

Theory in American Politics

The strength of American politics lies in its understanding that heaven and earth are two different places.

JAMES V. SCHALL

POLITICAL THEORY never has really discovered a congenial home in the United States. To be sure, American professors are quite frank about this and are openly prepared to admit, often even to lament this apparent deficiency. But thus far American political scientists have not agreed either about the nature of the difficulty or about what remedy to apply.

"Perhaps most of these worries about the state of our discipline," Professor V. O. Key noted in his recent presidential address to the American Political Science As-

sociation, "relate in one way or another to the place of political theory in our studies."¹ Theory, he continues, should be relevant to practical political activity, while empirical data should enrich theory. Yet, Professor Key emphasizes, theory and practice appear to be quite "antagonistic" to one another. Seldom is a theoretical work of "the slightest use for the empirical worker," nor does the theorist find detailed data of much real use.²

Professor Robert McCloskey, in a discussion of "American Political Thought

and the Study of Politics," takes the further logical step to bring to light what is perhaps the underlying concern of American political thinkers. "The difficulty, to be downright," he feels, "is that American political thinkers have not often produced works that rank with the best that has been thought or known in the world's intellectual history."³ So it is that in the state of political philosophy, we find ourselves to be second-class citizens.

As a witness to the somewhat chaotic relationship existing between political theory and actual political decision, we find with increasing, even disturbing frequency learned treatises in the pages of the *American Political Science Review* and other professional journals which attempt, for example, to "predict" on the basis of mathematical analyses such phenomena as Supreme Court decisions—an interesting fate indeed for the nine free men who sit on this venerable Bench of American liberty.⁴

It is true, fortunately, that we also find authors who quite frankly dub this kind of predicting effort as "science fiction."⁵ But mathematical elements do more and more dot the pages of our professional organs. Indeed, political scientists are often enamoured, if not entranced by the pure theoretical systems of the physical sciences. Thus they invite to their annual meetings specialists in the physical sciences to explain to them "the various meanings of 'theory.'"⁶

Yet, though in his heart the political scientist does not really feel at home midst the giants of physics, mathematics, or chemistry, the inordinate attraction is still there. "The great ambition of the political scientist," Bertrand de Jouvenel, somewhat cynically perhaps, has remarked, "is to be like other scientists."⁷

But exactly here lies the whole question. Is he like other "scientists"? The answer to this perplexing question, it seems to me,

paradoxically is found in the very lessons American political life since the eighteenth century teaches us vis-à-vis the major ideals that governed the minds of the great European theorists during the same era. So great has been the contrast between the systems that American theorists have tended to harbor a kind of inferiority complex when confronted with the great European constructs of liberalism, socialism, conservatism, Marxism, or nationalism. When we contrast *The Federalist Papers*—perhaps our finest single work—or Washington, Calhoun, James Wilson, Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln, or Woodrow Wilson with the visions of Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, J. S. Mill, Bentham, Marx, or Nietzsche, we lapse into awe and silence. We even discover—to heap insult on injury—that the greatest early studies of American politics were written by a French aristocrat and an English lord.

NEVERTHELESS, there is a basic difference about European political theory which it is essential to grasp. At bottom, the major European political thinkers whom we recognize to have been most influential in the world's intellectual history have not really been "politicians" in the American sense. Rather they have been systematic philosophers or secular theologians who have sought in political theory and organization the ultimate answer to man's very real quest for total fulfilment. This is the true significance of *The Prince*, *The Leviathan*, *The Social Contract*, *The Philosophy of Right*, *The Wealth of Nations*, the *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind*, *Das Kapital*, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, and *State and Revolution*.

American political writing and practice in contrast has been considerably more modest in its scope. It has been empirical, pragmatic, organic, quite content to limit

itself to the reasonable, temporary goals of this life. Although some of our scholars are of course closer than others to this more philosophical tradition flowing out of modern Europe, the vast majority have stayed closer to the life and reality of economic and social problems apt to be discussed in a normal session of Congress or at the conference table in the White House.

