There were a grand total of 1,890 men of Uzbek nationality in Sweden in 2016.
There were a grand total of 1,890 men of Uzbek nationality in Sweden in 2016.
Here is why Russia also needs a BBW (Turkestan edition):
Number of births: Red = Russia; Green = Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan).
In 1897, there were ten times fewer people in Russian Turkestan than within the modern borders of the Russian Federation.
Today, they constitute 50% of the Russian Federation’s population.
They have produced about as many children in the past thirty years as Russians, especially once you account for the mass emigration of Russians from Central Asia.
Therefore, later in the century, the population of dry, landlocked Central Asia may converge with or even come to surpass that of the Russian Federation.
(The usual disclaimers: No further regatherings of Russian lands, no radical life extension, no real life Fallout, etc.)
Open borders between Russia and Central Asia will probably result in Russia acquiring a permanent underclass of lower-IQ Muslims, and in the worst case, outright transforming it into Russabia (impossible with its current ethnic makeup, but the Turkestan demographic reservoir is an order of magnitude bigger than that of the Muslims in the North Caucasus).
One of the things I’m looking forwards to doing here is transmigrating HBD insights to Russian realities. On the plus side, it’s socially easier (no WEIRD “racism” taboos) and intellectually easier (since innovation is harder than copying, even if one does have to coin a lot of terms – e.g., “human biodiversity” itself – that don’t exist in Russian). On the negative side, there’s no First Amendment here, as in the rest of Europe.
A few weeks back Navalny brought my attention to this lovely song extolling Putin’s achievements by Tolibjon Kurbankhanov, a Tajik singer from Dushanbe.
Navalny exhorts his minions to spread this clip far and wide. The writing between the lines is obvious. His reasons aren’t nice and altruistic, but utterly insidious, playing on xenophobia towards Central Asians. The idea being that hearing a Tajik singing in support of Putin will hurt his standing among “true” Russians. “Liberal fascism” may be met with bemused grins in the US, being the rhetoric of unhinged demagogues like Jonah Goldberg, but in Russia the term accurately describes the emerging alliance between liberal podpindosniki and ethnic nationalists, as best embodied by Navalny.
That said, I’m spreading this clip nonetheless. Not because I support Navalny, nor even because I support Putin, but because I support the idea of Russia as a multi-national federation. And because it really is a very nice song.
It is now increasingly evident that Russia’s population has settled on a small but decidedly firm upwards growth trend. I have been vindicated.
According to the latest data, in the first eight months of the year births fell by 1.4% (12.5/1000 to 12.3/1000) and deaths fell by 6.2% (from 14.6/1000 to 13.7/1000) relative to the same period last year. The rate of natural population decrease eased from -198,3000 to -128,800. The big fall in the death rate is due to two factors: (1) the continuing secular increase in life expectancy, due to decreasing alcohol consumption and more healthcare spending; (2) specific to 2011, the “high base” effect of the mortality spike during the Great Russian Heatwave last year.
This natural decrease was more than compensated for by 200,255 net migrants during the same period, making for a population increase of 71,500 this year to August. This more than cancels out the population decrease of 48,300 for the whole of 2010, and let it be reminded that it rose by 23,300 in 2009. In other words, in stark contrast to the avalanche of doom-mongering articles that continue to be written in the Western press about “dying Russia” – of which two of the most egregious examples are this and this – the reality is that today in net terms Russia’s population is now larger than it was in 2009.
At this point an important methodological point has to be made. This year, Rosstat switched to only accounting for immigrants who “register at the place of residence” in their population updates, as opposed to the previous method of accounting for anyone who enters the country with a permit to stay for a year or more. The former number is much smaller than the latter: whereas there were the aforementioned 200,255 net immigrants by the old method, Rosstat’s registration method only shows 68,822 (with the result that Rosstat says that Russia’s population actually decreased by 60,000 in the first eight months of this year). However, as Sergey Slobodyan (a frequent guest blogger here) noted at the JRL, this was an opaque and rather bizarre switch. For a start, even using the first method in the years before 2011, which gives far more emigrants than the by residency method, Rosstat still under-counted the numbers of migrants in Russia by one million – the 2010 Census showed there to be 142.9 million Russians, as opposed to the 142.0 million estimated by Rosstat on the basis of projections from the 2002 Census. And even on an intuitive level, doesn’t it seem obvious that far from every migrant to Russia will immediately bother (or be able to afford!) registering at a place of residence? Slobodyan speculates that the reason the new methodology was adopted was because of nationalist tensions over immigration levels in the run-up to the upcoming elections, which may have pressed the Kremlin into pressuring Rosstat, at least for the time being, into purposefully under-counting immigrants; hence the unexplained switch in methodology.
