Other maps of Italy:
Other maps of Italy:
By far the most interesting indicator is the percentageof people who report paying a bribe in the past 12 months (more precisely, the percentage of households who paid a bribe when accessing basic services). It is as close to objective measurement as you can get in a sphere of life as indefinite and necessarily opaque as “corruption.”
You can take a look at a global interactive map here: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/global_corruption_barometer_citizens_voices_from_around_the_world
Access to the global data here in Excel format: Global_Corruption_Barometer_2017_Global_Results
More regional maps (where available), with a few comments comparing results to the GCB 2013.
Europe – Romania, Hungary, and Lithuania are the most notably corrupt EU countries; Greece, in fairness, has improved substantilaly since the last assessment in 2013, when 22% of Greeks paid bribes.
Ukraine didn’t budge relative to 2013; was 37%, now 38%. Both the Ukraine and Russia are much worse than Belarus. This confirms stereotypes, BTW.
East Asia – India has actually deteriorated further, from 54% in 2013. Taiwan’s figure is much more plausible than the anomalous seeming 36% in the last survey.
Latin America – What is going on in Mexico? It was 33% last time.
It appears that North America will not be covered in this round of the GCB. For comparison with its southern neighbors and Europe, the reported bribery rate in the US was 7% in 2013 (up from 5% in the survey before that, and 2-3% in the oldest surveys).
The bribery rate in Canada in the last GCB was 3%.
Middle East – This is pretty interesting – Tunisia is basically a European Mediterannean countries in this respect (Greece: 10%; Italy: 7%).
Algeria not bad either at 14%. Perhaps explains why there hasn’t been an Arab/Islamist “spring” there against its ageing rulers.
Africa – This concisely explains why Botswanans manage to maintain a pretty nice state despite very low average IQs (they have natural resouce rents from diamonds, ofc, but so does Equatorial Guinea – and far more of them – but that doesn’t translate into normal living standards for its 99%).
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys are an invaluable source of information on the business climate across both time and space.
In particular, its section on corruption does for businesses what Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer does for individuals – it directly asks them whether they are expected to give bribes to bureaucrats to reach understandings on taxes, get permits, utilities connections, and to “get things done” more generally.
Now in general, people love to complain about corruption. It seems to be universal. Opinion surveys almost always show that perceptions of corruption are getting worse everywhere.
Good news! This isn’t really borne out by the statistics. Things really do seem to be getting better. (I excluded countries with information for just one year).
We have basically seen a halving in corporations reporting they need to grease public officials to “get things done.”
Ergo for dealing with tax officials.
Curiously, though, there was minimal change in the number of firms reporting needing bribes to secure government contracts.
Still, I don’t think that invalidates the general picture.
(1) Paying bribes to tax officials and to “get things done” is a more coercive form of corruption. I imagine many of these are “cough up or we shut you down” scenarios. Securing government contracts is nice, but not a life-and-death issue for most businesses.
(2) Perhaps the lack of change in securing government contracts merely reflects the fact that more and more countries have been opening up open bidding systems, whereas before they would have just been automatically channeled off to the Minister’s business buddies (without bribes).
Here’s an observation from commenter Twinkie to flesh out these statistics:
I remember the days when American defense contractors used to complain about the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) constraining them in competition against the Europeans in pursuing contracts in less-developed countries (“The Germans can tax-deduct bribes paid overseas!”).
Those days are long gone. It’s not to say that corruption is a thing of the past, but the absolute scale and public acquiescence (or lack thereof) of it have changed dramatically in many parts of the world.
This is evidence for my assumption in Our Biorealistic Future that in the long-term, we can expect institutions everywhere to get better, as different countries adopt established best practices, despite individual cases of backsliding.
While I was writing an article about Russian IQ for Sputnik and Pogrom the past few days, I noticed this amazing statistic from the 2010 Census.