This does not mean, however, that Americans have ignored the issue of man's ultimate happiness. Perhaps we can take Mr. Tennessee Williams' recent essay in the *New York Times* as a contemporary proof of this: "I would say that there is something much bigger in life and death than we have become aware of in our living and dying . . . I would say that our serious theater is a search for that something that is not yet successful but is still going on."⁸ There is and always has been this ultimate search among our own people—though I doubt whether any great majority of our citizens utilize the theater as a proper vehicle to find it.

The point is that Americans in general have been inclined to believe that politics and political theory are not the proper avenues on which to reach ultimate happiness. They have been to a great extent a religious people. They have, consequently, separated their churches from their state in order to guarantee the autonomy of both, but they have likewise separated those philosophies which substitute for religion from their state. Their political leaders have usually respected religious beliefs and practices; most politicians indeed have themselves been religious men. The American politician as a result of his limited concept of politics and as a result of his personal contacts with the beliefs of the people has never felt that the way of politics could be used to solve essentially religious and philosophical problems. The real issue, then, seems to revolve around the true

goals of politics and political theory.

Two divergent approaches to politics must, therefore, be recognized. One approach—let us call it with admitted exaggeration the modern European concept—is rooted in a post-Christian philosophical outlook. It has constantly borne witness to man's eternal and necessary desire to attain personal, unchanging happiness for himself and his fellows. The essential core of the Christian revelation—Creation, the Fall, Redemption, Resurrection, personal responsibility and salvation—has been abandoned as a solution to this problem of happiness for most of these European thinkers.

Yet I am inclined to believe that the European mind has been true to its Christian and Greek heritage at least to the extent that it has sought some kind of infinity. Since it ceased to discover it in Christianity, it looked elsewhere. But it did look. Chateaubriand in his *Mémoires d'outre tombe* characterized this tradition when he wrote that "the concept of infinity is one of man's attributes; once you forbid our minds and emotions to concern themselves with unlimited good you have changed man into a machine."⁹ This quest for infinity, I believe, is present in practically every European movement since the seventeenth century in some form or another. Moreover, this "theological" aura of European politics explains in great part the peculiar aspects of continental parties when compared with the Republican or Democratic parties of the United States. Our parties are flexible and expansive and cooperative precisely because they are not, like so many of their European counterparts, expressions of a political creed.

Americans are often inclined to think that the Marxist tradition with its materialist basis is an exception to this rule of the infinite. But of all European philosophies, Marxism is the greatest single example of

its presence. The orthodox Marxist really believes in an infinity to be achieved in this life. And this is precisely why an American politician does not easily understand a Communist, for no American would ever think of looking to politics for an answer to ultimate questions.

CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN American politicians meet Russian leaders, they frequently act—and the American press, both scholarly and popular, supports their moves for the most part—as if they were dealing with politicians like unto themselves in all things, sin included, men who are concerned with peace, with pragmatic, temporal goals. But they are really talking to devoted theologians who are striving for the infinite—and in the Russian dogma the infinite happens to be tied up with the eradication of America as such.

Perhaps the most enlightening examples of this perplexity facing American politicians can be seen, I think, in some recent remarks of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Mr. Dean Acheson. In a TV interview, Mrs. Roosevelt was asked about President Roosevelt's reaction to the increasing Russian violations of allied agreements at the end of the war. She replied quite simply that Mr. Roosevelt always placed a great faith in his ability to work out solutions by personal negotiations with opposite leaders. At the end, she noted, he was becoming very disturbed over these Soviet violations.¹⁰

Most students of the era, I believe, would take a similar view of Franklin Roosevelt's general position on this point. After a recent lecture at Howard University, Mr. Acheson was asked by an earnest student obviously dismayed at the conflicting interpretations of the event: "Just what did happen at Yalta?" Mr. Acheson replied that a good deal has been written and spoken about this agreement by the Re-

publicans, but when they came to power themselves, they discovered to their dismay that the legal basis for eventual liberty to Eastern European countries was founded on the Yalta pacts. Consequently, to repudiate them would have been tantamount to abandoning these nations. So the issue was dropped.¹¹

