval

Young people are universally more supportive of American customs coming to their countries.

I can state that the figures for Russia are definitely correct.

pew-us-customs

Australians and Israelis have the only rightists who support Trump.

pew-us-support-ideology

By “far right” party opinion:

pew-us-support-ideology-2

Pretty much everyone opposes Trump’s wall, though it is perhaps hard to see how it is anybody’s except Mexico’s business.

pew-support-wall

More Indians and Africans (!) want Trump to create Tropical Hyperborea than Russians. How sad.

pew-support-trump-climate-withdrawal

Here is how Trump stacks up against Merkel, Xi Jinping, and Putin.

pew-trump-putin-merkel

 
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Latest poll on the “greatest people of all times and places”:

1989 1994 1999 2003 2008 2012 2017
Stalin 12 20 35 40 36 42 38
Putin 21 32 22 34
Pushkin 25 23 42 39 47 29 34
Lenin 72 34 42 43 34 37 32
Peter the Great 38 41 45 43 37 37 29
Gagarin 15 8 26 33 25 20 20
Tolstoy 13 8 12 12 14 24 12
Zhukov 19 14 20 22 23 15 12
Catherine II 10 10 11 8 11 11
Lermontov 5 5 9 10 9 8 11
Lomonosov 20 13 18 17 17 15 10
Suvorov 17 18 18 16 16 12 10
Mendeleev 13 6 12 13 13 12 10
Napoleon 6 19 19 13 9 13 9
Brezhnev 6 8 12 9 12 8
Einstein 9 5 6 7 7 7 7
Esenin 2 3 5 6 5 7
Kutuzov 10 11 11 10 11 12 7
Newton 6 3 4 6 6 6 7
Gorbachev 10 4 8 6 6 6

Putin’s #2 position is absurd, even if you have a positive opinion of his record, while places #1 and #4 are just depressing.

I explained the causes of modern Russian Stalinophilia in an earlier post:

One would think that given Stalin’s actual record, which was sordid enough, you would not need to “blackwash” him any further, but ideologues will be ideologues, so what happened happened, and next thing you know many people started suspecting that given the false facts and figures being pushed about Stalin – demonstrated so by the newly accessible archival evidence itself – then maybe they were lying about everything else as well, and well maybe Stalin was actually the good guy after all, maligned by his bitter and limp-wristed successors who “sold out” the Glorious Leader.

And thus a huge strand of the Russian “patriotic” opposition to the liberal neocon hegemony of the 1990s, which had decidedly triumphed by the end of Putin’s first term, had in the process also become infested with Stalinophilia – even though it is not really compatible with Russian patriotism, let alone Russian nationalism (which the Communists, including Stalin, ruthlessly persecuted). The tendency of Stalin’s popularity to wax and wane in sync with the state of Russia’s relations with the West – lower when they are good, and higher when they are bad – strongly suggests that the debate over Stalin in Russia has nothing to do with real history. Instead, it is merely one of several tribal identifiers in politics, much like denial of global warming is a tenet of the Red Tribe and blank slatism is a tenet of the Blue Tribe, both of which have everything to do with American-specific politics and nothing to do with science. In Russia’s case, this Stalinist identifier – like the broader patriotic Great Patriotic War ideology onto which it has affixed itself – gets deflated and boosted whenever Russia veers between globalist integrationism and siege mentality, respectively.

Stalinophilia is a joint creation of sovoks and liberals.

The sovoks because many of them are the equivalent of America’s 95 IQ patriotards, and the ethnoliberals because they want to demonize and further dismantle Russia.

On the plus side, at least Lenin is slowly fading from the scene, the traitor and outright Russophobe made into the secular equivalent of a founding prophet in the USSR.

This suggests something encouraging – that it is not sovoks, but vatniks, who are beginning to worship Stalin.

But they are doing so not out of any love for scientific communism and similar crap, but because of their misdirected nationalist instincts.

