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Population size doesn’t matter much if your goal is to live as a small, comfy, unambitious Switzerland or Singapore. But a large population, along with a sufficiently high IQ, remains of sine qua non of being a Great Power or superpower.

France went from having 20% of Europe’s population during the reign of the Sun King, when it was Europe’s preeminent Great Power with its largest armies, to being dwarfed by Germany (40mn to 67mn, and the Germans had twice as many young men) by the outbreak of WW1. Consequently, the French only managed to scrape out a Pyrrhic victory thanks to American intervention. And they would have been crushed in 1914 had Britain decided not to uphold its treaty obligations.

In the modern world, a large population also vital for fostering a strong, self-sustaining national IT industry. Since unit costs in software are minimal, countries such as US and China with large, unified markets have an advantage in this sphere well beyond the usual benefits of economies of scale. Furthermore, Switzerland and Singapore are never going to colonize space, or be able to embark on many other grand world-historical projects. The US, China, maybe even India might, with their populations in the 100 millions and GDPs in the tens of trillions. Russia or Japan, with their populations in the tens of millions and GDPs in the mere trillions – probably not.

Increasing fertility towards the upper bounds of what was historically observed in the industrialized world – e.g., TFR=4 in the US during the late 1950s – is basically a cheat code for massively augmenting your national power over the course of just a couple of generations.

Online simulation that you can play with:

For instance, assume the Poles decided to become really stronk, and raised their TFR to 4 children per woman with immediate effect. They’d approach Russia’s current population by 2100. Poland’s historical security problems with respect to their western and eastern neighbors would be definitively solved.

Meanwhile, if Russia were to do that, it would have half the population of China by 2100. This would be perfectly okay since North Eurasia can support at least 1-2 billion people, and an order of magnitude more with radical global warming.

The only developed country that is doing something along these lines is Israel. Steve Sailer recently wrote about increasing fertility there, which is driven exclusively by the Jews and now stands at 3.1 children per woman. If it just maintains this pace throughout this century – and it may even increase further, since the Haredim continue skyrocketing as a share of the population – then there may be close to 30 million Israelis by the end of the century. Israel will go from being outnumbered 1:10 by Iran to just a bit more than 1:2.

How to activate this cheat code?

1. Highly fertile religious minorities: Haredim, Amish, Mormons, etc. But they come with well-known problems, their rate of “defections” into the general population decreases as those of their progeny who find their lifestyle non-congenial “boil off,” and in any case Israel is the only country where they constitute a high enough percentage of the population to have a discernible demographic effect.

2. Recreating the 1950s: I.e., hardcore social conservatism + 5% annual GDP growth rates. Too intractable a task, but it doesn’t hurt to try. Just don’t go overboard with overly coercive measures because then young people will hate you, overthrow your regime, and undo everything anyway (see Romania).

3. Just wait a couple of centuries for breeders to literally outbreed the rearers.

4. Technology, again.

Obviously quantity isn’t everything. Average IQ plays an even bigger role. Switzerland generates approximately two orders of magnitude more elite scientific research than all of (non-RSA) Black Africa. Countries that start large-scale radical IQ augmentation programs through gene editing will enjoy a massive advantage, even if the gap is only a few years.

But why not both? Randall Parker suggests mature gene editing technologies will be highly pro-natal for a couple of reasons. First, gene selection for IQ and positive personality traits means no more disappointing children, which was always likely for high IQ parents due to regression to the mean. Second, since parents want grandchildren, many will choose genes that make their children have a stronger instinctive desire to have kids. So basically compressing #3 to within a single generation.

• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Futurism, I.Q. genomics 
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Last year’s summary: Russian Demographics in 2017

Preliminary data for 2017 is in.



There were about 1,689,884 (11.5/1,000) births in 2017, a decline of 10.7% relative to the 1,893,256 (12.9/1,000) births in 2016. There were about 1,824,340 (12.4/1,000) deaths in 2017, a decline of 3.4% relative to the 1,887,913 (12.9/1,000) deaths in 2016.

Consequently, the rate of natural increase declined from 5,343 (0.0/1,000) in 2016, to -134,456 (-0.9/1,000) in 2017.

Unlike the pattern in previous years, the decline seems to have been concentrated in ethnic Russian regions; births declined by only 6% in Buryatia and Tuva, by 5% in Dagestan, and outright increased by 5% in Chechnya and 8% in Ingushetia.

The population was estimated at 146,877,088 as of Jan 1, 2018, up from 146,838,993 exactly one year ago. This implies about 172,551 long-term net immigration.


Russian fertility fell off a cliff in the second half of 2016, though there are tentative signs that it may have bottomed out in recent months.


Monthly births in Russia, 2006-2017, with yearly moving average.


Monthly births in Russia (percent change year-on-year), 2007-2017 , with yearly moving average.

Consequently, I calculate Russian TFR was ~1.61 children per woman in 2017, down from 1.76 in 2016.


Russia Total Fertility Rate (children per woman), 1946-2017.

Russian birth rates were long expected to start decreasing due to the demographic “echo” of the small 1990s cohort – that they managed to hold at a plateau through to 2016, despite strong downwards pressure accruing from the ~3% yearly collapse in the numbers of women of childbearing age, was actually rather impressive.

map-fertility-europe But this year, it’s as if the floodgates finally opened, and then some.

This is a disappointing development if it represents a new normal.

First, whereas Russia was doing significantly better than most of the rest of Eastern Europe (see the map right), and showed tentative signs of breaking out into the high-fertility category of European countries (e.g. Scandinavia, France, the British Isles), this has now been postponed – possibly indefinitely.

Second, whereas before Russia was firmly on my Medium scenario for natality (and High scenario for mortality)…

Medium (TFR=1.75 from 2010)The population grows from 2010, rising from 142mn to 148mn in 2025 and 156mn in 2050. The death rate troughs at 10.8 in 2034, before zooming in to 11.5 by 2050. The birth rate peaks at 13.6 by 2014, before plummeting to 9.7 in 2033, before recovering to 11.9 in 2046 and again falling, although less rapidly than before.

… It is now half-way back towards the Low scenario, which is considerably more pessimistic:

Low (TFR=1.5 from 2010)Population growth starts from 2011, going from 142mn to 143mn by 2023. Then it falls slowly to 138mn by 2050. The birth rate peaks at 12.5 in 2013, falls sharply to 7.8 by 2032, and then remains in the 8-9 range. The death rate troughs at 11.4 in 2032, then rises to 12.9 by 2050. Positive natural increase is never attained.

Curiously, this seems to be a global pattern.

  • American TFR fell from 1.84 in 2015 and 1.82 in 2016, to approximately 1.77 children per woman in 2017.
  • Births fell by 8% in the Ukraine this year, so its TFR will decline from 1.47 in 2016 to around 1.40 in 2017. Like Russia, the Ukraine had a recession – though a far steeper one.
  • Births fell by 6% in Latvia and 3% in Estonia.
  • Commenter Cicerone: “Big drops (my forecasts based on published birth figures): Norway 1.71 to 1.62, Sweden 1.85 to 1.78, Finland 1.57 to 1.49, Russia 1.76 to 1.60, Ukraine 1.47 to 1.37, USA 1.82 to 1.75, New Zealand 1.87 to 1.77, South Korea 1.17 to 1.05, Hong Kong 1.21 to 1.15, Macao 1.14 to 1.05 and Singapore 1.20 to 1.14. (For Korea at least there is a drop every 12 years because of the zodiac. For the Nordics and the Anglo countries, the drops are simply a continuation of the trend since 2008. No idea about the rest.) Only countries prob seeing a TFR rise: Portugal, Italy (recovery from crisis), Visegrad-5 and Germany. In most other developed countries, TFR will drop significantly. As the declines continue despite economic recovery, it seems to be a real cultural change. Probably fallout from the SJWs? Millennials in the West giving up on having children?
  • Annatar: “TFR also falling in France, Spain and Japan this year, though at slower rate, TFR falling in Kazakhstan as well, seems to be a wider trend, wonder what happened in 2016 to cause this.”

Abortion in Russia continues to decline to normal country levels.


Russia abortions as percentage of live births.

This is still about 2-3x higher than in most of Western Europe and the US, but Russia is longer the absolute outlier it once was.


Based on the decrease in mortality, I calculate that life expectancy was ~72.9 years in 2017, setting it way above its Soviet era local peaks in the mid-1960s and late 1980s.


Russia life expectancy, 1959-2017.

As has usually been the case, this was accompanied by continued strong decreases in deaths from external causes.


Russia mortality / 100,000 from external causes.

This includes deaths from murder, suicide, and deaths from alcohol poisonings, the latter of which drives a great deal of Russian mortality in general.


Russia mortality / 100,000 from murder, suicide, and alcohol poisoning.

What I wrote in my demographic update last year is as relevant as ever:

One way of looking at this is that mortality trends in Russia are basically tracking improvements in the ex-Soviet Baltics (and the City of Moscow) with a lag of ten years, so there is good reason to expect this trend will continue.

This is primarily linked to the big reduction in vodka bingeing during the past decade, which depressed Russian life expectancy by about a decade relative to what it “should be” based on its GDP per capita and healthcare system. This “alcoholization” began to soar from around 1965, and peaked in the 1990s and early 2000s. According to calculations by the demographer Alexander Nemtsov, something like a third of Russian mortality around 2005 could be attributed to it.

As alcohol abuse fell, so did all of the other components of mortality, especially those most strongly associated with it, i.e. deaths from external causes: which includes homicides, suicides, deaths from transport accidents (despite soaring vehicle ownership), and, self-referentially, deaths from alcohol poisoning.

Part of this reduction was due to cultural change, including the realities of life under capitalism (if you turn up to work drunk, you can be fired, unlike under socialism), part of it was due to economics (more diversity of choice), and part of it was thanks to specific Kremlin policies, such as steady increases in the excise tax on alcohol and restrictions on alcohol advertising.

Some comparative guideposts:

Russia’s average life expectancy of close to 73 years is equivalent to Poland in 1998 (which as of this year has pretty much converged with the US), Estonia and Hungary in 2005, Latvia and Lithuania in 2010.

Neither is Russia any longer outlier in terms of “deaths from vices”. Poland (18/100,000) and especially Lithuania (24/100,000) have more suicides than Russia (16/100,000). Homicide rates are at 6.0/100,000, having almost converged with America’s 5.3/100,000 in 2016. Though hardly anything to write about, considering the challenges of America’s demographic composition, this still probably marks an all time record (the homicide rate in the late Russian Empire was around 20/100,000; in the RSFSR from 1961-1990, it varied from 6-11/100,000).

• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 
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PEW has just made three different projections of the Islamic percentage of Europe’s population in 2050.


Map of Muslim share of each European country today and in 2015 (High scenario).

Here are the assumptions behind each of them:

  1. Low: All migration into Europe stops from 2016. Muslims still increase from 4.9% to 7.4% by 2050 due to higher fertility and younger average age.
  2. Medium: Refugee flows of 2014-2016 stop, but “regular” (non-asylum) immigration continues at current levels. Muslims increase to 11.2% of the population.
  3. High: Refugee flows of 2014-2016 continue at the same level, with the same composition (i.e. mostly Muslim) in addition to regular immigration. Muslims increase to 14.0% of the European population.

Here is a summary:



1. I think actual policy will be between #2 and #3, i.e. #2.5. (Recall when Merkel said multiculturalism was a failure? What a change half a decade makes).