What I want to bring out here is not the merit or demerit of Mr. Roosevelt's policies or the wisdom of Yalta, but rather to indicate the nature of the underlying assumptions on which both Yalta and Mr. Roosevelt's efforts were based. Clearly, the feeling must have been that the Russians were men and politicians pretty much like typical American politicians back home. This is why Mr. Roosevelt could have honestly placed such great confidence in his admitted talent for personal negotiations, and why legal treaties were thought adequate enough to establish peace and justice.

But Mr. Roosevelt was not talking to other politicians. He was talking to devotees of an absolute system, a system which neither Mr. Roosevelt nor the majority of Americans were really capable of understanding at the time. Consequently, when Russia decided in 1946-50 to take the offensive, the popular cry of indignation in America was that the Russians had suddenly changed. In truth the Russians had not changed in the slightest. What changed was our naive belief that politics was a category into which Lenin, Herbert Hoover, Neville Chamberlin, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill all could fit with equal simplicity and ease.

Yet, to bring these reflections back into the mainstream of our discussion, there is a brighter side to this same picture from the standpoint of theory itself. This apparent lack of sophisticated *élan* which American politics and politicians reveal when confronted by European theories and

organizations does not, in my opinion, bear witness to a radical misapprehension about the nature of politics on our part. Quite the contrary: I believe the average American congressman or president knows much more about the real "stuff" of politics than most of his European counterparts. And the reason for this is that Americans are free to deal openly with politics as such and do not have to be distracted in current affairs by issues that are essentially philosophical and theological. Politics is a prudence and an experience based on the acceptance of defined and limited goals for real people in the actual situations of this life. American politicians have never really thought of politics in any other terms.

For this reason, I believe that the too much neglected theories of Belloc and Chesterton on the distinctiveness of the American experience are most significant. Both men insisted that American civilization was derived from, but still quite distinct from Europe; it was a civilization whose peculiar spirit both practically and historically was much more comparable to pre-Reformation Europe than to the Europe of their day.¹²

THESE OBSERVATIONS of Belloc and Chesterton that America is a different kind of civilization gain added point in the light of the recent studies of Charles N. R. McCoy, one of the most acute and perceptive of American scholars of the history of political theory. Professor McCoy declares that most modern writers in the field—Sabine, Carlyle, McIlwain—have never really grasped the significance of the Christian revelation vis-à-vis political philosophy.¹³ Usually, the major contribution of Christianity is held to have been its influence in the area of tolerance and liberty. Professor Paul Ramsey's summation of the thesis of *Twenty Centuries of Christianity* by Professors Hutchinson and Garrison

states the typical interpretation: "While not entirely agreeing with the judgment of the 'Gloomy Dean' of St. Paul's, London, that 'after Constantine there is not much that is not humiliating,' it is plain that the authors' sympathies, after the brief period of Constantine's Edict of Toleration, are mainly directed to the American experience of toleration and the separation of Church and State."¹⁴ According to most historians, early Christian theory is pretty much a sanctification of Stoic views on equality, the Fall, and universal brotherhood.

Professor McCoy grants the importance of Christianity in the areas of toleration, liberty, and brotherhood, but points out that the significance of these ideas was a relatively late development in Western political history. The deeper meaning of Christianity for political theory, he insists, lies in an Aristotelian rather than in a Stoic context. In the *Ethics* and *Politics*, Aristotle saw that man had a desire for perfect happiness, but he also saw that such a goal was not possible in this life. After Aristotle, Greek philosophy so abandoned hope of ever attaining earthly bliss that it finally arrived at Epicurus, who felt that man is better off simply to forget the desire since it only disturbs him and makes him incapable of appreciating what little happiness he can attain.¹⁵

But the human mind, as we noted in an earlier context, cannot relinquish the quest for felicity. If it is suppressed in one form, it will reappear in another. Just before the advent of Christianity the Roman Empire was engulfed by the cult of emperor-worship and various oriental pseudo-religions which, for the first time in man's history, extended the false promise that politics could be the means of attaining perfect happiness in this life.

