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 Russian Reaction Blog / DemographicsTeasers

The USSR played the leading role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, which the majority of Europeans recognized in 1945 even if half a century of Hollywood propaganda successfully displaced it in the public imagination in favor of the USA. But what about within the USSR itself?

Back in January 2015, during his brief nationalist phase after the return of Crimea, Putin declared that Russians played the leading role in the defeat of Nazism and paid the highest sacrifices. That seems like a dream today. Official rhetoric proclaims that “we achieved victory together” played over footage of Ramzan Kadyrov and Tajik workers wearing St. George’s ribbons (in the meantime, Tajikistan has banned the Immortal Regiments march on the grounds that it is un-Islamic).

So who’s right: Putin 2015, or Putin 2017?

I compiled the following two graphs based on the results of the Soviet Census of 1939 and Grigory Krivosheev’s statistics on military deaths by ethnicity in WW2 (table 122).

soviet-military-deaths-ww2-by-ethnicity

Predictably, Russians bore the highest number of absolute losses – some two thirds of the 8.7 million total.

Together with the Ukrainians and Belorussians that figure rises to 85%.

soviet-military-deaths-ww2-by-percentage-of-ethnicity

Moreover, Russians also bore the highest relative military losses as a percentage of their population, together with the Buryats.

The Ukrainians and Belorussians were somewhat lower, though this is explainable on account of them being occupied for part of the war, and incurring a greater share of civilian deaths as a result. There would have been be a similar dynamic with respect to the Jews, a large percentage of whom unfortunately fell within the Nazi zone of occupation.

I recall reading a history paper (can’t find it at the moment) where it was claimed that the USSR would create ethnic minority units from the Finno-Ugric peoples and intentionally send them to the hottest fronts so as to make them incur heavier casualties and shift the demographic balance in favor of Russins. That is obviously nonsense based on these figures, though that said, they did almost do their fair share.

The Central Asians, especially the Uzbeks and Tajiks, are underrepresented – the latter by a factor of almost three. This is perhaps not that bad a thing, since they had a reputation for technical incompetence; even in the late USSR, conscripts from those regions tended to go into “Class C” rear divisions with simple, obsolete equipment.

Of the major ethnicities, the worst group in terms of its lack of contribution were the restive Muslim provinces of the North Caucasus. Dagestan underdid its fair share by a factor of four, while the Chechens and Ingush as is known pretty much defected to the Germans en masse (hence the deportations).

I didn’t include any figures for the Balts and Moldovans. They were annexed by the USSR after the 1939 Census, so their percentages would be meaningless.

For comparison, the Germans lost approximately 6.1% of their population as military losses in WW2, including: Germany proper: 6.4%; Austria: 3.9%; The German diaspora in Eastern Europe: 7.2%, according to Rüdiger Overmans’s calculations.

***

Nationality Population (1939) WW2 Mil. Deaths % All Mil. Deaths % Deaths Population
Russians 99,591,520 5,756,000 66.40% 5.78%
Ukrainians 28,111,007 1,377,400 15.89% 4.90%
Belorussians 5,275,393 252,900 2.92% 4.79%
Georgians 2,249,636 79,500 0.92% 3.53%
Azeris 2,275,678 58,400 0.67% 2.57%
Armenians 2,152,860 83,700 0.97% 3.89%
Uzbeks 4,845,140 117,900 1.36% 2.43%
Turkmen 812,404 21,300 0.25% 2.62%
Tajiks 1,229,170 22,900 0.26% 1.86%
Kazakhs 3,100,949 125,500 1.45% 4.05%
Kyrgyz 884,615 26,600 0.31% 3.01%
Karelians 252,716 9,500 0.11% 3.76%
Komi 422,317 11,600 0.13% 2.75%
Bashkirs 843,648 31,700 0.37% 3.76%
Udmurts 606,326 23,200 0.27% 3.83%
Tatars 4,313,488 187,700 2.17% 4.35%
Mari 481,587 20,900 0.24% 4.34%
Mordovians 1,456,330 63,300 0.73% 4.35%
Chuvash 1,369,574 63,300 0.73% 4.62%
Kalmyks 134,402 4,000 0.05% 2.98%
Buryats 224,719 13,000 0.15% 5.79%
Jews 3,028,538 142,500 1.64% 4.71%
Kabardians & Balkars 206,870 3,400 0.04% 1.64%
Chechens & Ingush 500,088 2,300 0.03% 0.46%
Ossetians 354,818 10,700 0.12% 3.02%
Dagestanis 857,499 11,100 0.13% 1.29%
Bulgars 113,494 1,100 0.01% 0.97%
Greeks 286,444 2,400 0.03% 0.84%
Chinese 32,023 400 0.00% 1.25%
Poles 630,097 10,100 0.12% 1.60%
Finns 143,437 1,600 0.02% 1.12%
Others 3,770,306 132,500 1.53% 3.51%
TOTAL 170,557,093 8,668,400 100.00% 5.08%
 

vapor-macron-le-pen My latest podcast with Robert Stark, co-host and proponent of Asian-Aryanism pilleater, and Alt Right legend Guillaume Durocher, who has written for Counter-Currents, Radix, and Occidental Observer.

We mostly talked about the French elections and French demographics. Here’s a link: http://www.starktruthradio.com/?p=4467

Topics

The final election round between Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron
The French Elections 2017 (Round One)
The original candidates; Left Wing Populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Globalist Centrist Emmanuel Macron, Mainstream Conservative François Fillon, and Nationalist Populist Marine Le Pen
The demographic and regional support for the candidates
Whether Le Pen will appeal to the Conservative Fillon and Socialist Mélenchon supporters
How Macron epitomizes the worst of the establishment while Fillon and Mélenchon hold some anti-establishment positions
Macron’s work for a Rothschild Bank, Bilderberg attendance, and Neoliberal agenda
Mélenchon, his refusal to back Macron, how he is better on immigration then Macron, and his support for a basic income
Fillon, his endorsement of Macron while adopting some of Le Pen’s immigration stances
In contrast with Macron, Mélenchon and Fillon like Le Pen were more pro-Russia and non-interventionist
The ideology and agenda of Le Pen’s Front National
Comparisons to Donald Trump and how unlike Trump Le Pen has a consistent ideology
The misnomer that Le Pen is far right and her adoption of left leaning stances on issues such economics, gay rights, and the environment
Mainstream conservative Nicolas Dupont-Aignan backing Le Pen
Alain Soral and his advocacy of a left-right alliance
Éric Zemmour
The French Blackpill, Quantified
Michel Houellebecq’s Submission
Demographic Trends and future scenarios for France and Europe

 

Here is a graph of monthly births in Russia since 2006 through to March 2017:

russia-births-2006-2017

It is pointless to make sweeping conclusions based on demographic data from the past one or two months.

That said, the three month moving average has been down relative to the same period in the previous year since the middle of 2016, and as of this year, has widened to 10%, an unprecedented figure in the past decade.

russia-births-change-2006-2017

Now to be sure, birth rates should – all else equal – be falling, because the diminished generation of the 1990s is now moving into its peak childbearing years. It shouldn’t be falling by 10% in any one year, however. If this new trend continues, Russia’s TFR for 2017 should fall to about 1.65 children per woman from the 1.76 in 2016.

OTOH mortality continued improving, falling by 1% in the first three months of 2017 relative to same period last year, which translates into a correspondingly greater improvement in life expectancy because of Russia’s ageing population (i.e. for the same reason that Russia’s fertility rate would increase if the number of births was to stay the same).

So I don’t want to imply all is doom and gloom after having covered Russia’s demographic turnaround for almost a decade.

However, it does perhaps warrant a reassessment of the weight we attach to different demographic projections.

For instance, the “Medium” scenario in my Russian demographic model – also the one which I long thought likeliest – involves the assumption that the TFR would converge to about 1.75 (where it has generally been since 2012), with steady convergence in life expectancy to developed world levels, and annual (official) immigrant inflows of 300,000. In this scenario, Russia’s population would actually increase to about 150 million in 2025 and 158 million by 2050 (that’s including Crimea, aka +2 million).

However, if the recent fertility decline is not a one-year blip, and were to instead to continue falling to about 1.50, then Russia’s population would stagnate (this is from before Crimea):

Low (TFR=1.5 from 2010)Population growth starts from 2011, going from 142mn to 143mn by 2023. Then it falls slowly to 138mn by 2050. The birth rate peaks at 12.5 in 2013, falls sharply to 7.8 by 2032, and then remains in the 8-9 range. The death rate troughs at 11.4 in 2032, then rises to 12.9 by 2050. Positive natural increase is never attained.

Not really the demographic apocalypse long promised by the Western media either, but a disappointing outcome nonetheless.

It’s also possible that this will further encourage the kremlins to intensify immigration from Central Asia.

 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 

Emil Kirkegaard dug through a PEW dataset to find out who supports big government.

big-government-support-by-race

This is in line with the finding that 94% of American libertarians are non-Hispanic whites:

More than two-thirds (68 percent) of libertarians are men, while 32 percent are women. They are also racially homogeneous, with nearly all (94 percent) libertarians identifying as non-Hispanic whites. They also skew significantly younger. More than 6-in-10 (62 percent) libertarians are under the age of 50, including one-quarter (25 percent) who are under the age of 30.

