


offers an attractive career for young men. In 1949, 1,128 candidates took the foreign-service examinations; in 1950, 807; in 1951, only 760. At the present time just one is enrolled in the once-famous training program of the China Service.

Officers who once wrote candid reports, expecting them to be read only by their superiors, have come to consider how each word they write would look when excerpted before some committee and then re-excerpted in the newspapers. A good foreign-service officer, like a good detective or reporter, used to get all the information he could and keep a close watch on troublemakers. But now foreign-service officers have to restrict their acquaintanceship to people who will not seem objectionable. Our foreign service is becoming more and more like Soviet Russia's, which confines itself to telling its masters only what they want to hear.

Today many career diplomats tend to keep their mouths shut or to hedge. This is particularly true at meetings with representatives of other government agencies. Under such circumstances, correct policy decisions are accidental.

### 'Besmirched'

Yet the need for correct decisions has never been greater. The July, 1951, issue of the *American Foreign Service Journal* put it this way: "... such has been the effect of happenings of the last years that, at the very moment in history when the Foreign Service should be at the peak of its capabilities, when it should be best prepared to meet the terrible responsibilities of a period of decision between war and peace, it should itself become besmirched before the eyes of the American people, its confidence, courage, and very belief in its own principles and precepts, seriously if not irreparably damaged."



# XI—The World Of Alfred Kohlberg

CHARLES WERTENBAKER

MR. ALFRED KOHLBERG, the importer of Chinese embroidery and self-educated expert on Communist conspiracy, lives in a world of absolutes. He rigorously divides nearly everything that comes under his scrutiny into two general classifications—patriotic truth and treasonable conspiracy. "I'm a businessman," says Mr. Kohlberg. "I judge things by results."

Mr. Kohlberg himself usually gets results. For example, it has been substantiated by the record and by Mr. Kohlberg's own statements that he furnished much of Senator McCarthy's "case" against Owen Lattimore. But after Mr. Lattimore defended himself successfully against the McCarthy charges before the Tydings Committee, Mr. Kohlberg made a speech to the Larchmont Men's Club in which he stated:

"I am not trying to prove that Owen Lattimore is, or was, either a Communist or an espionage agent, because I do not have that proof."

Like Senator McCarthy, Mr. Kohlberg has a way of increasing the emotional effectiveness of his accusations by denying that he has made any accusations. Not long ago he told a student of Chinese affairs that Communists have filled the government with their agents and that Dean Acheson is the leader of the State Department ring. Mr. Kohlberg repeated that there was no doubt that Mr. Acheson was a Communist but added that he could not print the statement because he was unable to document it. But when this reporter asked whether he thought the Secretary of State was a Communist, Mr. Kohlberg replied as follows: "I don't believe he is a Communist or sincerely pro-Communist. He is a very able, very clever, very shallow man—not the kind of man who becomes a Communist. He's like my lawyer."

Mr. Kohlberg himself is an able, clever, complex man, and if he believes

one thing at one time and something else at another time, he nevertheless says everything with utter conviction.

### A Study in Scarlet

Mr. Kohlberg is a rotund little man in a neat business suit with what he has brand-named a "Kohlkerchief" sticking out of the breast pocket; he has a smooth, chubby face, a shiny bald head, and an agile smile. There is no warmth or mirth in the smile.

He has been writing long and important letters to newspapers and Congressmen for many of his sixty-odd years, and has written scores of articles and letters to editors. He is a voluble public speaker, and will talk readily to anybody who pays him a call.

"In January, 1945," he told this reporter, "I wrote a dream of the Communist conquest of the world. After I wrote it, an ex-Communist newspaperman dropped in on me and said I must have based it on the program of the Communist International."

"Who was the ex-Communist newspaperman?" he was asked.

"I won't tell you. I got the program at a second-hand bookstore. I had to pay \$2.50 for one ten-cent document." Mr. Kohlberg handed over a pamphlet entitled "Theses and Resolutions of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International," dated December 12, 1928. He also referred to the program of the Communist International dated September 1, 1928.