2. There’s some evidence that Muslims are undercounted in Europe. For instance, French Muslims have remained unchanged at around 8%-10% of the population since the early 2000s.


And there’s real quantitative evidence behind this, as Emil Kirkegaard points out:

There’s a lot to do, but one thing I’ve been thinking of is showing that Muslim populations are actually growing a lot faster than many claim. The reason they claim these low levels of growth is because they rely on official statistics and these data tend to convert 2nd and later generation people into the ‘native’ categories, thus effectively hiding them. However, Muslims are nice enough to use distinctive names, so one can count the number of persons with such names over time and this will show a more realistic growth rate. Preliminary results for Denmark indicate an official stats-based growth rate of 2.5%, whereas first names indicate 5.1%. That’s not a small difference. The growth rate of Danish natives is something like -16% per generation which comes out at about -0.5% per year. You don’t have to be a genius to see how 5.1% vs. -0.5% work out in a few decades.

3. This obviously doesn’t include non-Muslim immigration (see Sailer’s most important graph in the world).

4. Doesn’t take into account conversion. Anecdotally, many African immigrants to the UK are apparently into Islam; conversely, Muslims in Western Europe tend to become more secular and liberal (though paradoxically, Islamic radicalization also increases).

5. Invest in Eastern Poland.

• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Demographics, Eurabia, Europe, Islam 
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Results of the Pakistan Census are out and show that the population has reached 207,774,520 people as of 2017.


After hurtling past Russia around 2000, Pakistan has now just about converged with Brazil, which has approximately 207,932,000 people as of this year.

Considering that Pakistan increases by 4 million every year to less than 2 million in Brazil, it is very likely that it has already overtakenthe South American giant to become the world’s fifth most populous country.


Note that the UN Population Division estimated Pakistan’s population to be 197 million in 2017, or 10 million lower than the just released census figures.

Low-lying and impoverished Bangladesh is more commonly cited as the big country facing the greatest threat from global warming, but it has gotten its population growth under control to a far greater extent than Pakistan, and the effects of Greenland/Antractic melt on sea levels will take centuries or millennia to fully percolate.

But Pakistan might be in more of a immediate pickle (as in, within the next few decades). Unlike the other rivers of the Indian subcontinent, which are mainly powered by monsoon precipitation, the Indus is reliant on glacial runoff for the great bulk of its water flow. Will Pakistan be able to feed itself as those glaciers shrink over the coming decades?

• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Pakistan 
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Credit: Ivan Musinov.

There is this strange dichotomy with respect to Russia.

The Western elites like Hillary Clinton and many Russophile right-wingers believe that it is a paragon of fascist/conservative and white supremacist/traditionalist values, respectively. (The main difference being that the former think that this is Bad, while the latter think it’s Good).

On the other side, the more fervently anti-Putin Russian nationalists and /pol/ shitposters are in agreement that the Kremlin are just pursuing a Russian version of multiculturalism and open borders.

The Myth of Mosque-O

The central exhibit in this has become the Cathedral Mosque, and photos of the 100,000-200,000 strong crowds congregating around it on Islamic holidays.

Even Steve Sailer has written about it. Our Ukrainian friend AP never tires of reminding us about it in the comments.


Here is a slightly more relevant statistic: There are a grand total of four mosques in Moscow, and this is one of them.

Moreover, it was originally built in 1904, then controversially demolished, and rebuilt in a project largely financed by a private Dagestani tycoon, Suleiman Kerimov.

The other Moscow mosques include the historical Old Mosque (constructed in 1823), the Moscow Memorial Mosque (more of a war monument than a place of worship), and one that is part of a complex of religious buildings that also includes a Buddhist stuppa. The latter two were both constructed in the 1990s.

This is in comparison to Moscow’s 1110 churches, a number which is increasing by about 5% yearly.

Two of them are Catholic churches. What is the ratio between the Muslim and Catholic population in Moscow? 20:1? 100:1?

To add an international perspective, the “UK Mosque Searcher” lists 427 mosques in London (many of which are funded by Saudis).

It should therefore be immediately obvious as to why the streets around the Cathedral Mosque are jam-packed with worshippers. Unlike in London, or Paris, or Berlin… they pretty much have nowhere else to go!

It is also probably – hopefully – as good a proof as any that Russia’s elites are not focused on a population replacement agenda, as is evidently the case in Western Europe. If mosques aren’t being constructed, then presumably, there aren’t any intentions to keep many Muslims around in the long-term.

What I am saying is that there is rhetoric and there are facts and statistics, and the former is no substitute for the latter if you want to be taken seriously outside your own narrow ideological circles.

The Myth of Moskvabad

Here is another, in many ways stunning, statistic: Moscow is the last and only megacity in the world where Europeans remain a solid majority.

According to the 2010 Census, 92% of Muscovites are Russians, rising to 94% amongst infants. For all intents and purposes these figures go up to more than 95% if you only count Slavs and other non-Central Asian and non-Caucasian minorities. Now yes, to be sure, if you go outside, then 85%-90% of the faces you encounter will have a Slavic appearance. In 2014, the Federal Migration Service estimated there were 1.4 million foreign workers in the city, of whom 400,000 were there illegally. Bearing in mind that the city’s official 12 million strong population is overwhelmingly Russian,

Rounding that up to two million – while bearing in mind that a significant percentage of those are Ukrainians and Moldovans – and adding them to the city’s official population of 12 million, which is overwhelmingly Russian, and you get a figure of about 14 million people. That is, about 85% European.

In comparison, London is 60% white according to the latest UK census. The French (in)famously don’t collect such data, but Paris is probably similar. Non-Hispanic whites constitute 45% of New Yorkers and 29% of Los Angelinos.

Most importantly with respect to the post-1960s European experience, fertility amongst these Gastarbeiters appears to be very low. There’s a simple explanation why this must be the case: There are 8x as many Uzbek and Tajik male citizens in Russia as women in the 17-25 year age group, and 4-5x as many in the 25-45 year age group. Men cannot bear children, as it generally acknowledged outside the SJWsphere.


There’s another scrap of circumstantial but pretty strong evidence to support this. In Europe, we are constantly inundated with news of how Mohammed has become the most popular’s baby boys’ names in the latest European city of church spires and historical taverns. Yet according to Moscow official statistics, it was the 80th most popular name in the city in January 2015, with only ten Mohammeds being born (actually some “ethnic” names were more popular: There were 26 Amirs in 51st position, and 16 Umars in 66th position). The most popular “ethnic” girl’s name was in 36th position, with 34 Aminas being born.

This is not to say things are ideal, and I don’t think I ever have. London, Paris, and Berlin did not become the way they are now over a few years, but over several decades. Not even the Social Democrats of Germany ever planned for Gastarbeiters to stay permanently. There is no guarantee that the same will not happen in Russia.

Yet even so, it’s important to keep things in perspective.


The Last White Megacity

Here’s a stunning implication: Moscow is now the last and only megacity in the world where Europeans remain a solid majority.

In contrast, Japan has three 99% Japanese conurbations, out of 127 million people. China has more than a dozen. Korea has one.

This is a very sad state of affairs for the European world in general, but it might well be a relative boon for Russia itself. Economists have long identified increasing returns to city size for economic wealth and technological productivity, and psychometricians have long noticed that big cities tend to attract the cognitive elites, which further turbocharges economic dynamism. Russia is the only country within “Greater Europe” to retain a megacity with a solidly predominant white population and its associated benefits of a high average IQ.

To be sure, there are plenty of megacities in the world. Most are now in the lower IQ Third World, and thus inconsequential from a “smart fractions”-central perspective, but a good twenty or so are in high-IQ East Asia, a civilization that has thus far managed to escape the “baizuo” disease of mass immigration and cultural decomposition.

However, considering East Asians’ relative lack of curiosity, it is not completely beyond the realm of the possible that Moscow might become a genuinely one of a kind cultural and scientific hub as the 21st century goes on.

• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Demographics, Eurabia, Moscow, Russia 
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Another Uraza Bayram.

Countless photos showing zillions of Muslims filling up Moskvabad’s streets. More gleeful shitposts from /pol/ to svidomy forums about imminent Russabia.


But you don’t have to be a particularly big fan of open borders with Central Asia to be able to look at statistics.

In a series of recent posts, Russian blogger Ivan Vladimirov tallied the percentage of newborn ethnic Russians relative to the percentage of Russians as a whole per region.

This is a solid approach, because while counting immigrants is hard – estimates of illegal migrants in Russia vary all over the place – doing so for newborns is far easier. Ultimately the vast majority of births happen in hospitals, and it is difficult to imagine a vast Uzbek/Tajik underground baby boom taking place, not least because of the banal fact that the vast majority of Gastarbeiters are males.

Anyhow, bearing in mind that newborns today reflect society in 30-50 years’ time, the figures are actually quite encouraging (from an assimilationist perspective).


The percentage of ethnic Russians is increasing across almost the entirety of core Russia.

Here is another set of maps from blogger n_avdeev.

The first one shows the percentage of ethnic Russians by region:


The second shows the percentage of ethnic Russians younger than 5 years by region (note that green numbers represent an increase, and red numbers a decrease, relative to the total percentage of ethnic Russians):


You can actually see the majority Russian areas getting even more Russian. This even includes Moscow and Saint-Petersburg, despite them being Gastarbeiter magnets.

The Chuvash, Udmurts, Karels, Komi, Mari, and Mordva are steadily becoming Russians. The Republic of Karelia, once a separate Soviet Socialist republic from 1940-1956, has gone from being 57% Russian in 1926 to 82% by 2010 (and 94% amongst infants), while the comically named Jewish autonomous oblast has seen its Jews decline from 16% of the population in 1939 to 1% by 2010, and becoming 93% Russian overall (98% amongst infants).

Unsurprisingly, the Ukrainians and Belorussians are becoming Russians at an even faster pace, as are as the few remaining Jews and Germans.

Only the Tatars and Bashkirs are holding their own in their ethnic republics, though outside them, they too are dissolving into Russiandom.

However, in regions already mostly populated by highly fertile, underdeveloped, and lower IQ ethnic minorities, such as the North Caucasus (esp. “DICh”, i.e. Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya) and some Siberian regions such as Tyva and the Sakha Republic, the share of ethnic Russians is falling, often at a precipitous rate.

If Russia has an equivalent to US states like Arizona and Texas, where the original White American stock is steadily being outpaced by demographic expansionism from more virile southern ethnicities, it is Stavropol krai (81% total vs. 77% infants), Astrakhan oblast (67% vs. 64%), and the Altai republic (57% vs. 51%).

yuray-map-european-census However, these are literally the only major exceptions to a pattern where ethnic Russians are stable or increasing in the parts of the country where they already constitute a solid majority. In this sense, Russia is far better off not just relative to the US, where non-Hispanic Whites now total 62% of the population and account for less than 50% of new births since 2011, but also many West European countries that have gone from being ~99% to 85%-90% White in the space of just a couple of generations (see Mark Yuray’s map to the right).

Since ethnic Russians don’t have particularly high fertility rates (though they are not significantly lower than those of non-DICh and Mongoloid Siberian minorities), the primary vehicle through which Russianizationization occurs must happen on account of differential rates of intermarriage with Russians (in such marriages, children typically adopt the dominant Russian culture).