Here are the US Census Bureau projections about America’s future demographic makeup:

us-population-by-race-2010-2050

Charles Murray isn’t going to be happy about this. His is a doomed ideology.

 
• Category: Ideology • Tags: Demographics, Libertarianism, United States 

erdogan-have-5-kids

far better than we ever could.

Anyhow, how fast is the Muslim population growing? It’s long been clear that official statistics aren’t quite hacking it, and the situation is likely considerably worse.

Recent observation from Emil Kirkegaard gleaned from his meanderings through demographic statistics:

So, what’s next? There’s a lot to do, but one thing I’ve been thinking of is showing that Muslim populations are actually growing a lot faster than many claim. The reason they claim these low levels of growth is because they rely on official statistics and these data tend to convert 2nd and later generation people into the ‘native’ categories, thus effectively hiding them. However, Muslims are nice enough to use distinctive names, so one can count the number of persons with such names over time and this will show a more realistic growth rate. Preliminary results for Denmark indicate an official stats-based growth rate of 2.5%, whereas first names indicate 5.1%. That’s not a small difference. The growth rate of Danish natives is something like -16% per generation which comes out at about -0.5% per year. You don’t have to be a genius to see how 5.1% vs. -0.5% work out in a few decades.

 
• Tags: Demographics, Eurabia, Turkey 

The final figures for life expectancy and TFR in total and for the regions have been released today.

The Rosstat computations give an estimate of TFR = 1.76 children per woman and LE = 71.9 years for 2016, which are pretty close to my rough estimates a month ago.

The total population is estimated to be 146,804,372 at the end of the year.

Not really much extra to comment on than what I already have in February.

One thing of note is that Crimea has by now been fully integrated into the statistics so we can begin to analyze how its doing after liberation from the yoke of Ukrainian backwardness.

For instance, in terms of disposable income, Crimea remains well behind almost all majority ethnic Russian regions, including neighboring Krasnodar Krai (which became post-Soviet Russia’s main breachfront location). However, it is also converging quickly. Although Russia was in a recession during 2016, with only 0.7% growth in disposable incomes (-5.4% inflation), Crimea and Sevastopol both grew by more than 15% – the fastest rate of increase in Russia.

Ukraine was, of course, also in recession during this period.

The fertility rate in Crimea and Sevastopol has also increased since 2014, which you presumably wouldn’t expect of regions under brutal occupation.

TFR

TFR 2013 2014 2015 2016
Russian Federation 1.707 1.750 1.777 1.762
Central Federal District 1.478 1.514 1.575 1.595
Belgorod Oblast 1.526 1.544 1.561 1.547
Bryansk Oblast 1.534 1.557 1.650 1.612
Vladimir Oblast 1.591 1.643 1.730 1.712
Voronezh Oblast 1.437 1.471 1.517 1.484
Ivanovo Oblast 1.554 1.572 1.629 1.595
Kaluga Oblast 1.644 1.689 1.836 1.785
Kostroma Oblast 1.852 1.866 1.890 1.880
Kursk Oblast 1.674 1.699 1.716 1.643
Lipetsk Oblast 1.601 1.657 1.700 1.687
Moscow Oblast 1.522 1.600 1.675 1.727
Orel Oblast 1.530 1.552 1.603 1.590
Ryazan Oblast 1.552 1.595 1.640 1.703
Smolensk Oblast 1.480 1.528 1.522 1.509
Tambov Oblast 1.423 1.493 1.512 1.503
Tver Oblast 1.639 1.663 1.696 1.709
Tula Oblast 1.424 1.466 1.568 1.547
Yaroslavl Oblast 1.635 1.640 1.695 1.710
Moscow 1.328 1.341 1.406 1.460
North-West Federal District 1.574 1.613 1.657 1.670
Republic of Karelia 1.648 1.744 1.766 1.763
Komi Republic 1.961 2.013 2.002 1.972
Arkhangelsk Oblast 1.803 1.835 1.847 1.833
of which:
_Nenets Autonomous Okrug 2.312 2.423 2.584 2.774
_Arkhangelsk Oblast 1.784 1.812 1.818 1.795
Vologda Oblast 1.852 1.856 1.922 1.897
Kaliningrad Oblast 1.644 1.699 1.745 1.728
Leningrad Oblast 1.227 1.282 1.286 1.318
Murmansk Oblast 1.623 1.649 1.714 1.653
Novgorod Oblast 1.700 1.749 1.776 1.776
Pskov Oblast 1.675 1.695 1.741 1.796
St. Petersburg 1.482 1.522 1.591 1.634
Southern Federal District 1.642 1,711 1 1,735 1 1.719
Republic of Adygea 1.684 1.730 1.724 1.681
Republic of Kalmykia 1.882 1.853 1.831 1.708
Krasnodar Krai 1.825 1.818 1.763
Republic of Crimea 1.724 1.805 1.840 1.829
Astrakhan Oblast 1.911 1.968 1.970 1.938
Volgograd Oblast 1.529 1.571 1.589 1.574
Rostov Oblast 1.522 1.605 1.627 1.596
Sevastopol 1.649 1.821 1.726
North Caucasus Federal District 1.987 2.034 1.979 1.936
Dagestan Republic 2.015 2.077 2.022 1.978
Republic of Ingushetia 2.231 2.278 1.971 1.752
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 1.803 1.831 1.753 1.724
Karachay–Cherkessia 1.673 1.650 1.541 1.518
Republic of North Ossetia – Alania 1.977 2.009 1.930 1.891
Chechen Republic 2.925 2.912 2.799 2.622
Stavropol Krai 1.548 1.617 1.644 1.678
Volga Federal District 1.750 1.789 1.818 1.788
Republic of Bashkortostan 1.887 1.948 1.939 1.860
Republic of Mari El 1.926 1.981 1.993 1.980
Republic of Mordovia 1.366 1.374 1.360 1.403
Republic of Tatarstan 1.832 1.844 1.863 1.855
Udmurt Republic 1.922 1.959 2.006 1.956
Chuvash Republic 1.851 1.878 1.909 1.869
Perm Krai 1.932 1.977 2.018 1.979
Kirov Oblast 1.868 1.885 1.913 1.943
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 1.561 1.593 1.669 1.649
Orenburg Oblast 2.001 2.027 2.013 1.946
Penza Oblast 1.486 1.529 1.550 1.503
Samara Oblast 1.589 1.647 1.708 1.714
Saratov Oblast 1.536 1.574 1.601 1.550
Ulyanovsk Oblast 1.611 1.673 1.712 1.705
Ural Federal District 1.907 1.960 1.965 1.919
Kurgan Oblast 2.115 2.101 2.123 2.030
Sverdlovsk Oblast 1.871 1.921 1.945 1.911
Tyumen Oblast 2.004 2.073 2.072 2.009
of which:
_Khanty-Mansiysk Ugra-Autonomous Okrug 2.050 2.090 2.073 2.020
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 2.090 2.189 2.188 2.084
Tyumen Oblast 1.959 2.054 2.064 2.002
Chelyabinsk Oblast 1.802 1.855 1.843 1.809
Siberian Federal District 1.880 1.902 1.902 1.870
Altai Republic 2.815 2.883 2.677 2.634
Republic of Buryatia 2.205 2.260 2.280 2.237
Republic of Tuva 3.424 3.485 3.386 3.345
Republic of Khakassia 2.013 2.007 1.986 1.967
Altai Krai 1.830 1.841 1.811 1.777
Zabaykalsky Krai 2.014 2.078 2.057 1.979
Krasnoyarsk Krai 1.775 1.807 1.837 1.815
Irkutsk Oblast 1.978 1.966 2.012 1.989
Kemerovo Oblast 1.787 1.778 1.726 1.713
Novosibirsk Oblast 1.749 1.765 1.817 1.805
Omsk Oblast 1.867 1.951 1.911 1.808
Tomsk Oblast 1.591 1.593 1.600 1.581
Far Eastern Federal District 1.814 1.869 1.893 1.858
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 2.168 2.247 2.191 2.090
Kamchatka Krai 1.773 1.850 1.887 1.890
Primorsky Krai 1.685 1.732 1.761 1.736
Khabarovsk Krai 1.744 1.787 1.854 1.779
Amur Oblast 1.844 1.849 1.838 1.817
Magadan Oblast 1.693 1.659 1.664 1.596
Sakhalin Oblast 1.808 1.962 2.019 2.156
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 1.857 1.948 2.022 1.987
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 1.906 2.041 2.097 2.112