"These documents and others are available to the State Department. But the State Department didn't seem to know about them. James Byrnes didn't know about them. Marshall didn't know about them. Acheson didn't know about them. Acheson wrote to Senator George that he hadn't read them. That was in April, 1947." (Mr. Kohlberg never has to fumble for a date.) "What motivates Acheson is ambition. He realized that if he went along with the

pro-Communist group he would serve his own advancement. There was a pro-Communist group in the White House and he went along."

Mr. Kohlberg paused to listen to another question: "Who do you consider were the pro-Communists in the White House?"

"I'm not going to name them for you. There has been sworn testimony by Elizabeth Bentley, by Whittaker Chambers, and in the Tydings hearings. Between the fall of 1944 and August, 1946, in the State Department all five heads of the Far East end were relieved or removed. There was Joseph Grew, Stanley Hornbeck, Joseph Ballantine, Eugene Dooman—I said five; leave it at four. Who forced them out? Well, now, let's see who were the Secretaries of State. Stettinius, Byrnes, and Marshall, all in those years. [Marshall actually became Secretary of State in January, 1947.] They didn't know enough to make that mistake. They did it on the advice of people below who knew. No, I'm not going to name them, either.

"After 1946 there was almost no one in Washington who didn't have sympathy for Communism, and there were some pro-Communists."

"Exactly what do you mean by a pro-Communist?"

"I mean by a pro-Communist a person whose sympathies in the Far East were with the Communist forces. I can't go into the mental processes. He might not be a pro-Communist in Europe. Philip Jessup, for instance, is probably not pro-Communist in Europe. I don't know whether he is or not. But in the Far East he is pro-Communist."

### **Belfast and Swatow**

Mr. Kohlberg is reluctant to talk about his personal life and his business. He prefers his crusade against Communism as a topic of conversation. However, it is known that he was born and brought up in San Francisco, that his father was in the wholesale food business and, according to San Franciscans, was well off. Alfred graduated from Lowell High School in 1904 and from the University of California in 1908. After college, according to his own account, he was "sales representative in San Francisco for some New York firms."

At the Panama-Pacific International



**Alfred Kohlberg**

Exposition in San Francisco in 1915 he saw some Chinese silks and laces, became enamored of them, and made a trip to China the next year. He set himself up in business there and opened offices in England and Switzerland and, in 1917, in New York. His business prospered; Mr. Kohlberg has estimated his gross at \$1.5 million in an average year before the Second World War. "I imported laces, silks, and other items from China," he said. "After 1922 I had my own establishment in Swatow. I bought linen in Belfast, shipped it to Swatow, had it finished, and then brought it here."

By 1937 Mr. Kohlberg had a hundred thousand Chinese women, working under contractors, embroidering his linens for export. It has been widely reported that his profits were derived largely from cheap labor and child labor, that a skilled Chinese girl working twelve hours a day earned twenty-five Chinese dollars a month. It is a pleasure to record another aspect of the picture as reported by Irene Corbally Kuhn in the June, 1951, issue of the *Sign*, a monthly magazine:

"His enlightened business methods have made his firm an outstanding one and have paid off in unusual human dividends," wrote Mrs. Kuhn. "... At the time of Pearl Harbor, Kohlberg's firm had 3,500,000 pieces of work in China. When the Japanese struck, he simply wrote off that shipment as a complete loss. Early in 1946, however, he discovered that his workers had managed to store away nearly 70 per cent. . . . Some of the Chinese had gone to great lengths, often at

great personal expense, to hold up what they considered their end of the bargain. . . . As a matter of course, Kohlberg took over all living expenses for his employees in China for the four years of the war. 'They risked their lives to fulfill their contract and save my goods . . .' he says, matter-of-factly. 'I just put them back in business.'

"That reputation for fair-dealing which paid off so handsomely in China is as much a part of Kohlberg as his skin," Mrs. Kuhn concluded fulsomely.