With the correct changes in propaganda, vatniks will be demanding the toppling of Lenin statues and the restoration of the Russian Empire in no time at all.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Iosef Stalin, Opinion Poll, Russia 
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The figures for Russia are from Levada, those for Ukraine are from KMIS.

poll-ukraine-russia-relations-positive-negative

poll-ukraine-russia-relations-ideal

The basic story is that there was a (mutual) collapse in Ukraine-Russia views of the other country around 2014, which has remained steady since.

 
• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Opinion Poll, Russia, Ukraine, War in Donbass 
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In my coverage of the French elections, I’ve been vaccilating between optimism and pessimism. Obviously, Le Pen’s result – 34% of the vote – was unprecedentedly good, and her popularity seemed to be especially strong amongst French youth. On the other hand, it was perhaps not as good a result as could have been expected, considering she was facing off against the embodiment of an empty suit politician and representative of a political system that has worked hard to delegitimize itself in the past decade. In particular, her failures to make any inroads amongst the French intellectual and professional class, who control 90%+ of the media and universities, is particularly concerning.

Since then, I’ve taken the time to look through French post-elections opinion polls, and I am now leaning much more towards the pessimist side of things. I will mostly refrain from editorializing and just lay out the data, and maybe some of you could come up with a more positive interpretation.

1. IFOP: Comprehensive profile of French voters in the second tour.

france-elections-abstention-historical(a) The commenter AP has suggested that the reason MLP performed reasonably well amongst younger French is because more of them stayed home. Indeed, at 25% of the electorate, the rate of abstention in this election has been the highest since 1969.

Moreover, just as AP posited, abstentionism was concentrated Melenchon supporters (36%) and 18-24 year olds (33%) and 25-34 year olds (34%).

According to this poll, 81% of Melenchon voters in the first round ended up voting for Macron anyway (of those who voted at all, obviously). Any talk of “Red-Brown” alliances remains as chimeric as always.

(b) In the OpinionWay poll released soon after the French elections, it appeared that French women – unusually for nationalist parties – were relatively more supportive of MLP than the men (37% to 33%). This would have been pretty encouraging, since women tend to be more conformist, and a better result for MLP amongst them would imply nationalist ideas are infiltrating the mainstream and becoming less tabboo.

ipros-poll-le-pen-womenTwo consequent polls put paid to that, though. In this poll, men were more supportive of MLP than women (36% to 33%), and another IPSOS poll confirmed that picture (38% to 32%).

Still nowhere close to the 10% point or more gap in male/female voting in the recent US elections, but not a curious exception either.

(c) The biggest #blackpill, though, is the indication that support for MLP ebbs amongst the youngest age group, despite their high abstentionism.

Opinion polls in France have been conflicted on this question:

In particular, a voter poll released just now by OpinionWay is extremely encouraging – an amazing 44% of 18-24 year olds said they had voted for Marine Le Pen, compared to just 20% of over 65 year olds… This standards in positive contrast to a poll from the first round, which suggested that Le Pen’s support peaked at 29% in the 35-49 year old bracket, before declining to 21% amongst the youngest voters. It would also be a confirmation of polls from 2015 which indicated that support for the Front National increased monotonically as voters became younger.

OpinionWay, which has a sample of almost 8,000, shouldn’t be dismissed. On the other hand, though, the IFOP survey supports the interpretation that support for MLP peaks amongst the middle-aged, then begins to fall again amongst the youngest voters.

ifop-poll-france-elections-2017-age-groups

2. Some more observations:

(a) The majority of Macron voters in the second round (57%) were not voting for Macron per se, but against Le Pen.

(b) There were… debates, about who had won the debates. This poll suggests it was Macron – more voters thought more favorably of him afterwards (10%) than of MLP (6%).

financial-times-france-elections-2017-education(c) The Coming Apart thesis: Of Macron’s voters, 80% said they had benefited from globalization, or at least not lost from it; in constrast, of Le Pen’s voters, some 74% said they were losers from globalization.