The victory of Christianity over its rivals was, therefore, as Professor McCoy indicates, almost as crucial in the realm of

politics as it was in religion. By defining the true nature of ultimate happiness for man—that is, in an eternal life after death—Christianity guaranteed the autonomy and limited nature of the political order. For if the solution to man's quest for infinity lies outside of this life, then political life cannot be converted into an instrument with which to reorganize and discipline society in an illusory pursuit of perfect happiness for mortal man. Thus politics can be what Aristotle said it was, and what American society has always felt it to be—a concern for a limited, temporal common welfare of this life, a life which can admit the reality of man's spiritual desires but which does not attempt to fulfill them by political action and organization.

As a sidelight on Professor McCoy's thesis, it is interesting to recall that Karl Marx himself wrote his doctoral dissertation on the difference between Democritus and Epicurus. Marx's general train of thought was that post-Aristotelian philosophies—Stoicism, skepticism, and Epicureanism—really formed the Roman spirit, but that their essential implications did not become apparent until they were reintroduced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the foundations of modern European philosophies.¹⁶ "Philosophy . . . will not permit itself," Marx wrote in the introduction to his thesis, "to hurl at its adversaries the cry of Epicurus, 'the impious one is not he who despises the gods of the crowd, but he who adheres to the idea that the rabble makes for itself of the gods.' Philosophy does not hide itself. It makes its own Prometheus' profession of faith, namely, 'I hate all the gods!' And philosophy opposes that slogan to all the gods of heaven and earth who do not recognize the human conscience as the supreme divinity. It suffers no rival."¹⁷ Thus the Christian idea that perfect happiness lies with God outside this life is abandoned

to a mystique that admits no opponent. The quest for perfect happiness again enters the political realm.

THE LATER HISTORY of Christianity in large part, it seems to me, can be seen more clearly in this light. For the reaction of the Church to political movements and to philosophical ideologies varies in direct proportion to the degree to which a political doctrine or movement claims to fulfill on earth man's quest for eternal happiness. The best contemporary example of this, I think, lies in the attitude of the Church's hierarchy towards the various European labor and socialist parties. Where these parties tend to embrace personalism, property, cooperation, and religion as in Holland and England, the hierarchy usually finds no objection to them.¹⁸ But where these parties retain traditional socialist dogma as in nineteenth-century France, and as seems to be the case in Italy today, the Church has been uncompromising, because she has seen in the platforms and the attitudes of these parties a false claim to secure man's quest for happiness in this life.¹⁹ The modern Church has usually encouraged political, economic, and social progress. Where she has tended to hesitate is at that very point where this progress was envisioned as an earthly substitute for a supernatural goal.

Christianity, then, from this aspect has performed an enormous service to political life and theory because it has insisted that the kind of happiness open to man on earth is the limited, tangible advance of the temporal order, a goal characterized best, in my opinion, pretty much by the attitudes and aims of American parties and politicians. Whenever politics has been transformed into a tool with which to construct happiness in this life, as is generally the case with major European thinkers from Machiavelli to Marx, practical politi-

cal life as we Americans know it has withered and died. For there can be no political process as the Americans are accustomed to it where parties are primarily ideological in nature.

Herein too lies the ultimate difficulty which American politicians face when confronting Communist leaders, for these leaders operate in a political and philosophical tradition which renders politics in the American sense almost meaningless. This is also probably the reason why American politicians almost instinctively tend to favor European conservative and Christian Democratic parties in their actual political negotiations. They see in these parties a recognition of the limited scope of political endeavor, a recognition they do not find so evident in other European parties.