In her article there was no mention of two cease-and-desist orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission to Alfred Kohlberg, Inc. The first, dated November 19, 1928, complained that although the firm's lace was wound on cards inscribed "Made in China," it carried such names as "Irish Crochet Lace," "Chinese Irish Lace," and "Swatow Irish Picot." The second order, issued on January 26, 1943, reported that "Made in China" tags or stickers had been loosely attached to Kohlberg merchandise bearing such names as "Tuscany," "Cluny Venise," "Valenciennes," etc. The order stated: ". . . that the unqualified use by the respondent of names signifying the lace producing sections of Europe . . . [has] the tendency and capacity to mislead and deceive a substantial portion of the purchasing public . . ."

Mr. Kohlberg himself was put back in business after the war by the Nationalist government, which promptly granted him export licenses. In the four years that the government stayed on the mainland after V.-E. Day, he was able to accumulate a pretty good inventory in New York. "If business stays bad, the way it is now," he says, "it will last for quite a while." The Nationalist government also granted him two decorations, the higher of which is called the Order of the Auspicious Star. Both hang in frames in Mr. Kohlberg's modest first-floor office at 1 West 37th Street, New York.

### **'World of Ideas'**

The conversion of Mr. Kohlberg from prosperous merchant to zealot took place suddenly in 1943. "I never took Communism seriously until then," he said. "Some people act according to ideas, but the businessman always looks at results. I went to Russia in 1926, 1932, and 1935. I looked at what they

# Fifteen Years of U.S.–Chinese Relations

(Events in the Far East are indicated in red)

1937

July—\$50-million U.S. stabilization loan to China

1938

January 20—American Bureau for Medical Aid to China set up

1939

February—\$25-million U.S. loan to China

1940

April 20—\$20-million U.S. loan to China

June—T. V. Soong arrives on unofficial mission to Washington

1941

February 4—\$50-million U.S. loan to China

March 11—Roosevelt signs Lend-Lease bill

April 29—T. V. Soong sets up China Defense Supplies

1942

February 7—\$500-million U.S. loan to China authorized

1943

February 18—Mme. Chiang addresses joint session of Congress

November 22-26—Roosevelt and Churchill meet Chiang at Cairo

1944

August 18—General Hurley named President's Personal Representative to China

October 28—White House announces that General Wedemeyer will replace Stilwell as U.S. Commander in the China Theater

November 27—Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., replaces Cordell Hull as Secretary of State

1945

January 8—Hurley accredited Ambassador to China

February 11—Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill sign Yalta Agreements, including provision for Soviet treaty with Chiang

April 12—Death of Roosevelt

April 15—Hurley confers with Stalin and Molotov on Nationalist-Communist controversy

May 8—V.-E. Day

July 3—James F. Byrnes becomes Secretary of State

November 27—Hurley resigns, claims State Department officials worked to disrupt U.S. policy

November 28—Senator Wherry (R., Nebraska) introduces resolution to investigate State Department

December 11—Senate Foreign Relations Committee drops investigation of Hurley charges

1946

June 14—Truman tells Congress China got \$602,045,000 since V.-J. Day, and aid will continue

July 11—J. Leighton Stuart confirmed as Ambassador to China

July 17—American China Policy Association formed, with J. B. Powell president


August 10—Marshall and Stuart issue joint statement that peace in China seems impossible

August 29—UNRRA reveals in Washington that it will provide twelve planes to fly emergency relief into Chinese famine areas; Chennault to operate service

August 31—Soong announces \$800-million surplus-property agreement with U.S.

October—Kohlberg and others launch *Plain Talk*, featuring "The State Department Espionage Case"





1947

January—Kohlberg *Plain Talk* article says that if aid to China is withheld, Chiang might accept Russian offer  
January 7—Secretary of State Byrnes resigns; Marshall succeeds him  
January 29—U.S. abandons efforts to mediate between Nationalists and Communists

June 30—\$500 million earmarked for China by Export-Import Bank, at Marshall's request, lapses; China held unable to use funds effectively for reconstruction