Particularly encouraging in the statistics for this year is that “mortality from vices” continues to fall very rapidly – things such as homicides, suicides, poisonings, etc., that have a much higher than average negative impact on life expectancy (because people who die those deaths tend to be younger) and the social problems they are typically associated with. Note that all of these figures are already lower than in 1990, the last year of Soviet normality (more or less). The same trend can be seen for deaths from accidents. Now to be accurate these death rates are still very high by global standards: whereas Russia’s total numbers of deaths from “external causes” (suicides, homicides, accidents, etc.) was 134 / 100,000, thus dipping below the levels of 1990, it is still far from the 40 / 100,000 types of figures in countries like Australia. No-one doubts that there is still a lot of work to be done on the health and safety front.
Predictably, none of this gets mentioned in the Western media, which is still replete with tropes about the mass emigration of Russia’s middle classes (debunked here multiple times), non-existent population collapse, and citations of outdated CIA World Factbook figures which are cited in lieu of official Rosstat ones. To the contrary, the population has stabilized, and the “brain drain” is now a mere trickle (only 400 Russian R&D specialists emigrated abroad for an undefined amount of time in the first half of 2011, which is a drop in the ocean besides its population of 143 million). Meanwhile, they have missed the true demographic apocalypse that is occurring not in Russia itself, but in one of its neighbors, Latvia, long lauded as a pro-Western and economically liberal “Baltic tiger”: almost as many people are now leaving Latvia every year as leaving Russia. But Latvia’s population is 75 times lower!
Three years ago, based on my own demographic models, I predicted that Russia’s demographic future will be either one of stabilization, or slow population growth. In late 2009, I wrote that even under undemanding assumptions, “the population size will remain basically stagnant, going from 142mn to 143mn by 2023 before slowly slipping down to 138mn by 2050.” This was highly counter-consensus, even scandalous, at the time, given that the debate was dominated by the likes of Nick Eberstadt and most of the main demographics agencies believed a decline to the low 130 millions was likely by 2025. For instance, in the professionally titled Spring 09 article Drunken Nation, Dr. Eberstadt wrote: “UNPD projections for the year 2025 range from a high of about 136 million to a low of about 121 million… The Census Bureau’s projections for the Russian Federation’s population in 2025 are 128 million.”
Now the big demographics agencies are recognizing that things have fundamentally turned around. For instance, in its most recent 2011 World Population Data Sheet, the PRB’s Medium forecast for Russia’s population in 2025 is now 139.0 million. In the 2010 Revision of the World Population Prospects by the UN Population Division has Russia’s population falling to 139.0mn in 2025, with the High forecast being 144.5mn in 2025. Russian statistics agency Rosstat forecasts 140.9 million in 2025, the High version being 146.7 million (note that they still use the base population of 142.0 million for this estimate, not the 142.9 million revealed by the recent Census; in reality, once this is accounted for, their 2025 would logically be by a million bigger).
Whither now? I believe the current Low scenarios, envisaging a drop to the low 130 millions by 2025, have become very unlikely – they assume that many of the trends we see today, such as falling mortality, and net emigration, almost completely stall. In the light of the government’s campaign against excessive alcohol drinking – the primary cause of Russia’s high mortality rates – and the historical successes that tend to accompany such campaigns (e.g. Karelian Finland in the 1970′s and 1980′s), not to mention the more recent Baltic experience; as well as continued economic growth that will enable more resources to be diverted to healthcare and for consumers to pursue healthier lifestyle choices; means that life expectancy will continue rising relatively quickly. Meanwhile, as long as there remains a substantial income gap between Russia and the Caucasus and Central Asia, immigrants will continue to come. Some commentators have argued that fertility convergence in those regions will reduce the number of potential migrants to Russia in the years to come. Perhaps. On the other hand, as Moldova and the Baltic nations show, even being in demographic straits of their own does not necessarily lead to diminishing supplies of emigrants from economically-behind countries.