Also, a striking graphic from (see right) from The Financial Times in support: Macron won 84% of the vote in the 10th decile of France’s most educated communes, versus 53% in the least educated decile.

(d) As per usual, MLP remains the candidate of the French siloviks:

…In Versailles, it is shown by the two voting stations in the Satory plateau (No. 10 and No. 11). Marine Le Pen got 64.61% and 53.34% there respectively, against 35.39% and 46.66% for Emmanuel Macron. These are the only voting stations in Versailles that don’t put Macron far ahead. In the town, Macron got 76.15% and Le Pen 23.85%. Abstention was slightly higher on the Satory plateau than in the rest of Versailles. The only people living on the Satory plateau are gendarmes, military personnel and civilians working in the defence industry who benefit from social housing.
The same observation in Nanterre, with voting station 14 which corresponds to the Republic Guard barracks. Marine Le Pen was in front with 54.04% against 45.96% for Macron. The contrast with the rest of the city is also striking here: Macron 83.15% and Le Pen 16.85%.

3. IFOP: Confessional voting:

(i) Abstentionism at about 25% for all religious denominations, except Muslims, of whom 38% abstained.

(ii) Macron actually got a higher result (71%) amongst practicing Catholics than irregular (54%) and non-practising ones(61%). I assume on account of the age difference. The irreligious voted 70% for Macron. Muslims – a near monolithic 92%.

ifop-poll-france-2017-by-religion

They also asked whom they had voted for in the first round. Fillon is the President of the Catholics. And Muslims vote highly Leftist: 37% for Melenchon, almost twice the national average, and 17% for the Socialist candidate Hamon, almost three times as high as the national average.

ifop-poll-france-2017-by-religion-first-round

4. The only foreign country where Le Pen won? Syria, LOL. (h/t Mohsen)

france-elections-2016-le-pen-macron-abroad

5. But speaking of Syria, even in the event of an MLP win, their celebration might be premature. While browsing through IFOP’s database of polls, I discovered one more #blackpill for your delectation.

The Front National portrays itself as an anti-immigration, non-interventionist party, and the former at least is definitely true – only 4% of MLP voters support immigration, versus 30% of conservative (Sarkozy) and 60% of leftist (Melenchon/Hollande) voters.

Unfortunately, it seems to be much weaker on the anti-intervention side of the equation.

In the wake of Trump’s strike on Syria, IFOP polled the French on whether they agreed with it or not, and the results are as astounding as they are depressing.

ifop-poll-2017-support-for-syria-strikes

62% of Front National voters and MLP supporters supported the strikes – that is virtually the same as those evil “globalist” En Marche!/Macron supporters.

Ergo for Fillon/conservative voters. Hamon supporters were 50/50, while Melenchon voters were actually opposed, at 45% to 55%.

This raises a disquieting scenario. Assume Marine Le Pen was to get into power by some miracle, and were to find herself hobbled by the universal hostility towards her populist-nationalist program from within and without.

What could she then do to break the deadlock?

Well, if the Trump experience is anything to go by, why not bomb some brown people in the Third World in the wake of the next round of dubious atrocity propaganda, with the quiet approval of her own electorate and the jingoistic cheers of the “moderate” centrists, who will go on to reward her “Presidential” actions with a few weeks of support before digging in their talons again.

 
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I haven’t been able to locate any international surveys on Macron vs. Le pen like there were for Trump, unsurprisingly so, since France is after all less important than the US.

Still, I have been able to find polls from Germany, Russia, and the UK.

***

zdf-poll-germany-le-pen

According to a ZDF poll of who would be better for Germany (April 28), some 90% of Germans supported Macron (adjusting for “don’t knows”).

Even AfD voters only favor Le Pen by the thinnest of margins.