Such considerations lead me to believe, contrary to the prevailing opinion, that American politicians and writers have actually contributed enormously to political theory, for the very reason that they do *not* compare favorably with the metaphysical aspects of Hegel, of Fichte, or Marx, or Alfred Rosenberg. We Americans have been concerned with the proper issues of politics, with popular representation, political leadership, interstate commerce, public morals and welfare, oligarchy, corruption, pure food and drugs, TVA, due process, labor unions, school buildings, control of the military. We have not understood the classless society, the master race (though on this score our hands are not quite so clean), or the World Spirit. This is why Belloc and Chesterton spoke of the presidency as the last of the mediaeval monarchies: when politics is based, as it is in America, on the premise that religion and philosophy are not its proper domain, it is possible for the king to work for a reasonable, temporal welfare.

As a result we can afford psychologically to be content with the pragmatic best we

can attain over a long period of time with our somewhat chaotic economic and social procedures. We are not, as a people, profoundly discontented because our political processes have not fulfilled our ultimate desires. We have in a kind of political manner inherited the old Christian idea that human sin and ignorance are very much with us, along with the equally Christian notion that we should do something about poverty and ignorance and suffering even while recognizing that we cannot eliminate them entirely. We are not sad that senators and bureaus and economic enterprise cannot complete our desire for happiness. We know in a kind of practical way that the solution to these questions lies in Christopher Dawson's happy phrase "beyond politics."

Yet, if we can rest content with the general attitude of our leaders towards the limits of politics within human society, the same security cannot be extended to their overall performance in dealing with absolutist systems. Our very failure to see in these philosophical and political movements a claim to attain ultimates has seriously hampered our effectiveness, indeed our very existence. Why do we display this weakness even in a time when we have more and more realized the implications of absolutist systems? Father Martin C. D'Arcy, I think, has stated it as well as most. When we face a total philosophy, we ourselves need to agree on our own values in order to maintain our position and, especially, to advance it.

But as the theoretical beliefs of our intellectual leaders recede more and more from the Christian and Greek premises on which our actual political life was built, we discover no commonly accepted core of ideas that can support the political ideals we in fact practice. Our political creed affirms a belief in freedom, responsibility, personality, and religion which our sci-

entific and theoretical beliefs fail to support. The scientific systems that are taught in our universities when transplanted into the social sciences—a movement which is only now reaching its full culmination—imply a denial of the liberty, personality, and common human nature needed in political life.

As a result, the social order evolves into a mechanism; and the individual himself, into an abstract, manipulatable, and uniform scientific construct. These ideas are hardly consonant with the dignity of an existentially unique human person for whom society ultimately exists. What we need is a theory that can support the fact that men in their characteristic activity and destiny are really distinct from the physical world, a theory which recognizes man's activity as free, responsible, organic, and responsible. We need to realize what Salvador de Madariaga recently stressed, namely that uniqueness and not repeatable uniformity is the characteristic attribute of life and especially of man.²⁰

In other words, to go back to the point from which we began this essay, the uneasy relationship existing today between political theory and practical politics in America stems largely from the fact that an ever-increasing number of our political theorists are attempting to *construct*—and note that I use the word “construct,” instead of saying “discover” which implies that man is made by something other than himself, made with a definite and stable nature—political philosophy in mathematical and physical analogies. The ultimate and serious danger of this movement is that it portends in America visionary attempts to transform into political action and organization the hope of attaining ultimate happiness in this life; for if society is to be subject to the laws of mathematics and physics, then happiness could be a result of the right scientific formula.

Fortunately, this kind of attitude has not yet reached the practicing politician—which is why, I suspect, congressmen are often somewhat disrespectful of political scientists. As a kind of empirical proof of this point—which will at the same time serve as an answer to the question posed at the beginning of these observations about whether the political scientist is “like other scientists”—we might consider two exchanges that took place in the Hearings of the House Select Committee on Lobby Activities during the Eighty-First Congress. The first exchange was between Representative Clarence Brown of Ohio, Representative Charles Halleck of Indiana, and Professor Hadley Cantril who was testifying:

Mr. Brown: . . . do you think the average member of Congress has any intelligence, or ability, or any knowledge of his district and of his people?