Percentage of the population with a postgrad degree:
1. Ingushetia: 1.59%
2. Moscow: 1.12%
90. Chechnya: 0.32%
Ingushetia is Chechnya’s quieter, lower T, slyer brother. They are part of the same Ichkerian nation. But instead of going head on against a nation that outnumbered them a hundredfold in the 1990s, they manipulated the situation to extract very generous monetary concessions from the federal center while their kinfolk withered under Russian bombs.
Today, they are the region with Russia’s highest rate of unemployment, the lowest Internet penetration, the lowest patents per capita. They are 85% subsidized by other Russian regions, more so than any other region. Back during the Soviet period, there were only 90 scientists for every 100,000 Ingush, versus 573 for the Russians.
Even so, this region somehow manages to have the the highest rate of people with postgrad degrees in Russia.
Say what you will about ol’ Ramzan, but at least he keeps his peeps in check. Based Chechen men need no diploma mill degrees.
I don’t have much to add to my previous posts on this matter:
An n=8,200 Ipsos poll from May 5 gave Emmanual Macron 63% to Le Pen’s 37%. She needs a miracle.
The betting markets are likewise gloomy. Macron is 87% favorites on PredictIt, which is bad but not hopeless for Le Pen.
However, the picture becomes much worse for the French nationalists when you look at betting markets with a wider breakdown of options. For instance, the probability distribution for the question asking what percentage of the popular vote MLP will get displays a bell curve with a peak around 37%-38%, declining to 1% for the segment 45-46%, and staying at 1% for each consecutive one percentage point segment until we get to 11% predicting 50%+, i.e. a Le Pen victory.
These Le Pen optimists are clearly banking on some kind of miracle – systemic polling problems that massively understate MLP’s support (seemingly disproved in the first round); the spirit of kek; perhaps a few timely leaks.
And it just so happens that kek has delivered through the hacker 4chan.
On May 3, a /pol/ack posted two PDFs with evidence of an offshore bank account owned by Macron in the Cayman Islands.
The first doc is the incorporation of a shell company in Nevis, a country that doesn’t keep ownership records of corporations. The second is proof of a banking relationship with a bank involved in tax evasion in the Cayman Islands.
People have known for a while that Macron underreported his income and assets to the government, but nobody knew where it was stored. Here’s where his money is stored. See what you can do with this, anon. Let’s get grinding. If we can get #MacronCacheCash trending in France for the debates tonight, it might discourage French voters from voting Macron.
Document 1: https://my.mixtape.moe/onviuq.pdf
Document 2: https://my.mixtape.moe/bspenp.pdf
The lawyer who the documents indicate set up Macron’s Cayman LLC appears to have had a career as a top CIA banking spy.
One day later, about 9GB of email, photos, and attachments up to April 24, 2017 were posted on the /pol/ boards.
Are you ready /pol/?
In this pastebin are links to torrents of emails between Macron, his team and other officials, politicians as well as original documents and photos
The emails were quickly established as credible, though the Macron campaign has taken a cue from the HRC campaign and hinted that there are fakes interspersed amongst the real emails.
Though nobody has comprehensively looked through the entire thing, and of course doing so before the actual elections is unrealistic, some interesting tidbits are cropping up that may involve insider trading, unauthorized access to classified state information, and the purchase of recreational drugs and perhaps harder stuff.
Needless to say, this has created quite the stir on cyberspace. Wikileaks and Jack Posobiec spread the message on Twitter; as I write this, #MacronLeaks is the number one trending hashtag on French Twitter. The French police have taken a formal interest in ascertaining the identity of the leaker.
Problem: The French media has entered its election silence period, so there will be no substantive discussions of the MacronLeaks in the MSM. (I checked the front pages of the major French newspapers and Le Monde is the only one to have prominent coverage of MacronLeaks).
Which begs the question of whodunnit.