Another blogger, Oleg Lisovsky, has compiled figures on intermarriage for both men and women.

Around 70% of Ukrainians and Belorussians marry Russians, so assimilation there is particularly fast, considering also the barely indistinguishable nature of those cultures.

These figures are considerably lower amongst the Christian Caucasian (Armenians, Georgians) and Finno-Ugric (20%-50%) nationalities, and extremely low amongst the Tyvans and DICh peoples (<5%).

On the basis of this data, Vladimirov also compiled a map of the intermarriage coefficient for Russia’s regions. Unfortunately, the scale is not specified, but one can make out the general pattern:

  • High levels of intermarriage in the regions where there are substantial ethnic minorities amongst large Russian majorities;
  • Moderate levels of intermarriage in regions with near homogenous Russian populations and predominant ethnic minorities;
  • Extremely low levels of intermarriage in DICh (who barely even intermarry amongst themselves).


One notes that this applies even to small population groups within DICh, such as the Laks, of whom there are 161,000 in Dagestan and 179,000 in Russia according to the 2010 census. Male Laks marry female Laks 85% of the time and ethnic Russians 5% of the time (my grandfather is a very rare case); female Laks marry male Laks 88% of the time and ethnic Russians a mere 1.2% of the time.

Three are three main lessons to take away from this:

(1) Russia is simply not undergoing population replacement/displacement on the American or West European model. There is, to be sure, considerable… métissage, but it is primarily happening between genetically and psychometrically similar peoples – and in many cases, this is something that has been happening for centuries anyway (e.g. north Russians are basically admixed Slavs and Finno-Ugrics anyway).

(2) The DICh regions are a lost cause in terms of assimilation, but in all fairness, they probably always were. They are very distinct from the rest of Russia, and understandably so, since like Central Asia, they were only annexed in the middle of the 19th century. They are also absurdly ethnocentric in terms of marriage and reproduction.

During the course of the next century, it seems inevitable that Russians will fade away from the other ethnic minority Caucasian republics, such as Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia, as well as Kalmykia and Tyva.

The only places in the North Caucasus where a demographic “struggle” of sorts is occuring with respect to traditional Russian majority regions are Stavropol krai and Astrakhan oblast, but even there, the scale of the problem is decidedly smaller than in America’s borderlands with Mexico’s or Western Europe’s inner cities.

(3) The system of ethno-republics, apart from feeding corrupt regional oligarchies, also seems to act as a break on assimilation. The prime historical example is of course the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which foistered a Ukrainian identity upon Malorussians within its territories – including Novorossiya, where they were essentially just settlers – whereas the Malorussians of the Russian Kuban have almost all became Russians since the 1920s by dint of being in the RSFSR. However, as the demographic statistics above make it clear, the same trends are playing out, to some extent, even within the Russian Federation proper.

This is why most Russian nationalists have tended to dislike federalism and ethnic minority republics, and urge a return to the imperial system of guberniyas.

• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Demographics, Minorities, Russia 
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So we correctly make fun of people like Neil Turok and Deirdre McCloskey who expect to discover the next generation of Einsteins amongst 70-75 IQ Africans. Even if we could run the full FLynn program on Africa and raise it up to its genotypic IQ potential of 85-90, it’s not like countries with those sorts of figures today are brimming with geniuses (though they are not necessarily unpleasant places to live in, as Fred Reed constantly reminds us).

But there’s some who think this implies that Africa will inevitably collapse due to overpopulation and their absolute inability to run any kind of industrial civilization without help from Europeans or the Chinese, because apparently Sub-Saharan Africa can barely support one billion people let alone the four billion that the UN projects for the end of the century. Here’s one example of such an argument:

This reply could also cover Piltdown man too: You are making an assumption that these people can work in an organized fashion, use and take care of mechanical equipment, and have an infrastructure that will let all of the population have access to this productive farmland. I know you’ve heard of Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia – the breadbasket of Africa.

Obviously I am not going to go down the “racism” card like some bottom-tier SJW, but I would like to play the “reality” card.

(1) First off, why the implicit assumption that trade and technological links with the outside world must vanish? I suppose that if a gamma ray burst were to fry the northern hemisphere tomorrow and wipe the high IQ peoples from the planet, then SSA will also experience an economic and demographic collapse. Advanced manufacturing will vanish, there will be zero further technological/scientific progress and an outright regression in the stock of knowledge by a century or so.

But short of these sci-fi scenarios, how can this happen? Individual African countries might decide to drive foreign investors and any lingering white/Indian minorities out, but there are more than fifty separate polities in Africa. The likelihood that the continent as a whole adopts such self-destructive policies are diminishingly small. The Chinese in particular are interested in acquiring tracts of African lands to increase their food security. Their motives are of course self-interested, but it results in technology transfer and helps Africans too.

(2) Sub Saharan Africa is almost eight times as big as India in land area, and India now supports 1.3 billion people. It has twice as much arable land, but this can be expanded. I don’t think there’s any equivalent of the Ganges valley in SSA (or really anywhere on Earth) in terms of agricultural productivity, but still, there’s no shortage of productive land.

Africa pessimists like citing Zimbabwe, where crop yields are lower than they were half a century ago. But it’s not representative of the continent. Crop yields in the continent as a whole have increased by almost 50% since 1990. In Ethiopia, a country once synonymous with photos of starving children, they have more than doubled.


SSA is now on average where India was in the 1980s, and the world in general was in the 1960s. And it’s not like agriculture is a particularly g loaded occupation.

world-irrigation Certainly I don’t see Africans introducing automated hydroponics farms that super-densely populated advanced countries like Japan and the Netherlands are experimenting with, but they don’t have to do that even to feed a quadrupled population; just getting to Brazil’s level (which is slightly above the world average) by 2100 would do.

They have plenty of time and plenty of low-hanging fruit to be picked up. For instance, irrigation, which can basically double yields, is almost entirely absent from SSA.

(3) Paradoxically, (moderate) global warming can actually help Africa.

Historically, it was during colder periods that Africa’s dry zones became even drier, leading to famines. The reverse might be true: Conditions may well become wetter in the West African Sahel, “in what would be a rare example of a positive tipping point” in response to global warming (Copenhagen Diagnosis 2009).

There is paleoclimatic evidence for this. In the warming at the end of the last Ice Age, the modern day Sahara turned into a lush savannah, with crocodiles, hippos and elephants roaming the plains. Progressive cooling turned the area into the dessicated desert it is today, pushing populations south and towards the Nile valley.

Severe warming (5C+) is one thing that would be very bad for SSA and will push all the above considerations into the margins. (Though, that said, the sort of commenters who envisage Africans as Piltdown men also tend to think climate change is a liberal elite conspiracy).

(4) All societies have undergone the demographic transition, so why exactly should Africa be the exception anyway?

(I mean, assuming that the Neo-Nazis are wrong about Africans being like rabbits with no ability to control their fertility, and that real world examples of Blacks undergoing the demographic transition when they reach a sufficient level of development like in Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago are not figments of statistics bureaus’ imaginations).

There’s no evidence that SSA is going to be an exception. It is certainly lagging, as it is most other indicators, but it’s still happening.


The TFR for the continent as a whole has declined from close to 7 children per woman inaround 1980 to about 5 children today. The Africa pessimist crowd loves to single out Niger, probably the single most illiterate and backwards country in the world. But if you want to nitpick, why not instead pick Rwanda, run by Paul Kagame (an authoritarian technocrat who has been called Africa’s Lee Kuan Yew), which has gone from having 8 children per woman in 1980 to just 4 today?

Demographers tend to project fertility trends as gentle declines, but they can also take the form of sudden collapses. Famously, Iran’s TFR plummeted from more than 6 children per woman to below replacement level rate within less than a decade. The decline in China during the 1970s was almost as steep (and took place before the One Child Policy was implemented).

To illustrate this further, below is a screenshot from Paul Kennedy’s 1993 book Preparing for the 21st Century, citing contemporary UN Population Prospects forecasts for the year 2025.


These were actually more pessimistic than the 2017 update of the World Population Prospects that Sailer is citing in his recent series of pessimistic posts on African demographics.

Outside Africa: Pakistan now projected at 227 million, not 267 million; Brazil at 219 million, not 245 million; Indonesia at 285 million, not 263 million, but as the only upwards exception massively canceled out by Iran, which is projected to have 87 million by 2025, not 122 million.

Even within Africa, which has by and large yet to undergo the demographic transition, those forecasts are now clearly pessimistic in hindsight: Nigeria now projected to be at 234 million, not 301 million; Kenya at 60 million, not 77 million; Tanzania at 73 million, not 84 million; and Zaire (now DRC) the only upwards outlier, at 104 million instead of 99 million.


Anyhow, it’s not like SSA is in standstill. Literacy is improving, school enrollment is rising, infant mortality is falling, peasants are leaving for the cities, wmen are going into education and having careers. All the factors that have historically collapsed fertility rates around the world are now acting on SSA.

It would not be surprising if Africa’s demographic transition happens faster than expected, as in the Low variant of the current UN forecast, and ends up merely tripling instead of quadrupling as in the Medium scenario.

(5) As I pointed out in A Short History of the Third Millennium, modern societies strongly select for lower IQ and higher fertility. The FLynn effect has gone into reverse, and if technological progress was to stagnate – as it might well do so due to the depletion of “smart fractions” – it is also likely that the cultural innovations that have hitherto suppressed fertility will also fall by the wayside. Even leaving aside low-IQ Third World immigration, Europe and White America will likely be duller and more fecund (leaving aside technological singularities, CRISPR-transhumanism, etc).

Africa still has some potential to increase its IQ via better nutrition, etc., though whether it will ever manage to create institutions capable of maximizing them out as in the developed world today is questionable. However, at least it does not yet appear to be subject to the dysgenic pressures that are ravaging the developed world. And if its future demographic expansion was to constantly bump up against the Malthusian limits, these dysgenic trends may even be averted altogether.

After three or four centuries of scraping against the Malthusian grindstone, it’s not inconceivable that African IQ will fully converge with that of Europeans and East Asians.

And then Turok’s successors will finally find their African Einsteins who will take us into space aboard the pyramids.


• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Africa, Demographics 
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The USSR played the leading role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, which the majority of Europeans recognized in 1945 even if half a century of Hollywood propaganda successfully displaced it in the public imagination in favor of the USA. But what about within the USSR itself?

Back in January 2015, during his brief nationalist phase after the return of Crimea, Putin declared that Russians played the leading role in the defeat of Nazism and paid the highest sacrifices. That seems like a dream today. Official rhetoric proclaims that “we achieved victory together” played over footage of Ramzan Kadyrov and Tajik workers wearing St. George’s ribbons (in the meantime, Tajikistan has banned the Immortal Regiments march on the grounds that it is un-Islamic).

So who’s right: Putin 2015, or Putin 2017?

I compiled the following two graphs based on the results of the Soviet Census of 1939 and Grigory Krivosheev’s statistics on military deaths by ethnicity in WW2 (table 122).


Predictably, Russians bore the highest number of absolute losses – some two thirds of the 8.7 million total.

Together with the Ukrainians and Belorussians that figure rises to 85%.


Moreover, Russians also bore the highest relative military losses as a percentage of their population, together with the Buryats.

The Ukrainians and Belorussians were somewhat lower, though this is explainable on account of them being occupied for part of the war, and incurring a greater share of civilian deaths as a result. There would have been be a similar dynamic with respect to the Jews, a large percentage of whom unfortunately fell within the Nazi zone of occupation.