Mr. Cantril: I cannot imagine anyone who would have much more.

Mr. Brown: Do you know of any professor in any college or any student . . . who can make a better analysis of my mail than I can make for myself? Do you think there is any student or any college professor who knows the people of my district better than I know these people?

Mr. Cantril: Probably not, no.

Mr. Brown: I can recognize most of their names when they write in.

Mr. Cantril: That is right; probably not.

Mr. Brown: I would like to have you comment in your answer to that question.

Mr. Cantril: I have only the highest respect for Congressmen.

Mr. Halleck: I think I ought to answer that the gentleman from Ohio is eminently qualified to analyze his mail.

Mr. Brown: I want to ask your opinion of the average Member of Congress. I want to know whether you

think he is intelligent enough to analyze his own mail, or know anything about his own district and be able to judge the people that write him and to properly weigh the influence and value of each letter?

The Chairman: This can be off the Record.

Mr. Brown: I think it ought to be on the Record. The gentleman has made some rather astounding statements this morning.²¹

The second discussion is between Representative Brown and Professor Stephen K. Bailey:

Mr. Brown: I notice you were quite critical, seemingly, in your study of Mr. Hoffman, and yet at the same time you also said he was typical of the people of his district and of their—I do not remember the exact words—I think “narrowmindedness,” and a few other things.

I am just wondering is that not representative government? Is it not well that we have a representative who is actually typical of his district, whether we agree with him or not?

Mr. Bailey: Surely. Again, sir, in drawing these portraits I have tried to be as fairminded as I possibly could. No student of government who has knocked around in this field at all believes that he is a scientist. I am a teacher of government, although occasionally the word “political scientist” slips out.²²

Now I cite these sometimes humorous, but penetrating remarks because they place in clear outline what I consider to be the essential limited and personal nature of American politics. Congressmen know their people and their problems. They are responsible, no one else. Thus they rise in wrathful indignation whenever they feel the ominous shadow of scientific theory falling on their duty to their people. Political science, as Professor Bailey rightly

affirmed, is not really like other sciences. It is part and parcel of the effort of congressmen and all our citizens to achieve a limited, yet we hope adequate public welfare for human persons whose ultimate happiness lies beyond the political order.

IN CONCLUSION, then, what are the theoretical implications of this *de facto*, and I think correct, American attitude towards politics as a limited, practical process for achieving a common goal that is temporal and self-limiting with respect to ultimate human desires? At first sight, it would seem that political theory should itself become terrestrial and wholly pragmatic, as in fact it has tended to become in the United States. But the very opposite, I believe, is the case. It is the political life itself that is limited to the temporal welfare. Man has to know why this limitation is justified or else he will, as Karl Marx rightly affirmed, turn on and revolutionize the natural order itself. The task of political theory is to account for and to place in proper perspective man's ultimate desires so that the striving for them does not become embodied in a political movement which hopes to achieve them in this life.

The first book of the *Ethics* of Aristotle is still the starting point of political theory. And the first book of the *Ethics* deals with the problem of man's ultimate happiness. Politics in America has instinctively respected these ultimate desires in men, but it has never tried to achieve them by political means. The ultimate goals are not the strictly political ones—even though, paradoxically, the political goals are as such very noble ones. Political theory, then, and the impact of Christianity upon it are indispensable in justifying and preserving the actual political life we Americans have lived and developed.

²¹V. O. Key, Jr., “The State of the Discipline,” *American Political Science Review*, LII (December, 1958), 967.

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 967-68.

²Robert G. McCloskey, "American Political Thought and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LI (March, 1957), 115.

³Cf. Fred Cort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions . . .," *American Political Science Review*, LI (March, 1957), 1-12; Glendon A. Schubert, "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making . . .," *ibid.*, LII (December, 1958), 1007-25.

⁴John P. Roche, "Political Science and Science Fiction," *ibid.*, LII (December, 1959), 1026-29.