The above graph is a set of Low, Medium and High projections from Rosstat in 2000, with the High version (green) being a stabilization at 142.7 million people in 2011. As one can see, the mere fact that Russia’s population is at 142.9 million is a surprise to the upside as viewed from a decade ago. If things go well – the economy continues growing, mortality rates keep falling, etc. – then it is entirely possible that Russia’s population will follow today’s mainstream High projections (144-147 million) or even surpass 150 million (as in my original High projection) by 2025.
EDIT: This article has been translated into Russian at Inosmi.ru (Российская демография: развенчивая мифы).
One of the staples of the neocon-Russophobe narrative is that Russia is alone in the world, utterly bereft of friends, left only with the likes of Nicaragua and Nauru to indulge it in its anachronistic “imperial fantasies”. Not really. Conflating the West with the world won’t change the fact that amongst the peoples of China, India, and most of the Middle East and Latin America – that is, the regions containing the bulk of the world’s population and future economic potential – Russia is actually viewed rather favorably. But what about peoples recently liberated from the oppressive, iron boots of Russian chauvinism – surely they dislike Russia? Not that simple. Some sure do – Estonians, Poles, West Ukrainians, Georgians… But plenty more don’t (Armenians, Bulgarians, East Ukrainians). It’s a complex picture of significant political and geopolitical import.
Back in November 2008, the VTsIOM polling site released some very detailed results about what peoples in the former Soviet Union think about each other. The first graph below asks people which countries they consider to be friends or allies of their country.
And these were the results. Some 74% of Belarussians, 58% of Ukrainians, 49% of Moldovans, 82% of Armenians, and 67-89% of Central Asians named Russia as a friend and ally. In contrast, only 11-17% in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Lithuania like Russia this way, but that is hardly surprising. (The Latvians are rather higher at 26%, presumably because of their large Russian minority, though far higher numbers, almost half of them, orient themselves with the other Baltic states).
The poll below is even more telling. It asks peoples in the former USSR to name which countries or blocs they would like to unite with, the main contenders being Russia, the EU, and “independence”.
Russians are mostly split between those favoring some kind of Slavic or Eurasian bloc (37% – Belarus, 29% – Ukraine, 24% – Kazakhstan), and Russia-as-is (32%); the European Union really isn’t that popular at 15%. This isn’t much different in Ukraine or Belarus. Some 56% of Belarussians and 47 of Ukrainians would like to unite with Russia, while 25% and 22% favor the EU, and 18% and 25% favor independence, respectively. Some 51% of Kazakhs favor Russia and 32% independence.
The Moldovans are equally split between Russia and the EU or independence (which in practical terms would mean the Romanian sphere of influence). The Azeris identify most strongly with Turkey, with 31% expressing a desire to join it, followed by 24% yearning for the EU and 24% for continued independence. Big majorities (65-73%) in the Central Asian nations of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan would like to rejoin Russia, which is unsurprising given their relative underdevelopment and the relative success of Russification there. Georgia has always had a strong sense of national identity, including during the Soviet period, so by far the majority there wants independence (38%) or the EU (37%); only 10% wouldn’t mind falling back into Russia’s sphere of influence.
Why is this important? Because to some extent, even in semi-authoritarian systems, national leaders are to some extent beholden to popular sentiment. This is not to say, of course, that this is the only factor – an objective assessment of national interests (which are often synonymous with the interests of the ruling elites) almost always trumps anything else. But it does illustrate that the much ballyhooed “Russian resurgence” across the former USSR rests on firmer foundations than just political pressure or economic takeovers – of at least equal importance is that many of the peoples in its path back to regional hegemony aren’t actually that averse to it*.