Life Expectancy

Russian Federation 70.76 70.93 71.39 71.87
Central Federal District 71.93 72.10 72.72 73.07
Belgorod Oblast 72.16 72.25 72.61 72.87
Bryansk Oblast 69.75 69.42 70.36 70.92
Vladimir Oblast 69.13 69.25 69.82 70.28
Voronezh Oblast 70.89 70.82 71.67 72.08
Ivanovo Oblast 69.84 69.88 70.62 70.77
Kaluga Oblast 70.02 69.93 70.73 71.18
Kostroma Oblast 69.86 70.05 70.38 70.87
Kursk Oblast 70.14 70.11 70.80 70.94
Lipetsk Oblast 70.66 70.60 71.07 71.62
Moscow Oblast 70.78 70.94 72.26 72.50
Orel Oblast 70.22 69.88 70.38 70.73
Ryazan Oblast 70.74 70.80 71.46 71.87
Smolensk Oblast 68.90 69.44 69.74 69.98
Tambov Oblast 70.93 71.11 71.67 72.11
Tver Oblast 68.13 68.43 69.10 69.24
Tula Oblast 69.41 69.63 70.06 70.56
Yaroslavl Oblast 70.45 70.64 70.98 71.21
Moscow 76.37 76.70 76.77 77.09
North-West Federal District 71.25 71.42 71.70 72.16
Republic of Karelia 69.19 69.36 69.16 69.78
Komi Republic 69.27 69.05 69.40 69.45
Arkhangelsk Oblast 70.16 70.23 70.71 70.82
of which:
_Nenets Autonomous Okrug 65.76 70.65 71.00 71.08
_Arkhangelsk Oblast 70.27 70.20 70.70 70.80
Vologda Oblast 69.35 69.74 70.40 70.24
Kaliningrad Oblast 70.51 70.28 70.58 71.92
Leningrad Oblast 70.36 70.28 71.23 71.70
Murmansk Oblast 70.46 69.97 70.24 70.94
Novgorod Oblast 67.67 68.41 68.70 69.15
Pskov Oblast 67.82 68.07 68.48 69.25
St. Petersburg 74.22 74.57 74.42 74.90
Southern Federal District 71.76 71,74 1 72,13 1 72.29
Republic of Adygea 71.80 72.01 72.22 72.59
Republic of Kalmykia 71.35 72.03 72.15 73.35
Krasnodar Krai 70.74 70.52 70.74
Republic of Crimea 72.29 72.28 72.53 72.83
Astrakhan Oblast 71.34 70.76 71.36 72.20
Volgograd Oblast 71.42 71.62 71.98 72.49
Rostov Oblast 71.39 71.30 71.90 72.20
Sevastopol 72.28 70.67 71.64
North Caucasus Federal District 73.95 74.11 74.63 75.13
Dagestan Republic 75.63 75.83 76.39 77.23
Republic of Ingushetia 78.84 79.42 80.05 80.82
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 73.71 74.16 74.61 75.12
Karachay–Cherkessia 73.94 73.91 74.44 74.72
Republic of North Ossetia – Alania 73.94 73.82 74.20 75.05
Chechen Republic 73.20 73.06 73.45 74.20
Stavropol Krai 72.75 72.75 73.36 73.40
Volga Federal District 70.06 70.20 70.71 71.39
Republic of Bashkortostan 69.63 69.76 70.08 71.00
Republic of Mari El 69.30 69.42 69.80 70.75
Republic of Mordovia 70.56 71.38 72.06 72.25
Republic of Tatarstan 72.12 72.17 72.81 73.64
Udmurt Republic 69.92 70.03 70.46 70.86
Chuvash Republic 70.79 70.62 71.35 71.52
Perm Krai 68.75 69.04 69.09 69.74
Kirov Oblast 70.26 70.59 71.11 71.71
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 69.42 69.53 70.17 70.75
Orenburg Oblast 68.90 68.73 69.63 70.57
Penza Oblast 71.54 71.63 72.12 72.53
Samara Oblast 69.40 69.63 70.35 71.08
Saratov Oblast 70.67 70.95 71.40 72.07
Ulyanovsk Oblast 70.50 70.37 70.46 70.97
Ural Federal District 70.06 70.20 70.38 70.82
Kurgan Oblast 68.27 68.75 69.03 69.43
Sverdlovsk Oblast 69.81 69.76 69.83 70.02
Tyumen Oblast 71.35 71.50 71.76 72.33
of which:
_Khanty-Mansiysk Ugra-Autonomous Okrug 72.23 72.27 72.58 73.50
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 71.23 71.92 71.70 72.13
Tyumen Oblast 70.14 70.32 70.58 71.03
Chelyabinsk Oblast 69.52 69.71 69.90 70.50
Siberian Federal District 68.63 68.85 69.31 69.81
Altai Republic 67.34 67.76 68.44 70.13
Republic of Buryatia 67.67 68.54 69.15 69.61
Republic of Tuva 61.79 61.79 63.13 64.21
Republic of Khakassia 68.57 68.83 68.68 69.33
Altai Krai 69.77 70.01 70.44 70.74
Zabaykalsky Krai 67.11 67.38 67.34 68.33
Krasnoyarsk Krai 69.06 69.23 69.69 70.01
Irkutsk Oblast 66.72 66.87 67.37 68.20
Kemerovo Oblast 67.72 67.80 68.31 68.72
Novosibirsk Oblast 70.19 70.28 70.86 71.20
Omsk Oblast 69.74 70.13 70.41 70.78
Tomsk Oblast 70.33 70.67 71.25 71.66
Far Eastern Federal District 67.81 68.21 68.68 69.22
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 69.13 69.81 70.29 70.84
Kamchatka Krai 67.98 68.06 68.56 68.66
Primorsky Krai 68.19 68.74 69.21 69.66
Khabarovsk Krai 67.92 68.01 68.72 69.13
Amur Oblast 66.38 67.00 67.27 68.28
Magadan Oblast 67.12 67.19 68.11 69.00
Sakhalin Oblast 67.70 67.89 67.99 68.66
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 64.94 65.20 65.04 65.88
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 62.11 62.32 64.16 64.42
 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 

PAPER REVIEW

Ashburn-Nardo, Leslie 2017
Parenthood as a Moral Imperative? Moral Outrage and the Stigmatization of Voluntarily Childfree Women and Men


Abtract:

Nationally representative data indicate that adults in the United States are increasingly delaying the decision to have children or are forgoing parenthood entirely. Although some empirical research has examined the social consequences of adults’ decision to be childfree, few studies have identified explanatory mechanisms for the stigma this population experiences. Based on the logic of backlash theory and research on retributive justice, the present research examined moral outrage as a mechanism through which voluntarily childfree targets are perceived less favorably than are targets with children for violating the prescribed social role of parenthood. In a between-subjects experiment, 197 undergraduates (147 women, 49 men, 1 participant with missing gender data) from a large U.S. Midwestern urban university were randomly assigned to evaluate a male or female married target who had chosen to have zero or two children. Participants completed measures of the target’s perceived psychological fulfillment and their affective reactions to the target. Consistent with earlier studies, voluntarily childfree targets were perceived as significantly less psychologically fulfilled than targets with two children. Extending past research, voluntarily childfree targets elicited significantly greater moral outrage than did targets with two children. My findings were not qualified by targets’ gender. Moral outrage mediated the effect of target parenthood status on perceived fulfillment. Collectively, these findings offer the first known empirical evidence of perceptions of parenthood as a moral imperative.

The author herself doesn’t seem to be happy with her own findings:

Practically speaking, the present findings have some troubling potential implications for howpeople transition to parenthood. For example, the present findings, obtained with college students in the Midwestern United States, suggest that many young people view children as a necessary ingredient for fulfilling lives. Thus, they may feel tremendous pressure to have children, not only from others as this literature suggests (Mueller and Yoder 1999), but also internally. Ironically, these perceptions have absolutely no basis in reality. Meta-analyses reveal that parents report significantly less marital satisfaction than do non-parents, and as their number of children increases, marital satisfaction decreases (Twenge et al. 2003).

That maybe so, but reality definitely seems to have a basis in those perceptions.

For instance, people without those perceptions didn’t tend to pass on their genes.

 
• Category: Science • Tags: Demographics, Paper Review, Psychology 

Here is why Russia also needs a BBW (Turkestan edition):

births-russia-vs-central-asia

Number of births: Red = Russia; Green = Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan).

In 1897, there were ten times fewer people in Russian Turkestan than within the modern borders of the Russian Federation.

Today, they constitute 50% of the Russian Federation’s population.

They have produced about as many children in the past thirty years as Russians, especially once you account for the mass emigration of Russians from Central Asia.

Therefore, later in the century, the population of dry, landlocked Central Asia may converge with or even come to surpass that of the Russian Federation.

(The usual disclaimers: No further regatherings of Russian lands, no radical life extension, no real life Fallout, etc.)

Open borders between Russia and Central Asia will probably result in Russia acquiring a permanent underclass of lower-IQ Muslims, and in the worst case, outright transforming it into Russabia (impossible with its current ethnic makeup, but the Turkestan demographic reservoir is an order of magnitude bigger than that of the Muslims in the North Caucasus).

The situation is very redolent of the challenges facing the United States vis-a-vis Central America and Europe vis-a-vis the Middle East and Africa.