I recall reading a history paper (can’t find it at the moment) where it was claimed that the USSR would create ethnic minority units from the Finno-Ugric peoples and intentionally send them to the hottest fronts so as to make them incur heavier casualties and shift the demographic balance in favor of Russins. That is obviously nonsense based on these figures, though that said, they did almost do their fair share.

The Central Asians, especially the Uzbeks and Tajiks, are underrepresented – the latter by a factor of almost three. This is perhaps not that bad a thing, since they had a reputation for technical incompetence; even in the late USSR, conscripts from those regions tended to go into “Class C” rear divisions with simple, obsolete equipment.

Of the major ethnicities, the worst group in terms of its lack of contribution were the restive Muslim provinces of the North Caucasus. Dagestan underdid its fair share by a factor of four, while the Chechens and Ingush as is known pretty much defected to the Germans en masse (hence the deportations).

I didn’t include any figures for the Balts and Moldovans. They were annexed by the USSR after the 1939 Census, so their percentages would be meaningless.

For comparison, the Germans lost approximately 6.1% of their population as military losses in WW2, including: Germany proper: 6.4%; Austria: 3.9%; The German diaspora in Eastern Europe: 7.2%, according to Rüdiger Overmans’s calculations.


Nationality Population (1939) WW2 Mil. Deaths % All Mil. Deaths % Deaths Population
Russians 99,591,520 5,756,000 66.40% 5.78%
Ukrainians 28,111,007 1,377,400 15.89% 4.90%
Belorussians 5,275,393 252,900 2.92% 4.79%
Georgians 2,249,636 79,500 0.92% 3.53%
Azeris 2,275,678 58,400 0.67% 2.57%
Armenians 2,152,860 83,700 0.97% 3.89%
Uzbeks 4,845,140 117,900 1.36% 2.43%
Turkmen 812,404 21,300 0.25% 2.62%
Tajiks 1,229,170 22,900 0.26% 1.86%
Kazakhs 3,100,949 125,500 1.45% 4.05%
Kyrgyz 884,615 26,600 0.31% 3.01%
Karelians 252,716 9,500 0.11% 3.76%
Komi 422,317 11,600 0.13% 2.75%
Bashkirs 843,648 31,700 0.37% 3.76%
Udmurts 606,326 23,200 0.27% 3.83%
Tatars 4,313,488 187,700 2.17% 4.35%
Mari 481,587 20,900 0.24% 4.34%
Mordovians 1,456,330 63,300 0.73% 4.35%
Chuvash 1,369,574 63,300 0.73% 4.62%
Kalmyks 134,402 4,000 0.05% 2.98%
Buryats 224,719 13,000 0.15% 5.79%
Jews 3,028,538 142,500 1.64% 4.71%
Kabardians & Balkars 206,870 3,400 0.04% 1.64%
Chechens & Ingush 500,088 2,300 0.03% 0.46%
Ossetians 354,818 10,700 0.12% 3.02%
Dagestanis 857,499 11,100 0.13% 1.29%
Bulgars 113,494 1,100 0.01% 0.97%
Greeks 286,444 2,400 0.03% 0.84%
Chinese 32,023 400 0.00% 1.25%
Poles 630,097 10,100 0.12% 1.60%
Finns 143,437 1,600 0.02% 1.12%
Others 3,770,306 132,500 1.53% 3.51%
TOTAL 170,557,093 8,668,400 100.00% 5.08%
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vapor-macron-le-pen My latest podcast with Robert Stark, co-host and proponent of Asian-Aryanism pilleater, and Alt Right legend Guillaume Durocher, who has written for Counter-Currents, Radix, and Occidental Observer.

We mostly talked about the French elections and French demographics. Here’s a link:


The final election round between Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron
The French Elections 2017 (Round One)
The original candidates; Left Wing Populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Globalist Centrist Emmanuel Macron, Mainstream Conservative François Fillon, and Nationalist Populist Marine Le Pen
The demographic and regional support for the candidates
Whether Le Pen will appeal to the Conservative Fillon and Socialist Mélenchon supporters
How Macron epitomizes the worst of the establishment while Fillon and Mélenchon hold some anti-establishment positions
Macron’s work for a Rothschild Bank, Bilderberg attendance, and Neoliberal agenda
Mélenchon, his refusal to back Macron, how he is better on immigration then Macron, and his support for a basic income
Fillon, his endorsement of Macron while adopting some of Le Pen’s immigration stances
In contrast with Macron, Mélenchon and Fillon like Le Pen were more pro-Russia and non-interventionist
The ideology and agenda of Le Pen’s Front National
Comparisons to Donald Trump and how unlike Trump Le Pen has a consistent ideology
The misnomer that Le Pen is far right and her adoption of left leaning stances on issues such economics, gay rights, and the environment
Mainstream conservative Nicolas Dupont-Aignan backing Le Pen
Alain Soral and his advocacy of a left-right alliance
Éric Zemmour
The French Blackpill, Quantified
Michel Houellebecq’s Submission
Demographic Trends and future scenarios for France and Europe

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Here is a graph of monthly births in Russia since 2006 through to March 2017:


It is pointless to make sweeping conclusions based on demographic data from the past one or two months.

That said, the three month moving average has been down relative to the same period in the previous year since the middle of 2016, and as of this year, has widened to 10%, an unprecedented figure in the past decade.


Now to be sure, birth rates should – all else equal – be falling, because the diminished generation of the 1990s is now moving into its peak childbearing years. It shouldn’t be falling by 10% in any one year, however. If this new trend continues, Russia’s TFR for 2017 should fall to about 1.65 children per woman from the 1.76 in 2016.

OTOH mortality continued improving, falling by 1% in the first three months of 2017 relative to same period last year, which translates into a correspondingly greater improvement in life expectancy because of Russia’s ageing population (i.e. for the same reason that Russia’s fertility rate would increase if the number of births was to stay the same).

So I don’t want to imply all is doom and gloom after having covered Russia’s demographic turnaround for almost a decade.

However, it does perhaps warrant a reassessment of the weight we attach to different demographic projections.

For instance, the “Medium” scenario in my Russian demographic model – also the one which I long thought likeliest – involves the assumption that the TFR would converge to about 1.75 (where it has generally been since 2012), with steady convergence in life expectancy to developed world levels, and annual (official) immigrant inflows of 300,000. In this scenario, Russia’s population would actually increase to about 150 million in 2025 and 158 million by 2050 (that’s including Crimea, aka +2 million).

However, if the recent fertility decline is not a one-year blip, and were to instead to continue falling to about 1.50, then Russia’s population would stagnate (this is from before Crimea):

Low (TFR=1.5 from 2010)Population growth starts from 2011, going from 142mn to 143mn by 2023. Then it falls slowly to 138mn by 2050. The birth rate peaks at 12.5 in 2013, falls sharply to 7.8 by 2032, and then remains in the 8-9 range. The death rate troughs at 11.4 in 2032, then rises to 12.9 by 2050. Positive natural increase is never attained.

Not really the demographic apocalypse long promised by the Western media either, but a disappointing outcome nonetheless.

It’s also possible that this will further encourage the kremlins to intensify immigration from Central Asia.

• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 
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Emil Kirkegaard dug through a PEW dataset to find out who supports big government.


This is in line with the finding that 94% of American libertarians are non-Hispanic whites:

More than two-thirds (68 percent) of libertarians are men, while 32 percent are women. They are also racially homogeneous, with nearly all (94 percent) libertarians identifying as non-Hispanic whites. They also skew significantly younger. More than 6-in-10 (62 percent) libertarians are under the age of 50, including one-quarter (25 percent) who are under the age of 30.

Here are the US Census Bureau projections about America’s future demographic makeup:


Charles Murray isn’t going to be happy about this. His is a doomed ideology.

• Category: Ideology • Tags: Demographics, Libertarianism, United States 
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far better than we ever could.

Anyhow, how fast is the Muslim population growing? It’s long been clear that official statistics aren’t quite hacking it, and the situation is likely considerably worse.

Recent observation from Emil Kirkegaard gleaned from his meanderings through demographic statistics:

So, what’s next? There’s a lot to do, but one thing I’ve been thinking of is showing that Muslim populations are actually growing a lot faster than many claim. The reason they claim these low levels of growth is because they rely on official statistics and these data tend to convert 2nd and later generation people into the ‘native’ categories, thus effectively hiding them. However, Muslims are nice enough to use distinctive names, so one can count the number of persons with such names over time and this will show a more realistic growth rate. Preliminary results for Denmark indicate an official stats-based growth rate of 2.5%, whereas first names indicate 5.1%. That’s not a small difference. The growth rate of Danish natives is something like -16% per generation which comes out at about -0.5% per year. You don’t have to be a genius to see how 5.1% vs. -0.5% work out in a few decades.

• Tags: Demographics, Eurabia, Turkey 
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The final figures for life expectancy and TFR in total and for the regions have been released today.

The Rosstat computations give an estimate of TFR = 1.76 children per woman and LE = 71.9 years for 2016, which are pretty close to my rough estimates a month ago.

The total population is estimated to be 146,804,372 at the end of the year.

Not really much extra to comment on than what I already have in February.

One thing of note is that Crimea has by now been fully integrated into the statistics so we can begin to analyze how its doing after liberation from the yoke of Ukrainian backwardness.

For instance, in terms of disposable income, Crimea remains well behind almost all majority ethnic Russian regions, including neighboring Krasnodar Krai (which became post-Soviet Russia’s main breachfront location). However, it is also converging quickly. Although Russia was in a recession during 2016, with only 0.7% growth in disposable incomes (-5.4% inflation), Crimea and Sevastopol both grew by more than 15% – the fastest rate of increase in Russia.

Ukraine was, of course, also in recession during this period.

The fertility rate in Crimea and Sevastopol has also increased since 2014, which you presumably wouldn’t expect of regions under brutal occupation.


