

PEACE IN OUR TIME

The Spirit of Munich Lives On

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The central failure of American conservatism over the past 10 years has been its inability to delegitimize the Soviet Union in the same way the left has delegitimized South Africa. Until the Soviet Union is recognized universally as the dangerous and evil empire that it is, neither the Reagan Administration nor any subsequent conservative administration will be able to achieve such worthy goals as the deployment of a strategic defense, the strengthening of alliances with other free world nations, or the rollback of international Communism through consistent support of freedom fighters.

The foreign policy of the Reagan Administration, of course, has been vastly superior to that of the Carter Administration. Since the humiliation America experienced with the seizing of its embassy in Tehran and culminating in the failed Desert One rescue operation, there has been a genuine restoration of confidence and purpose in America's foreign policy. Our national defense has been reinvigorated; the Soviet empire, which expanded substantially under Carter, has gained no ground in seven years; authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific have experienced smooth transitions to democracy; Grenada has been liberated at the invitation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; and Libyan terrorism has subsided after a well-orchestrated U.S. precision attack on its military installations.

However, seven years after Ronald Reagan's arrival in Washington, the United States government and its allies are still dominated by the culture of appeasement that drove Neville Chamberlain to Munich in 1938. While President Reagan has eloquently and properly defined the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union as one between good and evil, even he has fallen victim to this culture. The best example is the administration's ongoing obsession with the process of arms control. By allowing the Soviets to place nuclear weapons at the pinnacle of the international political agenda, we have allowed them to divert attention from their human rights record, their denial of democratic participation, and the malefic nature of the Soviet system itself.

It is still widely thought that the peace is endangered unless the United States is negotiating with the Soviets on nuclear capabilities. Yet, nuclear weapons have not killed

one million civilians in Afghanistan; nuclear weapons have not sent religious dissidents to psychological camps where their minds are destroyed with mind altering drugs; nuclear weapons have not crushed the Solidarity campaign in Poland; nuclear weapons are not supporting a war on democracy in Latin America; and nuclear weapons did not attempt the assassination of the Pope. These barbarities—only a sampling of many—were initiatives of Soviet Communism, and it is an unblinking awareness of this evil ideology that must govern any discussions we might have with the Soviets. Persistent Soviet aggression—in line with the Leninist dogma of world domination—undercuts the often made argument that nuclear weapons are equally dangerous in the hands of the United States or any western nation.

The "Arms Control" Lie

Arms control agreements would be valuable if they enhanced the security of the United States and its allies. But after 20 years of the "arms control process," clearly this test has not been met. The Soviets have stockpiled enough strategic weapons to destroy almost all U.S. ICBMs and ground-based bombers in a first strike. They are also developing the capability to destroy our submarines and to deploy a missile defense system to reduce the effectiveness of American retaliation.

Furthermore, the voluminous record of Soviet cheating renders the entire process a sham. The Soviets have violated every major treaty they have signed: SALT I, SALT II, ABM, the Helsinki Accords, and the Chemical and Biological Convention. At what point will the allies wake up and acknowledge that the Soviets cannot be trusted to keep agreements? Even the Reagan Administration shrinks from this obvious conclusion. While the administration has spoken favorably of the deployment of a strategic defense, it has also refused to scrap the ABM treaty, which stands in the way of deployment.

Another example of appeasement is the unsteady commitment to freedom in many parts of the world. The Reagan State Department, like the Carter State Department, has consistently opposed aid to anti-Stalinist resistance

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