One of the things I’m looking forwards to doing here is transmigrating HBD insights to Russian realities. On the plus side, it’s socially easier (no WEIRD “racism” taboos) and intellectually easier (since innovation is harder than copying, even if one does have to coin a lot of terms – e.g., “human biodiversity” itself – that don’t exist in Russian). On the negative side, there’s no First Amendment here, as in the rest of Europe.

 
• Category: Race/Ethnicity • Tags: Central Asia, Demographics, Russia 

Here is why the US needs a Big Beautiful Wall in one graph:

usa-vs-central-american-births

Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are the top four source countries of illegal immigrants to the US.

The American White percentage of the population has been dropping relentlessly for more than half a century, in large part due to immigration itself.

Here is the same graph compared to just US Non-Hispanic Whites:

births-us-nonhispanic-whites-vs-central-america

Let’s play with some simple, easy to understand numbers (also the necessary autism-borne disclaimers: No radical life extension, no artificial wombs, no singularity, etc).

A very loose but useful rule of thumb in demographics is that the steady state future population (minus migration) equals the numbers of births per year times the life expectancy.

Life expectancy can be set to 80 for everyone.

The steady state population of the US, with around 4 million yearly births in recent years, is therefore around 320 million, which is exactly what it is today (this makes intuitive sense, since the TFR is around the replacement level rate).

Of that number, about 160 million will be Whites, down from 200 million today, and the other 160 million will be minorities, up from 120 million today.

With annual births stabilizing at around 2.5 million, there should eventually be around 200 million people in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, up by about 60 million people relative to today.

Trump’s Wall will play a big role in determining the geographic distribution of that future 200 million north or south of the Rio Grande.

 

The reason I don’t write much about Russia’s demographics nowadays is that there isn’t much point to it.

Up until the early 2010s, the Western media was brimming with misinformation about the subject – what we now call #fakenews – so refuting it was both profitable and easy. Incredibly easy. You didn’t really have to do anything much more complicated than taking a few minutes to browse through Russia’s national statistics database, but apparently that was beyond the capabilities of most Russia journalists.

However, by now a critical number of Western pundits have apparently acquainted themselves with at least the Wikipedia article on Russia’s demographics. In the longterm, reality wins out, and so with a lag time of about a decade, references to Russia’s “plummeting population” and “sixth wave of emigration” have steadily petered out (the last major holdouts of Russia demographic doomerism was Barack Obama in this 2014 interview with The Economist, and Michael Rubin for Commentary in 2015,).

We can now finally say that the “Dying Bear” meme has fulfilled lived up to its own name.

***

Anyhow, preliminary demographic results for 2016 are in.

Births remained marginally ahead of deaths, both at around 12.9/1,000 people, though the usual ~300,000 annual net immigrants (almost half of them from Ukraine) will ensure that overall population growth remains decidedly positive.

russia-births-deaths-1946-2016

Births decreased by 2.6%. The full impact of the small 1990s cohort is now being felt, so this was always inevitable. Deaths also declined by 1.2%, despite the ongoing aging of the population. This pretty much completes what I termed The Russian Hexagon, the successor to the so-called “Russian Cross” in the early 1990s when the births and deaths graphs intersected; in the past decade, birth and death rates once again converged, but from the opposite direction, forming a sort of hexagon.

russia-tfr-1946-2016

The Total Fertility Rate seems to have stabilized at around 1.75 children per woman (inevitable question: How much without Muslims/ethnic minorities? Approximately 0.1 children less, based on completed fertility data from the 2010 Census).

This makes sense. As I pointed out almost a decade ago, Russian fertility preferences are similar to those of Scandinavians and the Anglosphere (~2.5 children per woman), and higher than that of Visegrad/The Med (~2.1 children) or the Teutonic world (1.7 children), so convergence to at least this level was always on the cards as soon as some semblance of economic stability and predictability was restored.

As I pointed out, this makes Russia’s fertility rates reasonably respectable by European standards; they are only noticeably higher in France, Ireland, the UK, and Sweden.

russia-life-expectancy-1946-2016

Life expectancy is now close to 72 years, which is the highest it has ever been in Russia’s history.

One way of looking at this is that mortality trends in Russia are basically tracking improvements in the ex-Soviet Baltics (and the City of Moscow) with a lag of ten years, so there is good reason to expect this trend will continue.

This is primarily linked to the big reduction in vodka bingeing during the past decade, which depressed Russian life expectancy by about a decade relative to what it “should be” based on its GDP per capita and healthcare system. This “alcoholization” began to soar from around 1965, and peaked in the 1990s and early 2000s. According to calculations by the demographer Alexander Nemtsov, something like a third of Russian mortality around 2005 could be attributed to it.


Blast from the Past

Incidentally, back in 2008, I created a demographic model for Russia, which enabled me to accurately predict a resumption in both total (2010) and natural (2013) population growth to the exact year.

In the scenario where TFR is set to a constant 1.75 children per woman, the “Medium” scenario of mortality improvements (which has best tracked Russia’s life expectancy trends to date), and about 300,000 annual immigrants, it predicted the following:

Medium (TFR=1.75 from 2010)The population grows from 2010, rising from 142mn to 148mn in 2025 and 156mn in 2050. The death rate troughs at 10.8 in 2034, before zooming in to 11.5 by 2050. The birth rate peaks at 13.6 by 2014, before plummeting to 9.7 in 2033, before recovering to 11.9 in 2046 and again falling, although less rapidly than before.

How does this stack up against reality? The birth rate reached a multi-year plateau at 13.3 children per woman during 2012-2015, when the decline in the numbers of women of childbearing age were exactly offset by rising total fertility rates. The mortality rate fell steadily throughout this period, just as predicted, though it is marginally higher as of 2016 (12.9/1,000) than in the Medium variant (12.6/1,000).

Overall, this is pretty close, and suggests that the model is fundamentally sound and thus so are its future population projections.

Of course it has to be adjusted upwards by 2.3 million to take into account Crimea, and any further (re)gatherings of rightful Russian clay.


 

As alcohol abuse fell, so did all of the other components of mortality, especially those most strongly associated with it, i.e. deaths from external causes:

russia-deaths-external-causes-1990-2016

… which includes homicides, suicides, deaths from transport accidents (despite soaring vehicle ownership), and, self-referentially, deaths from alcohol poisoning.

russia-mortality-alcohol-murder-suicide-1990-2016

Part of this reduction was due to cultural change, including the realities of life under capitalism (if you turn up to work drunk, you can be fired, unlike under socialism), part of it was due to economics (more diversity of choice), and part of it was thanks to specific Kremlin policies, such as steady increases in the excise tax on alcohol and restrictions on alcohol advertising.

Finally, the abortion rate continues to quietly decline. The ratio of abortions to births is now down to 40%, down from well more than 100% during the era from the post-Stalin legalization of abortion to the 1990s. This is still about 2-3x higher than in most of Western Europe and the US, but Russia is longer the absolute outlier it once was.

russia-abortion-rate-1957-2016

Just like the trends with fertility and mortality, this too can be considered a return to “demographic normality” after the Soviet aberration.

One important point: Conservative talking points to the contrary, there is no hard evidence that high abortion rates actually decrease fertility. Low abortion rates are good though for general health reasons and (depending on your religious views) for ethical ones but they have very little to do with demographic health per se.

Even though it completely bans abortions, Poland has one of Europe’s lowest fertility rates. For some reason Mark Steyn never did dwell on that…

 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, Russia 

Turkey has a proud and rich history of military coups. As analysts tirelessly point out, they are even sanctioned by the Constitution as a means of preserving secularism.

However, those days have come to an end.

The abortive coup of the past few days was in all likelihood the dying gasp of 20th century Turkey.

I

In Western op-eds over the years, there has been rising disquiet over the AKP’s “Islamization” of Turkish society, including the education system. However, if opinion polls are anything to go by, the Islamization effect has been slight.

According to the World Values Survey, a comprehensive survey of global cultural values that runs in multiyear “waves,” there has been no very significant rise in religious fervor in Turkish society from the first wave in 1989-1993 to the last wave in 2010-2014. A mere 1% of Turks disbelieve in God, but that is barely different from 2% in the mid-1990s (and exactly analogous to the US in the early 1980s and Poland in the early 1990s). The percentage of Turks who listed “religious faith” as one of the more desirable traits for their children fell from 44% to 40% in the last 25 years, and while the percentage of Turks who consider religious faith to be “very important” rose from 60% in the early 1990s to around 80% through the rest of the 1990s and 2000s, in the very last wave of surveys that number fell back to 68%. The percentage of Turks considering themselves to be a “religious person” rose from 73% in the early 1990s, but has remained stable at around 80%-85% ever since. And despite all the mosque building under the AKP, religious attendance has virtually no changes over the past quarter century and only 1% of Turks say they are members of a religious organization.

The banal reality is that Turkey has consistently been a conservative and strongly religious society (even if it is nothing on the scale of Arab countries where half or more of the population supports the death penalty for adultery and apostasy). Some 70% of Turks agree that in conflicts between religious and science, the former is “always” right. This is lower than the 90%+ agreement rate you see in Arab Muslim countries for this question, but is considerably higher than in the more religious Western countries such as the US (39%) and Poland (25%) – or for that matter in Russia (22%), for all the rhetoric about it becoming a theocracy.