***

. Total Moscow & SPB cities with ~1M people cities with 500k-1000k cities with 100k-500k cities with <100k Rural
Macron 8 9 8 11 5 11 6
Le Pen 61 69 61 63 63 57 58
Neither/don’t care 26 18 27 24 24 30 28
No answer 5 4 4 2 8 2 8

According to a VCIOM poll of whom Russians sympathize with (May 2), Marine Le Pen would beat Macron 86%-14%.

That is almost the exact inverse of her results in Germany.

***

yougov-poll-uk-le-pen

Curiously, even though they disliked Trump almost as much as the average German, the Brits have a much more positive outlook on Le Pen according to a YouGov poll (April 24).

Only 53% of Brits thought Macron would be better for Britain.

The results, predictably, followed party lines. Labour, the LibDems, and the SNP were strongly for Macron; the Conservatives leaned towards Le Pen; and UKIP was overwhelmingly for Le Pen.

This is basically an extension of attitudes towards Brexit.

yougov-poll-uk-le-pen-brexit

This makes sense. At a minimum, a Le Pen in power in France would make the UK’s own process of exiting the EU much easier.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Brexit, Elections, France, Opinion Poll 
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The other day a Levada poll was released showing an apparently lackluster performance by Navalny in a hypothetical Presidential race against Putin and the other candidates.

If there were elections on the coming Sunday, who would you vote for? (The figures below exclude those said they don’t know, or don’t intend to vote).

Apr13 Apr14 Apr15 Jan16 Apr17
Putin 64 81 82 83 83
Zhirinovsky 7 6 5 4 5
Zyuganov 13 7 9 6 4
Shoigu 3 2 <1 3 2
Navalny <1 <1 1 1 2
Medvedev 3 <1 <1 <1 1
Mironov 1 1 1 1 1
Prokhorov 4 1 1 1 <1
Other 4 2 1 2 2

This seems very bad for “Alexey 2 Percent,” as he was just styled by the great Paul Robinson.

On the one hand, he is certainly correct in his main point that one shouldn’t be rushing to buy the hype around Navalny generated by the Western media.

OTOH, I don’t think it’s quite as catastrophic for Navalny as the professor makes it out to be. For instance, in February 2012, (adjusted for non-voter’s/don’t knows) about 6% of Russians intended to vote for Prokhorov. In the event, he got 8%, which would have been closer to 9% without electoral fraud.

Of perhaps greater relevance, Levada and VCIOM opinion polls were giving the Kremlin-backed candidate Sobyanin about 70% versus 9-13% for Navalny in the Moscow mayoral election of 2013. In the event, Sobyanin only narrowly avoided a second round with 51% to Navalny’s 27%.

navalny-voting-intentions Even more worrying for the Kremlin though is that the percentage of Russians saying they were “probably” or “definitely” going to vote for Navalny increased from the 5% level he enjoyed from March 2012 to February 2017 (i.e. encompassing the period of the Moscow elections) to 10% in March 2017 following the release of the Medvedev corruption video.

Now just to make it clear I am not implying that Navalny is any sort of serious electoral threat to Putin – at least for now. In particular, the President’s ratings are at a consistent ~80% since Crimea, whereas during the 2012-13 period they were hovering at a nadir of ~60%.

Putin’s relatively greater popularily will, presumably, mostly or even wholly cancel out Navalny’s momentum.

And, of course, the question of whether Navalny will even be allowed to run is still an open one. Just a few hours ago a Russian court upheld the five year suspended sentence given to Navalny for the Kirovles Affair, which might be grounds for formally barring him from the Presidential race – though as in 2013, it is possible that it will not be enforced. Still, I’m not going to bet on that. Navalny is far more charismatic than Prokhorov, he is the only liberal candidate with a reasonable chance of making inroads into the (considerably bigger) nationalist electorate, and the recent attack on him by kremlin-affiliated thugs – which threatens to make him blind in one eye, if his own assertions are true – might create a martyr effect for him (as the murky dioxin poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko in 2004, which helped drive Ukrainians to stage the Orange Revolution). It would not be wise for the kremlins to risk a Navalny run.

