

I can't roll barrels in Pensacola, Florida, or hoops in Triadelphia, West Virginia. I can't throw confetti in Borger, Texas, and I don't want to. I can't pour pickle water on the railroad tracks in Central Falls, Rhode Island, or soap in Magnolia, Mississippi, or salt in Andalusia, Alabama, or I get ten years minimum in the state penitentiary. I can't laugh hilariously in Helena, Montana, or frown in Pocatello, Idaho—"These reflect unfavorably upon the reputation of Pocatello and are hereby declared illegal." And I can't gargle in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, or sneeze in Asheville, North Carolina, or spit into the wind in Sault Sainte Marie, Michigan. "Ptui!" I say, and I'll paraphrase John Stuart Mill: "There are reasons for remonstrating with me or reasoning with me but not for compelling me!"

The authorities! Damn them, I say. But I can't damn them in Youngstown, Ohio. I can't throw rotten eggs at them in Rawson, Ohio, or onions in Princeton, Texas, or coal (if it's three inches wide) in Harlan, Kentucky, and I can't put a skunk in their desks in Lansing, Michigan. I give up. I can't even scream in Cos Cob, Connecticut, or go out and get drunk in Monmouth, Oregon, or commit suicide in Newark, New Jersey—if I do I'm liable for six months' imprisonment, although, as the state supreme court said, "the offense is rarely charged." Well, thank you, Mr. Justice! Your mercy is not strained, sir! But when will you bigwigs listen to Lao-tzu?

*If we keep from meddling with people,
They take care of themselves.*


*If we keep from commanding people,
They behave themselves.*

*If we keep from preaching at people,
They improve themselves.*

*If we keep from imposing on people,
They become themselves.*

In other words, lemme go!

"If our destruction comes, it will be because [of] men who were only flesh and blood," says a retired presidential press-secretary. No, the bigwigs aren't sinister people, but I say they're people, period, and the best and the brightest are as imperfect as I am at administering my one and only life. In fact, they're worse, for they haven't even met me. Now hear me. America! I learned long ago and I've learned again, I mustn't indenture myself to any authorities but me, myself, my shadow, and I. So long live me! The most efficient ruler of me! Viva John Sack!



SAUL LANDAU & JOHN DINGES

The truth behind 'Missing'

'MISSING,' THE NEW FILM by Costa-Gavras starring Sissy Spacek and Jack Lemmon, is the first American feature movie to confront the questions of official U.S. complicity in the brutal military coup that overthrew Chilean President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. Controversy breeds controversy, and *Missing* has incited a spate of political comment from the State Department, newspaper columnists, and film reviewers. The questions it raises—Was the United States involved in the coup? Did the American embassy cover up, or even conspire in, the death of an American citizen during the coup?—are answered only suggestively in the film, but they resonate against the political backdrop of growing U.S. involvement in El Salvador and reports of a covert campaign to "destabilize" Nicaragua.

The plot of *Missing* "is based on a true story," the film informs us at the outset. "The incidents and facts are documented: Some of the names have been changed to protect the innocent and also to protect the film." It opens shortly after the military coup in Chile. Two young Americans, Charles Horman and Terry Simon (their real names are used in the film), find themselves stranded at the Chilean resort town of Viña del Mar. There they meet an American military adviser in civilian clothes, Arthur P. Creter (Carter Babcock in the film), who exults about the coup and boasts, "We came down to do a job, and it's done." (Horman recorded the conversation in his diary.) Horman

SAUL LANDAU and JOHN DINGES are the authors of *Assassination on Embassy Row*, published by Pantheon.

meets other gleeful military officials at Viña, including Captain Ray Davis (Captain Tower in the film) and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Ryan (Lieutenant Colonel Sean Patrick in the film). Ryan arranges for Davis to drive Horman and Simon back to Santiago, using Davis's military status to pass through roadblocks. Several days later a truckload of troops arrive at Horman's home and take him away to the national stadium, where thousands of political prisoners are being held. Horman then disappears. The Chilean government denies having any record of his arrest. Horman's wife, Joyce (Beth in the film), and his conservative father, Edmund, begin their search for Charles with the "help" of the embassy. Ed Horman initially regards the embassy staff as friends, but begins to change his mind after the embassy, obviously a powerful force in Chilean affairs, continues to protest its ignorance about his son and its innocence in the bloody repression that surrounds them. His confidence further wanes when a contact tips him off that Charles has been killed by the military and that the embassy knows this. The film ends with Ed Horman's horrible realization that Charles was a victim of a brutal military putsch that had the complicity of the U.S. government. It leaves open the question of whether Charles's abduction could have been arranged by some Americans to keep him from reporting what he had learned at Viña del Mar about the U.S. military's role in the coup.