October 13—William Bullitt in *Life* recommends \$1,350,000,000 aid to save China from Communism  
October 22—Clare Boothe Luce elected president of American China Policy Association  
November 14—Representative Walter Judd (R., Minnesota) asks immediate aid to China  
November 24—Dewey attacks Administration's China policy, recommends an estimated \$250 million a year for three or four years' economic aid, plus smaller amount for military  
During the year—Kohlberg gives \$1,000 to Senator Styles Bridges's campaign fund

1948

January 21—Bridges letter to Marshall asks China aid  
February 18—Truman gives Congress Administration program for China (\$570 million for fifteen months)  
March—Bullitt, Wedemeyer, and Chennault testify before House Foreign Relations Committee on China aid

April 3—Truman signs Foreign Assistance Act of 1948; China gets \$463 million (\$338 million economic, \$125 million military)

April 5—*Life* editorial, "China: Blunder & Bluster," says Truman-Marshall Far Eastern policy is defeatist

April 9—William J. Goodwin registers as public-relations expert for National Resources Commission (Chinese)

June—*China Monthly* prints Kohlberg article, "Stupidity and/or Treason," attributing to "greatest living American" the statement that American foreign-policy difficulties spring from stupidity at the top and treason just below

June 10—Kohlberg testifies before Senate Appropriations Committee conducting foreign-aid hearings

October—Ex-Senator D. Worth Clark (D., Idaho) sent to China by Bridges's Senate Appropriations Committee

November 12—Bridges urges special session of Congress to speed China aid

December—Archbishop Paul Yu-Pin of Nanking, intimate of Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang, arrives in U.S.

1949

January 6—Bullitt, back from China, reports to Joint Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation, calls for further economic aid to Nationalists

Dean

Acheson becomes U.S. Secretary of State

February 25—Senator McCarran (D., Nevada) introduces bill for \$1.5-billion military and economic loan to China  
March—China Emergency Committee formed; Frederick C. McKee, Pittsburgh businessman, chairman  
April 14—China Aid Act of 1948 extended; Bridges urges investigation of China policy

May 3—Chennault urges Senate Armed Services Committee to authorize minimum program of \$700 million a year for holding action against Chinese Communists

May 26—W. Walton Butterworth nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Senate Republicans say Butterworth had a hand in "bankrupt" policy

July 2—Senator William H. Knowland (R., California) calls for military mission to China

July 11—William J. Goodwin, hired by Chinese News Service as press consultant, registers as lobbyist

August 5—State Department White Paper, *U.S. Relations with China*, published

August 8—David B. Charnay (president Allied Syndicates, later Allied Public Relations) hired by Bank of China for public relations; Congressman Judd calls for complete housecleaning in State Department

August 25—Congressman Mansfield (D., Montana) calls for investigation into use made of funds appropriated for China; suggests much has been used to finance attacks on State Department

October 2-5—U.S.S.R. and satellites (and Yugoslavia) recognize People's Republic of China

October 26—McKee organizes Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China (China Emergency Committee dissolved in May, 1949)

December 7—Acting President Li Tsung-jen arrives in New York for medical treatment

December 18—Chennault and partner Whiting Willauer buy Chinese government's interests in two Chinese airlines, C.A.T. and C.N.A.C.

December 22—Joint Chiefs of Staff advise no U.S. occupation of Formosa but agree to send large staff

1950

January 5—Mr. Truman announces U.S. will take no military measures to protect Formosa; Acheson says Chinese government had or could buy all military equipment needed, but lacked will to resist; Britain recognizes Communist China

January 8—Mme. Chiang broadcasts farewell speech from U.S. before joining Chiang on Formosa

January 11—Taft in Senate charges that State Department's China policy "has been guided by a left-wing group"

January 12—Acheson in National Press Club speech reaffirms "hands-off" policy for Formosa

February 9—Senator Joseph McCarthy (R., Wisconsin) speaks in Wheeling, West Virginia, on Communist infiltration of State Department; Far Eastern Economic Assistance bill assures continued aid to Formosa

February 22—Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee directed to investigate McCarthy's charge about Communists in the State Department

March 1—

Acting President Li in New York denounces Chiang as dictator

March 3—Kohlberg writes to Kung and Soong about *Newsweek* article and urges that they authorize Treasury to disclose their financial holdings in U.S.