On the other hand, a generation ago, masses of bearded men would not have come out onto the streets of Istanbul, charging rifle tanks and putting themselves in the way of tanks, to defend an Islamist President against a military coup. They would not have then proceeded to beat up and in some cases lynch surrending soldiers, most of whom – as it now emerges – were hapless conscripts who were not even aware that they were participating in a coup.

But if this wasn’t a case of the AKP’s Islamization campaign generating many more hardcore Islamists, what actually changed?

II

The answer ultimately lies in Turkish demographics: In short, the devout Muslims have migrated to the cities.

In the past generation, Turkey has urbanized at breakneck speeds. The urban population share of Turkey has increased from 44% in 1980, the data of the last major successful coup, to 73% today. In absolute numbers, this translated in an increase from 20 million to 55 million urban denizens during this period, including a fivefold increase in Istanbul from 3 million to 15 million. The other western coastal cities and Ankara also saw major increases.

From 1965 to today, the share of the Turkish population residing in richer, more heavily urbanized Western Turkey soared from a third to a half, while poorer and more rural Central Turkey and Eastern Turkey fell from a third each to 23% and 28%, respectively. However, Western Turkey also has the country’s lowest fertility rates, at less than the replacement level rate of 2.1 and comparable to those seen in the North-Eastern USA.

turkey-fertility-rate-2000

Total fertility rates in Turkey in 2000.

So where did their new denizens come from?

turkey-internal-migration

Internal migration in Turkey.

They came from the Anatolian hinterlands, whose fertility rates – almost one expected child more in Marmara and the Aegean coast – are comparable to that of Utah, not New England. They are much more conservative, much more religious, and less socioeconomically advanced (Western coastal Turkey has a GDP per capita comparable to Greece, whereas Central Turkey is more comparable to Romania and the Kurdish triangle to the southest converges to more overtly Third World conditions).

These people of Middle Turkey, derided as backwards country bumpkins and Islamist retrogrades by coastal Kemalist latte-sipping urbanites, have their own political vision…

turkey-2011-elections-results

Typical Turkish electoral map (2011 elections).

… which is centered on the social conservatism and political “Islamism Lite” of Erdogan and the AKP. And they continue to have many more babies than the traditional westcoasters, even after moving there: Whereas in 2003 the TFR of urban natives across all of Turkey was a mere 1.68 children per woman, considerably lower than the all Turkish average of 2.23 children per woman, for rural-to-urban migrants it was 2.82 children per women, and only modestly lower than the 3.28 rate for rural natives.

Incidentally, this also explains the strong Islamism, low socioeconomic status, high fertility rates (higher than back home!), and high degree of Erdogan support amongst German Turks. The Gastarbeiters primarily hailed from Middle Turkey, and the migration to Germany was just one aspect of the mass population movement from there to more advanced areas in the second part of the 20th century.

III

And all this, possibly more so than contingent factors like poor planning or the failure to eliminate Erdogan, explains why the military coup failed.

First off, this internal migration of virile Islamists created a class of urbanites in Ankara and especially Istanbul who were ready to go out for and in some cases to lay their lives down for their beliefs. While historically rapid urbanization was associated with political instability and revolution, the major difference is that in Turkey, it is Erdogan who is the candidate of the sans-culottes and of the factory workers. In previous coups, the military could take control to reinstate secularism at will, and what was an aggrieved Muslim in the Anatolian boondocks to do about it? Stew in his own juices. But now, those same people could flood into the streets, having been rapidly mobilized by their neighborhood imams and Erdogan pleading for help on social media.

Second, it should be noted that the economic effects of Anatolian urbanization have worked strongly to the Islamists’ favor. Apart from the direct benefits to people’s pockets that came with the fusion of political Islam and economic liberalization, the construction projects associated with the mass Anatolian relocation to Ionia and Marmara, as well as the industries that sprang up to service their needs (retail, credit, etc.), has created a class of Turkish oligarchs. Moreover, unlike in say Russia, where the oil & gas oligarch class remains somewhat resentful of Putin for circumscribing their power after the 1990s free-for-all when not expropriating their ill-gotten gains outright, the Turkish oligarchs created in the 1990s generally have more reasons to remain loyal to the regime:

The names of those allegedly involved reads like a Who’s Who of Turkey’s ­government-linked oligarchy, whose firms have profited in recent years from the more than $100bn-worth of public contracts awarded by the AKP. Nepotism in the awarding of tenders has long been one of the most visible signs of corruption in Turkey, and in the AKP’s years a coterie of construction firms has risen up around it.

A hostile oligarch class combined with an independent military makes for a highly unstable polity and has been the traditional bane of populist governments in Latin America. Erdogan, however, has successfully coopted the oligarch class through the same mechanisms that won him the support of a critical mass of people in Turkey’s twin capitals.

IV

It is now increasingly evident that a political transformation of cardinal proportions is taking place in Turkey. As of the time of writing, around 30 governors, 100 generals, 2,700 judges, 3,000 soldiers, and 8,000 police have been dismissed or arrested – in short, something like a third of Turkey’s high-level apparat has been purged. Although there remain good grounds to continue to doubt that the coup was “planned” by Erdogan, it’s pretty clear that the Black Book was written long beforehand for just such an occasion.

If Erdogan now uses the opportunity to take Turkey in a much more Islamist direction what do the demographic trends indicate about his chances of longterm success?

First off, it was not that the incidence of religiosity has increased in Turkey. In fact, DESPITE the much higher fertility rates of the Islamists, and more than a decade’s worth of active Islamization, religiosity in Turkey has only modestly increased during the 2000s and actually seems to have started falling again by the time of the fifth WVS (see above). This is quite stunning in that it implies that the global secular trend towards secularism (LOL) is incredibly strong, in that even in Turkey it has succeeded in holding its own against very powerful demographic and propaganda countercurrents. Even if Turkey went so far as to delink itself from the Council of Europe and NATO, it’s not clear why these secularizing forces should stop acting on it.

Second, there is the Kurdish factor. Although the oft made case for similarities between Putin and Erdogan have tended to be overstated, there is one sphere in which I think where the comparison is legitimate: Ethnic policy. Both are “manynationals” who are using ideology to try to glue their country together – Islam is basically the Turkish version of Russia’s WW2 Victory cult with a small dose of “spiritual buckles” like the anti-LGBT law. But if anything Turkey’s problems are more acute. Russia’s only truly “problematic” region in that it combines an aggrieved ethnicity with a high total fertility rate – which at 2.9 children per woman is not even that high – is Chechnya, which only has 1% of Russia’s population. In contrast, Kurdish Turkestan has more than 10% of the Turkish population and almost all of its provinces have a fertility rate of greater than 3 children per woman. Will an even more rigorous Islamization campaign keep them within Turkey or will the gravitational attraction of the incipient Rojava state prove to be unavoidable?

On that particular front, there are few grounds for optimism. It is above all Erdogan’s own foreign policy that enabled the rise of Rojava and it is too late to put the lid on it; certainly it is beyond the capabilities of the SAA itself, which has enough problems dealing with Al Nusra and Islamic State to say nothing of an SDF that is now supported by US airpower. And Turkey’s own military capabilities have, at least in the short-term, been sharply curtailed by Erdogan own purge of as many high-ranking officers (percentage wise) within a couple of days as Stalin only managed to do over the course of a year.

 
• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Color Revolution, Demographics, Turkey 

When I posted a 2007 map of the share of European children born out of wedlock from Reddit to Twitter, it generated considerably discussion, including a discussion at Razib Kan’s blog.

europe-nonmarital-fertility-2007

There are many rather interesting patterns here:

  • The Nordics, France, The Former GDR, Estonia, Bulgaria all have high rates out of wedlock births. Most but not all of them are socially liberal; all of them, however, are highly secular and irreligious.
  • There does not seem to be a high correlation between out of wedlock births and total fertility rates. “Traditionalist” Italy, West Germany, and Spain all have low TFRs; conservative and strongly religious Poland has one of the very lowest TFRs in all of Europe.
  • On the other hand, ultraconservative and very religious Far West Ukraine has consistently had some of the very highest TFRs in Europe, along with moderately conservative Ireland and very liberal France, Scandinavia, and Iceland.

A query from Charles Murray provoked me into seeking out its source: A 2015 paper by Sebastian Klüsener, “Spatial variation in non-marital fertility across Europe in the 20th-21st centuries.”

That study is basically a statistical survey of the history of nonmarital fertility (NMF) in Europe in the past three centuries.

Here is a map of nonmarital fertility rates in 1910, just before modern nationstates began to break down traditional marriage folkways through laws and regulations:

europe-nonmarital-fertility-1910

As we can see, there are significant but not overwhelming continuities between 1910 and 2007. Klüsener found a Spearman’s rho correlation of 0.29 between regional out of wedlock shares of births.

What determines NMF?