One other very interesting, and even more interesting development, is the complete collapse of Zyuganov’s (Communist) support – he has gone from 13% in April 2013, to just 5% today; practically level pegging with the nationalist Zhirinovsky, who has also declined, but by a far more modest degree, despite losing part of his nationalist base to Putin after Crimea.

russia-elections-2016-party-support-age-group As I have long pointed out, the Red base of pensioners is dying out – there are three times fewer Communist voters in the youngest age group versus the oldest, whereas the LDPR’s share, conversely, doubles – and the demographics are now fast translating into electoral politics.

What this means in practice is that in the unlikely scenario that Navalny does run, I strongly suspect that he and Putin will between them compress the two fossils of Russian politics – that is, Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky – into the single digits, and will manage to come a distant second, perhaps 15% to Putin’s 70%.

 
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Should the government try to limit the inflow of immigrants, or should it not place any administrative barriers and try to use it for the benefit of Russia?

levada-russia-opinion-about-immigrations

 

Red = Restrict immigration; Blue = Don’t place barriers; Green = N/A.

russian-emigration-immigration-1997-2015

This makes sense. The early 2000s saw an all time low in immigration to Russia – the influx of ethnic Russians from the Near Abroad had abated by that period, while the economy was not yet strong enough to attract masses of Central Asian labor.

From the mid-2000s, large numbers of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz have been rotating in and out, with the occassional dip during recessions.

If there is one thing that Navalny can capitalize on, it is this graph. Still, there’s no need to overstress its significance. After all, discotent with immigration was similarly high by 2011-12, and Navalny’s nativist credentials then were far stronger, but he was unable to turn it into any significant political success.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Immigration, Opinion Poll, Russia 
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One of the reasons that I consider the results of these elections to have been strongly disappointing for the Front National is that it represents not just a stunting but a reversal of their upwards trend since the late 2000s.

For instance, back in December 2015, the Front National almost doubled their share of the vote in the regional elections relative to 2012 (and a tripling relative to 2010). Even though they failed to win a single region, it represented a strong surge that seemed to augur very well for the future.

But whereas their results at the local and regional party level surged upwards up until 2015, Le Pen’s result this time represents at best a stagnation or possibly an outright regress in the light of the halcyon days of 2014-2015. This becomes especially clear when you extend the graph I compiled in 2015 to the current day:

france-elections-2017-historical-context

What happened?

france-support-fn-by-age-group One encouraging thing from 2015 was that support for the FN was highest amongst the young age groups: 35% amongst the 18-24 years olds, versus ~30% amongst the 25-60′s and 20% amongst the over 60s.

This seemed to represent a general trend across many European nations where “conservatism” amongst the older generations (which is “Communism” in Russia’s case) transmutated into nationalism amongst the younger generations.

Now, this trend has come to an end in France, and has even begun to reverse.

france-elections-2017-age-group-vote

In 2017, the most avid supporters of Le Pen are the 35-49 year olds, falling to 24% amongst the 25-34′s and to 21% amongst the 18-24′s.

Now yes, to be sure, there is a Muslim/immigrant demographic effect here, which does somewhat dampen the nationalist vote amongst the younger generations (though this makes it no less electorally real). This is because of the well known fact that Muslims are much younger on average than France as a whole.

france-elections-2017-vote-by-religion According to a recent IFOP poll (see right), the far left Melenchon enjoys almost twice as much support from Muslims as he does from the country as a whole; another 17% of them support the socialist Hamon, three times as much as his all-country average. Conversely, only 5% of them vote for Le Pen, versus 21.3% overall.

And indeed, it is perhaps a telling coincidence that whereas Le Pen’s support falls by 8% points from the 35-49 age group to the 18-24 age group, conversely, Melenchon’s support increases by the same amount.