The MSM has, of course, rushed to blame the Russian hacker Ivan. However, as more level-headed people have pointed out, what would be the point of doing this at the last moment? Macron is the least Russia friendly of the four major candidates – his campaign has scandalously barred the Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik from his events – and, the logic goes, would now be even less well disposed towards Putin.
On the other hand, a more cynical view might be that the Kremlin views the prospects for cooperation with a Macron-led France as being so dismal anyway that it might as well begin destabilizing him straight away.
Two other possibilities:
(1) Bryan MacDonald: “My bet is other state actors trying to ruin any chance of a future Macron-Putin arrangement or freelance Russians acting the maggot.”
(2) Technically competent, disgruntled Leftist/Communist supporter who wants to undermine Macron, but who doesn’t want Le Pen to benefit from it.
Ernst & Young regularly carries out large-scale surveys of corporate employees across a range of countries on issues such as ethics and corruption in the workplace.
Incidentally, this figure was 85% in the 2013 survey, the last year of “normalcy” before the Maidan. It was also at 80% in 2015. In short, overthrow of the “kleptocratic” Yanukovych made no difference to these figures. Zilch.
Now to be sure, the E&Y survey is more a measure of corruption perceptions than a measure of corruption itself, and the two are not necessarily the same. Still, there is definitely a correlation – according to Transparency International’s direct surveys of bribery incidence, the Ukraine consistently competes with Moldova for the status of Europe’s most corrupt nation, while the country with the lowest (best) ranking on the E&Y survey, Denmark, had 0% of respondents saying they had to pay a bribe in the past year when they were queried about it.
Overall, this is just one more piece of evidence to the effect that the Maidan has failed to solve the main problem that it set for itself.
In other news, Central Bank head Valeria Gontareva has offered up her resignation (after having disappeared from the limelight several weeks ago). In her three years of office under Poroshenko, she and her relatives appear to have done well for thmselves, like many bureaucrats throughout the post-Soviet world. Still, but many accounts, she has done a pretty good job; some 40% of financial institutions have been closed, including many offshoring funnels and pocket banks, while most of the rest have been forced to clarify their ownership structures. But with mounting uncertainties over the future of IMF credits piling up and an emerging crisis over fraud at Kolomoysky’s Privatbank before its nationalization, I suppose now is as good a time as any to part ways.
|.||Average of all participants||51|
In an infamous 2008 article, Alexander Dugin makes the distinction between “patriotic corruption” and “comprador corruption,” or “Eurasian corruption” and “Atlanticist corruption.”
Here are the main features of “Eurasian” (patriotic) corruption:
And the main features of “Atlanticist” (comprador) corruption:
Now okay, this distinction between “patriotic” and “comprador” corruption is trivially fun to make fun of. It is almost self-parodying. It is easy to ridicule whoever is making this argument, regardless of whether or not he benefits from said corruption. Dugin was endlessly ridiculed for it (even though there are no end of other, far more legitimate ways to make fun of him, such as his opposition to Hawking’s physics). No doubt I will be ridiculed for this post.
But for all that, Dugin is not wrong.
If large-scale corruption has to exist – and we know that for most countries outside North/West Europe, it must – it is doubtless better for corruptioneers to invest in their own society, like the American robber barons did in the 19th century and which the Chinese elite mostly do today, than to stash it away abroad, as was typical for Russia in the “roving bandits” era of the 1990s, when Yeltsin’s “family” was ferrying away assets in London and Switzerland like there was no tomorrow.
And the recent revelations about the network of charitable fronts that sustain Medvedev’s property empire prove that at least Russia’s political elites have embraced “patriotic” corruption.
Consider the following:
1. Of Medvedev’s $1.2 billion empire, a good 90% of investments are in Russia itself. And the 10% that is abroad – the Tuscan villa and vineyard – is in Italy, a country that does not have any particular animus towards Russia, unlike the favorite bolthole of corrupt Russian elites, Londongrad. In the 1990s, these ratios would have likely been the inverse.