PS. Another useful survey of attitudes towards Eurasian regional integration by Gallup: “In all countries except Azerbaijan, the median average wants at least an economic union across Eurasia”.
* The big exception is Georgia. This is where there is both a clash of primary geopolitical interests (the irreconcilability of Georgia westward path and Russia’s desire to anchor itself in the South Caucasus) and of civilizational values (AFAIK, the only social grouping in Georgia with a real pro-Russia tendency are the monarchist “People’s Orthodox Movement“). Coupled with simmering border tensions, it is probably not surprising that this developed into a flashpoint for armed conflict.
The Western MSM (mainstream media) was abuzz the last few weeks about how Obama’s apparent extension of a hand to Russia did not make them willing to unclench their fist, citing the closure of the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. This was linked to Russia’s announcement of 150mn $ in aid and 2bn $ of credit to Kyrgyzstan, which was widely interpreted to be a bribe, a snub to the US or in some particularly nutty cases open support of the Taliban – as SWP put it, “objectively chosen to aid 8th century religious fanatics”.
Kyrgyzstan is a poor state relying on remittances from its workers in Russia, workers who are now being laid off as construction grinds to a halt. It is the only country in post-Soviet Central Asia to have rejected the status of a “developed” country to be eligible for more funds from the World Bank and other international development organizations. Coupled with the economic crisis sweeping the globe, this money is small change to Russia but a life-saver to Kyrgyzstan.
The perception that this is a Russian anti-American machination arrogantly dismisses Kyrgyzstan’s own incentives. It has not been happy with the American presence (see below). It is in their interest to play off Washington against Moscow for more aid; but ultimately, Russia is far more important to their economic development. Nonetheless, it would make sense for them to announce the shutdown of Manas in Moscow, immediately after getting promised these loans and aid, because then American ire would be deflected towards Russia. (After all, the US does have a penchant for sponsoring color revolutions in countries it doesn’t like).
Finally, the claim that Russia is aiding the Taliban is totally bogus. Frankly, considering the number of US military bases dotting the Middle East (there’s fifty) means that this cannot be a serious concern, especially given that Russia has extended its own hand in offering transport of non-military supplies through Russia. This is despite the fact that the US has repeatedly snubbed Russia in that region (and elsewhere) – it explicitly supported the mujahedeen in the 1980′s via Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with dollars and Stinger missiles without holding their beliefs to much scrutiny, negotiated with the Taliban in hopes of being allowed to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan and into Pakistan, bypassing Russian control – in stark contrast to Russia (and interestingly, Iran), who recognized the Taliban for the evil they are early on and supported the Northern Alliance against them and dismissed Putin’s overtures in 2002 acquiescing to an increased American military presence in Central Asia with abrogations of missile-defense treaties and colored revolutions. Getting ahead of myself here, but the point stands that Russia gains absolutely nothing from hindering NATO from effectively fighting the Taliban; when the alternative is doing this themselves.
I found the following article to be particularly insightful, which I see fit to quote in full – The Manas Disillusionment. I have highlighted the more significant parts.
Kyrgyzstan threatens to evict the US from the Manas airbase as Moscow trumps Washington with attractive aid packages, while Bishkek grows increasingly disillusioned with what it views as US usury, John CK Daly writes for ISN Security Watch.
By John C K Daly for ISN Security Watch
If those inside the Beltway are to learn anything from their Kyrgyz experience, it’s that Reaganesque “trickle down” economics in fighting a conflict halfway around the world is unlikely to buy local hearts and minds, much less allies.
Meeting with his Russian counterpart on 4 February in Moscow, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that he had decided to close the US airbase at Manas – a move that will complicate President Barack Obama’s stated intention to surge an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan and logistics for Operation Enduring Freedom.
When the Kyrgyz parliament votes on the president’s proposal, perhaps later this month, the measure is likely to pass, as Bakiyev’s Ak Jol party controls 71 of the legislature’s 90 seats. Under the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the US will then have 180 days to vacate the base, located some 27 kilometers from the capital, Bishkek.