TFR 2013 2014 2015 2016
Russian Federation 1.707 1.750 1.777 1.762
Central Federal District 1.478 1.514 1.575 1.595
Belgorod Oblast 1.526 1.544 1.561 1.547
Bryansk Oblast 1.534 1.557 1.650 1.612
Vladimir Oblast 1.591 1.643 1.730 1.712
Voronezh Oblast 1.437 1.471 1.517 1.484
Ivanovo Oblast 1.554 1.572 1.629 1.595
Kaluga Oblast 1.644 1.689 1.836 1.785
Kostroma Oblast 1.852 1.866 1.890 1.880
Kursk Oblast 1.674 1.699 1.716 1.643
Lipetsk Oblast 1.601 1.657 1.700 1.687
Moscow Oblast 1.522 1.600 1.675 1.727
Orel Oblast 1.530 1.552 1.603 1.590
Ryazan Oblast 1.552 1.595 1.640 1.703
Smolensk Oblast 1.480 1.528 1.522 1.509
Tambov Oblast 1.423 1.493 1.512 1.503
Tver Oblast 1.639 1.663 1.696 1.709
Tula Oblast 1.424 1.466 1.568 1.547
Yaroslavl Oblast 1.635 1.640 1.695 1.710
Moscow 1.328 1.341 1.406 1.460
North-West Federal District 1.574 1.613 1.657 1.670
Republic of Karelia 1.648 1.744 1.766 1.763
Komi Republic 1.961 2.013 2.002 1.972
Arkhangelsk Oblast 1.803 1.835 1.847 1.833
of which:
_Nenets Autonomous Okrug 2.312 2.423 2.584 2.774
_Arkhangelsk Oblast 1.784 1.812 1.818 1.795
Vologda Oblast 1.852 1.856 1.922 1.897
Kaliningrad Oblast 1.644 1.699 1.745 1.728
Leningrad Oblast 1.227 1.282 1.286 1.318
Murmansk Oblast 1.623 1.649 1.714 1.653
Novgorod Oblast 1.700 1.749 1.776 1.776
Pskov Oblast 1.675 1.695 1.741 1.796
St. Petersburg 1.482 1.522 1.591 1.634
Southern Federal District 1.642 1,711 1 1,735 1 1.719
Republic of Adygea 1.684 1.730 1.724 1.681
Republic of Kalmykia 1.882 1.853 1.831 1.708
Krasnodar Krai 1.825 1.818 1.763
Republic of Crimea 1.724 1.805 1.840 1.829
Astrakhan Oblast 1.911 1.968 1.970 1.938
Volgograd Oblast 1.529 1.571 1.589 1.574
Rostov Oblast 1.522 1.605 1.627 1.596
Sevastopol 1.649 1.821 1.726
North Caucasus Federal District 1.987 2.034 1.979 1.936
Dagestan Republic 2.015 2.077 2.022 1.978
Republic of Ingushetia 2.231 2.278 1.971 1.752
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 1.803 1.831 1.753 1.724
Karachay–Cherkessia 1.673 1.650 1.541 1.518
Republic of North Ossetia – Alania 1.977 2.009 1.930 1.891
Chechen Republic 2.925 2.912 2.799 2.622
Stavropol Krai 1.548 1.617 1.644 1.678
Volga Federal District 1.750 1.789 1.818 1.788
Republic of Bashkortostan 1.887 1.948 1.939 1.860
Republic of Mari El 1.926 1.981 1.993 1.980
Republic of Mordovia 1.366 1.374 1.360 1.403
Republic of Tatarstan 1.832 1.844 1.863 1.855
Udmurt Republic 1.922 1.959 2.006 1.956
Chuvash Republic 1.851 1.878 1.909 1.869
Perm Krai 1.932 1.977 2.018 1.979
Kirov Oblast 1.868 1.885 1.913 1.943
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 1.561 1.593 1.669 1.649
Orenburg Oblast 2.001 2.027 2.013 1.946
Penza Oblast 1.486 1.529 1.550 1.503
Samara Oblast 1.589 1.647 1.708 1.714
Saratov Oblast 1.536 1.574 1.601 1.550
Ulyanovsk Oblast 1.611 1.673 1.712 1.705
Ural Federal District 1.907 1.960 1.965 1.919
Kurgan Oblast 2.115 2.101 2.123 2.030
Sverdlovsk Oblast 1.871 1.921 1.945 1.911
Tyumen Oblast 2.004 2.073 2.072 2.009
of which:
_Khanty-Mansiysk Ugra-Autonomous Okrug 2.050 2.090 2.073 2.020
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 2.090 2.189 2.188 2.084
Tyumen Oblast 1.959 2.054 2.064 2.002
Chelyabinsk Oblast 1.802 1.855 1.843 1.809
Siberian Federal District 1.880 1.902 1.902 1.870
Altai Republic 2.815 2.883 2.677 2.634
Republic of Buryatia 2.205 2.260 2.280 2.237
Republic of Tuva 3.424 3.485 3.386 3.345
Republic of Khakassia 2.013 2.007 1.986 1.967
Altai Krai 1.830 1.841 1.811 1.777
Zabaykalsky Krai 2.014 2.078 2.057 1.979
Krasnoyarsk Krai 1.775 1.807 1.837 1.815
Irkutsk Oblast 1.978 1.966 2.012 1.989
Kemerovo Oblast 1.787 1.778 1.726 1.713
Novosibirsk Oblast 1.749 1.765 1.817 1.805
Omsk Oblast 1.867 1.951 1.911 1.808
Tomsk Oblast 1.591 1.593 1.600 1.581
Far Eastern Federal District 1.814 1.869 1.893 1.858
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 2.168 2.247 2.191 2.090
Kamchatka Krai 1.773 1.850 1.887 1.890
Primorsky Krai 1.685 1.732 1.761 1.736
Khabarovsk Krai 1.744 1.787 1.854 1.779
Amur Oblast 1.844 1.849 1.838 1.817
Magadan Oblast 1.693 1.659 1.664 1.596
Sakhalin Oblast 1.808 1.962 2.019 2.156
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 1.857 1.948 2.022 1.987
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 1.906 2.041 2.097 2.112

Life Expectancy

Russian Federation 70.76 70.93 71.39 71.87
Central Federal District 71.93 72.10 72.72 73.07
Belgorod Oblast 72.16 72.25 72.61 72.87
Bryansk Oblast 69.75 69.42 70.36 70.92
Vladimir Oblast 69.13 69.25 69.82 70.28
Voronezh Oblast 70.89 70.82 71.67 72.08
Ivanovo Oblast 69.84 69.88 70.62 70.77
Kaluga Oblast 70.02 69.93 70.73 71.18
Kostroma Oblast 69.86 70.05 70.38 70.87
Kursk Oblast 70.14 70.11 70.80 70.94
Lipetsk Oblast 70.66 70.60 71.07 71.62
Moscow Oblast 70.78 70.94 72.26 72.50
Orel Oblast 70.22 69.88 70.38 70.73
Ryazan Oblast 70.74 70.80 71.46 71.87
Smolensk Oblast 68.90 69.44 69.74 69.98
Tambov Oblast 70.93 71.11 71.67 72.11
Tver Oblast 68.13 68.43 69.10 69.24
Tula Oblast 69.41 69.63 70.06 70.56
Yaroslavl Oblast 70.45 70.64 70.98 71.21
Moscow 76.37 76.70 76.77 77.09
North-West Federal District 71.25 71.42 71.70 72.16
Republic of Karelia 69.19 69.36 69.16 69.78
Komi Republic 69.27 69.05 69.40 69.45
Arkhangelsk Oblast 70.16 70.23 70.71 70.82
of which:
_Nenets Autonomous Okrug 65.76 70.65 71.00 71.08
_Arkhangelsk Oblast 70.27 70.20 70.70 70.80
Vologda Oblast 69.35 69.74 70.40 70.24
Kaliningrad Oblast 70.51 70.28 70.58 71.92
Leningrad Oblast 70.36 70.28 71.23 71.70
Murmansk Oblast 70.46 69.97 70.24 70.94
Novgorod Oblast 67.67 68.41 68.70 69.15
Pskov Oblast 67.82 68.07 68.48 69.25
St. Petersburg 74.22 74.57 74.42 74.90
Southern Federal District 71.76 71,74 1 72,13 1 72.29
Republic of Adygea 71.80 72.01 72.22 72.59
Republic of Kalmykia 71.35 72.03 72.15 73.35
Krasnodar Krai 70.74 70.52 70.74
Republic of Crimea 72.29 72.28 72.53 72.83
Astrakhan Oblast 71.34 70.76 71.36 72.20
Volgograd Oblast 71.42 71.62 71.98 72.49
Rostov Oblast 71.39 71.30 71.90 72.20
Sevastopol 72.28 70.67 71.64
North Caucasus Federal District 73.95 74.11 74.63 75.13
Dagestan Republic 75.63 75.83 76.39 77.23
Republic of Ingushetia 78.84 79.42 80.05 80.82
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 73.71 74.16 74.61 75.12
Karachay–Cherkessia 73.94 73.91 74.44 74.72
Republic of North Ossetia – Alania 73.94 73.82 74.20 75.05
Chechen Republic 73.20 73.06 73.45 74.20
Stavropol Krai 72.75 72.75 73.36 73.40
Volga Federal District 70.06 70.20 70.71 71.39
Republic of Bashkortostan 69.63 69.76 70.08 71.00
Republic of Mari El 69.30 69.42 69.80 70.75
Republic of Mordovia 70.56 71.38 72.06 72.25
Republic of Tatarstan 72.12 72.17 72.81 73.64
Udmurt Republic 69.92 70.03 70.46 70.86
Chuvash Republic 70.79 70.62 71.35 71.52
Perm Krai 68.75 69.04 69.09 69.74
Kirov Oblast 70.26 70.59 71.11 71.71
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 69.42 69.53 70.17 70.75
Orenburg Oblast 68.90 68.73 69.63 70.57
Penza Oblast 71.54 71.63 72.12 72.53
Samara Oblast 69.40 69.63 70.35 71.08
Saratov Oblast 70.67 70.95 71.40 72.07
Ulyanovsk Oblast 70.50 70.37 70.46 70.97
Ural Federal District 70.06 70.20 70.38 70.82
Kurgan Oblast 68.27 68.75 69.03 69.43
Sverdlovsk Oblast 69.81 69.76 69.83 70.02
Tyumen Oblast 71.35 71.50 71.76 72.33
of which:
_Khanty-Mansiysk Ugra-Autonomous Okrug 72.23 72.27 72.58 73.50
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 71.23 71.92 71.70 72.13
Tyumen Oblast 70.14 70.32 70.58 71.03
Chelyabinsk Oblast 69.52 69.71 69.90 70.50
Siberian Federal District 68.63 68.85 69.31 69.81
Altai Republic 67.34 67.76 68.44 70.13
Republic of Buryatia 67.67 68.54 69.15 69.61
Republic of Tuva 61.79 61.79 63.13 64.21
Republic of Khakassia 68.57 68.83 68.68 69.33
Altai Krai 69.77 70.01 70.44 70.74
Zabaykalsky Krai 67.11 67.38 67.34 68.33
Krasnoyarsk Krai 69.06 69.23 69.69 70.01
Irkutsk Oblast 66.72 66.87 67.37 68.20
Kemerovo Oblast 67.72 67.80 68.31 68.72
Novosibirsk Oblast 70.19 70.28 70.86 71.20
Omsk Oblast 69.74 70.13 70.41 70.78
Tomsk Oblast 70.33 70.67 71.25 71.66
Far Eastern Federal District 67.81 68.21 68.68 69.22
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 69.13 69.81 70.29 70.84
Kamchatka Krai 67.98 68.06 68.56 68.66
Primorsky Krai 68.19 68.74 69.21 69.66
Khabarovsk Krai 67.92 68.01 68.72 69.13
Amur Oblast 66.38 67.00 67.27 68.28
Magadan Oblast 67.12 67.19 68.11 69.00
Sakhalin Oblast 67.70 67.89 67.99 68.66
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 64.94 65.20 65.04 65.88
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 62.11 62.32 64.16 64.42
• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 
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Ashburn-Nardo, Leslie 2017
Parenthood as a Moral Imperative? Moral Outrage and the Stigmatization of Voluntarily Childfree Women and Men


Nationally representative data indicate that adults in the United States are increasingly delaying the decision to have children or are forgoing parenthood entirely. Although some empirical research has examined the social consequences of adults’ decision to be childfree, few studies have identified explanatory mechanisms for the stigma this population experiences. Based on the logic of backlash theory and research on retributive justice, the present research examined moral outrage as a mechanism through which voluntarily childfree targets are perceived less favorably than are targets with children for violating the prescribed social role of parenthood. In a between-subjects experiment, 197 undergraduates (147 women, 49 men, 1 participant with missing gender data) from a large U.S. Midwestern urban university were randomly assigned to evaluate a male or female married target who had chosen to have zero or two children. Participants completed measures of the target’s perceived psychological fulfillment and their affective reactions to the target. Consistent with earlier studies, voluntarily childfree targets were perceived as significantly less psychologically fulfilled than targets with two children. Extending past research, voluntarily childfree targets elicited significantly greater moral outrage than did targets with two children. My findings were not qualified by targets’ gender. Moral outrage mediated the effect of target parenthood status on perceived fulfillment. Collectively, these findings offer the first known empirical evidence of perceptions of parenthood as a moral imperative.