Within days of the movie's release, a jittery State Department rushed out a three-page rebuttal. It consisted of simple assertions that the embassy had no advance knowledge of Horman's intended fate and did everything possible to locate him after his disappearance. "The Department regrets the sad death of Charles Horman," the statement concluded, "as well as the efforts by some to read into it possible involvement by the United States government and its officials, which the record indicates is wholly unwarranted."

New York Times columnist Flora Lewis also sallied forth with an influential rebuttal to the politics of *Missing*. She derided the film's claim to historical truth, charging that its one-sidedness "raises serious ethical, moral, and political as well as artistic questions." Lewis claimed that all responsible accounts agreed that after

1970 "the United States channeled funds to political parties, press, and radio stations in Chile but stayed away from violent right-wingers and military plots," and thus bore no responsibility for the coup. "He is so sure of his convictions, seems to feel so little need of specific evidence to support his deductions from his sense of the general iniquity of power, that one is driven to ask whether his attitudes derive from the fact that he is Greek." Lewis's remarks convinced other film reviewers (including the *Times*'s Vincent Canby and *INQUIRY*'s Stephen Harvey, whose review begins on p. 34) to deplore the sully of the film's esthetic qualities by dishonest politics.

But is the film inaccurate or misleading? To enter a debate about fact

through the same situations and nightmares as the characters in *Missing*.

To one who was there in those days, the film's verisimilitude is overwhelming. In every scene, in nearly every detail, the film jogs memories and half-forgotten sensations. That's the way it was: the terrible tension, the jumpiness, the anger and outrage, the terror, punctuated by the constant crackle of automatic-rifle fire around the city day and night for weeks on end. Virtually every image in the film that evokes the climate of terror after the coup parallels what Dinges himself experienced, or heard described by eyewitnesses:

■ The harrowing after-curfew scenes show how Horman's wife is forced to hide in doorways and alleys

scribed leaning over a Santiago bridge—as the Hormans do in the film—with a crowd of people to watch a bloated body float faccup in the Mapocho River.

■ No scene was as nightmarish as that in the Santiago morgue. A *Newsweek* reporter who went there recorded his ghastly vision of more than 200 bodies lined up like cordwood. Ed and Joyce Horman went there in vain to look for Charles. (Their discovery of Frank Teruggi's body is one of the few moments of fiction in the film; he was actually found by others.)

■ The U.S. embassy at the time, and the State Department in Washington, steadfastly backed up the Chilean regime's denials of all summary executions and atrocities. Three years later, however, embassy officials admitted to Dinges that they had information that 3000 to 5000 people had been killed in the days following the coup. The Hormans suffered a more personal form of deception. When Ed Horman arrived in Santiago on October 5, 1973, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis told him that his son was probably in hiding, perhaps with other leftists. Yet one day earlier Davis had cabled Washington with information, including eyewitness accounts, of Charles Horman's arrest and detention by the military.

For more than a decade before the coup, the U.S. made a regular practice of subverting Chilean politics, spending tens of millions of dollars to influence elections.

or fiction in moving pictures one must begin with an axiom: Nothing that appears on the screen is true; that is, nothing projected through a magnifying glass and brightly illuminated in a larger-than-life image can be anything more than a picture. *Missing*, moreover, makes no claim to being a documentary or a filmed legal brief. Yet it does convey a powerful, and essentially accurate, image of the Chilean tragedy and of U.S. involvement therein. For those who were in Chile during the coup, the film is like a series of devastating flashbacks to real life, to real terror. The brilliant recreation of the random violence, the all-pervasive fear, the ominous curfew, makes *Missing* an important document, not documentary. Yet Lewis, by exonerating the United States government on the word of the accused, casts doubt on the entire gamut of images in the film, and their moral impact.

One of the authors of this article, John Dinges, was an American freelance journalist living in Chile in September 1973. He knew Charles Horman and the other American victim of the junta's executioners, Frank Teruggi. In short, Dinges lived

from rampaging soldiers using citizens for target practice in a free-fire zone. On September 13 one of Dinges's housemates arrived home four hours after curfew telling a similar story—he had been arrested early in the day, then "released" onto the street after curfew and forced to dodge patrols and bullets for many blocks before scaling an iron gate and arriving, panicked and exhausted, into the relative safety of home.

■ The brutal and arbitrary arrests, house searches, and book burnings became a fact of existence. Dinges was lined up against a wall with a rifle butt in his back a block from his house the first time he ventured out. Two days later twenty-five soldiers arrived in a city bus lined with hay bales for protection. They tore the house apart and burned hundreds of books in his back yard. In both cases, Dinges later learned, the soldiers' action followed neighbors' reports of "suspicious, bearded foreigners" in the house.