2. As “stationary bandits” with some degree of interest in preserving the value of their holdings, the Russian ruling clique has a common interest in regulating corruption. Those who overstep the bounds of what is permissible, e.g. by practicing “compador” corruption, such as United Russia MP Vladimir Pekhtin with his Florida waterfront condo; or who end up stealing far too much for their station, such as the former head of Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin and former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, are quietly dismissed. The question of whether or not Medvedev overstepped his station is now on the cards, with the systemic opposition in the Duma, such Fair Russia’s Sergey Mironov, calling on Medvedev to answer the questions raised by Navalny’s investigation.
3. The properties in question do not directly belong to Medvedev, not even to his direct relatives, but to an opaque network of charitable foundations credited with interest free loans by Russian state banks. And since what is given can be withdrawn, and – most critically – not on the whims of Western lawmakers (who in practice only target corrupt Russians who do not serve Western geopolitical interests), but on that of the dozen or so security men around Putin who rule Russia. To be sure, those “silovarchs” like to enjoy la dolce vita themselves, but at least they are not compradors themselves, i.e. they are more loyal to Russian national interests than to foreign ones.
4. “Patriotic” corruption, relative to “comprador” corruption, is closer to how political corruption tends to operate even in Western countries such as the United States. It’s an open secret that the Clinton Foundation has very little to do with charity, and a lot more to do with currying favor with one of America’s most powerful political dynasties. One critical difference, of course, is that it is not American state banks (hence, taxpayers) providing the financing, but private actors, companies, and foreign governments that expect to get some return on their investments. Now on the one hand, personally financing the lavish lifestyle of your elites is more directly insulting. On the other hand, having the likes of George Soros and Saudi Arabia do it for you is perhaps not an altogether superior alternative.
5. To end on an especially whimsical note: Although Navalny in his video criticizes Medvedev for owning Russian vineyards while also pushing for lower excise taxes on wine, one cannot judge him too harshly for it, since it would be a great boon for public health in Russia for alcohol consumption to shift from vodka to wine. To be sure, Medvedev – or rather, the charitable funds who finance the properties and vineyards he occasionally stays at – monetarily benefits from that, but then so does the life expectancy of Russians. Perhaps former Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin, one of Putin’s few confidantes who still enjoy respectability in the West, is personally less corrupt than Medvedev, but he has also gone on record calling for Russians to smoke more to benefit the Treasury; his fiscally hard-headed lack of concern for the social good was one of the reasons why he fell out with, and was eventually sacked by, Medvedev. Which of these two would be the better choice as PM for the average Russian? It is not clear that it would be Kudrin.
Well, that’s my strained defense of Russia’s corrupt thieving elites out of the way. They should pay me for the PR, or something.
With a bit less than a year left to Russia’s Presidential elections in 2018, the general contours of this cycle’s protest movement against Putin are already coalescing.
Alexey Navalny has called a march for tomorrow along Tverskaya Street, a central boulevard that leads to the Kremlin. The Moscow mayoralty refused to allow it, and Navalny in turn refused its offer of alternative venues, so the march is going to be unsanctioned. These events tend to come with a high journalist to protester ratio, because Navalny’s office plankton constituency doesn’t like events where there is a non-negligible chance they’ll be roughed up by the police. So I don’t expect much to come out of it. But we’ll see. I’ll probably go myself to observe it first hand.
As in 2011-2012, when he coined the term “The Party of Thieves and Scoundrels” to describe United Russia, the brunt of Navalny’s attacks are going to be on corruption in the Kremlin. It appears that the centerpiece this time around is going to be a massive investigation carried out by Anti-Corruption Fund on Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev, and released early this March:
In Russia, even amongst liberals, Medvedev has a reputation as a cuddly, affable, and absent-minded sort of fellow, often nodding off at meetings, but endowed with a hip, modernist outlook that will take “Russia forwards” into the clean, prosperous, sponsored content clicking future. This expresses itself in things such as appreciation for Deep Purple, support for the Skolkovo technology hub, and an obsession with hip electronic gadgets – the latter of which earned him his nickname, iPhonchik. Another of his nicknames is his diminutive, “Dimon,” which became very popular after his press secretary told Russia’s bloggers, commenters, and online trolls not to use that name: “He is not Dimon to you.” That worked on the Internet! (Not).