Klüsener lays out several factors:

  • Economic instability – Favors NMF.
  • Preexisting traditions – Some regions like Iceland and parts of Sweden have always had less of an absolute emphasis on marriage.
  • Laws/Customs – Historically, Jews in Austrian Galicia had children almost entirely within wedlock, but they were not officially registered; hence the unexpectedly rather high share of out of wedlock births across the eastern Habsburg domains in the 1910 map are more a statistical artefact than a reality. Today, similar factors apply to Kosovan Muslims.
  • Agricultural inheritance systems
  • Secularization levels – Favors NMF.
  • Female autonomy and economic participation – Favors NMF.

In Temporal Terms

Initially very low before the early 18th century, NMF became a significant phenomenon in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. He doesn’t mention a cause, but the obvious suspect would be the wellknown secularization of European society after the religious wars of the 17th century.

NMF decreased significantly during the postwar miracle economy years, ushering in the “Golden Age of Marriage.” After 1960, however, this model began breaking down.

europe-nonmarital-fertility-history It began in Northern Europe, and then spread to Western and Central Europe by the 1980s; Southern and Eastern Europe followed in the 1990s, albeit the latter reversed direction from the mid-2000s, presumably due to some combination of economic stabilization and post-Soviet desecularization (indeed, Eastern Europe went from being the region with the highest share of out of wedlock births in the 1950s and 1960s, to the lowest share as of today). NMF in Northern Europe seems to have reached a plateau at around 50%, but continues rising steadily in Western Europe, having reached 64% in France.

The author links this with legislative actions providing greater autonomy for women, which is supported by institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the EU. Its worth noting that French laws on marriage and paternity are (in)famously favorable to women, prohibiting paternity testing without both partners’ consent and obligating men to look after “their” children even if they discover they are not theirs. In substantial part, ergo for Sweden. In such a legal environment, coupled with the high secularism rates and expansive welfare states, it is hardly surprising that many men appear to be “striking” against marriage.

In Regional Terms

In the 1910 map, the big cities in the more backward and traditionalist countries – Madrid in Spain, Rome in Italy, Saint Petersburg and Moscow in Russia – stand out, having West European like NMF rates in a sea of near universal traditional marriage patterns.

central-europe-nonmarital-fertilityA century ago and earlier, Germany used to have a general east/west division, in which Bavaria belonged to the high NMF region (this is also mentioned by Emmanuel Todd in The Explanation of Ideology). But while Austria, which also had historically high NMF, remains an NMF hotspot to this day, Bavaria has converged with the rest of Western Germany; the author links this to its adoption of the unified German civil code in 1900, which stated that children born outside marriage were not related to the father and invalidated Bavarian regional legal norms giving out of wedlock children substantial rights.

Switzerland has traditionally had the lowest NMF rates of any Germanic region. Is in any way connected to the fact it was the last major European country to give women the vote?

intermarium-nonmarital-fertility This traditional east German propensity for high NMF (present well before the GDR), even continues to be reflected on the map of Poland today, where the parts previous under German rule continue to have somewhat higher NMF rates than the otherwise very low Polish average (just like the famous map of Polish voting patterns). Poland has traditionally had the lowest NMF rates in East-Central Europe, but since 1990 and especially since 2000 they have started going up sharply. In this case at least, Estonia can into Nordic.

east-europe-nonmarital-fertility In the future, Klüsener suggests increasing convergence between the Protestant and Catholic regions of Europe, as secularization in the latter drives up their NMF rates further. However, the Orthodox regions of Europe may be an exception to the general European pattern due to their “reactionary trend” of rising religiosity and rejection of a “wide range of family formation behaviors that are not in line with traditional norms.” As for the Muslim regions of Europe, their NMF rates remain stable at a very low level.

 
• Category: History • Tags: Demographics, Fertility 

One thing you start noticing when you read commentary on Russia long enough is how the same discredited tropes arise again and again. Zombie-like, they refuse to die.

russia-migration-history In 2011, for example, there was supposed to have been a “sixth wave of Russian emigration,” in which disillusioned Russians were said to have finally had enough with Putin and were bolting for the exits en masse. Perhaps this was so in the fervid imaginations of the RFERL staff, but in the real world, as proxied by things like numbers and records and statistics, Russian emigration had long collapsed to almost insignificant levels. All the Russians – actually, Jews and Volga Germans, for the most part – who were ever likely to leave Russia had already done so in the 1990s. As such, they picked an exceedingly bad time to come up with this “Sixth Wave of Russian Emigration” fable.

Incidentally, Nikolay Starikov’s deconstruction of how this myth came to be, translated by yours truly, remains a highly relevant case study in how the Western propaganda machine against Russia works: Russian liberals misrepresent or outright invent figures which are quoted by ever more “authoritative” sources and are eventually picked up by and broadcast by a MSM which doesn’t care for elementary fact-checking whenever Russia is concerned.

In 2014-2015, this particular myth is getting resurrected – articles on this have appeared in the RFERL (again), the Guardian, The Diplomat, the BBC, Business Insider, and most recently – in the Washington Post, in an article by Vladislav Inozemtsev on the “self-destructing” Russian economy.

Net emigration from Russia rose from 35,000 people a year from 2008 to 2010 to more than 400,000, by preliminary estimates, in 2015.

Finally! Some actual, concrete numbers are brought forth, which is a positive change from the typical pattern of quoting anecdotal individual cases (e.g. what a tragedy for Russia to have lost those intellectual giants Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Masha Gessen).

And at first glance they do not look good and actually appear to support the anti-Putin narrative.

russian-emigration-1997-2015

But then we notice a strange thing: Immigration has grown in tandem with emigration. (Figures for 2015 here and below are based on the first 10 months of 2015 relative to the same period last year).

russian-emigration-immigration-1997-2015

Well, surely it must then be the case that all the bright young Yuropean Russians fleeing Putin’s regime and getting replaced by Uzbek street cleaners, right? Right??

russian-emigration-by-destination-country-1997-2015

Wrong.

The increase in immigration to the (much poorer!) countries neighboring Russia has if anything been bigger than the increase in emigration to developed Western countries.

If you honestly believe that Russians are escaping Mordor to earn their keep in the cottonfields of the Fergana Valley then you will believe anything.

Even Russian emigration to Ukraine has soared. Apart from Masha Gaidar and a few hundred Neo-Nazis who to their horror are now realizing that they have outlived their usefulness to the Maidan regime, there are probably fewer real Russian emigrants to Ukraine than the number of times Poroshenko promised to sell his chocolate factory in Russia. It is self-evident that the increase in emigrants to Ukraine – from 19,000 in 2013 to a projected 44,000 in 2015 – was a function of the much greater intensity of border flows in general i.e. an approximate fourfold increase in recorded Ukrainian entries into Russia.

In contrast, the number of Russian “exits” to the countries of the so-called Far Abroad – especially the three that have traditionally accepted the most Russian immigrants, Germany, the US, and Israel – show much more modest increases between 2011 (the absolute nadir of Russian emigration according to official Russian statistics) and 2014. Germany: From 3,815 to 4,780; USA: from 1,422 to 1,937; Israel: From 977 to 1,139. Moreover, based on available statistics for the first ten months of 2015, the number of “exits” to all three of these countries fell by around 10% relative to 2014, and are now merely at the level they were at around 2008 (i.e. the very peak of Russia’s 2000s economic boom!).

Moreover, there is a very obvious reason for the “spike” in Russian emigration that did occur: A banal change in bureaucratic definitions. Here’s a summary from one of my commentators:

Briefly – in 2011, Rosstat has changed the way it counted migration – only those registered at an abode (a specific address) started to be counted for the “official” number. “Unofficial” number became very large because in addition to the above, those registered for 9 month+ stay in a particular place (city or town) started to be included. Before 2010, the number of incoming migrants was counted as those registered at an address plus registered at a place for 12+ months.

In 2012, a brief experiment with counting only those registered at a particular address was discontinued. The only reported definition in 2012 is the same as the “unofficial” definition in 2011, but year-to-year comparisons are done, as far as I could see, with the “official” 2011 results. This explains huge discrepancy.

The case for an Nth Wave of Russian Emigration (n=7) is now looking really weak, but one rejoinder that was made even during the n=6 period was that the countries receiving immigrants tend to keep better statistics than the country sending them. And besides, Tsar Putin wouldn’t exactly want the world to know that everyone is trying to flee his tinpot kingdom.

So let’s look at statistics from countries that receive Russian immigrants.

Canada is a a rich country with democracy, rule of law, and a climate that would be familiar to Russians. Not the worst place an exile could go to. It has never given out many permanent resident permits to Russians, and that number dropped to a record low in 2014, the year when Russia-West relations went south (the Israelis actually got marginally more permanent resident permits in 2014).

russian-permanent-residents-in-canada

 

The US gave out 7,502 Permanent Resident permits to Russians in 2010; 8,548 in 2011; 10,114 in 2012; and 10,154 in 2013. (The average during the 1990s was around 45,000 a year).

Steve Sailer can write what he wants, but current Russian emigration to the US is ultimately very small scale. It’s worth pointing out that in per capita terms, Germany is getting as many Permanent Resident Permits as Russians, and Poles are getting them thrice as frequently. Russia accounts for less than 15% of the European total, and Europe as a whole gets 10% of the global total. Although DHS statistics only run to 2013, I see no evidence things changed cardinally in 2014 or 2015. As for illegal Russian immigration to the US, it has always been negligible.