⁵Anatol Rapoport, "Various Meanings of 'Theory,'" *ibid.*, LII (December, 1958), 972-88.

⁶Bertrand de Jouvenal, *Sovereignty*, trans. J. F. Huntington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 219.

⁷Tennessee Williams, "Wells of Violence," *New York Times*, March 8, 1959, p. X 3.

⁸René de Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'outre tombe*, Vol. IV, Bk. 12, Reading No. 5 in Hans Kohn, *Making of the Modern French Mind* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 108. Cf. also Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, trans. William Smith (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1931), pp. 152-3; Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1944), pp. 32-33.

⁹Eleanor Roosevelt, Wisdom Series, NBC, March 8, 1959.

¹⁰Lecture, Howard University, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1959.

¹¹Cf. H. Belloc, *The Contrast* (New York: McBride, 1924); G. K. Chesterton, *What I Saw in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1923).

¹²Cf. Charles N. R. McCoy, "The Turning Point in Political Philosophy," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (September, 1950), 678-88; C. N. R. McCoy, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the Formation of the Marxian Revolutionary Idea," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, VII (1951), 218-48. Professor McCoy's thesis will be further treated in his forthcoming book on the structure of political thought to be published by the McGraw-Hill Company.

¹³Paul Ramsey, "Milestones Along the Road of Faith," *New York Times Book Review*, March 15, 1959, p. 10.

¹⁴Epicurus, "Letter to Herodotus," *Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers*, ed. W. J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 13.

¹⁵Karl Marx, "Difference de la Philosophie de la Nature chez Democrite et chez Epicure," *Oeuvres Philosophiques*, trans. J. Moliter (Paris: Costes, 1952), I, 1-5.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. xxiv. Author's translation.

¹⁷Cf. Michael P. Fogarty, "Socialism in Europe," *Commonweal*, December 19, 1958, pp. 7-9.

¹⁸Arnaldo Cortesi, "Vatican Warns About Socialism," *New York Times*, January 21, 1959, p. 2.

¹⁹Salvador de Madariaga, Lecture, "The Psychology of the European," Institute of Contemporary Arts, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1959.

²⁰Part I of *Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities*, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, Second Session, H. Res. 298. *Role of Lobbying in Representative Self-Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 24-25.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 48.

Conservatives who feel uneasy in relying on Christian theology for their theory of human nature might well consider the analytical psychology of Carl Jung.

Conservatism and a Philosophy of Personality

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VARIED EXPLANATIONS have been offered for the virtual demise of political theorizing. We have all read the obituaries. Tallied up, these somber reflections produce one conclusion obscuring the rest in significance: we possess no generally accepted philosophy regarding the nature of the human personality upon which to ground political conjecture and prescription.

It is ironic, surely, that while at no time in historical memory have we known so much, quantitatively speaking, about man, we in our age have failed so evidently to effect any integration of these knowledges to the point that we enjoy any reasonable consensus regarding his nature. We have dismembered the human species, labeled his parts, and placed them under close analytical scrutiny; we have cunningly departmentalized him and coined such smoothly self-delusive terms as "biological man" or "economic man" or "moral man" to mask our confusion.

During the prolific periods of political philosophizing, no such embarrassing predicament existed. Knowledge about man if reduced to basic philosophical contention, however incomplete or fanciful, was sufficiently whole to allow for political speculation resting upon normative agreement. Theological premises, of course, made this agreement possible in large measure, and the loosely bound concord—or at least intelligibility of communion—was obviously the result of woefully inadequate data. It was hardly surprising that nascent science confounded this common intellectual language by rapidly widening the range of data and by destroying many of the more precarious tenets of orthodoxy, both theological and philosophical.

Alas, a Medieval, Renaissance, or Enlightenment account of human nature was manifestly simplistic. Humane considerations notwithstanding, knowledge regarding man the animal swiftly spewed out, chaotically and often abortively, in all directions. One is tempted to contrast this growth to the construction of a Miami