■ As the film shows, transportation of prisoners forced to lie flat on the floor of trucks was a common and disconcerting sight. No one could tell whether they were dead or alive.

■ An American friend of Dinges de-

ARE WE NOW TO TAKE Davis's word that the embassy was not involved in the coup? The events of September 11, 1973, cannot be understood apart from their wider context. For more than a decade before the coup, the United States had made a regular practice of subverting Chilean politics. As former Ambassador Edward Korry has related, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations pumped tens of millions of dollars into Chile—a vast sum for such a small country—to influence elections. In 1970 the Nixon administration tried the same tactic, but failed. On June 27 the White House, responding to pleas from Ambassador Korry, approved funding for a "spoiling" operation against presidential candidate Salvador Allende, leader of the leftist Popular Unity coalition. In all the CIA spent about \$1 million to direct the course of the election, subsidizing right-wing "civil action" groups, organizing a "scare campaign" through its media outlets, and disseminating "black propaganda" to

slowly dissent between the various parties within Allende's coalition.

Allende nonetheless won a plurality in the September election. Under the Chilean constitution, a joint session of Congress was scheduled to choose between the first- and second-place finishers. President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger met with CIA director Richard Helms on September 15 to plan a course of action. Helms's notes of the meeting were brief but eloquent:

One in ten chance perhaps, but save Chile!
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of embassy
\$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time job—best men we have
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action

"If I ever carried a marshal's baton out of the Oval Office," Helms later testified, "it was that day."

The CIA began to implement White House orders on September 21, with a cable of new instructions to the chief of station in Santiago. "Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power," the cable read. "Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective." Aside from gathering intelligence on potential coup plotters, and assuring them of U.S. backing, the key to the CIA's program was black propaganda to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military," as one CIA report put it. The CIA instructed its Santiago station to "create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup." Ultimately the CIA went so far as to sanction, and assist in, the kidnapping of General René Schneider, a fiercely constitutionalist military officer who stood in the way of a coup. The kidnap was bungled and Schneider was killed.

None of these plots stopped Allende from being confirmed by the Chilean congress as the country's new president. But—contrary to Flora Lewis and Ambassador Davis—the Nixon administration did not simply accept defeat and confine its aid to the "democratic opposition." Instead, CIA subsidies were lavished on extremist newspapers, anti-Allende business associations, and even, through third parties, on the right-wing terrorist group Patria y Libertad.

According to a Senate report, "A CIA project renewal memorandum concluded that . . . media outlets supported by the Agency had played an important role in setting the stage for the September 11, 1973, military coup which overthrew Allende." The CIA's goal remained what it had been in September 1970. "As far as I was concerned, Track II [the original coup plot] was really never ended," testified the CIA's chief of covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, in 1975. ". . . What we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II."

Thus the CIA continued its "deception operations" to convince Chilean officers that only a coup d'état could save them from communist subversion; it collected operational intelligence necessary in the event of a coup, including lists of dissidents to be arrested and key government installations that would have to be taken over; and it stepped up its contacts with members of the military thought to be susceptible to its propaganda. "It is clear," observed the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA in Chile, "the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973." Moreover, the CIA's contact with that group "included activity which went beyond the mere collection of information."

It all becomes rather less important, then, just what role the CIA or the embassy played on the day of the coup. Flora Lewis cited investigative reporter Seymour Hersh as having found no evidence of U.S. involvement "in the actual Pinochet coup" (Hersh has since added that his findings don't rule that out, either), but that is hardly surprising. All the elements were in place thanks to years of U.S. covert intervention. The Chilean military was fully capable of staging the final act.

The Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation of the CIA in Chile did not explore the role of the U.S. military, which enjoyed closer ties to the leaders of the coup. One of these American officers was Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Ryan (Sean Patrick in the film), who headed the U.S. Naval Mission in Chile. Ryan has admitted learning the exact date of the coup two

or three days in advance, and passing it on to his superiors. "We had good information," he told *Newsday* in 1977. "I had a good tube, a good pipeline. And I was only one portion of that input." So much for the White House assurances on September 13, 1973, that "reports that we had advance knowledge of this coup are incorrect."

One of Ryan's closest colleagues, Captain Ray Davis (Captain Tower in the film), was head of the U.S. Military Group in Chile. Davis drove Charles Horman and his friends back to Santiago from Viña del Mar. In 1977 Davis ticked off a list of junta members, leaders of the coup, whom the Americans had cultivated—Admiral Toribio Merino, Admiral Sergio Huidobro, General Augusto Pinochet, and others. "They're all like brothers," Davis told *Newsday*. Davis later recommended Ryan for the Legion of Merit for his role in the trying days before and after the coup.