But according to Navalny’s investigation, which builds on earlier work by Russian journalists, the nice, professorial teddy bear is a mere mask for a deeply corrupt swindler; not so much a fan of hi-tech Apple gadgets as of big money and elite properties. Piecing together documents, his team constructed a convoluted web of charitable funds directed by Medvedev’s friends, classmates, and even relatives that don’t seem to do much in the way of genuine charity work, but do maintain a sprawling network of elite real estate for make benefit of the Prime Minister.
This includes an elite estate in Moscow’s Rublevka district and a luxury ski resort in Krasnodar, each of which is valued at about $100 million; a big estate and agro holding compnay in his ancestral homeland of Kursk oblast; two yachts, both named after the Orthodox version of his wife’s name; an elite apartment in Saint-Petersburg; and even a wineyard and villa in Tuscany, Italy, bought in 2012-13 for $120 million. There is strong evidence, including from Medvedev’s Instagram account, that he has stayed at many of these properties, and partaken of his yachts.
These “charitable funds” are sponsored by a bevy of Kremlin-friendly oligarchs and state banks. For instance, one of them was funded by Novatek’s Simanovsky and Mikhelson, who contributed $500 million. The Uzbek oligarch Alisher Usmanov, who spent six years in a Soviet prison in the 1980s for financial fraud, appears to have funded the acquisition of the Rublevka property. Gazprombank is on record giving a loan of $200 million in 2007. Its Deputy Chairman at the time? Ilya Eliseev, a classmate of Medvedev’s from his time at Saint-Petersburg State University, who also happens to be listed as the current chairman of most of these charitable funds. In total, documented “contributions” run to about 70 billion rubles, or more than $1 billion.
Even a small fraction of this would sound the death knell for any politician in a country within the Hajnal Line.
In Russia, however, this is not atypical for the elites. Everybody knows that they are stealing, and if Russians didn’t move to overthrow them in 2011-12, in the aftermath of massively fraudulent elections in Moscow and at a time when Putin was at a trough in his popularity, they are certainly not going to do so now; not when Putin’s approval rating remains north of 80% in the long afterglow of the Crimea euphoria. Moreover, Navalny’s own reputation has since become tarnished, due to his own corruption scandal (which might disqualify from running for the Presidency entirely), and due to his ardent pro-Ukrainian rhetoric, which has driven off most of his former nationalist supporters.
This, at least, is my impression.
Anyhow, March 26 will be an opportunity to more directly gauge his support at the level of the streets.
Why is corruption so bad in Eastern Europe? And what can be done about it?
First off, I don’t know to what extent it can be reduced. According to the hbdchick’s theories on the Hajnal Line, ceteris paribus, Southern and Eastern Europe will always be more corrupt than the countries of “core Europe” because they did not undergo its centuries of selection for beyond-kin altruism.
Despite decades of institutional convergence under the aegis of European integration, Italy and Greece remain considerably more corrupt than Germany, Britainn, and Sweden. Poland has improved greatly since the 1990s, but reached an asymptote at around Italy’s level; Romania, at Greece’s. From the outset, this implies that Eastern European countries should keep their ambitions realistic, regardless of the policies that they choose to pursue.
Still, political economic factors do play a large role.
The main concept that I would draw upon is Mancur Olson’s distinction between “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits.”