The author herself doesn’t seem to be happy with her own findings:

Practically speaking, the present findings have some troubling potential implications for howpeople transition to parenthood. For example, the present findings, obtained with college students in the Midwestern United States, suggest that many young people view children as a necessary ingredient for fulfilling lives. Thus, they may feel tremendous pressure to have children, not only from others as this literature suggests (Mueller and Yoder 1999), but also internally. Ironically, these perceptions have absolutely no basis in reality. Meta-analyses reveal that parents report significantly less marital satisfaction than do non-parents, and as their number of children increases, marital satisfaction decreases (Twenge et al. 2003).

That maybe so, but reality definitely seems to have a basis in those perceptions.

For instance, people without those perceptions didn’t tend to pass on their genes.

• Category: Science • Tags: Demographics, Paper Review, Psychology 
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Here is why Russia also needs a BBW (Turkestan edition):


Number of births: Red = Russia; Green = Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan).

In 1897, there were ten times fewer people in Russian Turkestan than within the modern borders of the Russian Federation.

Today, they constitute 50% of the Russian Federation’s population.

They have produced about as many children in the past thirty years as Russians, especially once you account for the mass emigration of Russians from Central Asia.

Therefore, later in the century, the population of dry, landlocked Central Asia may converge with or even come to surpass that of the Russian Federation.

(The usual disclaimers: No further regatherings of Russian lands, no radical life extension, no real life Fallout, etc.)

Open borders between Russia and Central Asia will probably result in Russia acquiring a permanent underclass of lower-IQ Muslims, and in the worst case, outright transforming it into Russabia (impossible with its current ethnic makeup, but the Turkestan demographic reservoir is an order of magnitude bigger than that of the Muslims in the North Caucasus).

The situation is very redolent of the challenges facing the United States vis-a-vis Central America and Europe vis-a-vis the Middle East and Africa.

One of the things I’m looking forwards to doing here is transmigrating HBD insights to Russian realities. On the plus side, it’s socially easier (no WEIRD “racism” taboos) and intellectually easier (since innovation is harder than copying, even if one does have to coin a lot of terms – e.g., “human biodiversity” itself – that don’t exist in Russian). On the negative side, there’s no First Amendment here, as in the rest of Europe.

• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Central Asia, Demographics, Russia 
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Here is why the US needs a Big Beautiful Wall in one graph:


Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are the top four source countries of illegal immigrants to the US.

The American White percentage of the population has been dropping relentlessly for more than half a century, in large part due to immigration itself.

Here is the same graph compared to just US Non-Hispanic Whites:


Let’s play with some simple, easy to understand numbers (also the necessary autism-borne disclaimers: No radical life extension, no artificial wombs, no singularity, etc).

A very loose but useful rule of thumb in demographics is that the steady state future population (minus migration) equals the numbers of births per year times the life expectancy.

Life expectancy can be set to 80 for everyone.

The steady state population of the US, with around 4 million yearly births in recent years, is therefore around 320 million, which is exactly what it is today (this makes intuitive sense, since the TFR is around the replacement level rate).

Of that number, about 160 million will be Whites, down from 200 million today, and the other 160 million will be minorities, up from 120 million today.

With annual births stabilizing at around 2.5 million, there should eventually be around 200 million people in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, up by about 60 million people relative to today.

Trump’s Wall will play a big role in determining the geographic distribution of that future 200 million north or south of the Rio Grande.

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The reason I don’t write much about Russia’s demographics nowadays is that there isn’t much point to it.

Up until the early 2010s, the Western media was brimming with misinformation about the subject – what we now call #fakenews – so refuting it was both profitable and easy. Incredibly easy. You didn’t really have to do anything much more complicated than taking a few minutes to browse through Russia’s national statistics database, but apparently that was beyond the capabilities of most Russia journalists.

However, by now a critical number of Western pundits have apparently acquainted themselves with at least the Wikipedia article on Russia’s demographics. In the longterm, reality wins out, and so with a lag time of about a decade, references to Russia’s “plummeting population” and “sixth wave of emigration” have steadily petered out (the last major holdouts of Russia demographic doomerism was Barack Obama in this 2014 interview with The Economist, and Michael Rubin for Commentary in 2015,).

We can now finally say that the “Dying Bear” meme has fulfilled lived up to its own name.


Anyhow, preliminary demographic results for 2016 are in.

Births remained marginally ahead of deaths, both at around 12.9/1,000 people, though the usual ~300,000 annual net immigrants (almost half of them from Ukraine) will ensure that overall population growth remains decidedly positive.


Births decreased by 2.6%. The full impact of the small 1990s cohort is now being felt, so this was always inevitable. Deaths also declined by 1.2%, despite the ongoing aging of the population. This pretty much completes what I termed The Russian Hexagon, the successor to the so-called “Russian Cross” in the early 1990s when the births and deaths graphs intersected; in the past decade, birth and death rates once again converged, but from the opposite direction, forming a sort of hexagon.


The Total Fertility Rate seems to have stabilized at around 1.75 children per woman (inevitable question: How much without Muslims/ethnic minorities? Approximately 0.1 children less, based on completed fertility data from the 2010 Census).

This makes sense. As I pointed out almost a decade ago, Russian fertility preferences are similar to those of Scandinavians and the Anglosphere (~2.5 children per woman), and higher than that of Visegrad/The Med (~2.1 children) or the Teutonic world (1.7 children), so convergence to at least this level was always on the cards as soon as some semblance of economic stability and predictability was restored.

As I pointed out, this makes Russia’s fertility rates reasonably respectable by European standards; they are only noticeably higher in France, Ireland, the UK, and Sweden.


Life expectancy is now close to 72 years, which is the highest it has ever been in Russia’s history.

One way of looking at this is that mortality trends in Russia are basically tracking improvements in the ex-Soviet Baltics (and the City of Moscow) with a lag of ten years, so there is good reason to expect this trend will continue.

This is primarily linked to the big reduction in vodka bingeing during the past decade, which depressed Russian life expectancy by about a decade relative to what it “should be” based on its GDP per capita and healthcare system. This “alcoholization” began to soar from around 1965, and peaked in the 1990s and early 2000s. According to calculations by the demographer Alexander Nemtsov, something like a third of Russian mortality around 2005 could be attributed to it.

Blast from the Past

Incidentally, back in 2008, I created a demographic model for Russia, which enabled me to accurately predict a resumption in both total (2010) and natural (2013) population growth to the exact year.

In the scenario where TFR is set to a constant 1.75 children per woman, the “Medium” scenario of mortality improvements (which has best tracked Russia’s life expectancy trends to date), and about 300,000 annual immigrants, it predicted the following:

Medium (TFR=1.75 from 2010)The population grows from 2010, rising from 142mn to 148mn in 2025 and 156mn in 2050. The death rate troughs at 10.8 in 2034, before zooming in to 11.5 by 2050. The birth rate peaks at 13.6 by 2014, before plummeting to 9.7 in 2033, before recovering to 11.9 in 2046 and again falling, although less rapidly than before.

How does this stack up against reality? The birth rate reached a multi-year plateau at 13.3 children per woman during 2012-2015, when the decline in the numbers of women of childbearing age were exactly offset by rising total fertility rates. The mortality rate fell steadily throughout this period, just as predicted, though it is marginally higher as of 2016 (12.9/1,000) than in the Medium variant (12.6/1,000).

Overall, this is pretty close, and suggests that the model is fundamentally sound and thus so are its future population projections.

Of course it has to be adjusted upwards by 2.3 million to take into account Crimea, and any further (re)gatherings of rightful Russian clay.


As alcohol abuse fell, so did all of the other components of mortality, especially those most strongly associated with it, i.e. deaths from external causes:


… which includes homicides, suicides, deaths from transport accidents (despite soaring vehicle ownership), and, self-referentially, deaths from alcohol poisoning.


Part of this reduction was due to cultural change, including the realities of life under capitalism (if you turn up to work drunk, you can be fired, unlike under socialism), part of it was due to economics (more diversity of choice), and part of it was thanks to specific Kremlin policies, such as steady increases in the excise tax on alcohol and restrictions on alcohol advertising.

Finally, the abortion rate continues to quietly decline. The ratio of abortions to births is now down to 40%, down from well more than 100% during the era from the post-Stalin legalization of abortion to the 1990s. This is still about 2-3x higher than in most of Western Europe and the US, but Russia is longer the absolute outlier it once was.


Just like the trends with fertility and mortality, this too can be considered a return to “demographic normality” after the Soviet aberration.

One important point: Conservative talking points to the contrary, there is no hard evidence that high abortion rates actually decrease fertility. Low abortion rates are good though for general health reasons and (depending on your religious views) for ethical ones but they have very little to do with demographic health per se.

Even though it completely bans abortions, Poland has one of Europe’s lowest fertility rates. For some reason Mark Steyn never did dwell on that…

• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 
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Turkey has a proud and rich history of military coups. As analysts tirelessly point out, they are even sanctioned by the Constitution as a means of preserving secularism.

However, those days have come to an end.

The abortive coup of the past few days was in all likelihood the dying gasp of 20th century Turkey.


In Western op-eds over the years, there has been rising disquiet over the AKP’s “Islamization” of Turkish society, including the education system. However, if opinion polls are anything to go by, the Islamization effect has been slight.

According to the World Values Survey, a comprehensive survey of global cultural values that runs in multiyear “waves,” there has been no very significant rise in religious fervor in Turkish society from the first wave in 1989-1993 to the last wave in 2010-2014. A mere 1% of Turks disbelieve in God, but that is barely different from 2% in the mid-1990s (and exactly analogous to the US in the early 1980s and Poland in the early 1990s). The percentage of Turks who listed “religious faith” as one of the more desirable traits for their children fell from 44% to 40% in the last 25 years, and while the percentage of Turks who consider religious faith to be “very important” rose from 60% in the early 1990s to around 80% through the rest of the 1990s and 2000s, in the very last wave of surveys that number fell back to 68%. The percentage of Turks considering themselves to be a “religious person” rose from 73% in the early 1990s, but has remained stable at around 80%-85% ever since. And despite all the mosque building under the AKP, religious attendance has virtually no changes over the past quarter century and only 1% of Turks say they are members of a religious organization.

The banal reality is that Turkey has consistently been a conservative and strongly religious society (even if it is nothing on the scale of Arab countries where half or more of the population supports the death penalty for adultery and apostasy). Some 70% of Turks agree that in conflicts between religious and science, the former is “always” right. This is lower than the 90%+ agreement rate you see in Arab Muslim countries for this question, but is considerably higher than in the more religious Western countries such as the US (39%) and Poland (25%) – or for that matter in Russia (22%), for all the rhetoric about it becoming a theocracy.