Still, even the youngest voting generations outside the Île-de-France are still solidly majority French, so the Muslim factor can only account for a minor part of the difference. The logical conclusion, then, is that Le Pen has simply stopped growing on the youngest generations of ethnic Frenchmen, if not gone into outright reverse.

For any French or European nationalist, this is doubleplusungood no matter how you spin it.

What makes this even worse is that I don’t think this is explainable on account of Marine Le Pen’s antipathy towards the EU or her statist economic program (as argued by the Russian liberal nationalist Egor Prosvirnin, who has mocking called her Marine Ivanovna Kurginyana).

Again, as with Russia, the trick is to look at the opinion polls.

france-support-for-eu-by-age-group According to this IFOP poll from April 2017 (see right), there is hardly any significant difference in support for the EU (specifically, agreement that France is stronger by dint of its membership of the EU) across different age groups: 69% for the 18-24′s, ~60% for the 24-65′s, and 68% for the 65+s. However, there is a clear separation across party lines: Whereas 80% of the mainstream political forces support the EU, and 60% of Melenchon’s leftists, for the FN/Le Pen this figure is just above 20%. She is not going to get trainloads of Parisian hipsters hopping aboard by reversing her policies on the EU.

economist-support-for-free-markets-france As regards economic policy, consider the basic fact of the election itself: The “neoliberal” candidates, Macron and Fillon, got 67% amongst the oldest age group, versus 27% amongst the young; in contrast, the basic income supporter Hamon and the commie Melenchon got 40%.

In tandem with the observation that the French have always been one of the most anti-capitalist nations, more so than even Russians, and considering who forms the core of the Front National’s support – blue-collar workers in the depressed post-industrial towns of the North-East rustbelt – it is absolutely clear that any significant shift towards a more neoliberal economic platform would be a disaster.

Note that all this is quite independent from any discussion about the purely economic merits of this or that economic platform. I would only make one last point that Le Pen’s economic platform is actually quite moderate in comparison with both that of Melenchon and Hamon.

Ultimately, I think Le Pen is just playing a bad hand just about as well as she could. Its just not enough to win this year, and I am now skeptical about 2022 as well.

Because in the end, a 2-7 offsuit will lose against any other hand.

That losing hand is the mentality of the French themselves, who have decided that one dead immigrant child washed up on their beaches through the neglect of his own parents is worse than having dozens of their own children blown up in the theaters of Paris or mowed down on the streets of Nice.

There are only one or two more decades left in which the French could continue indulging their ethnomasochism. After that, the preservation of the traditional French way of life – at least through democratic and constitutional means – will become permanently untenable.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Elections, European Right, France, Opinion Poll 
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Almost two weeks since the street protests against corruption, the first poll results have started to trickle in, and the provide a mixed picture.

(1) Politician Approval Ratings

Putin’s approval rating remains at 82% as of this March, almost unbudged from February’s 84%. On the other hand, the approval rating of Prime Minister Medvedev, the main target of Navalny’s anti-corruption video, have plummeted from 52% to 42%.

(2) Navalny’s Video

7% of Russians claim to have seen Navalny’s video, which tallies well with the 17.7 million views it has received on YouTube as of the time of writing. Another 11% haven’t seen it but claim to be familiar with its contents, and another 20% have heard of it but without many details. 60% haven’t heard of it.

Of this 38% of Russians who are somewhat familiar with the video, some 27% are confident that it is entirely true, and another 45% believe that it is likely to be true, although accept that the accusations might not be entirely reliable. 16% think it is entirely false, and 13% don’t have an opinion.

However, 75% of respondents aware of the video think that it is a typical phenomenon amongst the Russian elites, whereas only 12% think it is an unusual case.

Questioning all Russians, some 17% believe that neither Putin nor Medvedev are involved with corruption; 30% think that the accusations against Medvedev are true, but that Putin is clean; while 38% think that all the country’s leaders are involved in corruption. 14% are unsure.