Finally, here are some figures from the OECD’s International Migration Database in relation to inflows of foreign population by Russian nationality.

russian-emigration-into-oecd-countries

We do see a substantial uptick in Russian emigration into OECD countries in the early 2010s. This was primarily a matter of more Russians coming to Germany, which reached 31,000 in 2013. Even allowing for a further rise in 2014, however, it would only take it back to the levels of the early 2000s, and would remain quite modest in comparison with emigration from Germany’s Eastern European neighbors. The equivalent figures in 2013 were 190,000 for Poland and 60,000 for Hungary, countries with respectively less than a third and one fifteenth of Russia’s population. In other words, these are not the sort of emigration levels that mark a “brain drain” let alone create any noticeable detrimental demographic effect.

I do not intend to paint this as any sort of “achievement” on Russia’s part. To the contrary, low Russian emigration rates to the First World are explained at least as much by its lack of access to the Schengen free travel zone and poor foreign language skills as any success it has had creating opportunities and decent living conditions at home.

But facts are facts, and Vladislav Inozemtsev’s figure of 400,000 Russian net emigrants in 2015 are in the realm of pure fantasy. Russia’s total migration balance remains positive (whether that in itself is a good or bad thing is a debate for another day), so its number of net emigrants is actually negative. Even assuming this was a simple definitional mistake, I do not even see how he could have arrived at a total emigration figure of 400,000 even going by official statistics – the great bulk of which, lest we not forget, now essentially consist of tallying back-and-forth movements between Russia and its neighbors in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

russia-is-finished

What Inozemtsev means by “country of hope.”

Now to be sure, there are a lot of other tendentious arguments in Inozemtsev’s WaPo article. Contrary to what he implies, few people in Russia care much about the dollar value of their apartments since it has no relation to everyday economic life. His claims that the business climate has deteriorated are negated by Russia’s rapid rise in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings since 2012. His description of Russia in the 1990s as a “country of hope” that was attractive to investors is so utterly facetious that it is unworthy of further commentary. Suffice to say that by the end of Yeltsin’s reign even the Western media at large was begging to differ.

I would recommend Mercouris’ recent analysis of the Russian economy in 2015 for Russia Insider as an antidote, filled as it is with actual economic statistics as opposed to lazy ideological rhetoric and innuendo.

But the thing about his emigration claims is that they are just wrong on a direct factual level. One might think it remarkable that someone affiliated with Davosian-sounding institutions like the “Center for Strategic and International Studies” in Washington and “Center for Post-Industrial Studies” in Moscow would make such mistakes. Even more remarkable is that the Washington Post does not bother doing basic fact-checking.

But ultimately none of this is all that surprising.

Professional charlatans like Inozemtsev are a dime a dozen in Russia. They tend to participate or direct opaquely financed and “thinktanks” with these strange names in Moscow while being affiliated with other obscure thinktanks in the US and Europe. Publications like the WSJ and the Washington Post – the Guardian caters to the more “creative” types – solicit an article or two from them once a year, while in their day jobs they pump in neoliberal and pro-Western propaganda into Russia. Second rate bottom of the barrel Chicago School stuff that might have been fashionable in the 1980s but no longer gets any intellectual truck in economic debates in the US itself. But they continue to be wheeled out when it comes to debates on Russia because what they say, no matter how factually hazy or intellectually negligible, serves the purpose of giving an ideological backbone, and a conveniently pro-oligarch one at that, to the revolutionary Westernist opposition. Their aim is not to inform but to obfuscate.

What is perhaps the most terrifying fact of them all is that these people had a lot of influence in important Russian institutions all the way up until the start of Putin’s third term, from high level academia (the School of Higher Economics is a notable cluster) to the RIA state news agency. Inozemtsev himself taught at MGIMO in the 200s, a prestigious university specializing to churning out Russia’s diplomatic corps. That was when an effort was finally made to clean out the Augean stables of these agents of influence. Russia is not the dictatorship they universally proclaim it to be, so they remain free to propagandize all they want from Centers for Post-Industrial Studies or thinktank positions in the US or their media pulpits in WaPo or the WSJ or even Westernist Russian media portals like Vedomosti.

But at least fewer of them are now doing it on the Russian taxpayers’ dime. And consequently, more of them are doing it from overseas. But a few disgruntled aspiring revolutionaries does not an nth wave of emigration make.

 
• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Academia, Demographics, Emigration, Russia 

In 2012 this German video on what the news would be like in 2018 was satire…

… but reality seems to be catching up to and overtaking satire three years in advance.

And who says Germans don’t plan ahead?

Laws banning incest between brothers and sisters in Germany could be scrapped after a government ethics committee said the they were an unacceptable intrusion into the right to sexual self-determination.

“Criminal law is not the appropriate means to preserve a social taboo,” the German Ethics Council said in a statement. “The fundamental right of adult siblings to sexual self-determination is to be weighed more heavily than the abstract idea of protection of the family.”

This is a one up even on the Muslims who at least stop at first cousins.

Which of course brings us to recent events in Cologne.

world-consanguinity-map Cousin marriage, especially the father’s brother’s daughter type, is extremely prevalent across the Muslim world. It is also almost unheard of in Christian Europe. It is pretty well known even from perusing MSM outlets that these cousin marriages result in high levels of genetic defects.

Venturing into the twilight realm of what is and what is not politically correct, it is well established in the literature that the children of close cousins take massive hits on IQ. That less intelligent people are more impulsive and more likely to commit crimes is also well established.

Finally, and most germane to the newly flourishing rape culture of Cologne, are the social accoutrements of the mass cousin marriage institution.

What happens if a very large percentage of the girls and young women in a society have their choice of potential future marriage partners tightly circumscribed, and indeed, largely predetermined?

It means that women will be kept out of the public sphere – veiling, segregation, accompaniment by male guardians. You don’t want some young strapping village lad throwing a wrench in the family arrangements.

It means a severe shortage of their own women, especially for younger Muslim males. What to do if your cousin is slated to marry off some older cousin in Pakistan, and you don’t have the gold or the seduction XP to game the loosely dressed and unsupervised local women? You resort to the rape game, as we have seen from the institutionalized grooming in Rotherham and other UK cities to the recent wave of mass enrichment in Cologne to mark the new year.

It need hardly be said but the usual SJWs and feminists have gone crickets, and apart from the ritualistic expressions of outrage, the German state shows no signs of abating on its policy of closing the blinds and pretending the train is still moving. The female Green mayor of Cologne Henriette Reker went one further and suggested German women adopt a code of conduct to prevent future assault.

The suggested code of conduct includes maintaining an arm’s length distance from strangers, to stick within your own group, to ask bystanders for help or to intervene as a witness, or to inform the police if you are the victim of such an assault.

islam-feminist-ideals

Why not go the full hog straight away and put on a burqa while you’re at it.

The radical feminists have always been just fine with it, and in the end, it will become a matter of practical safety anyway, as it has amongst Christian communities in the Middle East.

When should we expect that?

Now to be sure, there are still good reasons to be be skeptical of the “Eurabia” thesis. After all, to keep the focus on Germany, 1, 2, or even 5 million new immigrants would still be relatively minor compared to the German population of 80 million. Fertility rates will converge; Merkel will flip-flop again, or be voted out of office; and walls will go up again.

This is a mistaken view, according to a recent argument by Adorján F. Kovács, a German surgeon and publicist.

The gist of the argument is that number we should be looking at is not so much 80 million as 800,000 – the typical number of yearly births Germany has had since the mid-1970s. And of which a consistent 10%-20% accrued to immigrant parents even back then.

Suddenly, when compared against the much diminished size of the youngest German cohorts, what at first might seem like a trickle becomes a flood. Put another way, the 1 million or so immigrants that were officially registered in Germany this year represent one a half year’s worth of the younger ethnic German cohorts.

A much more accurate picture of the influx can be obtained when it is compared to the already existing German population within this same age group, Professor Kovács says.

The official Federal Statistical Office currently counts some 15 million people in this age group in Germany, he continues, adding that the “proportion of people with an immigrant background in this age group is about 3.5 million people.”

In other words, the current native—European—German population aged between 20 and 35, excluding the new wave of invaders, stands at 11.5 million people.

Working on a rough figure of around a million invaders coming to Germany every year for the next few years—and the real figure may be higher—it is perfectly reasonable to expect a total “asylum-seeking” population in Germany of between three and four million by the year 2020.

This is, however, only the tip of the iceberg. Presuming, Professor Kovács says, that only half this number will actually be granted asylum and stay in Germany, this means that there will be around two million successful applicants by 2020.

“The fact that the majority of so-called asylum seekers are men, means that in almost all the cases, a successful bid for family reunification will be made.

“This will add between three and eight extra persons per successful asylum seeker, which means that by 2020 the total number of this group will be in excess of eight million.”

The fact that that are currently only 11.5 million European Germans in the 20- to 30- year-old age group means that by 2020—just four years away—white Germans will be an outright minority in this age category.