March 26—McCarthy calls Lattimore "top Soviet spy" in U.S.

March 27—Bridges starts "get-Acheson" campaign

April 20—Ex-Communist Louis Budenz calls Lattimore a Communist

May 1—Ex-Communist Freda Utley denounces Lattimore as "Judas Cow"

May 10—Kohlberg-Kung-Soong correspondence put in Congressional Record by Knowland

June 27—Truman orders U.S. air, ground, and naval forces to repel attack; orders Navy to defend Formosa





and prevent Chiang's forces on Formosa from attacking mainland

- September 12—Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson resigns; replaced by Marshall
- October 2—First issue of the *Freeman* appears, financed in part by Kohlberg as a successor to *Plain Talk*
- October 3—Bridges charges State Department plot with Britain to give Peking seat in Security Council; State Department denies the charge

#### 1951

- January 14—Dr. Hu Shih advises use of Chiang's help against "Stalin's grand strategy for world conquest"
- April 5—House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin discloses MacArthur letter endorsing use of Chiang's troops to open second front on Chinese mainland
- April 11—Truman dismisses MacArthur
- April 19—MacArthur addresses Congress
- May 3—MacArthur hearings begin
- May 9—Freda Utley's *The China Story* published
- May 14—Ending Senate testimony, Marshall says Chinese Nationalists were beaten by Reds because of poor officers, lack of public support, and "the character of government"
- May 18—Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicates changes in U.S. China policy; speech taken in some quarters to mean U.S. would back Nationalists to revolt and would have no dealings with Reds even in peace talks; Acheson denies policy shift
- June 7—Senator Wayne Morse (R., Oregon) charges that the "China Lobby has for several years been conducting a violent campaign against American policies in China"
- June 9—William Loeb, president of the American China Policy Association, says Administration is "bluffing" when it demands investigation of his organization

June 11—Frederick McKee denies his group got any support, direct or indirect, from any Chinese source in U.S. or abroad; Wedemeyer's testimony supports MacArthur

June 14—McCarthy speaks in Senate for two and three-quarter hours attacking Marshall as supporter of Administration Far Eastern policy contrived to weaken U.S.; ex-Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testifies that it was Acheson who recommended U.S. intervention in Korea and that no high military figures in Washington opposed the intervention

June 20—Hurley criticizes Acheson for "appeasing" Communists, calls Yalta Agreements "immoral and cowardly"

June 25—MacArthur hearings end after fifty-four days

July 25—McCarran's Internal Security subcommittee begins hearings on "subversive" influences in U.S. foreign policy

August 7—\$307-million aid program to Nationalist China proposed by Administration

August 22—Ex-Red Budenz says Reds used Institute of Pacific Relations

September 14—Wedemeyer, in *U.S. News and World Report*, says Chiang's troops could be effectively used by U.S.

September 19—Wedemeyer tells McCarran subcommittee that State Department advisers Davies, Service, and Raymond Ludden were anti-Nationalist during war in China

September 23—Budenz tells McCarran subcommittee that Henry Wallace, influenced by John Carter Vincent and Lattimore, followed Communist line on his China mission; Truman releases Wallace's 1944 reports urging aid to Chiang

September 27—McCarthy before Senate Foreign Relations Committee attacks Ambassador-at-large Philip Jessup for "subversive" associations

October 6—Joseph Alsop, in open letter to McCarran, says Budenz lied about Wallace's 1944 mission

October 9—Judd, at fortieth anniversary dinner for Republic of China, says Roosevelt and Acheson caused spread of Communism in China

October 18—American Legion Convention demands reorganization in the State Department

December 5—Ad for Freda Utley's *The China Story* quotes General MacArthur as recommending it to "those who are interested in knowing the truth"

#### 1952

January 21—Lieutenant General P. T. Mow and Colonel V. S. Hsiang, accused by Formosa of misusing funds, file libel suit in Washington court

February 12—Taft asserts invasion of mainland by Chiang "might snowball rapidly," sees 600,000-man army "begging to be sent to do the job"

were doing there, and I decided we didn't have to worry about Russia; they don't deliver the goods. I wasn't at home in the world of ideas. I didn't realize that people could be moved by ideas and not by results."