In unstable polities, the elites can be replaced at any time, often through unpredictable and lawless methods such as coups, or “people power” driven “color revolutions” if the new gang are more pro-Western. The elites know this. As such, they have an interest in maximizing their thievery in the here and now, with corresponding disincentives to large, capital-heavy investments that will only pay in the long-term. Most likely, they will not be around to enjoy the fruits of their labor a decade or two down the line. But a Mayfair apartment and British Virgin Islands cash stash won’t go anywhere.
This describes Ukraine, and Russia in the 1990s.
In polities where the system is more stable, “roving bandits” start to settle down – they become “stationary bandits.” There are relatively greater incentives for long-term investments – if you steal less today, your pie will be greater tomorrow. Although corruption still exists, and may even remain systemic, the more predictable nature of the tariffs levied by “stationary bandits” enables corporations to account for them in their business plans. It’s not even so much the degree of corruption that’s important as its predictability. Furthermore, the bandits at the very top have greater incentives to clamp down on their underlings, since if they get start getting too greedy it will bite into their own profit margins. This in turn can pave the way for the emergence of institutions that can upgrade the war on corruption from manual to semi-autonomous mode.
This describes countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. (China would also fall into this category).
These ex-Soviet countries, ruled by “stationary bandits,” have been far more successful at economic recovery (and growth) than Ukraine. For all the “Gabon with snow” jokes, Ukraine is still an industrialized country with a well educated population and a respectable average IQ of perhaps 95, with considerable natural resources, access to the sea, and Russian gas subsidies that have totalled approximately $200 billion since independence.
So the Ukrainian economy should be doing MUCH BETTER, given the huge gap between potential and reality (perhaps the biggest gap of any country in the world). But as of 2015, its inflated-adjusted GDP was a mere 60% of the UkSSR’s in 1990 (Russia: 110%; Belarus: 180%), and is now in a neck-and-neck race with Nigeria in terms of Internet penetration.
Telling example: One of the few genuinely bright spots in the Ukrainian economy has been the IT sector. In particular its presence on the video game scene is rather impressive in relative terms – Cossacks, Stalker, Metro 2033.
Why? Because that is what you get when you combine roving bandits with a high IQ population. Few people are willing to build anything substantial like a multi-billion dollar factory. Hence, so far as heavy industry goes, it just continues to coast on the ever depreciating Soviet legacy.
How much capital do you need to launch a middle-sized video game studio? Can’t imagine it’s much more than $100,000. Most of the value is in the brains, and you get some of the best cognitive bang per dollar in the Ukraine. You can sell your game on Steam, and should instability strike, you can just bugger off to someplace warmer and more civilized, like Cyprus or Malta (like 4A games, the creators of Metro 2033, did in 2014).
Incidentally one can see the same thing (if to a significantly smaller extent) in both Russia and Belarus.
How to solve – or at least mitigate – corruption follows naturally from the above observations.
(1) The roving bandits need to be settled down. (Replacing one gang with another under the cover of a color revolution doesn’t do anything – as Ukraine has already proven, TWICE).
In Ukraine’s case, that means it needs to put an end to its never-ending internecine struggles. Broadly speaking, both Novossiya supporters and Ukrainian nationalists have the right idea, even if they are otherwise diametrically opposed. (Nadia Sevchenko represents a curious convergence of these two streams: A Ukrainian nationalist to the core, she has negotiated with LDNR authorities in contravention of official Kiev policy while suggesting that Ukraine needs a period of dictatorship to get itself sorted out).
(2) East Asia furnishes many several examples of non-Hajnal societies that have successfully solved the corruption problem. One approach is greater criminal penalties for corruption (“kill the chicken to scare the monkey,” as the Chinese proverb goes); another is to richly compensate civil servants, so as to reduce the relatice incentive for additional thievery (Singapore government ministers are paid like the CEOs of big corporations, and in tandem with harsh punishments and wealth, this has helped Singapore become one of the world’s least corrupt societies, despite traditional China’s penchant for corruption).