“Of the 23 million people in this country who are between 20 and 35 years, approximately 11.5 million people have a migration background within five years,” Professor Kovács says.

Furthermore, the higher birth rate of immigrants “has not even been factored in,” he continued.

“You have to think ahead 30 years. If the majority, that is, more than 50 percent of those now living in Germany are elderly, and will have died within that time, it takes no imagination to get an idea of the composition of the future German population.”

germany-muslim-fertility-rates According to PEW estimates, the fertility rate of German Muslims is 1.8 children per woman during 2005-10, versus 1.3 children per woman for the non-Muslims (see right).

And one supposes that as the numbers pile up those women who do not feel Islam is all that congruent with feminist ideals, and those men who are not tempted into living out a polygamous Houellebecqian fantasy, will start to emigrate en masse, further accelerating the process of population replacement.

It is still not too late to turn things around and won’t be for a number of years yet (previously it would have been measured in decades). In my own social networks I am even beginning to observe some formerly enthusiastic #RefugeesWelcome people expressing shock and rage at the events in Cologne (admittedly there’s some self-selection going on here because any of the truly rabid SJWs would have long since DeFriended me). After all, a dozen bad apples, as in the Paris Attacks, are presumably easier to explain away more than a thousand strong “group of people who mostly come from her in appearance from the North African and Arab countries” (to use the least obfuscatory official phraseology).

Still, considering the bizarre and abrupt manner in which Merkel pivoted from calling multiculturalism a failure and openly saying that immigrants are “more criminal” to opening the gates wide open and leaning on Zuckerberg and other social media to stamp out “hate” on social media, it is not beyond plausible reason that there are darker and more powerful designs at work that are fundamentally ringfenced from open debate and democratic choice.

 
• Category: Foreign Policy • Tags: Demographics, Eurabia, Germany, Rape 

Hungary is opting for the latter:

The scheme—designed to boost the Hungarian birthrate—was announced at a recent government press conference in the Hungarian Parliament building attended by the Minister heading the Prime Minister’s Office, János Lázár.

The scheme will see the state grant a non-repayable aid package of 10 million Hungarian Forints (HUF) to all couples agreeing to have three children within ten years.

According to the Global Property Guide, the average detached house price in Hungary is HUF 9.3 million.

Minister Lázár said that the grant was part of the extension of the government’s “family first home benefit.”

10 million forints is about $35,000.

hungary-birth-death-rates-historical

You may recall that this is the exact same sum that George Soros is demanding that the EU pay each immigrant during just their first two years there. No wonder he and his minions hate Orban so much.

Seems that supporting natality is much cheaper than supporting immigration and will result in a great deal less racism and Islamophobia besides. Everybody wins.

Besides, its something that Hungary needs regardless. It is a real demographiz disaster zone. As seen in the chart right, deaths started outnumbered births there since 1981, a full decade ahead of trends in most of the rest of East-Central Europe.

A reminder that Russia managed to reverse an analogous state of affairs with not inconsiderable help from “maternal capital” – about $10,000 worth of housing aid for each child above one – implemented from the mid-2000s. The total fertility rate (TFR) went from 1.3 children per woman then to about 1.8 now. This flew in the face of demographic conventional wisdom, which tended to dismiss the efficacy of such pro-natality schemes. Hungary currently has a TFR of 1.4 children per woman. It would be interesting to see if it turns out to be another counter-example.

 
• Category: Economics • Tags: Demographics, George Soros, Hungary 

us-mortality-compared-1999-2013

Since the release of the paper by Anne Case and Angus Deaton showing that mortality rates amongst middle-aged White American males increased from 1999-2013, there has been a lot of anguished hand-wringing about the sorts of further regression or even collapses that it might portend. Comparisons have been made to the Soviet Union, which also saw an (alcohol-fuelled) spike in mortality since the 1960s, which reached its apogee in the 1990s.

This self-criticism, seen both on alternative media outlets like the Unz Review as well as higher profile venues such as The New York Times (Paul Krugman I see also made a limited Soviet comparison), is a perfectly health reaction to a problem which although quite severe by developed world standards is nowhere near the scale of that which afflicted the Soviet Union (where until the late 1980s discussion of adverse demographic trends was silenced by the Communist regime). This is something I stressed in my own post on this:

Nonetheless, regardless of the fact that the US mortality crisis is far less severe in absolute terms, and didn’t undergo the catastrophic “spike” that post-Soviet Russia experienced, the similarities – a major demographic group experiencing a sustained deterioration in its mortality prospects over a period of decades in an industrialized country – are otherwise quite remarkable.

Here are a couple of graphs that should prevent Americans falling into unreasonable pessimism. The figures for mortality rates / 100,000 for 50 year olds are drawn from mortality.org, which hosts one of the most detailed databases on mortality rates for a variety of OECD and ex-USSR countries. (I used it extensively to compile my forecasts of Russia’s 21st century demographics). And the blunt fact of the matter is that relative to what happened in the late USSR not to even mention the 1990s, when the Russian state lost its monopoly on vodka production, there is simply no comparison in absolute terms to the limited meth/painkiller epidemic that is currently suppressing life expectancy in some of the poorer US White communities. (Although this graph shows mortality for all 50 year Americans, do note that that age group is still very much predominantly White, so the all-American figures will to a very large extent be merely parallel to White American trends. For Whites specifically, just imagine the very marginal decline from 1990 to today as a flat line instead).

50-year-old-mortality-</p><br />
<p>usa-vs-eastern-europe

As we can see above, the American trends in the past two decades – characterized by stagnation – are qualitatively different from what afflicted the USSR and its successor states from 1965 to 1985, let alone the turmoil of the post-Soviet transition – characterized as they were by very significant outright increases in mortality followed by a sharp mortality spike in the 1990s. Even Poland, a country with some of the lowest prediclections towards vodka bingeing in Eastern Europe – though that, admittedly, is not exactly the highest of bars – has only recently just about finished recovering the sort of middle-aged mortality rates that it had half a century ago. In contrast, American middle-aged men – primarily thanks to medical advances – now enjoy mortality rates less than half of those that prevailed before the advent of advanced modern medicine in the 1960s.

50-year-old-mortality-</p><br />
<p>usa-vs-developed-world

The US health profile isn’t anywhere near as good relative to other countries in the developed world, but it should be noted that this has pretty much always been the case (though of course the burden of that difference has shifted in relative terms from US Blacks to Whites). As seen from the graph above, as of the early 2010s, the US had a significantly higher than middle-aged male mortality rate than the European country with the shortest life expectancy, Denmark, as well as the longest-lived Latin American country, Chile. Moreover, the US were from being around the highest end of the developed country range in the early 1990s, to something close to an outlier by the early 2010s.

This merits concern. Furthermore, whereas in my Soviet Fishtown post I posited that the cause of this US mortality lag might have been due to a vicious symbiosis of loose pharma advertising rules and obesity, the example of New Zealand – which has seen very strong and consistent reductions in mortality – puts a big question mark over that thesis. That is because as pointed out by the commentator Chuck, New Zealand was the only country in the world – alongside the US – to legalize direct to consumer advertising of prescription drugs; and New Zealand, too, has a fairly rotund obesity problem of its own. Nonetheless, it has not experienced the mortality stagnation that the US has.

Note however that New Zealand doesn’t exactly support “Leftist” explanations of the US White exception to First World middle-aged mortality declines either. That is because New Zealand too had a distinct “neoliberal” revolution – and one that hasn’t generally been judged to have been successful. Nonetheless, contrary to Leftist conventional wisdom, New Zealand in fact saw very rapid reductions in mortality – including middle-aged male mortality, as seen in the graph above – during the late 1980s and early 1990s, to the extent that it basically halved in overall terms.

Two meager conclusions follow:

(1) Don’t rush to assign overly “ideological” explanations to adverse trends, such as the stagnation in middle-aged US White male mortality. Neither the “Leftist” one of neoliberal reform, nor the “Rightist” one of increasing immigration and White demoralization (which most of Europe saw as well), nor even quasi-HBD one I posited in my “Soviet Fishtown” post (combination of easily prescriptiond drugs, obesity, and White melancholy) work very well.

(2) Although there is ample cause of concern, overly direct comparisons with what happened in 1990s Russia – or even the 1970s-1980s USSR – are as yet overwrought. And in any case, with medical technology continuing to advance, there might be a good chance that the last 25 years of stagnation in US White middle-aged mortality might end up being a temporary affair before the resumption of progress.

 
• Category: Miscellaneous • Tags: Demographics, Mortality, USA 
Anatoly Karlin
About Anatoly Karlin

I am a blogger, thinker, and businessman in the SF Bay Area. I’m originally from Russia, spent many years in Britain, and studied at U.C. Berkeley.

One of my tenets is that ideologies tend to suck. As such, I hesitate about attaching labels to myself. That said, if it’s really necessary, I suppose “liberal-conservative neoreactionary” would be close enough.

Though I consider myself part of the Orthodox Church, my philosophy and spiritual views are more influenced by digital physics, Gnosticism, and Russian cosmism than anything specifically Judeo-Christian.