After twenty-five years of business dealings in China, during which he had made some thirty-five trips to that country, Mr. Kohlberg had become known by the time of the Second World War as a man who could be counted on for help to the Chinese cause. He was an active member and supporter of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in 1943 he made another trip to China as chairman of the executive committee of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China. "I saw funny things happen. I heard lies put out by the [U.S.] Embassy. I believed the lies myself until I went out in the field and heard the truth."

Specifically, Mr. Kohlberg heard that Chiang Kai-shek was stockpiling Lend-Lease tanks and guns for future use against the Communists instead of using them against the Japanese. He reported this to Brigadier General Thomas S. Arms, who was in charge of General Stilwell's infantry school at Kunming, and was told that munitions from the United States were delivered to Stilwell, not to Chiang Kai-shek. "That was in August, 1943."

It should be noted that this was the time of one of the periodic crises between General Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang. Stilwell was training a Chinese army at Kunming with inadequate supplies flown over the Hump. Chiang was objecting to Stilwell's plan to attack the Japanese in Burma; he was arguing for arms for his own forces

and insisting that he would know how and where to use them. Stilwell was pressing Washington for more supplies while the Chinese, Chennault's air force, and even his own forces accused him of niggardliness in distributing the supplies on hand. At the same time, Stilwell was complaining in his diary of Chiang's failure to supply him with promised reinforcements, of delays in getting promised mortars from Chiang, of the thefts of army payrolls by Chinese unit commanders. In this atmosphere of complaint and countercomplaint, no doubt there were exaggerations. What Mr. Kohlberg saw was a Communist plot. Perhaps the Chinese helped him see it.

### 'Narrow Militancy'

"When I came back to see Cordell Hull, he sent me to Stanley Hornbeck, who was chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. Hornbeck said that when he saw the people the Department was sending to China he shook in his shoes." [Hornbeck's version is less colorful. He says that he was indeed distressed by the many Americans with no knowledge of China whom the government was at the time using to staff its multiple agencies in China. Among so many people, he added, undoubtedly there were a few Communists or Communist sympathizers.]

"I soon saw that the center of the conspiracy was the Institute of Pacific Relations, to which I had contributed time and money. The I.P.R. people had infiltrated the State Department, the OWI, Commerce, the Treasury, and the intelligence services of the armed forces. There were between a hundred and

two hundred I.P.R. people in the Far Eastern divisions of government departments. I also found out that their so-called scholarly studies coincided with the Communist line. I spent six months of 1944, four hours a day and some Saturdays and Sundays, at the public library, studying the I.P.R. publications for the last seven years. So I tried to clean out the I.P.R. Instead they cleaned me out."

Mr. Kohlberg's efforts to clean out the I.P.R. went on from 1944 to 1947. They began in 1944 with an eighty-eight-page pamphlet designed to show the parallels between the Communist line and the writings in I.P.R. publications, and culminated in March, 1947, with his proposal to the Institute's trustees of a resolution that the I.P.R.'s entire treatment of China be investigated. The Institute probably made a mistake in not taking Mr. Kohlberg seriously enough at first. When it got around to answering his charges in detail, it was able to show omissions and distortions in his quotations and to point to many instances in which it had presented two or more sides of a controversial subject. Mr. Kohlberg, according to "a long-time friend" quoted by Irene Kuhn in her article in the *Sign*, "doesn't make the mistake of being a liberal who dilutes his views. He has a kind of narrow militancy about them that strengthens them beyond measure."