In a "situation report" filed October 1, 1973, Ryan described how the coup began. "Our D-day started with a foreboding 0630 hammering on the front door by Ignacio Martínez, a retired Marine officer and very close friend, who was later identified as one of the key local planners in the coup d'état. . . . Ignacio proudly announced the long expected D-day had arrived. . . . Ignacio recommended all U.S. personnel stay undercover, asked for our prayers, and then rushed off to carry out his duties." Praising the military's blow to "world Marxism," Ryan commented, "What perhaps history will ask in retrospect is not 'Why the overthrow of the Allende government by the armed forces,' but rather 'Why the armed forces waited so long?'"

For Joyce and Ed Horman, of course, Charles was more than a regrettable sacrifice in the campaign to free Chile from "world Marxism." *Missing* captures the full poignancy and pain of their discoveries and disillusionment in the aftermath of the bloody coup that took his life. *Missing* does not prove that the United States was culpable in the coup—better documentation is available for that. But as the first American film to confront the horror of that time, its impact on the consciousness and conscience of American citizens promises to weigh a thousand times more heavily than all the exposés and congressional investigations that have told the story before. □

HOW TO REALLY CUT THE BUDGET

BY DAVID BOAZ

DAVID GERGEN MUST HAVE FELT A strange sense of déjà vu. For two weeks the congressional leaders had been lambasting the president's new budget, screaming at new "cuts," wailing at the huge deficit. Every day Gergen conducted a press briefing at the White House and listened as the reporters quoted some new congressional attack. Finally a reporter asked if the White House wasn't getting tired of it all, if it didn't plan to back off. No, Gergen said; no "fundamental retreats" were in the works.

What, a reporter asked, was "fundamental"?

"I guess it's like obscenity," Gergen answered. "You'll know it when you see it."

With such bold, enlightened leadership does the administration plunge ahead into the budget thickets, fearlessly confronting \$90 billion deficits, refusing to shrink from the occasional liberal charging out of the underbrush, barely acknowledging the conservative Cassandras who predict eternal hellfire for the soul that countenances twelve-digit red ink.

And why not? President Reagan assures us that his new budget "faithfully adheres" to his mandate to "reduce the size of government." The special interests and court intellectuals who flock toward government like moths toward light take him at his word, flailing away at his ostensible budget cuts.

Amid all this rhetoric, the facts are hard to come by. President Reagan's budget proposes to spend \$757.6 billion in 1983, up from a projected \$725.3 billion in 1982 and \$657.2 billion in 1981. To those of us raised on the old math, where a budget cut meant that the budget was lower than last year's, that is not a budget cut at all—it is a \$32 billion budget increase.

In fact we can expect it to be substantially higher than that. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 1983 expenditures will actually amount to \$809 billion. Over the past few years, spending has almost always run higher than expected. In 1978, for instance, President Carter estimated that the 1981 budget would be \$575 billion. In 1979 he was

still predicting only \$578 billion. By 1980 he had increased his estimate to \$616 billion. Spending in 1981 actually amounted to \$657 billion. Given this history, we will be fortunate to see 1983 spending held under \$800 billion. Likewise, although Reagan predicts a budget deficit of \$91.5 billion, nearly everyone agrees that ultimately that figure will soar over \$100 billion.

We are told that it is too difficult to cut the budget, that 78 percent of the budget is "uncontrollable," that people will suffer if spending is cut. These excuses are just a charade designed to conceal the fact that Congress and the administration—any administration—don't really want to cut spending. Too many special interests depend on the federal budget, and the public demand for reduced spending is too diffuse to offset them.

The fact is, people are suffering *now*—from excessive federal taxing and spending. Young people can't afford to buy housing, parents can't afford college tuition, businesses can't afford to expand, entrepreneurs with a new idea can't get financing, the unemployed can't find jobs, the elderly can't keep up with rising prices. Moreover, there are people who are hurt directly by government programs—potential entrepreneurs shut out of cartelized industries, workers denied jobs by minimum-wage laws, honest citizens harassed by the FBI or the Drug Enforcement Administration, and 220 million Americans whose lives are endangered by the Reagan administration's hawkish military policies. All of these people would benefit from drastically reduced levels of taxes, spending, deficits, and government activity, yet we never read their stories in the newspapers.

Instead we're bombarded with heart-rending articles about the victims of budget cuts—the working family dependent on food stamps, the commuters who have to pay more to ride Amtrak between Los Angeles and San Diego, the government workers who are RIFed. (The *Washington Post* recently pushed this art form to its ultimate: a 4000-word story on heart-broken bureaucrats who haven't lost their jobs but have been "separated from the programs they love"—a kind of modern Washington equivalent of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.) Stories about the victims of high taxes and bloated budget deficits are harder to find, probably because

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