Manas was established on 4 December 2001 under the joint Kyrgyz-US SOFA agreement, which granted the Pentagon the right to use the airbase for a bargain rent of US$2 million annually. The Defense Department selected Manas because its 14,000-foot runway, originally built for Soviet bombers, could service US C-5 Galaxy cargo planes and 747s in their flight to Afghanistan. Of Kyrgyzstan’s 52 airports, Manas was the only one with a lengthy runway capable of supporting international flights. An adjacent 32-acre field was initially utilized for a tent city for US personnel, which beginning in mid-2004 was replaced by more permanent structures at a cost of US$60 million.
Manas is home to the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing and serves as the premier air mobility hub for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and coalition military operations in Afghanistan. According to the US Defense Department, Manas handles about 15,000 passengers and 500 tonnes of cargo monthly. Last year, coalition KC-135s stationed there flew 3,294 missions disbursing 97,226 tonnes of aviation fuel to 11,419 coalition aircraft over Afghanistan and supported more than 170,000 coalition personnel transiting in and out of Afghanistan.
Judging by Washington’s reaction, Bakiyev’s decision blindsided the Pentagon – though in reality it is the culmination of years of American obtuseness, arrogance and penny-pinching, the warning signs of which have long been visible.
There is an atmosphere of faint hope in Washington that the announcement is in fact a negotiating attempt by Bishkek to up the rent for the base, but the State Department and Pentagon have been scrambling to find alternatives, holding discussions with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan while dispatching negotiators as far afield as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Turkey in case Bakiyev follows through.
The Pentagon was so certain that it was secure in Manas that last October the Army Corps of Engineers issued a pre-solicitation notice for potential contractors for up to US$100 million in improvements to the base. There were rumors that the Pentagon was also seeking an additional 300 hectares for expanding the base.
Moscow trumps Washington
While both Bakiyev and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev strenuously deny it, generous Russian loans totaling US$2 billion and a non-repayable US$150 million grant, announced the day before Bakiyev made his pronouncement, undoubtedly played no small part in the decision.
To put the proffered assistance in context, Moscow’s financial aid is worth double Kyrgyzstan’s current annual GDP, and the Russian assistance stands in stark contrast to Washington’s fiscal policy over the years towards Kyrgyzstan, which has never offered the country any loans.
But Kyrgyzstan is no stranger to haggling, and for now parliament has decided to delay the vote on closing Manas until it receives the first tranche of Russia’s promised US$450 million.
Besides the US$150 million outright grant, the Russian aid includes US$300 million in preferential credit for 40 years at a symbolic interest rate of 0.75 percent, with a grace period of seven years before the first payment is due.
An intergovernmental agreement signed during Bakiyev’s Moscow visit sets up a joint venture between Kyrgyzstan’s Elektricheskie Stantsii and Russia’s Inter RAO EES, and the bulk of the loan (up to US$1.7 billion) will go towards the construction of the 1,900-megawatt Kambar-Ata Hydroelectric Power Station-1 on the Naryn River.
Kambar-Ata epitomizes why Russia is currently in the ascendancy in Kyrgyzstan and the US is being shown the door. It is an indigenous energy project that has direct bearing on the quality of life for the average Kyrgyz. In contrast, the US for the last eight years has displayed indifference to Kyrgyzstan’s energy sector, as it is devoid of exportable hydrocarbons, viewing the country instead solely in military terms.
While much western commentary implies that the loans were ad hoc arrangements, in fact they represent part of US$2 billion in assistance to Kyrgyzstan first promised by then-president Vladimir Putin in August 2007, which in turn built upon a 15 December 2006 Russian-Kyrgyz agreement to spend US$1 billion to construct the Kambar-Ata-1 and Kambar-Ata-2 hydroelectric cascades. The project is a massive undertaking which on completion could not only supply electricity not only for domestic consumption but also for export to Afghanistan, China and Pakistan.