(3) Navalny’s Ratings

Awareness of Navalny has been increasing through the period fo the 2011-12 protests and peaking at around the time of the 2013 Moscow elections. It waned a bit during 2014-16, but in the past month, he has fully regained all the lost ground.

navalny-awareness-rating

Moreover, the share of Russians who had both heard of Navalny, and who said they were “certainly” or “possibly” going to vote for Navalny, doubled from a stable 5% during the period from from 2012 to February 2017, to 10% in March 2017, after the release of his video on Medvedev.

navalny-voting-intentions

That said, Navalny retains a significant “antirating” – that is, Russians who say they are “probably” or “definitely” not going to vote of him – of 40%. This high antirating, which is probably linked to his outspoken opposition to the Crimean referendum and the Novorossiya project – which alienated most of his nationalist base – will be difficult for Navalny to overcome. Ultimately, while Russians are cynical about the moral qualities of their elites, this same cynicism limits the extent to which you can run a political campaign in Russia based just on anti-corruption.

Nonetheless, the kremlinites have no good reason to be particularly complacent either. For instance, a 5% voting intention in March 2013 still translated into a 27% share of the vote in the Moscow mayoral elections against United Russia functionary Sergey Sobyanin, who has the reputation of a competent and reasonably clean bureaucrat (by Russian standards). Now one certainly shouldn’t generalize to Russia, because Moscow is by far Russia’s most “liberal” region; for every Muscovite hipster, there are ten Uralvagonzavod vatniks. Nonetheless, the discrepancy does imply that a lot of the undecideds and those who haven’t heard of Navalny are partial to his message.

 
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In my 2017 predictions, I wrote:

Russians have a more positive view of the US than of the EU as of the last Levada poll in that year: 60%.

Latest polls:

russia-approval-usa-eu

The gap is only 2 points now.

Republicans, at least are returning the favor.

us-approval-of-russia

The New Cold War might well be petering out in a premature end.

The Germans are far less happy with Trump, though.

german-approval-of-usa

Feel free to spy on their Chancellor to your heart’s content, but don’t you dare refuse to accept Infinity Moslems into your country.

 
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I have been thinking about how to optimize my blogging and I would like to ask for your input with the following one page survey:

http://darussophile.polldaddy.com/s/june-2016-akarlin-reader-survey

In particular, I would like to hear from you on the following questions:

  1. What should I write more about?
  2. What should I write less about?
  3. What sorts of posts do you prefer (longer, shorter)?
  4. Do you want more reviews?
  5. Do you want me to resume open threads? (which I promised and then slowly discontinued)
  6. Your assessment of the quality of the posts, the comments, and the website.
  7. Do you follow me on social media?

Preliminary Thoughts

I don’t thrive on making short posts like Steve Sailer. You need a predictable schedule and a regular work ethic for that and I don’t really possess either. Also, the three “slots” I have on the Unz.com front page aren’t ideal for more frequent shorter posts. Moreover, one can make a more general point that it is the longer, more indepth material that tends to get noted and cited in the longterm. I am as big a fan of Sailer as anyone here, but in terms of name recognition, the father of HBD lags Nicholas Wade, Charles Murray, and probably even Greg Cochran and Henry Harpending, all of whom have published best-selling books on closely related topics. While progress on my own book has been nothing to write home about, I am seriously considering at least making a habit of writing longer, more indepth articles.

In general I think in the grand hierarchy social media < short posts < longreads < books. This is why the emergence of Twitter, Facebook, etc. are so overestimated. They amplify short-term noise, but in the overall scheme of things they contribute nothing to global progress and understanding (indeed by rewiring so many brains from deep analytical mode to dopamine-fueled reaction mode they might even have retarded it). Besides, both platforms are fast sinking into politicized censorship. Personally, for the past several years, I have mostly used social media just to advertise my own blog posts. But maybe I should put my money where my mouth is and put them into archive mode entirely except for the occasional big announcement. But first I want to find out exactly what percentage of readers here follow me on my social media accounts.