On the other hand, a generation ago, masses of bearded men would not have come out onto the streets of Istanbul, charging rifle tanks and putting themselves in the way of tanks, to defend an Islamist President against a military coup. They would not have then proceeded to beat up and in some cases lynch surrending soldiers, most of whom – as it now emerges – were hapless conscripts who were not even aware that they were participating in a coup.

But if this wasn’t a case of the AKP’s Islamization campaign generating many more hardcore Islamists, what actually changed?


The answer ultimately lies in Turkish demographics: In short, the devout Muslims have migrated to the cities.

In the past generation, Turkey has urbanized at breakneck speeds. The urban population share of Turkey has increased from 44% in 1980, the data of the last major successful coup, to 73% today. In absolute numbers, this translated in an increase from 20 million to 55 million urban denizens during this period, including a fivefold increase in Istanbul from 3 million to 15 million. The other western coastal cities and Ankara also saw major increases.

From 1965 to today, the share of the Turkish population residing in richer, more heavily urbanized Western Turkey soared from a third to a half, while poorer and more rural Central Turkey and Eastern Turkey fell from a third each to 23% and 28%, respectively. However, Western Turkey also has the country’s lowest fertility rates, at less than the replacement level rate of 2.1 and comparable to those seen in the North-Eastern USA.


Total fertility rates in Turkey in 2000.

So where did their new denizens come from?


Internal migration in Turkey.

They came from the Anatolian hinterlands, whose fertility rates – almost one expected child more in Marmara and the Aegean coast – are comparable to that of Utah, not New England. They are much more conservative, much more religious, and less socioeconomically advanced (Western coastal Turkey has a GDP per capita comparable to Greece, whereas Central Turkey is more comparable to Romania and the Kurdish triangle to the southest converges to more overtly Third World conditions).

These people of Middle Turkey, derided as backwards country bumpkins and Islamist retrogrades by coastal Kemalist latte-sipping urbanites, have their own political vision…


Typical Turkish electoral map (2011 elections).

… which is centered on the social conservatism and political “Islamism Lite” of Erdogan and the AKP. And they continue to have many more babies than the traditional westcoasters, even after moving there: Whereas in 2003 the TFR of urban natives across all of Turkey was a mere 1.68 children per woman, considerably lower than the all Turkish average of 2.23 children per woman, for rural-to-urban migrants it was 2.82 children per women, and only modestly lower than the 3.28 rate for rural natives.

Incidentally, this also explains the strong Islamism, low socioeconomic status, high fertility rates (higher than back home!), and high degree of Erdogan support amongst German Turks. The Gastarbeiters primarily hailed from Middle Turkey, and the migration to Germany was just one aspect of the mass population movement from there to more advanced areas in the second part of the 20th century.


And all this, possibly more so than contingent factors like poor planning or the failure to eliminate Erdogan, explains why the military coup failed.

First off, this internal migration of virile Islamists created a class of urbanites in Ankara and especially Istanbul who were ready to go out for and in some cases to lay their lives down for their beliefs. While historically rapid urbanization was associated with political instability and revolution, the major difference is that in Turkey, it is Erdogan who is the candidate of the sans-culottes and of the factory workers. In previous coups, the military could take control to reinstate secularism at will, and what was an aggrieved Muslim in the Anatolian boondocks to do about it? Stew in his own juices. But now, those same people could flood into the streets, having been rapidly mobilized by their neighborhood imams and Erdogan pleading for help on social media.

Second, it should be noted that the economic effects of Anatolian urbanization have worked strongly to the Islamists’ favor. Apart from the direct benefits to people’s pockets that came with the fusion of political Islam and economic liberalization, the construction projects associated with the mass Anatolian relocation to Ionia and Marmara, as well as the industries that sprang up to service their needs (retail, credit, etc.), has created a class of Turkish oligarchs. Moreover, unlike in say Russia, where the oil & gas oligarch class remains somewhat resentful of Putin for circumscribing their power after the 1990s free-for-all when not expropriating their ill-gotten gains outright, the Turkish oligarchs created in the 1990s generally have more reasons to remain loyal to the regime:

The names of those allegedly involved reads like a Who’s Who of Turkey’s ­government-linked oligarchy, whose firms have profited in recent years from the more than $100bn-worth of public contracts awarded by the AKP. Nepotism in the awarding of tenders has long been one of the most visible signs of corruption in Turkey, and in the AKP’s years a coterie of construction firms has risen up around it.

A hostile oligarch class combined with an independent military makes for a highly unstable polity and has been the traditional bane of populist governments in Latin America. Erdogan, however, has successfully coopted the oligarch class through the same mechanisms that won him the support of a critical mass of people in Turkey’s twin capitals.


It is now increasingly evident that a political transformation of cardinal proportions is taking place in Turkey. As of the time of writing, around 30 governors, 100 generals, 2,700 judges, 3,000 soldiers, and 8,000 police have been dismissed or arrested – in short, something like a third of Turkey’s high-level apparat has been purged. Although there remain good grounds to continue to doubt that the coup was “planned” by Erdogan, it’s pretty clear that the Black Book was written long beforehand for just such an occasion.

If Erdogan now uses the opportunity to take Turkey in a much more Islamist direction what do the demographic trends indicate about his chances of longterm success?

First off, it was not that the incidence of religiosity has increased in Turkey. In fact, DESPITE the much higher fertility rates of the Islamists, and more than a decade’s worth of active Islamization, religiosity in Turkey has only modestly increased during the 2000s and actually seems to have started falling again by the time of the fifth WVS (see above). This is quite stunning in that it implies that the global secular trend towards secularism (LOL) is incredibly strong, in that even in Turkey it has succeeded in holding its own against very powerful demographic and propaganda countercurrents. Even if Turkey went so far as to delink itself from the Council of Europe and NATO, it’s not clear why these secularizing forces should stop acting on it.

Second, there is the Kurdish factor. Although the oft made case for similarities between Putin and Erdogan have tended to be overstated, there is one sphere in which I think where the comparison is legitimate: Ethnic policy. Both are “manynationals” who are using ideology to try to glue their country together – Islam is basically the Turkish version of Russia’s WW2 Victory cult with a small dose of “spiritual buckles” like the anti-LGBT law. But if anything Turkey’s problems are more acute. Russia’s only truly “problematic” region in that it combines an aggrieved ethnicity with a high total fertility rate – which at 2.9 children per woman is not even that high – is Chechnya, which only has 1% of Russia’s population. In contrast, Kurdish Turkestan has more than 10% of the Turkish population and almost all of its provinces have a fertility rate of greater than 3 children per woman. Will an even more rigorous Islamization campaign keep them within Turkey or will the gravitational attraction of the incipient Rojava state prove to be unavoidable?

On that particular front, there are few grounds for optimism. It is above all Erdogan’s own foreign policy that enabled the rise of Rojava and it is too late to put the lid on it; certainly it is beyond the capabilities of the SAA itself, which has enough problems dealing with Al Nusra and Islamic State to say nothing of an SDF that is now supported by US airpower. And Turkey’s own military capabilities have, at least in the short-term, been sharply curtailed by Erdogan own purge of as many high-ranking officers (percentage wise) within a couple of days as Stalin only managed to do over the course of a year.

• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Color Revolution, Demographics, Turkey 
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When I posted a 2007 map of the share of European children born out of wedlock from Reddit to Twitter, it generated considerably discussion, including a discussion at Razib Kan’s blog.


There are many rather interesting patterns here:

  • The Nordics, France, The Former GDR, Estonia, Bulgaria all have high rates out of wedlock births. Most but not all of them are socially liberal; all of them, however, are highly secular and irreligious.
  • There does not seem to be a high correlation between out of wedlock births and total fertility rates. “Traditionalist” Italy, West Germany, and Spain all have low TFRs; conservative and strongly religious Poland has one of the very lowest TFRs in all of Europe.
  • On the other hand, ultraconservative and very religious Far West Ukraine has consistently had some of the very highest TFRs in Europe, along with moderately conservative Ireland and very liberal France, Scandinavia, and Iceland.

A query from Charles Murray provoked me into seeking out its source: A 2015 paper by Sebastian Klüsener, “Spatial variation in non-marital fertility across Europe in the 20th-21st centuries.”

That study is basically a statistical survey of the history of nonmarital fertility (NMF) in Europe in the past three centuries.

Here is a map of nonmarital fertility rates in 1910, just before modern nationstates began to break down traditional marriage folkways through laws and regulations:


As we can see, there are significant but not overwhelming continuities between 1910 and 2007. Klüsener found a Spearman’s rho correlation of 0.29 between regional out of wedlock shares of births.

What determines NMF?

Klüsener lays out several factors:

  • Economic instability – Favors NMF.
  • Preexisting traditions – Some regions like Iceland and parts of Sweden have always had less of an absolute emphasis on marriage.
  • Laws/Customs – Historically, Jews in Austrian Galicia had children almost entirely within wedlock, but they were not officially registered; hence the unexpectedly rather high share of out of wedlock births across the eastern Habsburg domains in the 1910 map are more a statistical artefact than a reality. Today, similar factors apply to Kosovan Muslims.
  • Agricultural inheritance systems
  • Secularization levels – Favors NMF.
  • Female autonomy and economic participation – Favors NMF.

In Temporal Terms

Initially very low before the early 18th century, NMF became a significant phenomenon in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. He doesn’t mention a cause, but the obvious suspect would be the wellknown secularization of European society after the religious wars of the 17th century.

NMF decreased significantly during the postwar miracle economy years, ushering in the “Golden Age of Marriage.” After 1960, however, this model began breaking down.

europe-nonmarital-fertility-history It began in Northern Europe, and then spread to Western and Central Europe by the 1980s; Southern and Eastern Europe followed in the 1990s, albeit the latter reversed direction from the mid-2000s, presumably due to some combination of economic stabilization and post-Soviet desecularization (indeed, Eastern Europe went from being the region with the highest share of out of wedlock births in the 1950s and 1960s, to the lowest share as of today). NMF in Northern Europe seems to have reached a plateau at around 50%, but continues rising steadily in Western Europe, having reached 64% in France.

The author links this with legislative actions providing greater autonomy for women, which is supported by institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the EU. Its worth noting that French laws on marriage and paternity are (in)famously favorable to women, prohibiting paternity testing without both partners’ consent and obligating men to look after “their” children even if they discover they are not theirs. In substantial part, ergo for Sweden. In such a legal environment, coupled with the high secularism rates and expansive welfare states, it is hardly surprising that many men appear to be “striking” against marriage.

In Regional Terms

In the 1910 map, the big cities in the more backward and traditionalist countries – Madrid in Spain, Rome in Italy, Saint Petersburg and Moscow in Russia – stand out, having West European like NMF rates in a sea of near universal traditional marriage patterns.

central-europe-nonmarital-fertilityA century ago and earlier, Germany used to have a general east/west division, in which Bavaria belonged to the high NMF region (this is also mentioned by Emmanuel Todd in The Explanation of Ideology). But while Austria, which also had historically high NMF, remains an NMF hotspot to this day, Bavaria has converged with the rest of Western Germany; the author links this to its adoption of the unified German civil code in 1900, which stated that children born outside marriage were not related to the father and invalidated Bavarian regional legal norms giving out of wedlock children substantial rights.