"There were pro-Communists not only on the staff level," Mr. Kohlberg went on, "but on the Board of Trustees and the executive committee of the Board of Trustees. In the vote on my resolution, in April, 1947, no trustees voted for my investigation." Who were



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the pro-Communists on the Board of Trustees? Mr. Kohlberg thereupon proceeded to associate the following names: "Lauchlin Currie, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Mortimer Graves, Edward C. Carter, Harriet Lucy Moore, Len deCaux (he was kicked out of the CIO when they cleaned out the Communists), Owen Lattimore, Ben C. Kizer, Maxwell Stewart—maybe there were some others but that's all I can think of right now. They got rid of Field later, and they got rid of Carter in part later, although he's still a trustee. Oh, yes, another pro-Communist was Philip C. Jessup."


Neither Mr. Jessup nor two of the others named by Mr. Kohlberg were on the Board of Trustees of the I.P.R. in April, 1947. Of the fifty-seven-member board, that left fifty "non-pro-Communist" trustees who saw no sense in Mr. Kohlberg's resolution.

Having gotten nowhere with the trustees of the I.P.R. or with its members, who subsequently gave him sixty-six proxies against 1,163 in a vote on whether or not to conduct the investigation he had proposed, Mr. Kohlberg resigned from the I.P.R. and went to work with his own organization, the American China Policy Association. Its mailing pieces are printed in the basement of his importing house and go through his firm's mailing machines. "To that extent, I guess you'd say I support it."

For four years he also supported the small, shrill magazine *Plain Talk*, whose editor was Isaac Don Levine. *Plain Talk* was discontinued in 1950, shortly before the appearance of the *Freeman*. Mr. Kohlberg has described himself as "one of the supporters" of the *Freeman*.

"You know, Lattimore wrote a book called *Ordeal by Slander*," Mr. Kohlberg remarked. "I'm slandered all the time and I don't find it any ordeal. Maybe I'm not publicity-minded. I'm surprised I get so much attention. All I did was to write a few letters to the press, to Congressmen, and to people on my mailing list."

The reporter asked Kohlberg what he thought of Senator McCarthy. "McCarthy's a great guy. Practically everything he said will be proven. What I gave McCarthy was what I'd been sending to the newspapers over the years." He was asked about his statement that McCarthy was the only man



"with guts enough and dumb enough" to do what he did. "By dumb enough, I meant that there were others who knew more but were too smart politically to put themselves out on a limb. But maybe McCarthy was not so politically dumb after all. I said that back last April."

### Seeing Red

Mr. Kohlberg never betrays a glimmer of doubt as to the righteousness of his campaign, which is against not only Communism, or even chiefly against Communism, but against those Americans who in his personal opinion have aided the Communists in one way or another. His thesis, a simple one, he has summed up substantially as follows, to the student previously quoted:

There is a Great Conspiracy aimed at the destruction of the United States. Its method is to say "Europe first" in order to throw away Asia, then to do something about Asia only after it is too late, thus throwing away Europe as well. (Kohlberg does not appear to consider that the "Asia Firsters" could, with equal justice, be accused of the same strategy in reverse.) Recruiting for the Great Conspiracy has been going on for years. Its main tools are Communist ideology and heavy bribes; \$20 million a year is spent on buying members and operating the ring, says Mr. Kohlberg with conviction. During the Second World War the Great Conspiracy worked to deliver Asia to Russia. The personnel selected for government agencies in the Far East was picked from a roster of "experts" made up by the Council of Learned Societies under the direction of Mortimer Graves.

Mr. Kohlberg, of course, has a foreign policy of his own and has sent it to Congress. It calls for:

1. Congressional declaration of a state of war with Communist China.
2. Limiting unrestricted trade relations to those nations which agree to a mutual armed-aid pact against Communist nations.
3. The granting of armed assistance to all nations that join in such an agreement ("no question of the form of government of nations entering such an alliance, whether free-enterprise, democratic, monarchial, dictatorial, socialist, or otherwise").
4. Immediate breaking of diplomatic relations with all Communist nations.

### Korea Explained

Mr. Kohlberg would also like to bring the "reliable men" back into the State Department and make "some good man like Walter Judd" Secretary of State. He offers a simple solution for rescuing China: "What Russia did, we could do in reverse, and we could do it in shorter time."

Q.: "How would Chiang Kai-shek get the men?"