I am also considering introducing more stringent moderation. I am one of the few authors on this website who doesn’t premoderate, and my general comments policy is extremely lax. Perhaps too much so, since it seems to me that more and more commentators have been taking it as a licence to troll, spam, shitpost, and otherwise pursue their particular obsessions even when the post topic has nothing to do with them. This normally wouldn’t matter on modern commenting platforms such as Disqus, where these SIFs (Single Issue Fanatics) are typically downvoted into oblivion, but there is no such mechanism on linear commenting systems. So from now on I am considering becoming much more proactive about redacting stupid and off topic posts, and if necessary, banning repeat offenders. Then again, if most people are satisfied with the way things are, I will refrain from fixing something that isn’t broken. You tell me!

 
• Category: Miscellaneous • Tags: Administration, Opinion Poll 
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According to the latest figures from Gallup, only 1% of Russians approve of the US leadership.

russian-approval-us-leadership-2016

This is quite impressive. Not often you get such extreme figures.

Although the percentage of truly committed “zapadniks” in Russia is not high, around 15% at most, I do think the data must have taken a sharp turn down within the confidence interval. The figures for last year where 4%.

Incidentally, according to the independent Russian polling organization Levada, whereas positive impressions of the US as a country (not the leadership as with Gallup) plummeted to a record low of 12% by 2015, since then there has been a marginal recovery back up to around 20%. So, not a major change, but a minor uptick nonetheless.

russian-approval-us-2016

From the full Gallup report, here is a list of the ten countries with the dimmest view of the US leadership (China was not included in the survey):

. + -
Syria 20% 71%
Iran 19% 51%
Lebanon 18% 72%
Serbia 16% 56%
Yemen 15% 69%
Egypt 10% 62%
Belarus 9% 67%
Palestine 9% 79%
Kazakhstan 8% 70%
Russia 1% 89%

So that’s basically Russia+ and various Middle East countries it has bombed/invaded/tried to color revolution.

Iraq is a strong net negative, but at 30% approval, nowhere near the bottom of the list. Even Ukraine is a net negative, with 35% approval and 40% disapproval.

Countries with the most positive outlooks on the US leadership include a whole bunch of African countries topped by Congo-Brazzaville (80%); Kosovo (85%), Albania (74%), and the UK (65%) in Europe; and Cambodia (74%) in Asia.

 
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Many puzzling sociological developments can be explained through opinion polls. According to recent YouGov polls carried out in the US and Britain:

(1) Only 30% of American 18-29 year old men describe themselves as “completely” masculine, compared to 65% of over 65s.

gender2a

(2) If you are of the opinion this isn’t a great trend then prepare to get triggered even harder – Only 2% of 18-24 year old men describe themselves as “completely” masculine (relative to 56% of over 65s), while 14% of 18-24 year old women describe themselves as “completely” feminine (versus 59% of over 65s).

genderAge

(3) “British masculinity is a fraction of America’s.”

USUKgender

(4) … and is quickly becoming a dirty word. 42% of young British men have a negative impression of masculinity, more than the 39% who have a positive impression of it. In fact, they appear to dislike masculinity even more than young British women, of whom only 27% have a negative impression of “masculinity.”

masc

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Masculinity, Opinion Poll 
Anatoly Karlin
About Anatoly Karlin

I am a blogger, thinker, and businessman in the SF Bay Area. I’m originally from Russia, spent many years in Britain, and studied at U.C. Berkeley.

One of my tenets is that ideologies tend to suck. As such, I hesitate about attaching labels to myself. That said, if it’s really necessary, I suppose “liberal-conservative neoreactionary” would be close enough.

Though I consider myself part of the Orthodox Church, my philosophy and spiritual views are more influenced by digital physics, Gnosticism, and Russian cosmism than anything specifically Judeo-Christian.