Switzerland has traditionally had the lowest NMF rates of any Germanic region. Is in any way connected to the fact it was the last major European country to give women the vote?

intermarium-nonmarital-fertility This traditional east German propensity for high NMF (present well before the GDR), even continues to be reflected on the map of Poland today, where the parts previous under German rule continue to have somewhat higher NMF rates than the otherwise very low Polish average (just like the famous map of Polish voting patterns). Poland has traditionally had the lowest NMF rates in East-Central Europe, but since 1990 and especially since 2000 they have started going up sharply. In this case at least, Estonia can into Nordic.

east-europe-nonmarital-fertility In the future, Klüsener suggests increasing convergence between the Protestant and Catholic regions of Europe, as secularization in the latter drives up their NMF rates further. However, the Orthodox regions of Europe may be an exception to the general European pattern due to their “reactionary trend” of rising religiosity and rejection of a “wide range of family formation behaviors that are not in line with traditional norms.” As for the Muslim regions of Europe, their NMF rates remain stable at a very low level.

• Category: History • Tags: Demographics, Fertility 
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One thing you start noticing when you read commentary on Russia long enough is how the same discredited tropes arise again and again. Zombie-like, they refuse to die.

russia-migration-history In 2011, for example, there was supposed to have been a “sixth wave of Russian emigration,” in which disillusioned Russians were said to have finally had enough with Putin and were bolting for the exits en masse. Perhaps this was so in the fervid imaginations of the RFERL staff, but in the real world, as proxied by things like numbers and records and statistics, Russian emigration had long collapsed to almost insignificant levels. All the Russians – actually, Jews and Volga Germans, for the most part – who were ever likely to leave Russia had already done so in the 1990s. As such, they picked an exceedingly bad time to come up with this “Sixth Wave of Russian Emigration” fable.

Incidentally, Nikolay Starikov’s deconstruction of how this myth came to be, translated by yours truly, remains a highly relevant case study in how the Western propaganda machine against Russia works: Russian liberals misrepresent or outright invent figures which are quoted by ever more “authoritative” sources and are eventually picked up by and broadcast by a MSM which doesn’t care for elementary fact-checking whenever Russia is concerned.

In 2014-2015, this particular myth is getting resurrected – articles on this have appeared in the RFERL (again), the Guardian, The Diplomat, the BBC, Business Insider, and most recently – in the Washington Post, in an article by Vladislav Inozemtsev on the “self-destructing” Russian economy.

Net emigration from Russia rose from 35,000 people a year from 2008 to 2010 to more than 400,000, by preliminary estimates, in 2015.

Finally! Some actual, concrete numbers are brought forth, which is a positive change from the typical pattern of quoting anecdotal individual cases (e.g. what a tragedy for Russia to have lost those intellectual giants Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Masha Gessen).

And at first glance they do not look good and actually appear to support the anti-Putin narrative.


But then we notice a strange thing: Immigration has grown in tandem with emigration. (Figures for 2015 here and below are based on the first 10 months of 2015 relative to the same period last year).


Well, surely it must then be the case that all the bright young Yuropean Russians fleeing Putin’s regime and getting replaced by Uzbek street cleaners, right? Right??



The increase in immigration to the (much poorer!) countries neighboring Russia has if anything been bigger than the increase in emigration to developed Western countries.

If you honestly believe that Russians are escaping Mordor to earn their keep in the cottonfields of the Fergana Valley then you will believe anything.

Even Russian emigration to Ukraine has soared. Apart from Masha Gaidar and a few hundred Neo-Nazis who to their horror are now realizing that they have outlived their usefulness to the Maidan regime, there are probably fewer real Russian emigrants to Ukraine than the number of times Poroshenko promised to sell his chocolate factory in Russia. It is self-evident that the increase in emigrants to Ukraine – from 19,000 in 2013 to a projected 44,000 in 2015 – was a function of the much greater intensity of border flows in general i.e. an approximate fourfold increase in recorded Ukrainian entries into Russia.

In contrast, the number of Russian “exits” to the countries of the so-called Far Abroad – especially the three that have traditionally accepted the most Russian immigrants, Germany, the US, and Israel – show much more modest increases between 2011 (the absolute nadir of Russian emigration according to official Russian statistics) and 2014. Germany: From 3,815 to 4,780; USA: from 1,422 to 1,937; Israel: From 977 to 1,139. Moreover, based on available statistics for the first ten months of 2015, the number of “exits” to all three of these countries fell by around 10% relative to 2014, and are now merely at the level they were at around 2008 (i.e. the very peak of Russia’s 2000s economic boom!).

Moreover, there is a very obvious reason for the “spike” in Russian emigration that did occur: A banal change in bureaucratic definitions. Here’s a summary from one of my commentators:

Briefly – in 2011, Rosstat has changed the way it counted migration – only those registered at an abode (a specific address) started to be counted for the “official” number. “Unofficial” number became very large because in addition to the above, those registered for 9 month+ stay in a particular place (city or town) started to be included. Before 2010, the number of incoming migrants was counted as those registered at an address plus registered at a place for 12+ months.

In 2012, a brief experiment with counting only those registered at a particular address was discontinued. The only reported definition in 2012 is the same as the “unofficial” definition in 2011, but year-to-year comparisons are done, as far as I could see, with the “official” 2011 results. This explains huge discrepancy.

The case for an Nth Wave of Russian Emigration (n=7) is now looking really weak, but one rejoinder that was made even during the n=6 period was that the countries receiving immigrants tend to keep better statistics than the country sending them. And besides, Tsar Putin wouldn’t exactly want the world to know that everyone is trying to flee his tinpot kingdom.

So let’s look at statistics from countries that receive Russian immigrants.

Canada is a a rich country with democracy, rule of law, and a climate that would be familiar to Russians. Not the worst place an exile could go to. It has never given out many permanent resident permits to Russians, and that number dropped to a record low in 2014, the year when Russia-West relations went south (the Israelis actually got marginally more permanent resident permits in 2014).



The US gave out 7,502 Permanent Resident permits to Russians in 2010; 8,548 in 2011; 10,114 in 2012; and 10,154 in 2013. (The average during the 1990s was around 45,000 a year).

Steve Sailer can write what he wants, but current Russian emigration to the US is ultimately very small scale. It’s worth pointing out that in per capita terms, Germany is getting as many Permanent Resident Permits as Russians, and Poles are getting them thrice as frequently. Russia accounts for less than 15% of the European total, and Europe as a whole gets 10% of the global total. Although DHS statistics only run to 2013, I see no evidence things changed cardinally in 2014 or 2015. As for illegal Russian immigration to the US, it has always been negligible.

Finally, here are some figures from the OECD’s International Migration Database in relation to inflows of foreign population by Russian nationality.


We do see a substantial uptick in Russian emigration into OECD countries in the early 2010s. This was primarily a matter of more Russians coming to Germany, which reached 31,000 in 2013. Even allowing for a further rise in 2014, however, it would only take it back to the levels of the early 2000s, and would remain quite modest in comparison with emigration from Germany’s Eastern European neighbors. The equivalent figures in 2013 were 190,000 for Poland and 60,000 for Hungary, countries with respectively less than a third and one fifteenth of Russia’s population. In other words, these are not the sort of emigration levels that mark a “brain drain” let alone create any noticeable detrimental demographic effect.

I do not intend to paint this as any sort of “achievement” on Russia’s part. To the contrary, low Russian emigration rates to the First World are explained at least as much by its lack of access to the Schengen free travel zone and poor foreign language skills as any success it has had creating opportunities and decent living conditions at home.

But facts are facts, and Vladislav Inozemtsev’s figure of 400,000 Russian net emigrants in 2015 are in the realm of pure fantasy. Russia’s total migration balance remains positive (whether that in itself is a good or bad thing is a debate for another day), so its number of net emigrants is actually negative. Even assuming this was a simple definitional mistake, I do not even see how he could have arrived at a total emigration figure of 400,000 even going by official statistics – the great bulk of which, lest we not forget, now essentially consist of tallying back-and-forth movements between Russia and its neighbors in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.


What Inozemtsev means by “country of hope.”

Now to be sure, there are a lot of other tendentious arguments in Inozemtsev’s WaPo article. Contrary to what he implies, few people in Russia care much about the dollar value of their apartments since it has no relation to everyday economic life. His claims that the business climate has deteriorated are negated by Russia’s rapid rise in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings since 2012. His description of Russia in the 1990s as a “country of hope” that was attractive to investors is so utterly facetious that it is unworthy of further commentary. Suffice to say that by the end of Yeltsin’s reign even the Western media at large was begging to differ.

I would recommend Mercouris’ recent analysis of the Russian economy in 2015 for Russia Insider as an antidote, filled as it is with actual economic statistics as opposed to lazy ideological rhetoric and innuendo.

But the thing about his emigration claims is that they are just wrong on a direct factual level. One might think it remarkable that someone affiliated with Davosian-sounding institutions like the “Center for Strategic and International Studies” in Washington and “Center for Post-Industrial Studies” in Moscow would make such mistakes. Even more remarkable is that the Washington Post does not bother doing basic fact-checking.

But ultimately none of this is all that surprising.

Professional charlatans like Inozemtsev are a dime a dozen in Russia. They tend to participate or direct opaquely financed and “thinktanks” with these strange names in Moscow while being affiliated with other obscure thinktanks in the US and Europe. Publications like the WSJ and the Washington Post – the Guardian caters to the more “creative” types – solicit an article or two from them once a year, while in their day jobs they pump in neoliberal and pro-Western propaganda into Russia. Second rate bottom of the barrel Chicago School stuff that might have been fashionable in the 1980s but no longer gets any intellectual truck in economic debates in the US itself. But they continue to be wheeled out when it comes to debates on Russia because what they say, no matter how factually hazy or intellectually negligible, serves the purpose of giving an ideological backbone, and a conveniently pro-oligarch one at that, to the revolutionary Westernist opposition. Their aim is not to inform but to obfuscate.

What is perhaps the most terrifying fact of them all is that these people had a lot of influence in important Russian institutions all the way up until the start of Putin’s third term, from high level academia (the School of Higher Economics is a notable cluster) to the RIA state news agency. Inozemtsev himself taught at MGIMO in the 200s, a prestigious university specializing to churning out Russia’s diplomatic corps. That was when an effort was finally made to clean out the Augean stables of these agents of influence. Russia is not the dictatorship they universally proclaim it to be, so they remain free to propagandize all they want from Centers for Post-Industrial Studies or thinktank positions in the US or their media pulpits in WaPo or the WSJ or even Westernist Russian media portals like Vedomosti.

But at least fewer of them are now doing it on the Russian taxpayers’ dime. And consequently, more of them are doing it from overseas. But a few disgruntled aspiring revolutionaries does not an nth wave of emigration make.

• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Academia, Demographics, Emigration, Russia 
Anatoly Karlin
About Anatoly Karlin

I am a blogger, thinker, and businessman in the SF Bay Area. I’m originally from Russia, spent many years in Britain, and studied at U.C. Berkeley.

One of my tenets is that ideologies tend to suck. As such, I hesitate about attaching labels to myself. That said, if it’s really necessary, I suppose “liberal-conservative neoreactionary” would be close enough.

Though I consider myself part of the Orthodox Church, my philosophy and spiritual views are more influenced by digital physics, Gnosticism, and Russian cosmism than anything specifically Judeo-Christian.