Against such largesse, Washington’s fiscal assistance to Kyrgyzstan looks miserly indeed. However, the Pentagon insists that the US has given Kyrgyzstan more than US$150 million annually in aid. Furthermore, it insists that it has been paying US$63 million in rent for Manas, but other sources, including the Kyrgyz government, say otherwise.
According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, funded by the US Congress, the US paid US$2 million a year to use Manas for the first five years of the base’s operation. In 2006, this was increased to US$17.5 million, while the US funded other in-country programs that totaled approximately US$100 million. On 6 February, Kyrgyz Finance Minister Tajikan Kalimbetova corroborated the RFE/RL figures to parliament, according to Informatsionnoe agentsvo 24 press klub in a 6 February report.
“There is not in Kyrgyzstan a single bank representing the interests of the United States, the trade balance is small, there is no major investment project involving US firms. There is sufficient economic potential, but very little use is being made of it, unfortunately,” Informatsionnoe agentsvo Regnum quoted Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov as saying on 7 February.
And for the average Kyrgyz, there has been no “trickle down” of the loudly proclaimed American assistance.
The potential utility of Manas for the Pentagon is not limited to operations in Afghanistan; the fact that it is only 320 kilometers from the border with China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang means that tankers based at Manas put US aircraft within range of China’s nuclear test site facilities at Lop Nor in Xinjiang. Manas is a sore point with both the Russians and Chinese as it affords the US military the ability to snoop on their military activities.
Unease over the Pentagon’s possible uses of the airbase is not limited to Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors. Kyrgyz lawmakers have grown increasingly apprehensive with what the Pentagon might do with its untrammeled access to Manas.
On 21 May 2007, lawmaker Almanbet Matubraimov quoted remarks by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that in case of a military offensive against Iran, the first air attack would be delivered from Manas, to which Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad promised that Iran would immediately reply by targeting the site from where the attack was launched, Informatsionnoe agentsvo AKIpress reported.
Two years after Manas was established, Russia founded its own airbase at Kant, its first outside of Russian territory since the 1991 collapse of the USSR, under an agreement within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a post-Soviet regional security bloc that besides Russia includes Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world with both American and Russian bases on its territory.
At a popular level, Kyrgyz disillusionment over Manas developed gradually. When the base opened people hoped that there would be employment opportunities, but the only Kyrgyz hired to work were employed largely as janitors. According to Moskovskii Komsomolets, in 2005-2006, the salaries of these workers were not even paid. ISN Security Watch has not been able to independently confirm this report.
Shortly after Manas began operations, the Pentagon signed contracts with Manas International Services Ltd. and Aalam Services Ltd., the only two aviation fuel suppliers in Kyrgyzstan. Both companies were controlled by relatives of then-president Askar Akayev. In addition Aydar Akayev, the president’s son, was a part owner of Manas. The Pentagon also agreed to international civil aviation rates for the daily take-offs and landings of military aircraft at Manas to Akayev’s cronies as well. None of these Manas-related revenues were reported in Kyrgyz government budgetary statistics.
Following the “Tulip Revolution” which deposed Akayev, the two entities came under the scrutiny of the Kyrgyz government and FBI, but the Pentagon stoutly maintained its innocence regarding the US$207 million it spent on inflated fuel contracts. The new president, Bakiyev, insisted that the US make US$80 million retroactive lease payments and assist in recovering the allegedly purloined contract money. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman responded that “any possible misappropriation of funds is an internal Kyrgyz matter.”
Other simmering complaints included a 26 September 2006 aircraft collision involving a KC-135 and the presidential Tu-154, for which the Americans declined to take responsibility, and the reportedly frequent dumping of tonnes of surplus fuel over Kyrgyz farms adjoining the base.
Things came to a head on 6 December 2006, when 20-year old US soldier Zachary Hatfield shot twice and killed 42-year-old Kyrgyz Aleksandr Ivanov, an ethnic Russian Kyrgyz, at the airbase’s entry gate. Ivanov worked for Aerocraft Petrol Management, which provides fuel services for Kyrgyz and international civilian aircraft. Hatfield maintained that he fired in self defense after Ivanov approached him with a knife. Adding to local anger was the fact that at the time of the shooting Ivanov was about 5-6 meters away from Hatfield and Ivanov’s knife was found 20 meters away from the site of the incident, while rumors swirled that the guard was drunk at the time of the incident.