In practice, neither of these is practical for Eastern Europe. European human rights regulations preclude the killing of chickens; and East Europeans themselves are far too populist and demotic to tolerate elitist-technocratic policies like CEO-scale salaries for bureaucrats (with the result that said bureaucrats will unofficially continue to compensate themselves at CEO levels anyway, but with huge markups).
(3) The removal of roving bandits will enable faster economic growth, and greater tax receipts allow you to pay more to develop institutions, while greater per capita wealth leads to money floating about for the development of an indigenous civil society. It also makes e-government, which makes far less demands on face-to-face interactions between citizens and bureaucrats, with all their associated potential for corruption, far more realizable.
(4) To be sure, it can be very frustrating to live in a country that is visibly and strikingly more corrupt than the fairylands of core Europe. It is understandable that people, especially young people without much life experience, want change, and they want it quick. More often than not, the result is a cargo cult approach to combatting corruption, which results in spectacles such as Anti-Corruption Forums to which the participants show up in Mercedes and Lexuses (a most apt metaphor for Euromaidan).
From this perspective, an understanding of the deep gene-cultural underpinnings of corruption might not lead you to forgive everything, but it will at least imbue you with a sense of realism as to what is and what is not possible. A slow, steady convergence over two or three decades to Italy’s or even France’s level of corruption – entirely possible, even likely. A new Sweden overnight through the power of mass lustrations and Lenin statue topplings? Nope.
Going ahead will only set you up for eventual disappointment, but in the meanwhile, you’d have wrecked your own country.
Finally, don’t worry. In the end, corruption just isn’t that important to economic growth! Just compare Chile and China: One by far the cleanest country in South Americat; the other one is far more corrupt, but a standard deviation higher in average IQ. Which of those two is the economic steamroller, and which one has nothing to write home about? Exactly. And corruption tends to diminish with increasing wealth, as the power of institutions and civil society increases. Just don’t smother your economy with regulations and central planning, don’t allow roving bandits to pick the place clean and stymie all long-term development, and the problems should ultimately resolve by itself without any particular further effort on your part.
PS. Daniel Chieh comments: “These days, modern China has moved significantly from executions to pressuring corrupt officials to commit suicide: possibly a return to honor suicides that was the norm in Asia and perhaps part of the entire initiative for Xi’s “return of traditional Chinese virtues.” Honor suicides just doesn’t seem to be a thing in East Europe, that I know of, anyway. Human rights law in Europe in theory wouldn’t stop all methods of “killing the chicken” as there are a number of other “greater criminal punishments” that don’t include capital punishment – which is rarely used these days, to be honest. Mass social shaming, prohibitions on future job-seeking, reduced status opportunities and unfavorable associations that spread even to the family all work just as well.The life of a pariah can be worse than death, imo.“
Has been released.
It is basically a composite index of about a dozen subjective corruption ratings given out by various development organizations and more political NGOs (e.g. Freedom House).
Although it generally reflects reality, as in it correlates well with other, more objective measures of corruption, there are two major caveats:
(1) It is not necessarily accurate for any one particular country. You would be better off looking at things like Transparency International’s own Global Corruption Barometer surveys of everyday bribery, the World Bank’s enterprise surveys, and expert assessments (preferably blind) of national legislation such as the Global Integrity Index, the Open Budget Index, and the Revenue Watch Index. (I tried to combine some of them here).
(2) The people actually doing the ratings are employed by outfits such as the World Bank and democracy promotion NGOs. This means their perspectives are going to be ideologically loaded in predictable directions.
For instance, it’s pretty likely that despite the Maidan’s promises, Ukraine is still considerably more corrupt than Russia. Although Ukraine and Russia score an equally bad 29/100 according to the CPI, there are differences in their component scores [XLSX]. The World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey, which queries businesspeople who are more concerned with profits than politics, gives Russia 38/100 to Ukraine’s 27/100. The “political” NGOs, however, rate Ukraine higher; Freedom House gives it 33/100 to Russia’s 25/100.