A.: "How do you get men in China? You take 'em. I doubt if a private ever enlisted in China. You get 'em by conscription. That's the way they've always been taken, by the war lords, by the Nationalists, and by the Communists. Chiang has got more troops now than we've armed. We can reverse the process of Russia and do it faster because we can make the things to do it with faster than they can. Then there won't be any World War III because Soviet Russia won't be big enough. They'd never risk a war with a hostile China on their frontier.

"It's all right to call things mistakes, but if a mistake causes one hundred thousand casualties it becomes expensive. If we hadn't let China go Communist, we could have written the ticket out there, and then there wouldn't have been a war in Korea. I don't know why they started the Korean War—it wasn't on Stalin's program—unless it was cooked up."

"Cooked up with whom?"

"Cooked up with us," said Mr. Kohlberg, eyeing his interviewer suspiciously. "The Russians were out of the U.N. at that time, and they had to have some way to get back in."

## In Conclusion . . .

IT IS STRANGE, but it is a fact: In this day and age there still seems to be something indecent about the mere presence of foreign lobbies in our country. Our government has power of life and death over practically every country in the non-Communist world; not only Cabinets but constitutions may survive or fall depending on the amount of economic and military aid that Washington grants. Any foreign government is derelict in its duty if it does not state its case as convincingly as it can to the people of the United States—particularly, in these times of Congressional supremacy, to the men who make the laws.

Just as every government that expects something from us has its lobby over here, we have a lobby in every country where our interests are at stake. Effective lobbying is aimed where the power lies—sometimes at the Executive, sometimes at the legislature, sometimes, before a crucial election, at the people themselves. A few weeks ago an American ambassador lectured Greek politicians on the advantages of the two-party system; whenever there are Italian elections—and they are invariably crucial—American citizens of Italian descent are asked to write their relatives and tell them how to vote. The destinies of nations have become so intermeshed that the conduct of foreign affairs can no longer be monopolized, though it must be controlled, by Foreign Offices or Departments of State. This means lobbying, official and unofficial.

Congress, which should know everything there is to know about foreign lobbies, got around to recognizing their existence some years ago, when, following its fashion in dealing with unsavory things, it ordered all lobbyists to register. A few years later, it dealt with Communists the same way. Congress as a whole is still sour on all foreign lobbies, but quite a few Congressmen make generous exceptions in favor of some lobbyists.

With all the lobbying that is being done by foreigners here and ourselves abroad, there seems to be no reason why people should be squeamish about admitting that such a thing as a China Lobby exists—

squeamish to the point that most publications still bracket the phrase chastely in quotation marks. If the Kuomintang didn't have a lobby here, there would be something radically wrong with it. As a matter of fact, there is something radically wrong with the Chinese Nationalist government—not that it carries on lobbying, but that it is little but a lobby.

Since the beginning of the war, the weakness of the Kuomintang on its home grounds has been offset only by the strength it has built up in Washington. It has always lived on credit with no collateral. Its leaders, lacking a real constituency among their own people, have been able to count mostly on their American constituency. This has put the China Lobby in a category all by itself, for it has always represented not a great nation but a régime playing at being a great power.

### *Nothing Short of War*

Since the China Lobby was reassembled here after Mao's victory, it has had to exert pressure on Congress, on the Executive, on public opinion, to get dollars and weapons in almost unlimited quantity. Yet not even billions or arsenals can satisfy it. Actually, nothing can, short of total war—a total war against international Communism that the United States has to start in the shortest possible time, for Chiang's position on Formosa is tragic, and his shrunken army has to reconquer a nation of nearly five hundred million people.

Never has there been a government that has asked so much of another. Yet the China Lobby has a formidable weapon in its hands: Since the alternative to Chiang is Mao, anybody in America—State Department official or private citizen—who is not for Chiang's restoration can be called a Red. Of course the China Lobby has money—a lot of it—and, particularly in the case of its Chinese agents, the resourcefulness that comes with despair. But what has helped most is the Red issue, which was first raised when the American people had grown aware