The Kyrgyz government insisted that Hatfield be handed over for trial, but the US military spirited Hatfield out of the country on 21 March 2007 even as talks about Hatfield’s legal status were ongoing. Adding insult to injury, the US government initially offered Ivanov’s widow US$2,000 in compensation, an amount that Galina Skripkina, a lawyer representing Ivanov’s widow, described as “humiliating,” according to a 12 March 2007 Associated Press report.
Despite the Kyrgyz disillusionment, there are experts who believe that Bishkek’s latest threat is ill-advised. Dr S Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, told ISN Security Watch that Kyrgyzstan’s move to close the Manas air base “is the wrong action done at the wrong time and in the wrong way.”
“It will send the clear signal that Kyrgyzstan has abandoned a balanced foreign policy. But it is not too late for the Kyrgyz Republic and US to work together to correct it,” he said.
Blinded by the perfidious Russian bear
Given the obvious disenchantment with the deal, only the most blinkered of Washington bureaucrats can have been surprised by Bakiyev’s 4 February announcement.
While recidivist Washington cold warriors are quick to see the perfidious Russian bear behind their ouster, in fact the Kremlin has thrown Kyrgyzstan a desperately needed fiscal lifeline even while Russia (along with the former Soviet Central Asian republics) has a desire to see ISAF stabilization efforts succeed in Afghanistan.
Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, succinctly summed up Moscow’s current thinking when he said, “In the event of NATO’s defeat in Afghanistan, fundamentalists who are inspired by this victory will set their eyes on the north. First they will hit Tajikistan, then they will try to break into Uzbekistan… If things turn out badly, in about 10 years our boys will have to fight well-armed and well-organized Islamists somewhere in Kazakhstan,” the International Herald Tribune reported on 24 January.
If the Obama administration is serious about making Afghanistan the focal point of its anti-terrorist operations, it might be forced to reexamine its relationship with Kyrgyzstan. Russia, China and India all have an interest in seeing the pacification efforts in Afghanistan succeed, and Russia has offered to open a supply route for non-military supplies, along with several Central Asian nations.
Washington may yet have an opportunity to remain at Manas, as Melis Erjigitov of the parliament’s press service stated on 11 February the Manas base closure bill was not on parliament’s agenda for February. But this is not likely to happen if Washington refused to change its mindset and one-up Russia in terms of aid.
Is Washington prepared to let Manas go? That is unclear, but a 10 February statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates indicates that Washington may give up and look elsewhere. “Manas is important, but not irreplaceable,” Gates said in a quote carried by the Washington Post on 11 February.
Regulars here will know that I don’t see Chavez as the demonic dictator he is frequently portrayed as in the media. In particular they’ve been having a field recently when Venezuelans voted in favor of overturning term limits for certain classes of elected officials, including the Presidency (and thus joined the leagues of such totalitarian regimes like the UK or Australia). Venezuela’s Referendum: Media’s Double Standards has more…
With Sunday’s Venezuelan referendum on term limits, we can expect to hear a lot about Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s “plan to become president for life” and its reflection on “Venezuela’s battered democracy”–as the New York Times editors put it (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/opinion/01sat2.html) around the time of Venezuela’s last (failed) term limits referendum.
But when Colombian President Álvaro Uribe’s efforts to change a constitutional prohibition barring a president from serving more than one term succeeded in 2005, the U.S. media took little notice, and Uribe’s reputation as the U.S.’s favorite ‘democrat’ in the region remained intact.
…It would seem the role of U.S. reporting and opinion on Venezuela (and Colombia) is less about informing the public about real threats to democracy and human rights in Latin America than it is about serving as a propaganda arm of U.S. foreign policy. One would be wise to remember this when reading about Venezuela’s referendum this weekend.
Finally, lots of stuff seems to be crashing into each other recently, from satellites to nuclear subs. Freaky. And not a bad metaphor for what is going on with the global economy. More on that this weekend, hopefully.